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Abstract 
This dissertation compares aspirations and life-choices among highly educated young adults 
in urban China and Taiwan: places that, at least notionally, share a cultural heritage while 
having very different political-economic systems. The objective of  my research is to assess 
how the different socioeconomic and political trajectories of  China and Taiwan have 
influenced young people's decision-making and hopes for the future. Drawing upon 18 
months of  ethnographic research, I analyze young adults’ choices in the areas of  education, 
career and marriage under consideration of  their individual social backgrounds and 
economic resources. In this context I also discuss how feelings of  hope, doubt and 
disenchantment are mitigated by the specific societal atmospheres and ideological 
discourses. 
Whereas stable employment and marriage appeared to be universal goals among my 
informants, I found that young adults in Beijing had much more autonomy in decision-
making than those in Taipei. In my research, I consider various factors behind these 
findings, which are linked inextricably to the specific socioeconomic and political 
trajectories of  China and Taiwan.  
Among other things, China's demographic controls and urban migration policies appear to 
increase the independence of  young people. Further, the prevalence of  boarding school 
education in China compared to Taiwan provides an opportunity for earlier autonomy and 
independent decision-making in China. Due to China’s specific socio-political history, 
parents of  informants in Beijing perceived spatial separation from children as a necessity to 
secure the future well-being of  the family, while parents in Taipei appeared to be more 
likely to interpret a child’s prolonged absence as unfilial behaviour. As a consequence, 
young adults in Beijing arguably have greater autonomy than young adults in Taipei when it 
comes to issues such as partner choice, premarital cohabitation and job selection. These 
differences have an important impact on future expectations of  family life and the 
realization of  filial obligations. 
However, while young Chinese showed more agency and autonomy in the pursuit of  
personal goals, their Taiwanese peers were more engaged in communal political activism 
prompted by an economy with lackluster opportunities for the next generation. Due to the 
political propaganda of  the CCP, young Chinese held a positive outlook for the future of  
their society which made them less prone to engage in communal action against the ruling 
party, while disenchantment with the government among young Taiwanese ignited 
unprecedented student protests in 2014. 
4 
 
CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 7 
INTRODUCTION 10 
I. MANAGING FATE AND FORTUNE - CHOICE AND RISK IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 10 
II. MAKING LIFE-CHOICES IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 12 
III. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ASPIRATIONS, ACHIEVEMENT AND CHOICE 17 
IV. SUBJECTIVITY, AGENCY AND DECISION-MAKING IN CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON 21 
V. MAPPING HOPE IN UNCERTAIN TIMES - THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC   TRANSITIONS ON 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE FUTURE 24 
VI. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS OF CHINA AND TAIWAN 27 
VII. INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS AND FILIAL PIETY (XIAO) IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 30 
VIII. SETTING THE SCENES: FIELDWORK IN TAIPEI AND BEIJING 34 
IX. DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY, POSITIONALITY AND RESEARCH ETHICS 37 
X. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 42 
CHAPTER ONE - GROWING UP UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES - CHILDHOOD MEMORIES OF 
MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 44 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 44 
1.2. IDEOLOGICAL INCULCATION AND ITS IMPACT ON PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 48 
1.3. YEARNING FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNICATION WITH PARENTS IN CHINA AND 
TAIWAN 60 
1.4. CONCLUSION 64 
CHAPTER TWO - EDUCATIONAL CHOICES AND THE FOSTERING OF INDEPENDENCE 69 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 69 
2.2. EDUCATION AND SEPARATION FROM FAMILY MEMBERS IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 71 
2.3. THE CONCERN FOR QUALITY AND STATUS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENTS OF BEIJING AND TAIPEI 80 
2.4. CONCLUSION 89 
CHAPTER THREE - WORKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE - PROFESSIONAL ASPIRATIONS 94 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 94 
5 
 
3.2. GENDERED EXPECTATIONS AND AMBITIOUS GOALS - FEMALE GRADUATES’ STRIVING FOR PROFESSIONAL 
SUCCESS IN TAIPEI AND BEIJING 96 
3.3. STRIVING FOR SECURITY AND SUCCESS - NEW IDEALS OF MASCULINITY AND PROFESSIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT IN BEIJING AND TAIPEI 104 
3.4. CONCLUSION 111 
CHAPTER FOUR - COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN BEIJING AND TAIPEI 116 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 116 
4.2. THE AMBIGUOUS SEARCH FOR ROMANCE AND FEARS OF FALLING BEHIND - THE PRESSURE ON YOUNG 
WOMEN TO MARRY IN TAIPEI AND BEIJING 120 
4.3. PRESSURES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SUCCESS - SEARCHING FOR WIVES IN TAIPEI AND BEIJING 131 
4.4. CONCLUSION 138 
CHAPTER FIVE - MAKING CHOICES 142 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 142 
5.2. DECISION-MAKING IN TAIPEI 147 
5.3. DECISION-MAKING IN BEIJING 154 
5.4. CONCLUSION 160 
CHAPTER SIX - DISENCHANTMENT AND ESCAPE 165 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 165 
6.2. YOUNG WOMEN’S DISENCHANTMENT AND ASPIRATIONS TO ESCAPE IN BEIJING AND TAIPEI 169 
6.3. YOUNG MEN’S DISENCHANTMENT AND ASPIRATIONS TO ESCAPE IN BEIJING AND TAIPEI 175 
6.4. CONCLUSION 182 
CHAPTER SEVEN - PERSPECTIVES OF HOPE 187 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 187 
7.2. TAIWAN - NATIONALISM ON THE PERIPHERY 190 
7.3. CHINA’S NEW WAVE OF NATIONALISM 194 
7.4. RHETORICS OF INDIVIDUAL AGENCY IN BEIJING 198 
7.5. RELUCTANCE AND RESISTANCE AMONG YOUTH IN TAIPEI - A “STRAWBERRY-GENERATION” WITH 
REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL? 203 
7.6. CONCLUSION 209 
6 
 
CONCLUSION 211 
CHINESE VOCABULARY GLOSSARY 223 
APPENDIX 225 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Acknowledgments 
Exploring how people express feelings of indebtedness and gratitude has been a 
fundamental part of this project. Yet, I fear that I still struggle to find a way that suffices to 
thank all those persons without whom the completion of this work would have been 
impossible. 
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisors Stephan Feuchtwang and Charles 
Stafford who have been an unlimited source of inspiration and support since my early days 
as a master student at the LSE. Stephan not only helped me to understand the connections 
between my observations in the field and the complex histories of the two locales, but also 
reminded me to pay attention to the small yet essential details that would have evaded my 
untrained eyes. Thank you, for making the effort to clarify my thoughts to help me express 
what I really tried to say. Charles taught me that anthropology is so much more than I 
thought it was and encouraged me to be bolder and to look for inspiration beyond the 
discipline’s imagined borders. He helped me to comprehend all the little twists and turns in 
people’s minds and I always left our meetings filled with new ideas and novel perspectives 
on issues I thought I had long figured out. I feel incredibly honoured to have had your 
guidance and support throughout those long years since I first came to the LSE. I could 
not have found better supervisors to lead me in this project.  
My work has also profited from the invaluable advice from so many other staff members 
of the Anthropology Department at the LSE. In particular I would like to thank Nicholas 
Long, Matthew Engelke, Mukulika Banerjee and Hans Steinmüller for commenting on 
parts of my work.  
I must also extend my gratitude for academic support to my advisor Professor Kuang-hui 
Yeh at the Institute of Ethnology at the Academia Sinica in Taipei where I was a visiting 
research associate during my fieldwork in 2012. I enjoyed our discussions and his ideas 
have influenced my work in many ways. I also want to thank Peter Chang and his 
colleagues at the Center for Chinese Studies at the Taiwanese National Central Library for 
their support during my fieldwork in Taipei. 
I am thankful to Professor Jin Wu and Professor Gubo Qi at the College of Humanities 
and Development Studies at the China Agricultural University in Beijing who made the 
second part of my fieldwork in 2013 possible. They assisted in helping me obtain a visa and 
introduced me to their students who went out of their way to make my research in Beijing 
successful. 
8 
 
Beyond the rich academic support I received during the more than five years of PhD-
studies, I would not have been able to complete this project without the generous financial 
contribution of various institutions. During the preparatory stage of my PhD I received a 
one-year scholarship for Chinese studies in Taipei from the German Academic Exchange 
Service. During my PhD studies, I received another scholarship from the German 
Academic Exchange Service, a Taiwan Fellowship from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Taiwan and various research studentships as well as a support fund from the LSE.  
In addition to this, I profited from a SUPRA Scholarship at the Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen where I spent several weeks in the summer of 2014. The 
memories of my time at NIAS will always belong to the favourite ones of my PhD. I am 
very grateful for the warmth I was welcomed with and for the encouragement and insights 
I received during my time at the Institute. In particular I want to thank Geir Helgesen and 
Katrine Herold for their support. I also have to thank Lennart Niemelä and Ask Greve 
Jørgensen for the insights into research methodology and sociology and more than that, for 
making my stay at Copenhagen so enjoyable.  
My fieldwork would not have been possible without the many young people and their 
families in China and Taiwan who accepted me with open arms into their lives, but which I 
cannot name here. I will be forever grateful for your openness and warmth as well as for 
your generosity in forgiving the many blunders and insensitivities that I without doubt 
committed. To this day I am still astonished by the hospitality I encountered at your homes 
and I hope that one day, I will be able to make up for it somehow. Thank you as well for 
the interest in my work and your unwavering support throughout the project; from taking 
me to family holidays in the countryside to staying up until unreasonable times of the night 
to update me about your lives via Skype. In particular, I want to thank my guest families in 
Taipei and Kaohsiung who let me live at their homes during my stay in the cities as well as 
my Taipei flatmate Chih-Wei Hsu who was so patient with helping me settle and answering 
my many questions. In Taiwan, I also want to thank my former SOAS classmate Minna 
Hsu whose friendship has helped me through many difficult times during my fieldwork. I 
am also grateful to Lisa Bauer-Zhao and Lidong Zhao for their unwavering support and 
presence during my research in Taipei and Beijing. Meeting you two has been an incredible 
luck. 
At the LSE, I have to thank my classmates in the writing-up seminar for their willingness to 
engage with my topic and the insights they provided. To Johanna Whiteley and Chris 
Martin, I was deeply impressed by your advice and keep your notes to this day. Thank you 
9 
 
also to Anni Kajanus, Agustin Diz, Jovan Lewis, Philip Proudfoot, Susannah Crockford, 
Fernande Pool, Meadhbh McIvor, Maka Suarez and Julia Huang for your comments and 
advice. To Natalia Buitron and Francesca Mezzenzana, thank you for lending an open ear 
and for many evenings full of laughter. I also want to thank the “China Group” Andrea 
Enrico Pia, Mark Stanford and Di Wu for the inspiration, the support in the field and the 
pleasant distractions. Di, thank you for being such a great friend and flatmate. I don’t know 
what I would have done without you.  
Whenever I felt lost, my “German family” in London, Janina Lam and Nicola von 
Bodman-Hensler built me up again. Janina, thank you for your unlimited generosity and for 
providing me with a temporary home during the last year of the PhD. Our Sunday 
meetings always kept me going throughout the week and I hope I don’t have to miss them 
for too long. I also want to thank Andrey Anikin and Carin Graminius for their friendship 
and for reading my work so closely at a stage at which the incoherence of my thoughts 
must have been nothing short of annoying. Talking to you has always been inspiring and 
helped me regain confidence in my project. In Ottawa, where I spent the last year in the 
writing-up of my thesis, I want to thank Alexander Hemingway for the many group study 
afternoons and for his open ear to my complaints and worries.  
My parents who have always been supportive of my rather unusual choices and accepting 
of my continuous absence from home deserve my particular thanks. The same is true for 
my godparents who were a steady source of support throughout all these years. My siblings, 
whose paths have been so different from mine, however no less challenging, have always 
been full of understanding and patience. You showed me that so much is possible once you 
set your mind on it.  
Finally, I want to thank Wayne for being there all parts of the way. Your love and support 
mean the world to me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Introduction  
I. Managing Fate and Fortune - Choice and Risk in China and Taiwan  
Pushed forward by the relentless stream of people crowding the narrow alley of the night 
market, I tried to keep track of Ma-ling who zigzagged her way through chatting families 
and groups of youngsters who were bargaining for clothes and indulging in late-night 
snacks. It was easy to become disorientated in the array of stalls, especially as I was not yet 
used to the design of Taiwanese cities. Suddenly, Ma-ling stopped. I then noticed the richly 
ornamented Daoist temple emerging between the neon signs and nondescript grey houses. 
I followed her into the dark building, billows of incense snatching my breath away. As we 
stepped into the silence that was broken only by muted whispers and the occasional sound 
of fortune blocks falling on the rough, stone floor, it felt like entering another world. Red 
and golden statues shimmered amidst plastic flowers and fruit offerings, reflecting the 
glimmer of countless candles. While my eyes slowly adjusted to the darkness, Ma-ling 
pulled me towards the lavishly decorated shrine of Mazu, the patroness of merchants and 
seafarers. This popular goddess, worshipped originally in the coastal regions of Southern 
China, had been taken to Taiwan by early immigrants. Today, Taiwanese people of all ages 
ask for her blessing before going on a journey. 
Only a few weeks ago, Ma-ling had come here to ask for Mazu’s protection for a weekend 
trip. With a couple of friends, she wanted to go camping at Sun-Moon Lake at the heart of 
the island to participate in an annual water sports event. She had been very excited about 
this trip. Recently, Ma-ling had decided to stop trying to conform to her family’s 
expectations and instead pursue her own aspirations. This weekend trip with a few friends 
was supposed to be one of her first steps towards a more autonomous life. Everything had 
been prepared but then something happened that made the group worry their plan might 
be ill-fated. 
One of her friends, a young woman, had been scared by a nightmare. She had dreamt that 
four1 people had entered her house unbidden. It appeared to her as though one of the 
visitors had touched her body, leaving her with the feeling of having being bitten. 
Anxiously she asked an acquaintance, known for her skills at interpreting dreams, about the 
meaning of this encounter. The woman explained that these were ghosts wandering around 
during the current “ghost month” (gui yue).2 But there was no cause for alarm, she explained, 
                                                 
1 Four (si) is considered to be an inauspicious number as it is reminiscent of the verb “to die” (si). 
2 The belief that during the seventh lunar month of the year, mostly August according to the Gregorian 
calendar, wandering ghosts are released from hell to roam among the living is especially prevalent in Southern 
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as they had only visited her to play. Ma-ling’s friend, however, could not be convinced of 
the good nature of her nocturnal visitors and Ma-ling was also left with uneasy feelings 
about their forthcoming trip. What if the dream had been a warning not to participate in 
the competition? Worried about the possible danger, Ma-ling ventured to the temple to ask 
for Mazu’s blessing. Feeling reassured, she then went on the trip with her friends. On the 
night we visited Mazu, Ma-ling renewed her divine protection by acquiring a small charm 
(fu) made of folded paper which she was supposed to carry close to her body to shield her 
from any malicious spirits that might cross her path in the weeks to come.  
During my fieldwork in Taipei, I often observed that young Taiwanese regarded the 
realization of a plan as dependent not only on careful preparation and personal skills but 
also on benevolent human and supernatural forces as well as “the right timing.” Even 
though Ma-ling was confident about her swimming skills, she feared that factors largely out 
of her control might endanger her and her friends. During my subsequent research in 
China, after I left Taiwan, I encountered a very different attitude to risk and uncertainty 
that pointed to greater self-reliance among young Chinese people. Particularly memorable 
is the story of a young Chinese woman whose travel plans were also disrupted. 
Xiao-xiao waved her hands wildly when she saw me while she was trying to break out of 
the stream of people pushing out of Dongzhimen Station in central Beijing. It was a windy 
Sunday afternoon and the grey sky made the high-rise buildings appear even grimmer than 
usual. Eager to evade the biting wind, we decided to search for something to eat. While 
walking, we exchanged our latest news. A few weeks before, Xiao-xiao had planned to 
apply for a working holiday visa in New Zealand. She was bored by her monotonous office 
job in China and, like Ma-ling, she aspired to a more adventurous, cosmopolitan lifestyle. 
But she had not foreseen the difficulties involved in her plan. Xiao-xiao recounted angrily 
that she had tried to apply for a visa through an online process but had failed to secure a 
place on the programme. She had heard rumours that some people had used specialized 
software which, although illegal, had provided them with a clear advantage in the race for 
visas. Later, she had seen quotas for the work-and-travel visa being advertised on taobao, a 
popular shopping website, for a price that was far beyond her means.3 She thus had to let 
her dream go - as she earned only a rather small wage, she could not afford to travel 
overseas without having the opportunity to work. Xiao-xiao was disappointed, but unlike 
                                                                                                                                               
China and Taiwan; risky activities, in particular water sports, are believed to be especially dangerous during 
this time (Yang, et al., 2008). 
3 I researched online forums to see whether other people had encountered similar problems; I found several 
comments by angry applicants who attributed their failure to obtain a place to special software that certain 
applicants had used illegally (eChinacities.com, 2014). 
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Ma-ling, she did not ponder long on the underlying reasons for this misfortune. Used to 
overcoming setbacks, she quickly revised her plans. Tibet was her new destination, the 
most exotic place she could think of in China.  
Unsurprisingly, her mother was not happy about her travelling alone. Knowing that her 
mother would disapprove of her plan to stay with a male friend who lived in Lhasa even 
more than of her travelling unaccompanied, Xiao-xiao tried to allay her by pretending that 
a female friend would be travelling with her. As she lived far away in Henan Province, her 
mother had little knowledge of the arrangements Xiao-xiao had made in Beijing. Xiao-xiao 
often told me how easy it was to conceal important details of her life from her mother and 
how this created much freedom for her. Indeed, a few weeks later, Xiao-xiao set out for 
Tibet alone; after returning, she gave me an enthusiastic account of her trip. She 
proclaimed that, from now on, she wanted to see more of the world and planned another 
trip for the Chinese New Year; this might also require a “cover story” to allay her mother’s 
concerns. 
 
II. Making Life-Choices in China and Taiwan  
As the two vignettes above illustrate, decisions whether to follow a plan through and take 
risks are not made independently of the sociocultural environment in which individuals are 
embedded. Collective and personal experiences as well as societal norms and ideals define 
the framework within which individual aspirations emerge and life-choices are made 
(Liechty, 2003; Long, 2013; Long and Moore, 2013; Rofel, 2007). However, the stories of 
Ma-ling and Xiao-xiao show that these same factors are also influential in the formation of 
doubt and can prompt people to amend or abandon the pursuit of a plan. This study 
compares how aspirations are formed and pursued by young adults in urban China and 
Taiwan; societies which are deeply connected by a shared cultural heritage but which have 
very different socioeconomic and political trajectories.  
Like Ma-ling, the protagonist of the first vignette, many young Taiwanese leading modern 
urban lifestyles are used to approaching life-choices with a careful evaluation of the 
external circumstances that could contribute to their success or failure. During my 
fieldwork, I noticed that decisions about concerns large and small were contingent on the 
opinion of family, friends, teachers and a tentative yet common concept of fate and divine 
intervention. This pluralism of opinions and beliefs imbued young Taiwanese with 
ambiguous moral guidelines which reflected the conflict between traditional and modern 
values that is distinctive of modern Taiwanese society. On the one hand, the rather 
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traditional Confucian-inspired family values and the actively practised folk religion 
consisting of Daoist and Buddhist elements offer a moral framework on which to model 
behaviour. On the other hand, young people increasingly strive for self-fulfilment and 
autonomy in decision-making, aspirations that are often difficult to reconcile with their 
parents’ more traditional expectations. 
In Beijing, I observed that although young Chinese people made life-choices with 
consideration of their families’ preferences in mind, they were more confident about 
making decisions that did not entirely conform to parental expectations or whose outcome 
was uncertain. Like Xiao-xiao, young adults appeared to be more self-reliant and willing to 
take risks in pursuing their aspirations. This was surprising in that, in many cases, their 
socioeconomic status offered them fewer opportunities than their more affluent Taiwanese 
peers. Even though similar normative expectations based on traditional family and gender 
ideology influenced my Beijing informants, their more autonomous lifestyle in the capital, 
often far removed from the parental sphere of influence, granted them more space for 
autonomous decisions.  
The stronger adherence to traditional values observed in Taiwan was also reflected in 
young people’s practising of folk religion. Many of the young Taiwanese I got to know 
resorted to the guidance of spirit mediums, religious masters and various forms of 
divination to arrive at decisions or to find a rationale for their own as well as other’s 
behaviour, whereas most of my young Chinese informants distanced themselves from any 
religious practices. They emphasized their disconnection from folk religious traditions by 
framing references to temple visits and methods of divination in terms of superstition and 
“backward” customs which only members of their rural home communities might adhere 
to but which they claimed not to know much about. A closer look at the connection 
between young adults’ different accounts of their involvement in religious life and the 
distinct ideological discourses surrounding religion, identity and modernity in China and 
Taiwan is thus important to gain a deeper understanding of aspirations and decision-
making. 
Recent research into Chinese youth suggests their growing interest in the pursuit of 
individual aspirations and autonomy, often accompanied by a yearning for a cosmopolitan 
lifestyle as expressed by their consumption of Western goods, a foreign education and the 
attainment of “first world” citizenship (Evans, 2010; Farrer, 2002; 2014; Fong, 2011; Yan, 
2009). Whereas parents are immensely supportive of their children’s educational goals, 
different expectations with regard to consumption, premarital relationships and practices of 
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filial support often cause intergenerational conflict (Evans, 2008; Fong, 2004; Yan, 2003). 
Yunxiang Yan links such intergenerational disputes to a more complex “value crisis” that 
started with the state-sponsored social-engineering in the early days of Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) rule, culminating later in the political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution 
(Yan, 2010 pp. 509-510). He suggests that the individuation of income and the political 
campaigns targeting elders’ authority during the Mao era led to a rise in conjugality and a 
stronger emphasis on the pursuit of individual material aspirations. These changes were 
ultimately intensified by the institutional changes during the reform period. 
Individualization in China, Yan stresses, was thus not a by-product of political liberalization 
as in the West but was a modernization strategy imposed top-down that was supposed to 
increase competition and economic self-reliance in the population to spur economic 
growth. As a consequence, he argues, “new optional, and individualistic ethics of rights and 
self-development” have replaced the collective ethics of the past (Yan, 2011 p. 40).  
Mette H. Hansen and Cuiming Pang challenge this narrative of moral decline and reckless 
individualism in Chinese youth (Hansen and Pang, 2010). They have found that their rural 
informants demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility for personal failures, in particular 
when it came to problems in their educational careers. Moreover, despite pursuing their 
ideals of an autonomous life, they were highly concerned about their parents’ well-being. 
Yet Hansen also points to an intergenerational rift caused by a growing distance between 
parents and children (Hansen, 2015). However, unlike Yan, the distance she describes is 
not of a moral but of a spatial nature. While at boarding schools, children are separated 
from their parents for months at a time. Hansen highlights the detrimental effect that this 
long separation from families has on children’s psychological well-being and questions the 
future impact of the trauma experienced (pp. 44-45).  
Nevertheless, most anthropologists researching Chinese family structure agree on the deep 
impact that a liberalization of premarital sexual relationships has had on marriage traditions 
and family relations. In particular, Farrer’s observations of the increasing tolerance of 
premarital sexual relationships and cohabitation in Shanghai convey the complex changes 
that have occurred in the spheres of courtship and marriage in urban China (Farrer, 2002; 
2014). 
While for Taiwanese youth’s lifestyle and aspirations there is not as extensive a body of 
recent anthropological research available, work published in this area in recent years also 
points to an increased emphasis on the pursuit of individual goals and to changes in family 
structures and the intergenerational support system (Adrian, 2003; Huang, 2013; Shaw, 
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1994). However, comparative research has shown that these transformations do not seem 
as dramatic because current Taiwanese practices within the realms of marriage, residence 
and filial duties are still more closely aligned with traditional, Confucian-inspired gender 
and family ideology than in China (Chu and Yu, 2010; Chu et al., 2011; Cornman et al., 
2003; Hermelin et al., 2003; Whyte et al., 2003; Whyte, 2004).  
Whyte and colleagues argue that the more traditional attitudes that persist in Taiwan 
despite its more advanced level of economic development have been facilitated by 
particular institutional arrangements and economic structures which have preserved the 
traditional patriarchal organization of the family (Cornman et al., 2003; Whyte, 2004). 
Whyte’s findings were complemented by additional research performed in this area. Chu 
and others also found in their comparative study of Chinese and Taiwanese families that 
certain aspects pertaining to gender ideology and intergenerational relations were more 
conservative in Taiwan than in China (Chu and Yu, 2010; Chu et al., 2011). In particular, 
they highlighted the comparative prevalence of a preference for sons and traditional gender 
role expectations in marriage in Taiwan, unlike in China (2010 p. 151). Moreover, Yang and 
Hu have compared different forms of religiosity in China and Taiwan and concluded that 
the percentage of adherents to folk religion is notably higher in Taiwan and, crucially in the 
context of my research, young Taiwanese under forty are especially involved in religious 
activities in their communities. These numbers, they claim, contrast starkly with China 
where it is mostly people over fifty years of age who practise communal religion (Yang and 
Hu, 2012).  
Data gathered in urban China and Taiwan hence suggests that Taiwan, despite its more 
advanced level of economic development, is more traditional in terms of gender ideology, 
kinship, intergenerational support systems and religion. In the context of my research, this 
apparent paradox seems to prompt several questions: what effects do these ideological and 
socioeconomic differences have on young adults’ aspirations and choices? How are these 
societal differences reflected in the ways in which young Chinese and Taiwanese perceive 
their roles within society, make decisions and reason for their choices?  
Due to their families’ comparatively greater affluence, young Taiwanese are often expected 
to have greater opportunities to pursue their aspirations - in particular in terms of an 
international education and career. At the same time, however, they appear to be more 
restricted by parental expectations of future coresidence and support as well as stricter 
gender role models in marriage.  
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Young Chinese also have to respond to parental expectations but they appear to have more 
room for negotiation due to their greater spatial independence from parents and a less 
strict adherence to traditional family and gender values. However, their less secure material 
situation might make pursuing dreams in terms of higher education, an international 
lifestyle and conspicuous consumption more difficult in comparison with Taiwanese peers.  
What impact do these contradictory influences have on the pursuit of personal aspirations 
that do not comply with traditional expectations? Will young Taiwanese make use of their 
higher social and economic capital to break out of societal norms or will their sense of 
obligation towards families trump desires for personal autonomy? Will the pursuit of 
personal aspirations by young Chinese be stifled by structural obstacles or will their sense 
of empowerment gained from early independence from parents effectively fuel their 
striving for the realization of their dreams? 
Moreover, the following question arises: what is the influence of these heterogeneous 
cultural and ideological factors on individuals’ perceptions of subjectivity, agency and 
choice? In China, each generation since the 1950s has grown up with a new set of state-
inculcated values, ranging from the collective ideals promoted by the Party during the Mao 
era, to the emphasis on economic self-reliance in the reform era, to a state-sponsored 
notion of cultural and moral excellence which, condensed in the concept of population 
quality (renkou suzhi), became integrated as a major educational goal in the 1990s (Woronov, 
2009; Yan, 2009).  
In Taiwan, no such abrupt breaks in state ideology can be observed; however, the 
Taiwanese population had also been exposed to diverse ideological and cultural influences. 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the Kuomintang (KMT) inculcated the population with 
traditional Confucian thought via schools and public campaigns to Sinicize the population 
after fifty years of Japanese colonial rule. At the same time, however, the Taiwanese were 
exposed to a host of Western cultural values through Taiwan’s close political, economic 
and military affiliations with the US (Chen, 2004 pp. 39-40; Wang, 1999). These at times 
contradicting values, blended with the Japanese colonial cultural heritage, can be expected 
to have influenced perceptions of the self and the individual’s role in society in very 
particular ways. How are these different cultural ideas of selfhood reflected in the 
perception by Taiwanese young people of family obligations and personal freedom? 
As I was interested in how young, highly educated people from diverse backgrounds in two 
culturally related yet different urban locations experience the years in which some of their 
most important life choices emerge, I deliberately applied rather loose criteria in selecting 
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my informants. To be eligible, young adults had to have tertiary education, be in their early 
twenties to early thirties and reside in cities. I interviewed approximately thirty young men 
and women at each location. The gender ratio, however, is skewed towards women 
(especially in Taiwan) as it was easier for me to meet young women alone due to gendered 
norms that attach certain expectations with regard to friendships between the opposite 
sexes in both societies. 
In the following, I will provide a brief outline of the discussions which are important to 
gain a thorough understanding of the historical, sociocultural and psychological aspects 
that influence young adults’ life goals and choices. I will first present an overview of 
current anthropological discourses within the areas of aspirations and achievement. This 
part will lead to a more psychologically oriented discussion of subjectivity, agency and 
choice that will be linked to anthropological considerations of hope and doubt. This will be 
followed by a brief historical overview of China’s and Taiwan’s economic, political and 
demographic development since the mid-20th century. I will then continue with a short 
discussion of certain aspects of family ideology and intergenerational relations in China and 
Taiwan. Finally, I will introduce my field sites and methodology and provide a brief 
overview of the subsequent chapters.  
 
III. The Anthropology of Aspirations, Achievement and Choice 
Before looking at the factors at play how young Chinese and Taiwanese form and pursue 
their ideals, I will provide a more general overview of recent anthropological research 
within the areas of aspirations, achievement and choice. Over recent decades, Nicholas 
Long and Henrietta L. Moore note, local notions of achievement have become closely 
entangled with globalized ideas of success that are influenced by the pressures of the 
neoliberal market structures (Long and Moore, 2013). In particular, they draw attention to 
different cases in which state-imposed concepts of achievement aim at fostering economic 
progress in order to realize specific visions of modernity; phenomena that could also be 
observed in China and Taiwan. Long and Moore accentuate that  
“[p]rocesses of self-making and self-stylisation, of which both striving and managing to 
achieve are a part, […] need to be understood in relation to the specific ways in which 
subjects at particular historical moments understand themselves, the entities with which 
they share the world and the relations between them” (p. 4).  
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Long describes that - in Indonesia - social prestige is generated through state-sponsored 
competitions that simultaneously serve as a yardstick for assessing citizens’ competitiveness 
in various subject areas on a national and international level. He illustrates how the 
government’s attempts to foster a spirit of success in the population to increase Indonesia’s 
performance on the global market has resulted in large numbers of youths structuring their 
lives around the pursuit of an abstract notion of achievement (Long, 2013 p. 86). Similarly, 
Susan Bayly describes how discourses on achievement in late-socialist Vietnam are closely 
interconnected with notions of the state, the nation and a “cosmopolitan modernity” 
(Bayly, 2013 p. 158). However, although the competitions supposed to lead to the 
accumulation of prestige described by Long stretch across various fields of interests, those 
determining achievement in Vietnam mostly take place within the realm of school 
education and professional life. This national striving for success in terms of class rankings 
and knowledge contests also has an impact on family life and gender relations. Parental 
obligations are closely tied to the civil duty of raising a new generation of achievers who 
will advance Vietnam’s transition to becoming an economic powerhouse. This 
responsibility places immense pressure on people, especially on women who have to 
negotiate their personal career aspirations combined with their responsibilities as mothers 
to their children as well as to the state (2013).  
These anthropological considerations of the political nature of achievement and their 
impact on notions of citizenship and selfhood offer valuable insights for the analysis of 
young people’s aspirations in China and Taiwan. Similar to the young Indonesians and 
Vietnamese described by Long and Bayly, notions of achievement among the people I met 
in Beijing and Taipei were closely tied to the yearning for cosmopolitan opportunities and 
their nation’s acknowledgement as a global power. Moreover, from early childhood 
onwards, rankings in classrooms and in youth groups determine an individual’s social status 
and his or her prospects of success in the future and, in the Chinese case, even the “quality” 
(suzhi) of the individual as a citizen (Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis, 2006).  
China’s rise in the global economy was accompanied by the deepening of neoliberal 
discourses of achievement that were additionally reinforced by the party’s concern for 
“population quality”; a concept that emerged in the early 1980s and became widely spread 
in the course of educational reforms aimed at the cultivation of highly educated citizens 
loyal to the economic and ideological goals of the party (Kipnis, 2006). As a consequence, 
the notion that self-improvement in the educational and moral domains is essential in the 
realisation of one’s full potential has become increasingly prevalent over the last decades. 
Leslie T. Chang describes how young female factory workers in southern China attended 
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commercial schools in the evening and on weekends to raise their “quality” by learning the 
English language and computer skills that would qualify them for white collar secretarial 
jobs (Chang, 2008). Their specialised skills and knowledge of proper etiquette, they hoped, 
would enable them to stand out from their colleagues and to be promoted into the desired 
office jobs (p. 174). Likewise, Lisa M. Hoffman notes that the young graduates she worked 
with in Dalian had adopted a self-enterprising ethos […] that focused in particular on the 
idea of self-development (ziwo fazhan) through their careers” (Hoffman, 2010 p. 82). 
Reaching one of these popular markers of achievement would not only raise their personal 
“quality” (suzhi) but, at the same time, improve the socioeconomic status of their rural 
families. This way, they would make an important contribution to the repayment of their 
filial debt towards parents; a topic that will be discussed in greater detail in one of the 
following sections of this chapter.  
Similarly, Yan mentions that self-improvement has become a central theme in 
contemporary Chinese society whereas collective values increasingly lose their influence. 
He accompanied a group of Beijing professionals to their philosophical reading group 
where they studied ethics and engaged in “soul-searching discussions” (Yan, 2011 p. 38). 
He notes:  
“Despite the continued insistence on socialist civilization and collective ethics in the official 
discourse, the most important change in popular discourse and moral practice has been a 
shift away from authoritarian, collective ethics of responsibilities and self-sacrifice toward a 
new, optional, and individualistic ethics of rights and self-development” (p. 40). 
Achievements in the educational, professional and moral domains in China are, as Chang 
and Yan show, increasingly perceived as dependent on personal willpower and diligence 
rather than on socioeconomic factors. This new individualised notion of achievement is 
also reflected in the aforementioned observations by Hansen and Pang who found that 
rural youth are increasingly blaming their academic failures on personal shortcomings 
rather than the socioeconomic circumstances that might have obstructed their successes 
(Hansen and Pang, 2010).  
The above described cases demonstrate the profound influence which the increasingly 
globalised and often state-sponsored notions of achievement can have on the life 
aspirations of youths and the paths they pursue to realise them. However, individual factors, 
like a person’s socioeconomic status, individual experience and mental disposition also play 
a major role in the formation of values and goals as well as in the way decisions are 
approached (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2012; Long and Moore, 2013 p. 4).  
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Noteworthy in this context is the work of Asa Boholm and colleagues who draw attention 
to the close interplay of social and psychological aspects in decision-making (Boholm et al., 
2013). They point out that decisions are neither made independent of the socio-cultural 
environment nor are they unaffected by the life experience and emotional state of the 
decision-maker. For these reasons, it cannot be expected that decision-makers who share 
the same information and preferences will make identical choices (p. 100). How decision-
making will turn out in each single case, they claim, is thus difficult to predict by the 
outside observer. Studies in decision-making should hence consider the “emotions, 
imaginations, and “irrationality” that emanate from experience and memory” (ibid.). For 
this reason, an individual’s personal biography as well as its cultural and socioeconomic 
environment have to be taken into account in the study of life choices. 
Michael Chibnik, applies an “integrative perspective” similar to that suggested by Boholm 
and colleagues which understands choices as embedded in their socio-cultural context as 
well as dependent on individual experience and preferences (Boholm et al., 2013 p. 108; 
Chibnik, 2011). Based on extended field research in a Mexican community, he shows how 
life choices are determined simultaneously by economic and political discourses on local, 
national and international levels as well as by individual emotional needs and social 
relationships. By means of detailed ethnographic examples he demonstrates the relative 
unpredictability of decision-making in real life situations. Chibnik describes the case of two 
Mexican brothers who both contemplate migrating to the US to improve the economic 
prospects of their young families. However, due to their different educational levels, 
attachment to their home place and, most importantly, different mental dispositions that 
affect their ability to cope with the stress the uncertain status of being an illegal migrant in 
the US implies, only one of the brothers left the community to work abroad. The other 
brother decided that the advantages of living within the emotional comfort of his local 
community and the opportunity to provide assistance to his aging parents would outweigh 
the potential material success he could achieve in the US (Chibnik, 2011, pp. 9-13).  
Likewise, my Chinese and Taiwanese informants placed different emphases on the relative 
importance of normative life goals. Academic success as well as a cosmopolitan lifestyle 
and, especially in China, “flexible citizenship” as described by Fong in her study of Chinese 
students abroad, were major aspirations (Fong, 2011). However, not all young Chinese and 
Taiwanese subscribed to the full set of popular ideals and, as the following chapters will 
discuss, even those who did would often eventually choose other biographical paths due to 
unforeseen complications or changing priorities as they entered new life stages. Further, it 
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is important to note that even those young adults who appeared to aspire to popular goals 
may have done so due to very different motivational factors.  
Samuli Schielke shows in his study of cosmopolitan aspirations among Egyptian young 
people that although aspirations to migrate to Western countries are ubiquitous in young 
men, their reasons for contemplating leaving their homes were highly diverse. Whereas 
“money and freedom” were commonly regarded as the main motivations for young people 
to migrate, these two terms encompassed diverse aspirations that ranged from a yearning 
for sexual or political freedom; from the hope of creating a material basis for family 
foundation in Egypt to dreams of permanently staying in the destination country (Schielke, 
2012 pp. 182-183). Schielke’s observations resonate with the ones I made among young 
adults in Beijing and Taipei; aspirations to attain certain academic goals could be driven by 
a desire to please parents, to accumulate prestige in order to rise within the ranks of the 
CCP’s youth league or by intentions to leave the country by way of academic scholarships. 
Likewise, a yearning for a cosmopolitan lifestyle and flexible citizenship was encouraged by 
aspirations for freedom from parental pressures, plans for professional self-realization as 
well as the hope of finding fulfilment in romantic love. An analysis of youths’ aspirations 
and efforts to realize them thus has to be conducted based on a nuanced understanding of 
societal structures as well as on the various factors that influence the individual perception 
of societal rules and norms.  
 
IV. Subjectivity, Agency and Decision-Making in Cross-Cultural Comparison 
In the following, I will take a closer look at various theoretical discussions of subjectivity 
and decision-making. Despite structural and institutional differences, China and Taiwan 
share a common cultural heritage which is not limited to family traditions but also extends 
to more abstract notions of selfhood, agency and choice that underlie social expectations. I 
will briefly outline these different discussions not only by drawing on anthropological 
studies but also by including research from social psychology.  
One dominant discussion across different disciplines in the social sciences proposes that 
the emphasis on collectively oriented values observed in many societies of East Asia has a 
significant impact on notions of selfhood which, in turn, may also influence perceptions of 
personal capability and responsibilities towards others. Mayfair M. Yang, who examines the 
issue from an anthropological perspective, stresses that unlike the Western notion of the 
self as a self-contained autonomous entity, the Chinese notion of personhood is relational 
22 
 
and thus in constant flux as it responds to the multitude of social relations in which it is 
embedded (Yang, 1994 p. 192). Hazel R. Markus and Shinobu Kitayama put forward a 
similar argument; however, they analyze perceptions of selfhood in East Asian societies 
through a psychological lens. They note that “different construals of the self […] can 
influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including 
cognition, emotion, and motivation” (Markus and Kitayama, 1991 p. 224). The specific 
understanding of individuality in East Asian cultures, they argue, puts emphasis on the 
relatedness of individuals and the importance of attending to other’s needs to maintain 
harmonious interpersonal relationships (ibid.).  
While anthropologists and social psychologists agree that the binary opposition between a 
supposed Western individualism versus an Eastern collectivism is a simplistic construction 
that does not reflect the complexity of social relationships in societies pooled under these 
terms, a more nuanced understanding of the impact that cultural models of sociality have 
on notions of subjectivity might offer important contributions to cross-cultural studies of 
decision-making (Kipnis, 1997; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003; Yan, 1996; 
Yang, 1994).  
Richard E. Nisbett’s experiment-based comparisons of cognitive processes between 
individuals from diverse Western and East Asian cultural backgrounds offer additional 
interesting insights into the impact that epistemological beliefs, social organization and 
cultural practices have on the perception of the social and spatial environment as well as on 
reasoning and decision-making. He concludes that individuals from East Asian cultural 
backgrounds tend to focus more on the context within which certain phenomena occur 
and make decisions based on holistic contemplation. Individuals from Western cultural 
backgrounds, however, exhibit a more analytical approach by trying to isolate the object in 
question from its context and thus make decisions based on logical reasoning (Nisbett, 
2004 [2003]; Nisbett et al., 2001). Nisbett attributes these differences partly to distinct 
traditions of thought that affect how selfhood and personal agency are perceived. He notes 
that Western philosophical traditions stress a strong sense of individual identity and agency 
whereas philosophical theories and religious beliefs originating in East Asian societies put 
more emphasis on interconnectedness and complex interactions between the physical and 
metaphysical realms as well as on collective agency (2004 [2003] pp. 3-12). Nisbett’s work is 
important to this study as it offers important insights into the underlying cognitive 
concepts that govern decision-making in different cultural environments. Following his 
train of thought, potential differences in the importance placed on cultural traditions that 
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value the well-being of the family over individual preferences in China and Taiwan could 
have a distinct impact on young people’s decision-making.  
Nisbett notes that numerous studies have shown that, in comparison to individuals from 
Western cultural background, East Asians are more acceptant of the complexities and 
changes in life. He suggests this might be due to a less strong belief in the controllability of 
events and a higher willingness to adjust to situations rather than trying to change them (pp. 
79-109). Albert Bandura, who has studied the subject of self-efficacy in great detail, 
however argues that the degree to which people believe that their actions will yield results 
in the world is not only strongly dependent on societal background but also on personal 
experience. He suggests that perceived self-efficacy is likely to change over a life course. 
Whereas successfully overcoming obstacles might strengthen a person’s belief in his or her 
causative abilities, failures have a detrimental effect (Bandura, [1995] 1999 p. 3). Bandura 
notes that “after people become convinced they have what it takes to succeed, they 
persevere in the face of adversity and quickly rebound from setbacks. By sticking it out 
through tough times, they emerge stronger from adversity” (ibid.). A resilient sense of 
personal efficacy thus enables one to have a confident approach to decision-making and 
risk-taking based on a confidence in one’s abilities to deal with challenges and a reliable 
estimation of possible consequences (pp. 3-6). In the context of my comparative study, a 
close analysis of individual case studies will thus be important to distinguish between those 
factors affecting aspirations and life-choices that may be related to sociocultural 
background and those that originate in personal experience. Furthermore, Bandura also 
suggests that the responsiveness of the environment to individual action plays an important 
part not only in individuals’ sense of self-efficacy but also in the way collective action can 
emerge and unfold (1982 p. 143).   
I have demonstrated so far that the influence that sociocultural factors play in decision-
making can hardly be understated. It might thus not be surprising that the way in which 
individuals reason for their choices - to themselves and others - is also highly influenced by 
social norms and expectations. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber note that people defend 
their choices less with arguments that are in line with premises of logic and rationality and 
instead put forward explanations that can be expected to be most acceptable by their social 
environment (Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Reasoning, they suggest, must thus not be 
logical to be considered persuasive but has to conform to the sociocultural norms of the 
respective environment. Consequently, decision-making in itself might be influenced more 
by aspects of social acceptability that make the justification of one’s choices less 
complicated than by criteria of rationality (pp. 69-70). The concept of reason-based choice 
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is especially valuable in the comparative analysis of decision-making as the arguments 
people choose to explain their choices might reveal interesting clues as to differences and 
similarities in social norms and ideals.  
In sum, one of the most important insights generated by these studies is that the ways in 
which people conceive of themselves and of others in society has a decisive impact on their 
perception of the results their actions might yield, the choices available to them and the 
acceptability of certain decisions as opposed to others. Due to their shared cultural heritage 
yet different economic and political historical trajectories, China and Taiwan offer an 
exceptional opportunity to examine the impact that economic and political factors have on 
individual and collective perceptions of agency and choice in societies that traditionally 
stress communal values.  
 
V. Mapping Hope in Uncertain Times - the Impact of Political and Economic   
Transitions on Perceptions of the Future 
Feelings of doubt, uncertainty and hope are closely connected to an individual’s perception 
of agency and the choices available yet, at the same time, they reveal an underlying set of 
values and ideals shared by the social group the individual is embedded in. Mathijs 
Pelkmans notes that doubt need not necessarily be triggered by ontological and 
epistemological problems but is more often centred on the more pragmatic concern of 
“what to do?” (Pelkmans, 2013 p. 2).  
He continues:  
“[q]uestions of being, of truth, and of action should always be seen in relation to each other: 
both in the banal sense that a sense of ‘what is’ provides direction (but not unilinear 
direction) to action, and also in the more profound sense that when nothing is worth 
fighting for […] apathy and hopelessness may set in” (ibid.). 
Questions of being and action relating to the private and public spheres will be at the heart 
of my analysis. The questions of “what is” and “what is possible” were indeed less 
ontological but highly pragmatic concerns among my young informants. Locating their 
positions in society and exploring the opportunities available to them, doubts about their 
decisions as well as anxious uncertainty, were constant companions.  
Doubt and uncertainty, according to Pelkmans, are associated mental states but doubt has a 
more active orientation that is directed toward solving a problem (p. 3). Doubt arises 
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within a context of uncertainty yet implies more agency as it is focused on the “questioned 
object” as well as on an alternative to the current situation (ibid.). Young Chinese and 
Taiwanese people often seemed to be floating back and forth between those states, often 
combined with periods of hope that were soon replaced by ambivalence and anxiousness. 
Yet doubt and uncertainty did not only pertain to personal matters but were simultaneously 
related to the political sphere. Their sense of hope and security seemed to be inextricably 
connected to their visions of the future of their home communities.  
Pelkmans notes that a “lack of clarity and absence of certainty tend to trigger doubt” (p. 
17). Periods of political and economic restructuring and social unrest might thus be 
especially prone to creating doubt. Esther Bartha has observed that the economic 
uncertainties that were brought about by the 1989 regime change in Hungary planted doubt 
in workers at a former state factory who had relied on the securities the socialist system 
provided them with (Bartha, 2013). The transition from socialism to capitalism had not 
only been accompanied by the loss of their workplaces and material benefits but also by 
uncertainty about their place in a post-industrial society. Having hoped that circumstances 
would improve for them thanks to the new freedoms the introduction of capitalism 
promised, they were bitterly disappointed when their status as workers was downgraded 
under the new regime. The resignation the workers felt afterwards dampened their outlook 
on the future and gave rise to extremist political views (pp. 212-214).  
Whereas Hungarian workers reacted largely with “passivity and apathy” to their failed 
hopes, doubts about the future can also generate renewed interest in traditional practices to 
restore certainty (p. 220). In North India, Caterina Guenzi has found that increased 
economic uncertainty resulted in a growing interest in divinatory practices to mitigate 
doubt. She observed in Banaras that after the liberalization of the Indian market, concerns 
about material security became more distinct among families of the urban upper and 
middle classes. The transformation of the economy sparked a proliferation of fortune-
tellers that specialized in making predictions about investment and wealth management 
through the determination of one’s personal fate (Guenzi, 2012).  
The cases from Hungary and India illustrate how societal transformations can trigger doubt 
and uncertainty. Individual and group efforts to overcome fears about the future often 
involve the evoking of supernatural assistance or an orientation towards political 
alternatives to reinstall security. At the same time, however, political and economic 
restructuring can also spark hopes for a better future. Post-socialist societies are 
exceptionally interesting in this regard, as economic transformations are often accompanied 
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by an ideological reorientation which can be expected to bring about a shift in values and 
aspirations. Morten Axel Pedersen has conducted research among unemployed Mongolian 
men who tried to improve their unfavourable status by taking advantage of the new 
opportunities of the free market. He illustrates how their hopes for material success and 
status improvement persist despite continuous setbacks. While actual conditions may look 
unpromising, “stubborn optimism” and a “seemingly presentist attitude” enabled them to 
maintain their confidence in a better future (Pedersen, 2012 p. 145). Jarrett Zigon has made 
similar observations among young Russians in Moscow. Despite rather grim prospects of a 
better life, they exhibit a high degree of agency in achieving their goals and do not lower 
their aspirations (Zigon, 2009 p. 260). Hope, Zigon asserts, allowed his informants to 
persevere in difficult times and provided them with ethical directions in morally challenging 
situations (p. 267).  
Likewise, in China, the economic restructurings of the recent decades have given rise to a 
more hopeful outlook into the future. However, the memories of political instability and 
terror have not completely faded yet among the older generations. Arthur Kleinman, who 
has researched the psychological effects of the traumatic events of the Cultural Revolution 
on Chinese individuals over the last decades, claims that he could observe an overall 
optimistic trend in Chinese society. Having overcome long times of adversity, he claims, 
especially the elderly regard the economic progress and political stability of the recent 
decades with favour and hold a hopeful stance for the future (Kleinman, 2011). Despite the 
grave resentments and grievances many of them still hold for the communist past, 
Kleinman notes, these appear “to be increasingly balanced by hope for the next generation” 
(p. 272). At the same time, however, many Chinese appear to be of a “divided self”; that is, 
hopeful for a better future, yet at the same time watchful of the volatility of the state. Not 
being able to forget past trauma, their hope for a better future remains tainted by the 
perceived arbitrariness of the ruling elite (p. 285). Kleinman explains: “The moral context 
created by the party-state is as much a place of collusion and collaboration with ruthlessly 
pragmatic power as it is a place of aspiration for and achievement of a better life for many 
of its citizens” (pp. 285-286).  
However, most of my Chinese informants, born in the reform era, appeared to be less 
concerned about the impact that the ideological whims of the party could have on their 
personal life than members of the older generations. Much like Pedersen and Zigon’s 
informants, they were full of hope for the future and confident about reaching their 
ambitious goals even though many among them faced a not insignificant degree of 
uncertainty due to their lack of financial resources and restrictive family connections 
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(Pedersen, 2012; Zigon, 2009). Many of my Taiwanese informants, by contrast, appeared to 
be gloomy and full of despair due to the high expectations of them, even though most 
could rely on financial support and their parents’ powerful social networks on the island 
and abroad. Detached from their actual socioeconomic situation, my young informants’ 
feelings of hope and doubt thus seemed to be informed by their personal assessment of the 
likelihood of achieving their preconceived notions of success. In the following chapters, 
this study will try to uncover the different factors that underlie the phenomena of 
uncertainty and hope and their interconnection with notions of achievement among young 
urbanites in China and Taiwan. 
 
VI. The Political and Economic Systems of China and Taiwan  
Although demographic, socioeconomic and political differences between China and 
Taiwan started to unfold during the late Imperial and Republican era when Taiwan was 
under Japanese colonial rule, such differences were additionally consolidated in the decades 
after 1949. Since then, China has been under the autocratic rule of the CCP while Taiwan’s 
political system has evolved from authoritarian one-party rule under the KMT to 
democracy in the late 1980s. China and Taiwan have also followed very different paths of 
economic development. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the Chinese 
government first implemented a planned economy that was reformed into state capitalism 
in the late 1970s. Meanwhile, with US assistance, the KMT introduced a free market 
economy in Taiwan from the mid-1950s. These different modernization strategies have had 
a decisive impact on China’s and Taiwan’s economic and demographic structures. 
Although a rapidly increasing wealth gap coupled with a rural-urban divide can be observed 
in China, Taiwan is highly urbanized with a well-established infrastructure that even 
reaches remote parts of the island (Lieberthal, 2004 [1995]; Roy, 2003; Rubinstein, 1999). 
Moreover, with a Gini index of 33.8 in 2012, the distribution of family income in Taiwan is 
more equal than in China, which ranks with an estimated value of 46.9 in 2014 significantly 
higher on the index (CIA). This means that opportunities for upward social mobility in 
Taiwan are greater than in China; this is an aspect which, combined with the different 
demographic structures, might have a decisive impact on young people’s expectations of 
the future. 
After the CCP defeated the KMT and took over power in 1949, it introduced many 
reforms targeting the social and the corporate structure (Lieberthal, 2004 [1995] pp. 52-56; 
66-67). During the land reform of the early 1950s, property was redistributed from 
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landowners to peasants and social hierarchies of prestige were reversed thanks to the 
introduction of a class system that favoured the formerly poor rural population. Likewise, 
in the cities, powerful networks connecting businessmen and officials were dissolved to 
allow state power to take hold (Harrison, 2001 p. 233). However, with the introduction of 
the household registration system (hukou), movement of the rural population was restricted 
to the countryside while resources were channelled into the development of urban 
industries (Jacka et al., 2013 p. 17).  
By the end of the 1950s, the CCP had mainly centralized the planning of the economy. In 
the cities, the party created work units (danwei) that employed most of the urban workforce 
while the rural population was assigned work in agricultural collectives (Jacka et al., 2013 
pp. 17-18; Lieberthal, 2004 [1995] pp. 109-110). In 1966, Mao Zedong launched the 
Cultural Revolution that would last a decade up to his death in 1976. In order to strengthen 
his waning power, he called upon the support of the young population to root out 
“bourgeois culture” and attack political enemies (Jacka et al., 2013 p. 18; Lieberthal, 2004 
[1995] pp. 112-116). Due to the persecution of academics and intellectuals critical of the 
Party and the launch of the rustication movement when urban students were sent to work 
in the countryside, schools were closed and university entrance exams were deferred for 
several years (Jacka et al., 2013 p. 18; Meng and Gregory, 2002).  
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping claimed leadership of the party and introduced reforms 
that spurred industrialization and economic growth, first in rural areas and then in the cities 
(Goodman, 1994 pp. 90-91; Lieberthal, 2004 [1995] pp. 140-142). The decollectivization of 
the countryside which lasted until the mid-1980s was followed by the privatization of 
former state-owned companies. During these restructurings, the urban work unit system 
and, with it, the comprehensive social welfare programme granting cradle-to-grave benefits, 
known as the “iron rice bowl” (tie fan wan), were gradually abolished (Gallagher et al., 2011 
pp. 3-5). Moreover, in order to control the population growth that had skyrocketed 
following pronatalist policies during the Mao era, the government implemented a one-child 
policy in 1979 that would dramatically transform family life in the following decades (Fong, 
2004 pp. 73-74; Lieberthal, 2004 [1995] p. 279). The opening of the market created new 
career opportunities but also increased the pressure on the individual who could no longer 
fall back on the assistance of the state. Simultaneously, conspicuous consumption was on 
the rise and produced new demands and expectations. Due to the accelerating race for a 
high education, prestigious jobs and ever more expensive housing, pressure on the new 
generation of singletons born after the introduction of the family planning law has risen 
enormously over recent decades (Fong, 2004; Jun, 2000; Mak et al., 2007; Yan, 2009). 
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At the same time, Taiwan has followed a very different developmental path. In 1945, after 
Japan’s surrender in the Second World War, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China 
after fifty years of colonial rule. In the same year, the KMT started to consolidate its rule 
on the island (Roy, 2003 pp. 56-67). Although the Taiwanese population had initially 
welcomed the arrival of the KMT, hoping they would be elevated from their low status as 
colonial subjects, this initial confidence was soon destroyed when Chiang’s troops started 
to plunder public and private property and favoured mainlanders in the assignment of 
official positions (Hsiung, 1996 p. 25; Roy, 2003 pp. 56-67).  
After Chiang Kai-shek’s ultimate defeat by the Communists in the Chinese Civil War in 
1949, he and his troops retreated to Taiwan where he planned to prepare for the 
reconquering of the mainland. In the same year, claiming that Taiwan would be threatened 
by an attack by CCP forces, Chiang announced a state of martial law that involved a range 
of restrictions on the population and concentrated all political power in the hands of the 
KMT (Fetzer and Soper, 2013 pp. 58-59; Kao, 2007 p. 195; Roy, 2003 p. 78). The one-
party rule that Chiang installed in Taiwan was modelled on the Leninist principle of 
democratic centralism; yet despite its authoritarian rule, the KMT was never able to create 
“a strong and efficient party apparatus based on discipline” that is key to attaining a high 
degree of social control essential to the Leninist state system (Singh, 2007 pp. 44-45).  
With the onset of the Korean War in 1950, Taiwan became a strategically important 
military base for the US army. To prevent the economically weakened island from being 
overtaken by the communist powers in the region, the US government subsidized its 
industrial development (Ngo and Chen, 2009 pp. 16-17). Within two decades, Taiwan had 
developed from an agricultural society into a modern, industrial economy (Hsiung, 1996 p. 
27). The biggest asset of Taiwan at that time was its cheap workforce that could complete 
the labour-intensive work that the increasingly export-led economy needed. Especially 
during the 1960s and 1970s, small- and medium-sized enterprises, most of them family 
businesses, flourished as their flexibility to cater to foreign investors made them highly 
competitive (Hsiung, 1996 pp. 1-4; 26-31; Rubinstein, 1999 pp. 367-370).  
After Chiang’s death, his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, gradually loosened the 
restrictions of martial law until it was lifted entirely in 1987. During the following years, 
Taiwan transformed into a democracy with a multi-party system and public elections on all 
levels. During the 1990s, Taiwan’s economy experienced another shift with the decline of 
manufacturing industries and a rapid growth in a knowledge-based economy that benefited 
from the substantial  improvement in Taiwan’s educational sector ever since the late 1960s 
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(Greene, 2007 pp. 134-135). During the last three decades, “an already prosperous society 
became affluent” by moving industrial production to the shores of its neighbouring 
countries to enter the stage of a post-industrial service economy (Yu and Liu, 2014: 239). 
However, due to the stagnating economy and rising real estate prices, graduates now face a 
precarious situation on the job market which poses new challenges to families and the 
government (Chen et al., 2007; Rowen, 2015). 
 
VII. Intergenerational Relations and Filial Piety (xiao) in China and Taiwan  
I will now take a closer look at the aspects China and Taiwan have in common. Despite the 
major changes that have affected both societies over the last seventy years, one can still 
find many shared characteristics, in particular in terms of family ideology and 
intergenerational obligations which may impact on young people’s approach to life choices. 
One of the most significant shared traits can be found in the way intergenerational 
obligations of support connect parents and children in China and Taiwan. The concept of 
filial piety (xiao) is at the centre of the parent-child relationship and has been a key aspect 
of Chinese ethics since the pre-imperial era (Chan and Tan., 2004 pp. 1-2; Fei, 1992 [1948] 
pp. 43-44). Although the notion of xiao connotes a host of moral and ethical 
interpretations, it is commonly understood as parents’ obligations to provide their 
offspring with material and emotional care during childhood as well as their children’s duty 
to assist their parents in old age. Traditionally, the eldest son was responsible for his 
parents’ well-being in old age; however, the reality was often different, with the main 
burden of care falling on daughters-in-law (Chan and Tan, 2004; Stafford, 2000 a pp. 60-62; 
Tan, 2004 pp. 226-227). The concept of filial piety has been subject to reinterpretation 
throughout the centuries, responding to the specific concerns of each era. Whereas its core 
value of filial respect for elders remained largely unchanged, the expression of care and 
support has altered in tandem with new demands that have emerged in modern society. 
Hence, in urban China and Taiwan the practice of xiao has taken on new forms to respond 
to major societal changes that have occurred over the last century (Ikels, 2004).  
Henrietta Harris describes how during the May Fourth Movement (1919-25), young 
activists harshly criticised Confucian values of obedience to parents as well as to political 
authorities (Harris, 2001 pp. 170-75). The movement had been induced by a reformation of 
the education system by Western educated Chinese academics who stressed social equality 
instead of submission to traditional hierarchies in the beginning of the 20th century (pp. 89-
104). After the Communist Party had taken over power from the Kuomintang in 1949, 
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Confucian values experienced another attack as the CCP introduced political reforms that 
aimed at dissolving family ties and intergenerational obligations to strengthen their rule 
(Yan, 2003). Yan describes that rural youths who had formerly helped on their parents' 
farms now had to work in the collective fields which opened up a new space free from 
parental supervision (Yan, 2003 p. 52). In the Chinese cities, where people had been 
assigned to work units (danwei), both men and women were now engaged in formal full-
time employment while children were sent to day care facilities provided by the danweis 
(Evans, 2010; Liu, 2007). Shift work and communal obligations that were common in the 
danweis and collectives additionally limited children’s time spent with parents (Liu, 2007 pp. 
65-86).  
However, the abolition of state welfare measures through work units and their transfer to 
municipal neighbourhoods and to households’ responsibilities in the reform era gradually 
reversed the dissolution of intra-family dependencies created under Mao. From the early 
1980s onwards, Vanessa Fong notes, parent-child dependencies increased again as the 
importance of higher education as well as the need to provide for material security in old 
age rose (Fong, 2004). Fong, who researched parent-child relationships in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s in a northern Chinese coastal city, observed that the relationship between 
her adolescent informants and their parents had become closer than had been common in 
the previous generations. Yet, she also found that parent-child relationships were riddled 
with tensions as the pressure to excel in school had risen exponentially. Due to the one-
child policy, most urban children were now raised as singletons. Hence they received the 
concentrated attention and care from grandparents and parents. At the same time, 
concerns that the family’s future well-being was now entirely dependent on their academic 
achievement created severe pressure in her adolescent informants. In some cases these 
tensions raised intense doubt and anger that led them to question the tenets of filial piety 
(pp. 143-148.).  
Hence, due to the increasing stress on parents’ responsibility for their children’s academic 
performance, raising children now implies duties that go far beyond what was conceived of 
as traditional parental obligations (Beckert et al. 2004; Fong, 2004; Kuan, 2015). Shortly 
after having introduced the one-child policy in 1979, the CCP introduced a concept of 
human quality (suzhi) that set standards against which the degree of a citizen's moral 
cultivation and educational attainment was measured and which should add substantially to 
parental duties in the future (Fong 2007; Kipnis 2006; 2011, pp. 65). Hence, while during 
the Mao-era, parents had been expected to foster children’s revolutionary spirit and 
ideological adherence to party morals, expectations were altered in the reform era when the 
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Chinese government recognised the need for highly educated professionals in order to 
advance the modernisation of China's economy (Chan, 1985 pp. 68; Kipnis, 2011).   
Elizabeth Croll points out that in order to form model citizens, the parents now had to 
contribute to the state's endeavour by the domestic formation of their children's academic 
excellence, moral integrity, and willingness to obey superiors in early childhood (Croll, 
1990). In Taiwan, by contrast, filial values were never contested by the state. Here, the 
KMT instrumentalized Confucian ideology to legitimize their rule and to reinforce 
Taiwan’s role as the repository of authentic Chinese culture (Fetzer and Soper, 2013 p. 20). 
During the movement, the KMT introduced “a conservative, moralistic Confucianism” to 
the curriculum in order to instil obedience to superiors in the Taiwanese from an early age 
(ibid.). Yet, despite the government’s adherence to traditional family values, a naturally 
decreasing birth rate and a growing trend for neolocal post-marital residence and female 
full-time employment complicated the continuation of traditional care practices in old age 
in Taiwan (Hsu, 2007; Lee et al., 1994). These problems have become aggravated in recent 
years as Taiwan’s economic progress came to a halt and it became increasingly difficult for 
the younger generation to accumulate enough resources to fulfil all aspects of filial 
obligations to their ageing parents.  
The insecurity that the decline in state benefits in China and economic stagnation in 
Taiwan brought about reinforced the importance of filial care obligations. The continuing 
value placed on children’s duties towards aging parents is demonstrated not least by 
recurrent studies and reports in both China and Taiwan debating the fatal consequences of 
filial neglect (Chen, 2015; Hsu, 2007; Liu, 2013 pp. 219-248; Yan, 2003). Young Chinese 
and Taiwanese thus grow up with the awareness that not only their personal but also their 
family’s well-being is dependent on their academic and professional achievements. For this 
reason, it is not surprising that considerations of future care obligations have a major 
impact on both Chinese and Taiwanese young people’s life-choices.  
Beyond that, the need for close intergenerational communication has increasingly taken a 
central position in new ideals of parenthood that emerged in both societies in recent 
decades. Harriet Evans, who conducted studies of mother-daughter relationships in Beijing, 
noticed that communication between mothers and their daughters had improved compared 
to previous generations and that daughters were profiting from their mothers' more open 
minded attitudes towards gender roles and filiality (Evans, 2008; 2010). From her in-depth 
conversations with women who became mothers in the 1980s, Evans resumes that rising 
self-reflection during the reform era initiated a new consciousness of parenting. Women 
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developed “an explicit antipathy to the model of gendered conduct their mothers 
represented” and aimed at conveying more emancipatory values to their own daughters 
(Evans, 2010 p. 990). However, in spite of these resolutions, they were not able to prevent 
any intergenerational rift from occurring. Many of these daughters criticised their mothers 
in their interviews with Evans for not acknowledging the novel demands that the 
contemporary urban environment had on them and wished for more emotional intimacy 
and understanding (p. 994). Evans concludes,  
“The anticipation of  “communication” as a mode of  emotional expressivity in 
contemporary urban subjectivities is in general terms an effect of  the exchange between 
individual subjects and China's changing economic and cultural climate. In part also 
encouraged by the intersections between local Chinese and global discourses about 
relationships and parenting, the language of  communication operates as a channel for new 
expectations of  personal relationships, including those between parents and children” 
(Evans, 2008 p. 94). 
These new discourses about parenting have not only had an effect on post-Mao China, but 
also started to dominate discourses on parenting in Taiwan. Richard Wilson argues that 
traditionally, Taiwanese father's occupied their role as a distant authority figure who did not 
establish close emotional bonds to his children. Mother's in contrast, were often perceived 
as closer, especially as they had the role of main caregiver for the children in everyday life 
(Wilson, 1970 pp. 63-64). Yet, Wilson observed an important change of these parental roles 
in the 1960s when he conducted his research in Taiwan. This “divergence from the more 
traditional and probably idealized model” of parenting was mainly expressed through 
fathers' closer emotional bonds to children that were a concomitant of the main 
restructurings in traditional families brought about by Taiwan's increasing industrialisation 
(p. 64).  
During my field research in Beijing and Taipei, these different concepts of mutual 
obligations and the expectations and tensions that arose from them figured dominantly in 
conversations with my informants and their families. Especially in the context of important 
life choices, the willingness to openly communicate personal hopes and wishes in order to 
achieve a mutual understanding between parents and children became an important part of 
the intergenerational contract. 
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VIII. Setting the Scenes: Fieldwork in Taipei and Beijing 
Before starting my fieldwork in 2012, I spent 12 months in Taipei preparing for my 
research by studying Chinese at a local university from 2009 till 2010. Upon my return to 
Taipei for my fieldwork in February 2012, my established friendships as well as the 
opportunity to move back into my previous flat-share with Taiwanese friends eased my 
entry into my research. As my criteria for the selection of informants allowed for a wide 
pool of people, I mostly used the snowball system to find young people who wanted to 
participate in the research. In the following weeks, my friends introduced me to their 
families and social circles and invited me to activities around Taipei. Popular leisure 
activities in the bustling, lively city included strolls around the night markets to grab snacks 
and buy bargain clothes, visits to restaurants and coffee shops dotted all over the city, as 
well as window-shopping sprees in Taipei’s countless glitzy shopping malls. At weekends, I 
accompanied them on outings to scenic spots around the island, going surfing or visiting 
their families and relatives in Taipei and other parts of Taiwan. My fieldwork in Taiwan was 
eased by the relatively small size of the island and its well established public transport 
system that enabled me to accompany my informants on their visits to their hometowns 
and villages.  
The capital, Taipei, the main location of my research, is situated at the northern tip of the 
island and is, with a population of roughly 2.7 million, Taiwan’s largest city (Taipei City 
Government, 2014). The low-lying terrain of the Taipei Basin is surrounded by mountains 
to the south, east and north while the area in the west slopes down towards the mouth of 
the Danshui River. The subtropical climate influenced by the monsoon causes hot and 
humid summers with frequent torrential rainstorms and typhoons from June to October. 
The short winters in Taipei are notorious for their grey skies and fog that cover the valley 
in a layer of all-pervasive humidity. For this reason, Taipei winters can feel cold despite the 
relatively mild temperatures that rarely fall below ten degree Celsius. Because of the rather 
unstable weather conditions and the intense heat during the summers, my meetings with 
informants were mostly at air-conditioned venues like coffee shops and tea houses, 
restaurants, malls and night markets where little shops and roofed stalls offered some 
protection.  
While adverse climatic and weather conditions restricted the choice of meeting locations in 
Taipei, it was environmental hazards that prevented my Chinese informants from venturing 
outside on many days during my fieldwork in Beijing. In 2013, the air pollution in the 
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Chinese capital reached record highs and a thick covering of grey smog veiled the city on 
many days, making it difficult to breathe outside.  
I had never been to Beijing before I started my fieldwork in February 2013 and thus my 
first days were rather stressful. I felt lost in this city that had almost ten times the 
population of Taipei. Arriving in mid-February, Beijing looked rather bleak to me. The icy 
winds that blew through the grey streets made me miss the warm temperatures and 
colourful markets of Taipei. Moreover, with the omnipresent police surveillance and the 
crowds shoving in stores and subway stations, the atmosphere in the Chinese capital 
appeared to be tense. With a population of almost 20 million, Beijing is China’s second 
largest city and its political and cultural centre (World Population Review, 2015). Many of 
China’s most highly renowned universities as well as the headquarters of the biggest state-
owned companies are located in Beijing, attracting students and young professionals from 
all over the country to the city (Forbes, 2015).  
Situated on the northern rim of the North China Plain, Beijing is surrounded by mountains 
to the north and west behind which the desert steppe extends. The continental climate is 
characterized by hot humid summers and cold dry winters. Spring often brings sandstorms 
from the Gobi Desert which, added to the environmental pollution, cause a deterioration 
in the air quality. Getting around in Beijing was more difficult than in Taipei. The vastness 
of the city as well as its notorious traffic jams and crowded public transport made 
spontaneous meetings difficult. Due to my three-month visas, I struggled to find suitable 
accommodation and moved between international student housing and private flat shares 
with expatriates. Like my Taiwanese informants, young people in Beijing worked extremely 
long hours and were granted only a few days’ vacation each year. After work, they had long 
commutes home which further restricted their availability. Faced with the sheer 
impossibility of building any meaningful relationships without having any point of contact 
in this foreign city, I had to design my fieldwork slightly differently from that in Taipei.  
From February till April 2013 I worked as an unpaid intern at the Beijing branch office of 
an Austrian consultancy firm. Most of the office staff were Chinese graduates in their mid 
to late twenties. Although the workplace offered me the opportunity to get to know young 
professionals, I was conscious that these highly educated men and women who had studied 
at top institutions in China and abroad were representative of only a small layer of Beijing’s 
educated elite. To extend my circle of informants, I met students for language exchange 
sessions and re-established contact with former Chinese classmates I had got to know 
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during my previous studies in England and Germany. However, as I worked full-time at 
the consultancy, most of my observations during these first months were of my colleagues.  
In September 2013 I returned to Beijing for three months, this time as a visiting research 
associate at a local university; this provided me with the opportunity to gain a deeper 
insight into students’ lives. There I met a group of PhD students who showed me around 
the campus and introduced me to their friends. During the following months I got to know 
a rather broad spectrum of students and young professionals whom I met regularly. 
However, although many of my Taiwanese informants had introduced me to their family 
members, this was rarely the case in China. My Chinese informants told me that their 
parents would not feel comfortable about talking about their private lives with a foreign 
researcher. In one case, a young woman even had to withdraw from participating in my 
study, acquiescing to the concerns of her mother. However, the main reason for the fewer 
family members in my research in Beijing was the long distances to my informants’ home 
places. Due to my limited time and resources it was not possible to visit their hometowns 
during my stay. I was, nevertheless, invited to a few Chinese households in Beijing which 
offered me valuable insights into my informants’ lives and relationships with their parents.  
While making contact with family members proved to be difficult in Beijing, arranging 
meetings with my young informants was surprisingly easy despite their busy work schedules. 
In Taiwan, I often struggled to arrange regular meetings with young people who were 
deeply involved with their responsibilities to partners, parents and grandparents; this was 
not as problematic in Beijing. Most of them lived on their own, whether their parents 
resided in Beijing or elsewhere. Living in university dorms, private flat shares or cohabiting 
with partners, they could manage their time relatively independently and did not have to 
conform to parental curfews or family engagements at weekends. This freedom facilitated 
my research immensely and enabled me to deepen new friendships quickly.  
After we had got to know each other better, I also shared in my Chinese informants’ 
weekend activities like drives into the mountains, walk in parks, hot-pot meals and - highly 
popular among my female informants - shopping strolls around the Zoo Market, an 
underground clothing market famous for its bargains and chaotic jumble of stalls. Due to 
my Chinese informants’ less binding family obligations in their daily lives, I was able to 
spend more time with each person over a short timespan than I often had been able to do 
in Taipei. This contributed to the comparability of the data from the two field sites. 
 
37 
 
IX. Discussion of Methodology, Positionality and Research Ethics 
Multi-sited urban research poses a host of challenges which, for a novice fieldworker, 
might at times be overwhelming. Ulf Hannerz argues that many problems emerging during 
multi-sited field research are due to the fixation on classical fieldwork methods that require 
the researcher’s immersion in his or her field for several years as well as a methodological 
emphasis on participant observation (Hannerz, 2003). I arrived at my first field site, Taipei, 
expecting to conduct rather classical, if time-compressed, ethnographic research that 
focused on family life with a heavy emphasis on participant observation. Even though I 
was prepared that my research question as well as my highly urban setting would not allow 
for casually walking around the neighbourhood and striking up conversations with 
potential informants, I did not expect the difficulties I encountered in establishing stable 
contacts in the first weeks. I quickly realized that in the fast paced environment of urban 
Taiwan, I would have to work with a highly structured schedule that made best use of my 
informants’ free time at night and weekends. In the next months, my mobile phone and 
online social networks became the most important media through which to arrange 
meetings and handle invitations. My informants’ busy work schedules often meant that we 
had to arrange appointments days, if not weeks, in advance. Meeting people at set dates 
instead of conducting participant observation made me feel inadequate as an ethnographer 
at first.  
Hannerz notes that “settings of modernity” where informants “spend hours alone at a desk, 
perhaps concentrating on a computer screen” force the urban researcher to create a new 
set of methodological tools that involve more foresight and planning (p. 211). 
Consequently, instead of following the flow of life, I had to be highly organized and 
persistent, adjusting my methods to this urban lifestyle. These particular circumstances also 
had an impact on the kind of data I gathered in the field. Most of the encounters with my 
Chinese and Taiwanese informants were one-to-one meetings that took place in the rather 
anonymous environments of tea shops, restaurants and trips to malls and night markets. 
These places were typical venues at which they also met up with their friends and for 
romantic dates. Although these meetings provided me with a valuable insight into Chinese 
and Taiwanese youth culture, they did not offer me many opportunities to observe my 
informants’ family lives. However, conducting numerous in-depth interviews with 
informants in environments where they felt at ease talking about their hopes and worries 
also offered several advantages for my study. First, I could establish relationships of deep 
trust with my informants that enabled them to talk openly about topics that concerned 
them, uninhibited by the presence of family members or romantic partners. Second, by 
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conducting several in-depth interviews with each informant over a timespan of six to 
eleven months, followed up by Skype interviews, I could not only track the decisions they 
made but also observe whether their rationales had changed. The strong emphasis on 
interviews coupled with the tracing of the choices they made over a long timespan emerged 
as an effective method with which to examine the contemplations that accompany 
decision-making. Third, I also gained insight into how my informants dealt with the 
consequences of their choices; how they coped with disappointment and doubt if things 
did not turn out as they had hoped, as well as the strategies with which they tried to 
overcome disillusion.  
Nevertheless, I was concerned about the rather interview-based nature of my fieldwork and 
also wondered how to begin studying the locals; in both Taipei and Beijing, my informants 
appeared to be all over the place, changing locations constantly not only within the city but 
across the globe to pursue their aspirations. Hannerz points out that “the local” is 
becoming an illusion in a globalizing world in which migration and displacement are 
becoming increasingly shared experiences (p. 210). In many field sites, he argues, “[t]here 
are more people who are, like the anthropologist, more like strangers” (ibid.). This was 
certainly an experience of mine in both locations. I often set out to discover the city with 
my informants who, like me, had only recently arrived to work or study. Often they had 
not yet grown accustomed to the different manners or dialect. Curiously, I bonded with 
them through our experience of being outsiders. Later, some of my Chinese and Taiwanese 
informants visited me in Germany and England - delineating a field site thus became 
increasingly difficult. 
Many of my informants were students too, whereas others connected with me via their 
personal experiences of missing their family and friends while following career paths that 
might not lead them back home. They were concerned about the progress of my research 
and often introduced me to friends while briefing me beforehand that this person was an 
extremely “representative” or “interesting” case. Having similar educational backgrounds, 
sometimes within the humanities, I often found it difficult to distinguish between the roles 
of research assistant and informant.  
Maryl C. Lawlor and Cheryl E. Mattingly point out the difficulties researchers encounter in 
drawing adequate boundaries in relationships with informants and being conscious of the 
responsibilities that an involvement in their lives implies (Lawlor and Mattingly, 2001). 
They stress that “[p]rolongued engagement contributes to the complexity as relationships 
deepen and shift over time and participants accumulate a substantial reservoir of shared 
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experiences” (p. 147). Although time spent together did contribute to the formation of 
trust, personal experiences first and foremost enabled us to connect. Although we had 
different cultural backgrounds, my Taiwanese informants and I shared in the more 
“universal experience” of being urban twenty-somethings in the developed world who had 
successfully navigated through institutions of higher education; however, we also felt 
confused and disoriented when degrees did not deliver the promised jobs. The experiences 
coming of age of young Chinese people appeared to be more removed from my own, but 
as we were of approximately the same age and we had similar educational backgrounds, our 
current worries and concerns about the future connected us.  
Joanne Passaro criticizes what she perceives of as an imperative of “otherness” in 
anthropology (Passaro, 1997 p. 152). It is commonly assumed, she argues, that a 
socioeconomic or cultural distance between the fieldworker and informants liberates the 
researcher from any “ideological filter” and thus renders his or her findings more 
“objective” (ibid.). I wondered how I should deal with this, at times, unexpected lack of 
otherness vis-à-vis certain informants and worried that I was lacking this “ideological filter” 
as their questions and concerns resembled mine too much (ibid.). Was my difficulty in 
drawing boundaries, being able to see an “other” where I saw sameness, a symptom of 
“having surrendered to the field” and having been “absorbed by it”, as Hannerz puts it 
(Hannerz, 2003 p. 209)? Or was this the consequence of tracing processes linked to 
sentiments and emotions that are part of a more general human experience?  
In the first months of my research, I was confronted with the more practical problem of 
adjusting my methods to fit the restricted timeframe. In Taiwan, where my main research 
consisted of eleven months, I conducted mostly informal interviews with my young 
informants during which we discussed their personal biographies, current issues and plans 
for the future. After several weeks, I drew a kinship diagram with each of them during 
which we reviewed their relationship to each of their relatives. Towards the end of the 
research I conducted life-history interviews with parents or grandparents. In Taiwan, I met 
about eleven men and eighteen women regularly and conducted life-history interviews with 
thirteen parents and grandparents, most of which I recorded. At the end of my research, I 
asked them to fill out a survey with questions pertaining to household finances. I returned 
to Taiwan for follow-up interviews for three weeks in September 2013. In 2014 I 
conducted structured life-history interviews with my Taiwanese key informants via skype 
which I recorded. I did this in order to improve the comparability of the Taiwanese data to 
the interview data collected in Beijing. 
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Due to my tighter schedule in Beijing, I first recorded a life-history interview with each key 
informant; twenty-six in total. During a second meeting, I drew a kinship diagram and 
recorded our conversation while working on the diagram. During the third meeting, I let 
them fill out my survey. My experience was that it was difficult to motivate people to 
return the survey to me and it turned out to be helpful to discuss the survey together. I 
found that these three “research” meetings were helpful so as to provide a platform on 
which to develop a relationship during the short time available to me in Beijing. I 
interviewed eleven young men and fifteen women in Beijing.  
Restricting my analysis to highly educated young urban residents, my work describes the 
aspirations and choices of those young Chinese and Taiwanese who, compared to their less 
educated peers, might have a relatively wide range of options available to them. While their 
concerns about their families and marital future might have been similar to those felt by 
young adults whose academic and professional options were more restricted, their hopes 
and aspirations might be typical only for this particular highly educated group of young 
urbanites. My analysis is thus not aiming to make claims about the whole of the young 
urban Chinese and Taiwanese population, but only about members of the university 
educated, internationally oriented and aspiring middle class youths from among whom I 
collected my case studies.  
All in all I have to mention that it was easier for me to build up close relationships with 
women in both field sites, yet especially in Taiwan. This was because it appeared that it was 
rather unusual for an unmarried woman to meet single men repeatedly without any 
intention to date them.  
Throughout my research, I was open about my work as an anthropologist as well as my 
research topic. Informants gave me their consent and were informed that their data would 
be treated confidentially. To protect my informants and their families, I use pseudonyms 
and have changed certain details that could reveal their identity. As I had to sign a 
confidentiality agreement with the consultancy in Beijing, I will talk about my relationships 
with my colleagues but will not provide any further details about the content of my work.  
I analysed my data applying a thematic approach. That is, I structured the data gathered in 
formal and informal interviews and observations by identifying the main themes that would 
form the basis for my comparison. I then designed an index to order the selected data 
segments according to these themes (Guest et al., 2012 pp. 49-79).  
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The interviews were conducted in English, Chinese and German, according to the 
preferences of each informant. Most informants were deeply engaged in their studies or 
early careers and thus only reluctantly took time off for leisure activities. I found that many 
of them felt more at ease with meeting me if they had the opportunity to improve their 
language skills at the same time. I thus decided to offer the option for language exchange 
despite the obvious difficulties which would ensue from this in terms of the comparability 
of the data. As a consequence, I was not able to conduct a quantitative analysis of key 
terms, however, the thematic analysis still allowed me to determine the major concerns and 
problems surrounding my informants’ key decisions. 
Immediately after each informal meeting I wrote a summary of it in either English or 
German. The interviews I recorded I either transcribed entirely or partially, depending on 
how useful the information appeared to be for my project. I also made notes during the 
structured life-history interviews, except for those I conducted in Chinese, which I used for 
my later summaries and transcriptions. Interviews conducted in Chinese I translated into 
German before analysing them. Back from fieldwork, I analysed the material in order to 
identify major themes and designed an index of important topics (such as marriage, religion, 
conflicts with parents, romantic relationships etc.) for each field site. I then segmented the 
interview and observation data according to these themes. I thus designed two indexes with 
largely identical themes, one for China and one for Taiwan. With the help of these indexes, 
I first compared the material I gathered within each fieldsite and then, after delineating 
commonalities, I compared the findings of the two fieldsites with each other. At this early 
point of the analysis some major commonalities and differences already became apparent 
by the volume of material I had gathered for each theme. Thus, the topic of religion took 
more space in the index for Taiwan whereas the theme of early childhood separation from 
parents took considerably more space in the China index. However, topics like romantic 
relationships and achievement pressure seemed to be equally important at both locales. 
From this, I continued with a more detailed analysis of the data and also selected my case 
studies with the help of the index. After having designed a rough outline of the chapters 
and the cases I wanted to present, I returned to the original data and interviews for a 
deeper analysis of each case. Further, I transcribed more recorded interviews that had now 
gained importance to flesh out my case studies. At the same time, I also contacted several 
of my key informants with skype or email to ask about missing details or to receive updates 
about their current situation which I then added to the index before starting with the actual 
writing process of the thesis. 
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X. Outline of Chapters 
The following chapters will elucidate different domains of decision-making and shed light 
on the underlying dynamics that affect aspirations and life choices. I will take a closer look 
at those aspects of young adults’ lives that are mostly concerned with the integration of 
personal aspirations and normative expectations. Having to integrate traditional values with 
new ideals that have emerged under the influence of increasing access to higher education, 
a globalized market and the growing influence of international media proves to be 
increasingly difficult for young Chinese and Taiwanese. Decisions in the realms of higher 
education, careers and marriages affect a person’s immediate social environment and can 
thus be expected to be ideal parameters to determine societal change.  
Chapter one will discuss how the content of filial obligation has changed due to societal 
transformations that have caused a reconceptualization of childhood and the parent-child 
relationship, accompanied by increased intergenerational conflicts. Childhood accounts of 
mothers and their grown-up children will provide greater insight into the transformation of 
parental authority, emotional intimacy and filial obligation that impact on future decision-
making in terms of autonomy. Chapter two elucidates how the specific demographics of 
China and Taiwan have given rise to different education systems that have resulted in 
diverging degrees of independence from parents. Moreover, it will be shown how parental 
ambitions as well as early experiences of success and failure in schools affect aspirations 
and perceptions of personal agency differently among young Chinese and Taiwanese 
people. Chapter three examines how those early ambitions came to be realized in 
professional careers. Conflicts with parents often surface when young people gain the 
material independence to break away from parental authority and pursue their own plans. 
The strategies young Chinese and Taiwanese people apply to mitigate arguments with 
family members are dependent on the degree of autonomy they have reached at that time. 
However, issues pertaining to one’s choice of partner and marriage (chapter four) also 
cause much controversy. As with schooling and careers, the intrinsic structural conditions 
of China and Taiwan do not impact only on parents’ authority over the choice of their 
offspring’s spouses but also affect expectations in terms of family life and residence which 
have undergone enormous changes in the urban environments of Beijing and Taipei. After 
shedding light on aspirations and choices revolving around major biographical milestones, 
chapter five will look at the aspects that inform decisions and trigger doubt. Young Chinese 
and Taiwanese people both have to overcome ambiguities in decision-making that are 
resolved by way of strategies that respond to the different realities of the localities. Taking 
into account anthropological and psychological theories about decision-making, an 
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examination will be conducted showing how different cultural beliefs, socioeconomic 
environments and political ideologies impact on young people’s life choices and rationales. 
Chapter six will look at young adults who have not succeeded in finding a satisfying 
compromise between their personal aspirations and normative expectations. Feeling 
disenchanted and frustrated with their current situation, they presume that escaping abroad 
is the only way to avoid societal pressures. On their way to reaching this goal, some feel 
reinvigorated by occasional successes while others encounter even more setbacks that only 
exacerbate their unfortunate situation. In the last chapter my analysis will be summed up by 
connecting young people’s pursuit of an independent life with emancipatory struggles in 
the political domain. Hope for a better future is a major theme in Chinese and Taiwanese 
nationalism and the way political and economic autonomy is pursued in both countries is 
closely connected with the personal hopes and aspirations of young Chinese and Taiwanese 
people. 
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Chapter One - Growing Up under Different Regimes - Childhood 
Memories of Mothers and their Children 
1.1. Introduction 
After spending several weeks at my first field site in Taipei, I realized that in order to 
understand the hopes and aspirations of  young Taiwanese, I would need to form a better 
understanding of  the social and spatial environments in which they grew up. Initially, I 
found it puzzling that conversations with these aspiring professionals, who seemed to excel 
in their lives in most ways, came more often than not to be dominated by their fears of  not 
meeting their parents’ high expectations and the problems they encountered in 
communicating their personal aspirations to parents. Slowly I noticed that these problems 
were based not only on their parents’ uncompromisingly ambitious plans for their 
children’s future but also on increasingly diverging ideals of  the parent-child relationship. 
Many of  my young Chinese and Taiwanese informants criticized the fact that instead of  
offering space for emotional closeness and communication, their parents appeared distant 
and neglectful of  their individual needs; they also felt that they had been raised not so 
much to be happy as to be successful. As they reached adulthood, it became increasingly 
difficult to bridge the rifts that had emerged between them and their parents. Others, 
however, could identify to a greater extent with their parents’ rather traditional expectations 
and worked hard to meet them. Yet the sacrifices this implied in terms of  their personal life 
goals were immense and often threatened to complicate relationships with romantic 
partners and future career plans. 
When talking to the parents of  my informants, I noted that although they often 
understood that their children’s aspirations might be different from their own, not least 
because they remembered similar conflicts from their own youths, they regarded it as their 
responsibility to ensure that the children would not fall behind on the competitive 
education market. Acknowledging a child’s individual wishes, while ensuring his or her 
future competitiveness in the world of  work, thus often implied a balancing act. 
Particularly memorable in this context were the childhood memories of  Shu-fen, a young 
woman I met in Taipei in the summer of  2012. Due to her flawless British English, I 
initially assumed that she had grown up in the UK but in fact had studied the language 
diligently since her early childhood, pushed by her extraordinarily ambitious mother. From 
a very early age, her mother had imbued her with the importance of  a higher education and 
had expressed her hopes that, one day, Shu-fen would be accepted by a renowned 
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university. Shu-fen’s mother proudly told me that her daughter had learnt to read characters 
and speak English before she had started primary school. With a sense of  pride, Shu-fen 
recalled how she had communicated in English with foreign missionaries in Taipei as a 
young child. Now, as she drew close to being accepted by a top European university, she 
had surpassed even the ambitious hopes of  her mother.  
In our conversations, Shu-fen often stressed her admiration for her mother’s strength and 
assertiveness. Yet she also recalled stressful moments when she felt overwhelmed by her 
mother’s ambitions for her future: 
 “[Striving for the best schools] is the norm of the whole of Taiwanese society. In my case, 
it’s also because my mum has received higher education […]. Also, she is smart and she 
says that she can feel that I am smart, too. She asked me to always do my best and doing 
the best by her standards means going to the best school. […] In my mum’s generation, 
going to university was a very prestigious thing because that means that you are smart, that 
you are successful. You can definitely get a job after your studies. So they passed on that 
concept to our generation. […]  I never really argued with her because arguing with my 
mum is a bit meaningless. She is quite stubborn. Mostly, I was just talking to my friends. 
[…] After my second year of study at senior high school, I found out that I really don’t like 
[my subject choice] and that I don’t want to be a [medical] doctor, so apparently my 
interest is not there. I talked to my mum, but my mum thought that it was just an excuse 
because I was doing really badly […] so I could not change [subjects]. I was pretty mad. In 
my family, my mother is this all-powerful figure who controls everyone’s decisions, I think 
I was in the habit of just obeying her.”  
Despite her mother’s seemingly controlling attitude, Shu-fen had managed to push through 
her goal of  studying for a degree in history. She was able to convince her mother of  this 
plan by being accepted on a programme at one of  Taiwan’s most renowned universities. 
However, while studying in Taipei, Shu-fen did not move out of  her family home so her 
mother continued to wield influence over her life. This remained unchanged even after her 
graduation when she started working as an assistant at a publishing house in Taipei; this 
job, due to its proximity to her home, forced her to continue living with her mother and 
sister.   
Her mother’s presence was almost “tangible” in many of  our meetings. Shu-fen, anxious 
not to worry her, frequently sent text messages about her whereabouts and confirmed 
when she would be home. Her mother did not allow her to go out to dance clubs at 
weekends and, usually, Shu-fen had to be home by ten each night. Pretending to be stressed 
by her job, she could nevertheless find some time for herself  sometimes. Her younger 
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sister, however, had not found a way of  distancing herself  from their mother’s demands. 
She spent most of  her time running errands for their mother and assisting her at home. 
The atmosphere at home was often tense.  
After Shu-fen finished work, we often met for dinner at one of  the little restaurants close 
to her office. During one of  these meetings, she told me about her recent application for a 
postgraduate programme in France. Our conversation that evening thus revolved around 
the pros and cons of  her future plans. Picking at her noodles, Shu-fen seemed indecisive. 
Her chances of  winning a funded place to study in Paris looked good yet she appeared 
almost fearful of  receiving an offer. She had always dreamt of  studying at the University of  
Cambridge in England, she sighed. She did not know whether she should accept the 
potential offer to study in Paris. She did not know whether she could give up on her dream. 
Yet, should she risk not being able to leave Taipei at all? 
Like Shu-fen, most of  my young Taiwanese informants either lived with their families or 
were surrounded by other family members resident in Taipei. They were thus closely 
monitored in their everyday lives and any transgressions of  parental rules were immediately 
noticed and criticized. I often heard accounts of  parents who, like Shu-fen’s mother, 
controlled their children’s educational or professional performances or who interfered with 
their romantic relationships. Many young Taiwanese thus appeared stressed by having to 
keep important parts of  their lives hidden from their parents while living in the same 
household.  
In China, I could observe the same trend - parents pushing their children to achieve high 
scores in exams to secure places at national or international first-tier universities and trying 
to influence their choice of  partner. However, I soon noticed that young Chinese people in 
Beijing responded to the pressures of  their families differently and seemed to have found 
ways to pursue their goals more autonomously. There were several obvious factors that 
contributed to these differences in personal independence. 
My Chinese informants’ everyday lives were usually not as dominated by their family 
relationships. Most of  them lived independently, either because their parents did not reside 
in Beijing or because they had moved into their own flat after starting work; this was more 
common among young, unmarried informants in Beijing than in Taipei (Farrer, 2014). 
Moreover, Chinese parents were not only too far removed spatially to interfere with their 
children’s lives, often they also lacked the educational background to provide useful advice 
on the educational or career choices of  their children. Many parents had missed out on 
parts of  their education due to the turbulence of  the Cultural Revolution. They thus often 
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did not have a clear concept of  the way in which their children’s university degrees could 
translate into a professional job on the urban labour market. This educational gap was 
often perceived as irreconcilable and was a major cause for conflict and misunderstanding. 
However, it also protected my Chinese informants from too much parental interference.  
In Taiwan, by contrast, the educational system had already been modernized at the onset 
of  major economic transformations in the 1960s (Rubinstein, 1999 pp. 377-384). Even if  
the authoritarian classroom structure and the heavily politicized curriculum of  the martial 
law era had largely been remodelled in recent decades, Taiwanese parents’ experiences of  
the educational system in the 1960s and 1970s were, compared to their Chinese 
counterparts, not as removed from the ones their children made in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Although demographic and socioeconomic factors can help to explain some of  the 
important differences I observed in the family relationships of  my Chinese and Taiwanese 
informants, they cannot wholly account for parents’ different degrees of  acceptance of  
their children’s independence. Why did Chinese parents appear to have accepted a sense of  
autonomy in their children that was not as obvious among the young Taiwanese?  
I hoped that a closer examination of  the distinct ideological programmes of  the CCP and 
the KMT during the 1960s and 1970s and their effects on family life might reveal 
underlying trends that influenced parent-child relations in subsequent generations. When 
listening to the accounts of  my young informants and their mothers, I soon noticed that 
their childhood experiences reflected the different ideological trends that had occurred in 
China and Taiwan since the 1950s. It also transpired that the values parents conveyed to 
their children bore the imprint of  the intense inculcation of  the different political 
ideologies they had been exposed to during their childhood.  
Harriet Evans has examined the impact that changing politico-ideological discourses and 
the associated parenting methods have had on mother-daughter relationships in urban 
China (Evans, 2008; 2010). She describes how women who came of  age during the Cultural 
Revolution often experienced long periods of  separation from their parents due to the 
latter’s work assignments or political activism. Deeply influenced by these early experiences 
of  alienation from parents, these women later encountered difficulties in establishing close 
relationships of  trust with their own daughters born in the early reform era. Evans also 
interviewed these women’s daughters who were then in their early twenties. They criticized 
their mothers’ lack of  emotional warmth and understanding as well as their apparent 
neglect of  their individual hopes and aspirations. Yet their yearning for closer 
communication with their mothers and the latter’s acknowledgment of  their personal 
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hopes and dreams often remained unfulfilled (ibid.). 
Teresa Kuan’s recent research in Kunming discusses in greater detail the difficulties parents 
face in integrating the educational demands dictated by the competitive schooling system 
with recognition of  their child’s autonomy and individual needs (Kuan, 2015). She focuses 
especially on the negative impact that the growing pressure to achieve has had on children’s 
psychological well-being and parent-child relationships. She describes the case of  a third-
grader who, overburdened by her tight schedule of  schoolwork and extra-curricular 
activities, needed treatment at a psychiatric clinic. In the aftermath of  the girl’s illness, her 
mother was torn between her feelings of  guilt for not having realized earlier the amount of  
stress her daughter was under and worries that any relaxation of  her schedule would 
compromise her competitiveness within the education system (pp. 1-7).  
Although these studies above both discuss issues which have emerged due to the 
particularities of  the political ideology, economic system and discourses on child-raising in 
China, Taiwanese parent-child relationships were strained by similar conflicts. It will be 
shown below that an explanation of  the intergenerational communication problems and 
the value conflicts evident in both societies cannot be reduced to rapid economic changes. 
Moreover, they are also related to shared notions of  parental and filial obligations that are 
not always easily integrated with modern discourses on parenting and personal autonomy. 
In the first part of the chapter, I will discuss how the different political and socioeconomic 
environments have laid the foundation for the emergence of different ideas about a child’s 
autonomy and how these concepts were perceived by my informants. In the second part, I 
will discuss the different strategies my Chinese and Taiwanese informants apply to solve or 
circumvent communication problems and value conflicts with their parents. I will 
demonstrate that despite ideological differences, traditional ideas of intergenerational 
support are still influential in both societies and complicate parents’ and children’s mutual 
expectations. I hope to give the reader an impression of the underlying reasons for 
intergenerational conflicts to facilitate an understanding of young people’s varying 
strategies to mitigate arguments and realize their aspirations. 
 
1.2. Ideological Inculcation and its Impact on Parent-Child Relationships 
It soon crystallized from Shu-fen’s accounts of  her mother’s high expectations of  her that 
meeting all of  her demands was rather difficult. On the one hand, Shu-fen was encouraged 
to pursue an elite education at international institutions of  higher education. On the other 
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hand, she was expected not only to assist her mother at home and keep her company but 
also to be present in her old age. Shu-fen was eventually offered a place at the university in 
Paris which she decided to accept. However, she told me that her mother expected her to 
return to Taipei immediately after she had completed her studies and move back into the 
family home.  
Shortly before Shu-fen had to leave Taipei, she agreed to introduce her mother to me. She 
suggested meeting at a high-end Western-style coffee shop close to their flat in Xinyi Qu, 
Taipei’s modern business district. On our introduction, Shu-fen’s mother, Mrs Fan, 
appeared impatient and vivacious, almost the polar opposite of  her calm and collected 
daughter who accompanied her. She told me that she was meeting me “between 
appointments” and had not had time to change clothes. She was dressed rather casually, 
wearing jeans covered with ink stains that her little nephew had carelessly caused. After our 
meeting, she had to rush to pick up her mother-in-law who was visiting Taipei. She clearly 
expected a structured interview instead of  the relaxed conversation about her childhood 
memories that I had planned. While I was introducing my research to her, she rushed me in 
English to “start with question one.” Yet as we started talking about her past, she seemed 
to forget about her pressing appointments. Reflecting on her tumultuous life, she became 
thoughtful and, as the interview progressed, increasingly assertive in stating her wish that 
Shu-fen, who was listening to her account, might learn from her story and not make the 
same mistakes. 
Mrs Fan told me that she had grown up with strict parents who spoilt her brother while 
she, as the eldest daughter, had to take care of  the household chores. The daily beatings 
and verbal mistreatment administered by her mother when she was a young teenager added 
to her despair. Whereas a significant proportion of  the family’s resources was invested in 
the education of  her brother, she and her younger sister received little care and support. 
She asked me if  I knew the idiom: “A married-out daughter is like spilt water” (Jia chuqu de 
nü’er shi pochu de shui). This, Mrs Fan explained, summed up her mother’s attitude to her. 
Expecting her daughter to soon marry and thus be her husband’s responsibility, her mother 
was not willing to invest in her future.  
She explained her mother’s mistreatment of  her by telling me about certain unfortunate 
signs surrounding her birth. As a teenager, she had learnt that her mother had tried to 
abort her twice. A female acquaintance suggested to her mother that these unsuccessful 
attempts could only be explained by a spiritual debt she owed to the unborn child. Hence, 
she was destined to carry it to term. It added to her mother’s suspicion that she was born at 
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a rather inauspicious time. Her mother believed profoundly in the typical character 
attributes associated with each Chinese sign of  the zodiac (dizhi). She thus resented having 
given birth to a baby girl in the year of  the tiger. This zodiac sign is associated with 
stubbornness and independence, character traits that were deemed to be unsuitable for a 
woman. Moreover, due to certain taboos that those born under this sign traditionally have 
to observe, Mrs Fan was barred from participating in certain community rituals and 
celebrations which added to her feeling of  rejection.  
Aged thirteen, Mrs Fan felt so desperate about her status in the family that she tried to 
commit suicide by drowning herself  in a river. At the last minute, however, she decided to 
live and swam to the banks. From then on, she concentrated on her studies, determined to 
get into one of  Taiwan’s best schools. Despite her household obligations, she had always 
been a good student. Her marks were promising and a place at the National Taiwan 
University (NTU) seemed to be within reach.  
Shortly before her final exams at senior high school, however, she fell in love with a 
classmate and her marks dropped. She remembered with regret that her exam scores only 
allowed her to be accepted by a private university. Mrs Fan, though at that time still 
shattered by this failure, tried to make the best of  her degree in English and started 
working as an analyst for a Japanese company after graduation. 
After breaking up with her high school sweetheart, she got to know her husband at her 
workplace. She could no longer remember what attracted her to him. Shu-fen entered into 
the conversation at this point and remarked that her mother had always seemed to be 
rather indifferent to her father. Mrs Fan confirmed this, arguing that she did not find him 
very intelligent but liked his good temper. However, her father warned her against her 
future husband. Believing that facial features reveal an individual’s character traits (mian 
xiang), he believed to have read in the face of  his daughter’s fiancé that he would turn 
physically aggressive to his future wife and would not be a very responsible person. At the 
same time, the father of  her fiancé was pushing for them to get married. His son was about 
to turn twenty-nine, an age regarded as inauspicious for marriage. He thus wanted them to 
complete the ceremony before this thirtieth birthday.  
Even though the topic of  our conversation was quite sad at this point, Mrs Fan told her 
story in a rather stoic, almost humoristic way; most likely assuming that her daughter and I 
would find it difficult to relate to her experiences. Indeed, listening to her mother’s account 
Shu-fen had to suppress her amusement. While Mrs Fan was answering a phone call, she 
uttered: “Why did they marry? […] That sounds so weird, he? […] I don’t think my mum 
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made a decision.” Her mother, having overheard her daughter, added that other people had 
indeed always been pushing her to make decisions, whether in terms of  her career or 
marriage. She never had a real opinion of  her own about these things (mei you xiangfa). 
Unsurprisingly to Mrs Fan’s family, their marriage was soon placed under pressure by her 
husband’s multiple affairs. Mrs Fan thus decided to divorce her husband after her eldest 
daughter had finished high school. Despite having to raise her three children alone from 
then on, she could not expect much support from her natal family. She thus focused on her 
career and, as she soon earned more than her ex-husband, she was indeed able to care for 
her children alone.  
Mrs Fan told me that she felt lucky that her education had allowed her to stay financially 
independent throughout her marriage and divorce. For this reason, she also inculcated the 
value of  higher education into her children: “In your career, you can work hard and you 
will get good feedback. Unfortunately, this does not work the same way in marriage.” She 
confessed that when Shu-fen was offered a place at NTU, she had fulfilled her long-held 
wish and she proudly thought to herself: “This is my daughter.” Looking at her daughter, 
Mrs Fan beamed with pride. Even though she had not managed to be accepted by the 
NTU, which she called “her” university, when she was young, she had been able to set an 
example of  determination and perseverance for her daughter. 
The lack of understanding with which Shu-fen listened to her mother’s account parallels 
the attitude with which the young Chinese women interviewed by Evans looked back on 
their mother’s life choices (Evans, 2008). Evans describes that in China, notions of 
personal agency in decisions about marriage and childbirth have changed. While women 
born in the Mao era still conceived of these events as “naturalized obligations,” their 
daughters had more autonomy in such decisions (p. 186). Now, with marriage considered 
to be more an “individual matter” than before, it was difficult for young women to 
comprehend their mother’s choices (ibid.). Similarly, Shu-fen found it hard to grasp that 
her seemingly emancipated, headstrong mother had given in to the demands of her partner 
and in-laws instead of pursuing her personal goals beyond the traditional path of childbirth 
and marriage. To Shu-fen, this seemed especially inconceivable as her mother had 
conferred upon her the importance of a higher education and a successful career since early 
childhood.  
Like Mrs Fan, most parents I talked to in China and Taiwan referred to their own 
childhoods to explain which values they tried to impart to their children. Often, the stress 
they placed on formal education originated in their regret of having been deprived of their 
52 
 
personal educational choices as young people. In Taiwan, a common theme among 
mothers was often that, during their youths in the 1960s and 1970s, women were 
encouraged to work in professions that could be combined with motherhood after 
marriage. Many Taiwanese women of this generation had a university education or did an 
apprenticeship but they were unable to pursue a career due to their obligations in the home 
or family business. They now wanted their children to realize the professional careers their 
education could allow for. 
In China, a common regret of parents was that their education and early career had been 
interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Some parents of my Chinese informants had only 
little education and worked as farmers or did low-skilled migrant work in the cities. They 
were thus eager for their children to succeed in the educational system in order to secure a 
better future and, as was often stressed, have “an easier life.” Other parents who ran 
successful businesses in the cities were ashamed by their low education that led them to 
have the status of the “nouveau riche” (xinfu/tuhao) and hoped to gain face by virtue of 
their children’s elite education.  
In both societies, especially those parents who felt their own education and career had been 
curtailed were understandably proud of their offspring’s early academic achievements. Not 
only Mrs Fan, who openly praised how her daughter’s educational successes had been 
forecasted by her early showing of language skills, drew pride from her children’s academic 
excellence. Relatives of another highly successful Taiwanese woman still remembered how 
she had scored exceptionally highly in an IQ test at primary school and taught her younger 
siblings of kindergarten age to read the newspaper. In the same way, the science or speech 
competitions that some of my Chinese informants had won as children still filled their 
parents with a sense of pride today. These stories of childhood achievements were 
cherished and often recalled as early manifestations of children’s intelligence which, at the 
same time, placed parents under the obligation to foster these talents in their children.  
Yet, it should be noted that Chinese parents’ responsibilities have been highly politicised 
and contested for decades and underwent important shifts with each ideological change in 
the political sphere (Croll, 1990; Kipnis, 2006). Although Confucian values of obedience to 
parents had been called into question by the May Fourth Movement as early as 1919-1925, 
they were much more fiercely attacked from the early 1950s as the CCP introduced political 
reforms aimed at dissolving family ties and intergenerational obligations to strengthen Party 
rule (Harrison, 2001 pp. 170-175; Yan, 2003). During the Cultural Revolution many young 
people joint activist groups which let parents’ authority over them diminish significantly 
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(Chan, 1985 pp. 68-79). Moreover, the new working conditions in the communes and work 
units further isolated youths from their parents. Yan describes that collectivization opened 
up a new space free from parental supervision for rural youth who previously had to work 
on family farms (Yan, 2003 p. 52). In the Chinese cities, where people were assigned to 
work units (danwei), the distance between parents and children was increased by the 
introduction of day care facilities provided by the danwei and social welfare measures that 
supported early economic independence from parents (Liu, 2007; Evans, 2010). Further, 
the rustication programme which assigned urban youths to agricultural work in rural areas 
played a key role in increasing their independence from parents. As Helena Rene 
emphasises: 
“If the rustication programme was irrational in normal economic terms and from the 
perspective of maintaining equilibrium, it certainly made sense in terms of emancipating 
sent-down youth from traditional ‘exploitative’ family structures” (Rene, 2013 p. 90). 
Whereas during the Mao era, efforts were made to isolate parents from child-rearing tasks 
to guarantee the party’s full impact on their ideological development, from the reform era 
onwards, parents were obliged to bear the main responsibility for encouraging their 
children’s academic excellence and ideological integrity (Croll, 1990). Yet to guarantee their 
competitiveness on the education market, children are now often sent to boarding 
institutions or have to participate in time-consuming extra-curricular activities that further 
reduce their contact with their parents (Fong, 2004; Hansen, 2015; Kuan, 2015).  
Unlike in Taiwan, the theme of separation from natal families caused by the direct and 
indirect factors of these party-induced transformations ran through the life stories of my 
young Chinese informants and their parents alike. Mrs Xi, the mother of a young man 
called Liang - a colleague at the Beijing consultancy I worked at for several months - was 
one of them. I was often assigned to assist Liang with projects and we quickly became 
friends. When he heard about my research, he was eager to introduce his mother to me 
who, he expected, would be willing to talk openly about her past. 
Mrs Xi appeared indeed happy to have the opportunity to talk about her childhood 
memories. I met her one evening in her small flat in an old apartment building that had 
once belonged to her work unit. Born in Guangzhou in the mid-1940s, she still seemed to 
long for her southern home town whose houses and people she described vibrantly. Due 
to her father’s military relocation, her family had to move to the capital where she was 
admitted to a music conservatory. At that time, family life was already strained by her 
mother’s mental illness and Mrs Xi spent most of the year at boarding school. She was a 
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remarkably ambitious violin student but during the Great Leap Forward hunger and 
exhaustion started to overshadow her carefree life. The shortage of food made it hard for 
students to follow lessons. She remembered vividly the hunger that accompanied them 
everywhere. Returning to her family home had not been possible as the conditions there 
were even worse than at school (shenghuo hen jianku). Hence, she was more or less self-
reliant during these difficult years. 
Mrs Xi graduated from the conservatory despite these poor conditions and was soon 
assigned a workplace as a music teacher at a vocational college. She was also allocated a flat 
by her danwei and, during these years, Mrs Xi enjoyed the independent life she led in the 
capital. However, with the onset of the Cultural Revolution and the disruption it caused to 
the education system, her work was also affected. When the school was eventually closed 
down, she was sent to the countryside around Beijing to help farmers fertilize the fields, 
work she detested not only due to physical exhaustion but also because the harsh chemicals 
caused her headaches. With a tone of regret in her voice, she remarked that today’s youth 
would be oblivious to this part of Chinese history.  
Mrs Xi’s parents raised her very independently and encouraged her interest in the arts so 
she had never felt the urge to marry. Having passed the age of thirty, however, the social 
pressure on her to find a husband increased. When a former classmate who had recently 
divorced his wife proposed to her, she gave in. Laughing, she explained that their 
characters did not match at all (bu heshi) but that she had been blind to this when they 
married. Two years later, her son Liang was born. She had to leave the child with a nanny 
because she had to return to work immediately. Like Mrs Fan, she told me that in 
retrospect, she would have been happy to completely immerse herself in her work without 
having to carry out the duties of a wife and mother.  
Mrs Xi’s life story illustrates how the education and workplace systems of the PRC during 
the communist era enabled her to lead a relatively independent life. In attending boarding 
school, she lived independently from her family even as an adolescent, whereas Mrs Fan 
had more difficulty negotiating her desire for a higher education with her parents. Both 
women eventually separated from their husbands and concluded that marriage should be 
carefully considered. However, even though Mrs Fan encouraged her daughters to pursue a 
higher education, she imparted to them a filial ideology that was strikingly traditional. Mrs 
Xi applied a similar liberal approach in raising her only son, Liang, as she had experienced 
with her parents. These different parenting styles resulted in distinct forms of resentment 
in their children. Whereas Shu-fen lamented her mother’s pressure to achieve and the 
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limited range of choice she had in childhood and adolescence, Liang complained that he 
lacked his parents’ attention and guidance during his difficult formative years at boarding 
school. 
Due to the long periods of separation from his parents in his childhood, Liang felt a 
distance from his mother that he found difficult to overcome. He returned to Beijing from 
his studies in Austria only shortly before I got to know him at work. Mrs Xi had suffered 
from poor health and when she needed major surgery, he felt obliged to return to Beijing 
to care for her. Now that she was in relatively good health again, he was unsure of how to 
plan his future. Liang often spent his evenings with Wei-xin, our female colleague, and me 
because he did not want to return home too early where his mother would be waiting for 
him. 
From early on, Liang felt neglected by his parents who both invested most of their time in 
their work. After having lived mostly with his grandparents, he was sent to boarding 
kindergarten when he was just three years old. He still remembered his tears each Monday 
morning when his mother left him with the teachers and how he anxiously waited for her 
to pick him up on Friday afternoon. One time, after they had left him at the kindergarten 
for a month due to a work commitment in the south, he refused to recognize his parents 
and hid behind his teacher on their return. Liang often wet the bed at kindergarten and was 
regularly scolded by the teachers. After he started school, he spent most days with his 
classmates as his parents worked late. Nevertheless, he found it difficult to adjust to his 
peers and felt like an outsider. He considered himself a bad student and found it difficult to 
keep up with the curriculum. However, he rarely talked about his problems with his parents. 
Liang attributed this to a general lack of communication between his family members. 
Later, he moved into a university dormitory in Beijing while his parents resided in a house 
in the suburbs. He was critical of the fact that he had been expected to follow the 
instructions of his parents and teachers without objection. Proper communication had thus 
not been possible and, in many ways, his parents had been blind to his needs. His parents 
now lived separately from one another and, to his astonishment, they were now suddenly 
trying to win his affections and wanted him to spend time with them. Moreover, his 
mother had started to exert subtle pressure on him to marry his girlfriend and have a family. 
He appeared quite disconcerted by these sudden claims on his filial love and, overwhelmed 
by their expectations, he hoped to be able to leave the country soon to continue his career 
abroad. Recounting his childhood memories, Liang still appeared bitter. He could not 
understand why his parents had not cared more about the well-being of their only child. 
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Liang’s feelings of parental neglect and of being misunderstood are reflected in many of the 
childhood accounts of my Chinese informants. Liang grew up in the urban environment of 
Beijing and was born to highly educated parents. He mostly criticized their focus on their 
careers that prevented them from taking sufficient care of him. By comparison, rural 
students and those from a less educated background often complained about their parents’ 
lack of understanding of the pressures they faced within the highly competitive education 
system. For all of them, the long periods of separation from parents, due to parental work 
commitments or their education at boarding schools, appeared to be defining moments in 
their childhoods. Whereas the Taiwanese mothers I talked to appeared to be eager to keep 
such separations from their children as short as possible as they were worried about facing 
old age alone, Chinese mothers seemed to be more accepting of their children’s absence if 
it benefitted their academic or professional careers. One factor that may have facilitated the 
more traditional mindset of Taiwanese parents may be the importance placed on Confucian 
family ideals within the KMT party ideology. 
Unlike the CCP, the KMT in Taiwan used the image of the family as an instrument to instil 
its population with a sense of duty towards the nation. Stafford points out that, blurring 
family relationships with political affiliations, Sun Yat-sen was portrayed as the father of 
the nation; similarly, his biologically unrelated successor, Chiang Kai-shek, was portrayed as 
his “dutiful son” working towards the completion of his father’s nationalist vision (Stafford, 
1995 p. 117). In an effort to Sinicize the population, the KMT also introduced the reading 
of the Confucian classics in Taiwanese classrooms, especially emphasizing those works that 
stressed filial virtues and the recognition of natural hierarchies (Fetzer and Soper, 2013 pp. 
21-25). Wilson states that “[s]upport by the family for education and for the teacher is 
echoed by the support given the home in school. In education, much of this support 
revolves around the concept of filial piety as the root of all proper relations to authority” 
(Wilson, 1970 p. 62). The KMT thus drew on powerful family idioms in their political 
imagery.  
It is difficult to determine to what extent the ideological inculcation of filial piety had a 
lasting impact on parenting, or whether the more conservative attitude towards filial 
obligations in Taiwan was preserved to a greater extent by other factors such as the 
structures of the labour market, especially the greater prevalence of women employed in 
the informal sector. Either way, the KMT’s endorsement of the concept did not imply any 
strict break with Taiwanese family life but instead highlighted the Confucian roots of 
existing practices in order to foster an identification with Chinese culture in the population 
(Fetzer and Soper, 2013 pp. 47-48). As illustrated by the childhood memories of Mrs Fan 
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and her daughter, rather traditional notions of intergenerational obligations were conveyed 
to children from early childhood onwards. Meanwhile, the story of Mrs Chung and her son, 
Pei-chun, shows how a family tragedy can intensify children’s feelings of obligation to their 
parents. I had met Pei-chun at a group gathering of young backpackers in Taipei. He 
appeared eager to practice his English; while most other attendants of the meeting behaved 
rather shyly, he immediately offered to translate difficult vocabulary to me and introduced 
me to the different group members. Afterwards we exchanged mobile numbers and started 
to meet regularly. Over the months, he became one of my closest male informants in 
Taipei. 
Mrs Chung lived with her two adult children and mother-in-law in a spacious house in a 
suburb of Taipei. Originally from a rural area, she had come to the city as a young woman 
to seek work. Unlike Shu-fen’s mother, Mrs Chung appeared gentle and quiet and seemed 
surprised that anyone was interested in recording her life-story. The inside of the family’s 
house was very modest; only a large ebony shrine underneath a colourful triptych at the 
back of the living room attracted one’s attention. In the middle of the shrine sat the white 
statue of Guanyin (Pusa) 4  amid white, porcelain lotus flowers and fruit offerings. To 
Guanyin’s right, there was a smaller, more delicate shrine which bore the name plaques of 
Mrs Chung’s deceased husband’s ancestors. The whole family, Pei-chun told me as he 
guided me around the house, prayed in front of each shrine every day. 
Although Mrs Chung appeared slightly overwhelmed by the sudden attention she was 
being given by me, she felt ready to start the interview after serving tea and fruit. Seated in 
the middle of the sofa, surrounded by her two children, she started to tell her story in a low 
voice.  
Mrs Chung had spent her childhood at her family’s farm with four siblings. The family had 
always been poor but, after her paternal uncle had incurred a debt that all his brothers had 
to help repay, their living conditions worsened. After the division of the family estate, the 
brothers also split the debt; for as long as Mrs Chung could remember, her parents had 
struggled to get by. From early childhood onwards, she had been aware that she would 
have to earn money as soon as possible to support her family.  
After Mrs Chung finished primary school, she left her rural home and moved to Taipei. A 
former neighbour had referred her to a family in the city that was looking for a nanny. 
Only fourteen years old, Mrs Chung was soon supporting herself in Taiwan’s capital. She 
                                                 
4 Buddhist deity of mercy and compassion. 
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kept her promise to send her wage home each month and did her bit to pay off her father’s 
debt. Mrs Chung did not know why her father’s brother had borrowed the money but this 
did not diminish her sense of obligation to help repay it. When I asked her how she felt 
about sacrificing her financial freedom for her parents, she thought long and hard about 
her answer. At that time, it had not crossed her mind not to send her parents the money she 
saved from work. She did not have any aspirations at that time apart from supporting her 
family in the countryside. 
Later, she worked in different factories (gongchan) producing sportswear and lived in the 
adjacent dorms. She liked this job more than her previous work as a nanny since the wage 
was higher and she could make friends with her colleagues. At that time, she told me, there 
was no space for her to dream about professions that suited her interests and talents. She 
lived on her own in Taipei; if she had quit her factory job, she would also have lost her 
place in the dormitory. Her low educational level also restricted her employment options. 
Hence, Mrs Chung’s aspirations were confined to the opportunities that the factory offered 
her. She realized that education could improve her situation and decided to attend evening 
classes to complete her junior high school certificate. Mrs Chung thus worked during the 
day and studied at night. Throughout this time, she told me, her parents had a rather 
indifferent attitude towards her achievements as they were too far away to lend her any 
form of support. 
At the age of twenty-six, Mrs Chung got to know her future husband who worked at the 
same factory. She found him handsome and, after going out for a year, they decided to 
marry. However, she could not recall any romantic (langman) moments leading up to this 
marriage. It was more that their friends suggested they suited each other, so Mrs Chung 
accepted the proposal as she longed for a home in Taipei. She did not regret this step, even 
though it meant living with her husband’s family in an extended household.  
Yet the home she had dreamt of soon seemed to be breaking apart. When her son was just 
a teenager, her husband suddenly died. A few years later, her brother-in-law, who had been 
the only adult male member left in the household, also passed away. In her early forties, 
Mrs Chung was thus left a widow with two children and an elderly mother-in-law to care 
for. Having experienced that her limited education meant that she was only able to work in 
low-skilled manual jobs, Mrs Chung’s encouraged her children to do well in their education.  
Talking to her son, Pei-chun, revealed that Mrs Chung did not only try to instil in her 
children her austere work discipline but also her distinct feeling of obligation towards the 
family. In one of our first conversations, we discussed the dire working conditions for 
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young people in Taiwan. Pei-chun complained that it was difficult for him to find a 
challenging engineering job in Taiwan as most companies in this sector would not invest in 
innovation. When I asked him why he could not try to find a job abroad if he wanted to 
extend his work experience, he hesitated and explained that he felt obliged to stay with his 
family. Pei-chun felt the sole responsibility for his family weighing heavily upon him. He 
had at first not realized the need to study and was a very negligent student in his youth. But 
when his father died suddenly, he decided to study hard in order to relieve his mother of 
her financial worries as soon as possible. Similar to his mother who had worked hard to 
repay her parents’ debt in her youth, Pei-chun also felt the need to demonstrate his sense 
of filial obligation at a young age.  
When I met him, he intended to stay in his mother’s household even after marriage in 
order to fulfil his duties as only son as best as he could. He gave a proportion of his salary 
to her each month. During one of our conversations, I drew the character for the classical 
Confucian concept of filial piety (xiao) on a tissue and asked him how he would define it. 
He smiled in slight surprise and explained that this would mean that if his mother bought 
two loaves of bread, she would definitely give him the bigger, better one. He did not 
understand the expression in terms of his own duties to his mother, but more in terms of 
motherly love; this highlights the connotation of reciprocity that the concept implies. He 
often talked of his mother’s caring gestures that seemed to define their relationship.  
One afternoon we were strolling around the city. As we passed by a temple, our 
conversation turned to popular charms (fu). Pei-chun took out his wallet and pointed to a 
subway ticket he always kept in a little pocket with his ID card. His mother had given him 
the ticket a few years ago, he explained, as the name of the destination sounded auspicious. 
If he kept the ticket close to his body, she hoped it would help protect him from 
misfortune. Unlike Liang, who felt alienated from his parents due to their lack of care and 
attention during childhood, Pei-chun felt deeply indebted to his mother due to her self-
sacrificing care and devotion to him and his sister. This feeling was reinforced by these 
small gestures whereby she demonstrated her concern for their well-being.  
It thus seems that although a sense of  responsibility for ageing parents was expressed by 
both Chinese and Taiwanese young adults, young Taiwanese maintained more traditional 
views of  filial duties. In particular, an obligation to be physically present during parents’ old 
age was felt more strongly by my informants in Taipei than in Beijing. This trend has also 
been noted by Whyte and colleagues who, in their comparison of  living arrangements in 
urban China and Taiwan, found that it was more common for Taiwanese parents to live 
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with adult children and their families than it was for Chinese parents (Whyte et al., 2003) In 
China, the ideological shift aimed at abolishing the traditional family hierarchies during the 
Mao era, as well as social benefits that facilitated early independence from parents, may 
have led to different notions of  filiality among Chinese parents (Hansen, 2015; Liu, 2007). 
At the same time, however, they had not abandoned more traditional expectations; like 
Liang, several Chinese informants complained that as their parents aged, their expectations 
of  their children became more conservative. In some cases, like the one of  Xiao-xiao, these 
intergenerational communication problems became so debilitating, that only a deliberately 
created distance from parents could ease the tensions. 
 
1.3. Yearning for Mutual Understanding and Communication with Parents in China 
and Taiwan 
Xiao-xiao, the young Chinese woman yearning for a more adventurous lifestyle who was 
introduced in the last chapter, often complained about her mother’s great demands and 
strictness. I have already mentioned how her mother tried to evoke pressure on her during 
her regular calls. During her childhood, Xiao-xiao complained, her mother’s harsh criticism 
of her behaviour had been unbearable. At that time, her mother had focused only on her 
academic progress and often scolded her for being lazy. As a consequence, Xiao-xiao had 
felt estranged from her mother as an adolescent and at times, when she felt overwhelmed 
by the pressure, she even considered committing suicide. She told me that she became 
drawn to the edge of high buildings, imagining jumping and thus freeing herself from her 
worries.  
Her mother, Xiao-xiao explained, had never experienced a close relationship with her own 
mother. Her maternal grandmother had been a difficult person who Xiao-xiao remembered 
as distant and reserved. Her mother told her that her family suffered a great deal 
throughout the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but she and Xiao-xiao’s 
grandmother had always been reluctant to tell her any details. Xiao-xiao could only guess at 
the reasons for the resentment she sensed in the maternal family members. Sometimes her 
mother talked about bits of her childhood, for example that her mother had tried to put 
her up for adoption when she was a baby and that they had to eat chicken feed during 
periods of famine. She had never conveyed to Xiao-xiao a coherent picture of her family 
history, however.  
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Evans notes that, for many women who came of age during the Cultural Revolution, 
“[m]aking the transition from their experience as daughters of the Mao era to wives and 
mothers under market reform was not easy, and in some instances produced distress and 
tensions with their husbands, parents and parents-in-law, and children” (Evans, 2010 p. 
990). This was very probably also the case for Xiao-xiao’s mother who did not only 
struggle with her relationship with her parents but also experienced an abusive marriage 
from which she escaped when Xiao-xiao was still a young child.  
Then, as a single mother, she experienced periods of severe financial hardship. She was 
thus eager for her daughter to become financially independent and pressured her to study 
hard. Xiao-xiao complained that, in her childhood, all her mother cared and asked about 
was her performance at school while ignoring her emotional needs. Xiao-xiao’s memories 
of her childhood and adolescence were full of anger:  
“When I was in high and middle school, I really got angry about that. She didn’t really care 
about my heart, my emotions. She just cared about my studies. It’s like a machine, almost... 
One day, I was really angry, like, I hated this family and I wanted to go out. I really went 
out and didn’t come back home. She really got some problems then and came to my school 
to apologize, but still, we don’t talk that much about my life.” 
Xiao-xiao moved out from her natal home upon entering the last year of junior high school 
(chuzhong) and, from then on, her mother’s influence on her life diminished. Even though 
Xiao-xiao had been successful in pursuing her personal aspirations, studying a subject her 
mother did not approve of and refusing any financial support to maintain her 
independence from her mother and stepfather, after visits home she repeatedly complained 
about her mother’s lack of understanding of her choices. Urging her to marry soon, her 
mother was not happy with Xiao-xiao’s plans to go abroad. Even though she wanted her to 
have a higher education, she did not envisage her daughter using it to break out of a 
conventional lifestyle. As a consequence, Xiao-xiao kept more and more details of her life 
hidden from her family. 
Evans stresses that women who grew up during the Mao era developed “an explicit 
antipathy to the model of gendered conduct their mothers represented” and aimed to 
convey more emancipated values to their own daughters (2010 p. 990). These women’s 
increased reflections on their self-identification as mothers initiated a new consciousness of 
parenting in the reform era. Despite their resolution to be more tolerant than their own 
mothers, however, they were not able to prevent rifts from occurring in relationships with 
their own children. Raising their daughters in a socioeconomic and political environment 
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that was radically different from the one that they had experienced during their childhood 
and adolescence, conflicts were inevitable. Similar to Xiao-xiao’s experiences, the young 
women Evans interviewed complained about the ambiguous values their mothers conveyed 
to them. On the one hand, their mothers wanted them to lead autonomous lives; on the 
other, they still expected them to fulfil certain gendered expectations such as marriage and 
childbirth. As a consequence, these young women felt misunderstood and left alone when 
facing the challenges of modern city life (2008 pp. 179-184). 
Although Chinese daughters born in the reform era may wonder why their mothers still 
cling to rather conventional gender role models despite their personal experiences and their 
resolve to convey more modern, emancipated ideals to their children, young Taiwanese 
women appeared to be less surprised by their parents’ traditional expectations. However, 
this does not mean that their relationships were less problematic. Like Xiao-xiao, some 
young Taiwanese women also tried to establish a spatial distance from their mothers if they 
perceived them as too demanding and intrusive.  
One of such cases was Ma-ling, the young woman whose troubled plan of participating in a 
water sports event together with her friends I have described in the introduction. Ma-ling 
felt pressured by her mother to follow in her sister’s footsteps and find a suitable husband 
soon. Sharing a flat with her sister and her sister’s fiancé, she sometimes appeared stressed 
by the crammed living conditions and the lack of privacy. However, being able to split the 
rent was economical and for that reason, she found it difficult to justify moving out. One 
night in the late summer of 2012, I accompanied her shopping for clothes at a market 
popular for its bargains. As we strolled around the stalls, she told me that her mother had 
criticized her tomboyish style of dress. Ma-ling mostly wore simple t-shirts and denim 
shorts. Compared to the pastel dresses adorned with rhinestones and frills that were en vogue 
during my fieldwork in Taiwan and which were sported by many of my female informants, 
she did indeed have quite modest tastes in style. Combined with her pixie hair cut, she 
looked “sporty” rather than conforming to the Taiwanese idea of femininity. Her mother’s 
words had caused doubt in Ma-ling and after a few unsuccessful dates, she was becoming 
increasingly unsure of herself. We thus rummaged through the piles of clothes for a 
summer dress that Ma-ling could feel comfortable wearing. She eventually settled on a plain 
green dress; while she paid for it, she sighed in disbelief that she was following her 
mother’s advice.  
Before her studies abroad, Ma-ling had attended a private university close to her home; this 
allowed her to live with her parents. In retrospect, Ma-ling admitted, she wished she had 
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moved out from her natal home earlier. Living on her own, she explained, her social skills 
improved quickly and now she wished that she had made these experiences earlier. Last 
time she was at home, she told her mother about a young man she had met but she did not 
disclose that she liked him a lot. To Ma-ling’s disappointment, her mother had only been 
interested in his academic degree and, when Ma-ling admitted that she had not asked him 
about this yet, her mother reprimanded her for not caring about such important matters. 
Nowadays, Ma-ling sighed, she got into the most “random” arguments with her parents; 
they could not accept that she was no longer a child and found it difficult to accept her 
privacy. 
After my return to the UK, I skyped with Ma-ling to catch up on the events of the previous 
months. I wondered why she had suggested talking on Chinese New Year’s Eve. When I 
called, she was alone in her bedroom in the flat she shared with her sister and her sister’s 
boyfriend who had already left for their home town in the south. Ma-ling explained that 
she did not want to go home for the family gathering and had used her work as an excuse. 
She resented being questioned again about her relationship status and thus preferred to stay 
in Taipei, even if this meant spending the evening alone. However, her parents tried to 
convince her to return home after she had finished her shift at work that night. She had no 
plans to go but, during our conversation, she appeared melancholic and doubted that the 
New Year would bring any positive changes. Even though she did not appear too keen on 
marriage, she feared that she would increasingly be pushed into an outsider position in her 
family and circle of friends should she continue her singledom. 
The case studies above illustrate that despite the introduction of new discourses on 
parenting that place emphasis on considering the emotional needs of children in China and 
Taiwan, many of my informants who had grown up in the 1980s and 1990s felt a sense of 
estrangement from their parents. For Chinese and Taiwanese parents alike, it was difficult 
to accept their adult children’s individual goals if they did not conform to the ones that 
they had envisioned for them. It was even more difficult if they feared that their children 
seemed to be drifting towards life choices that would not only increase the distance 
between them but which would also make them unlikely to succeed by any conventional 
standards.  
Kuan describes how Chinese parents struggled to strike a balance between cultivating their 
child’s subjectivity and preparing them for survival in a highly competitive society with 
hardly any space for individuality. They grew up in a time when families still had more 
children and when educational achievement had not yet become such an exclusive 
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determinant of success. Like Kuan’s interlocutors, the parents of my Chinese as well as my 
Taiwanese informants were the first generation of parents who had to ask themselves 
whether they met the standards of “good parenting” (Kuan, 2015 pp. 209-210). Both the 
Chinese and Taiwanese mothers I met articulated their worries about the high competition 
and stressful environment their children were exposed to. Yet, at the same time they 
wanted their children to succeed which made it difficult not to evoke any pressure.  
 
1.4. Conclusion 
The accounts above illustrate how discourses about filiality and parent-child relations have 
changed over time and how such changes are evaluated by the different generations.  There 
is a struggle for both generations to reconcile traditional values of filiality with the 
competing ideals that political ideology, new economic opportunities or modern urban 
lifestyle constitute. Moreover, one important theme is the desire of young adults to have an 
active dialogue between the generations in order to enable their parents to understand their 
hopes and aspirations. Thus, my observation made in Beijing and in Taiwan parallel those 
made by Evans in the Chinese capital in the early 2000s (Evans, 2008; 2010). However, 
while Evans only interviewed young women, my interviews with members of both sexes 
confirm that young men have similar communication problems with parents as their female 
peers. Not being able to communicate personal aspirations concerning their education, 
careers, and romantic relationships, they often felt at a loss of how to maintain good 
relationships with their parents in the future.  
In particular, I observed that many instances of intergenerational conflict were based on a 
disparity of ideals in terms of personal autonomy. However, there were important 
differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese cases. Taiwanese mothers maintained 
rather traditional ideals of filial piety. Although some adult children, like Shu-fen and Pei-
chun, were willing to conform to these expectations, even if this meant having to sacrifice 
their personal goals, others, like Ma-ling, struggled to integrate parental demands with her 
pursuit of an independent urban lifestyle. 
Chinese mothers, at least during their children’s childhood, valued independence as a 
prerequisite for academic and professional success. However, as the cases of Liang and 
Xiao-xiao have demonstrated, their way of instilling this sense of independence in their 
children could also cause feelings of rejection in them. Moreover, many Chinese 
informants mentioned that as they reached adulthood, their mothers also started to 
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articulate rather traditional expectations with regard to marriage and childbirth. Liang felt 
overwhelmed by his mother’s increasing demands for him to be present in her life, whereas 
during his childhood, he was left mostly to himself. He found it puzzling that despite the 
liberal parenting he had experienced as a child, and his mother’s negative experiences of 
marriage, her wish for him to marry became increasingly stronger. Likewise, Xiao-xiao 
found it difficult to understand the pressure her mother exerted on her to marry early since 
her mother had traumatic experiences during her first marriage. Moreover, she had also 
always conveyed to her that academic achievements and a successful career were the most 
important goals. Jun Zhang and Peidong Sun observed a similarly rapid change of mind 
among parents of highly educated daughters in Shanghai (Zhang and Sun, 2014 p. 135). 
While having stressed the importance of academic achievements during young adulthood, 
they worried when their daughters had not found a husband as they approached their 
thirties and tried different strategies to secure their timely marriage. At that time, many 
parents regretted not having granted their only children more freedom to find a partner. 
There might be other factors contributing to the return to traditional values that these 
Chinese mothers demonstrated as they grew older. While those I talked to still emphasized 
the importance of their children’s autonomy, their awareness of their needs with regard to 
financial and physical assistance in the future might have been heightened by their 
experiences of divorce and separation. Thus, in the Chinese cases it is difficult to tell 
whether the tendency to make rather traditional demands of adult children that contradict 
ideals with which they were raised is a result of the individual experiences of these mothers, 
or a broader trend pointing to more complex changes in the perception of old age security 
and filial duties.  
Except for Ma-ling’s mother, the Taiwanese mothers introduced in this chapter also 
experienced singledom at middle age due to the death of or separation from their husbands. 
Moreover, despite the more traditional values with which my Taiwanese informants were 
raised, they also found their mothers’ seemingly paradoxical expectations difficult to 
understand at times. On the one hand, the resentment Shu-fen’s mother felt for her parents 
was based on the traditionalism with which she was raised. On the other hand, she 
conveyed similarly strict values to her children which could potentially obstruct their 
personal career goals. Further, while she was warning her daughters of marriage, it 
appeared highly doubtful, measured by the otherwise strict rules she imposed, if she was 
willing to accept them living together with romantic partners without the intention of 
getting married. I frequently observed this seemingly liberal attitude towards marriage 
among Taiwanese mothers. Yet as was revealed after time, it did not necessarily give any 
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indication if they indeed accepted their children’s future romantic relationships without any 
reservations. 
Most of the young adults and their mothers introduced above have thus experienced loss, 
either in the form of the death of a parent or the separation of their parents. This 
experience might have had an important influence on their emotional needs and 
expectations of the remaining parent. Moreover, it might also have increased their feeling 
of responsibility towards their mothers and made them more likely to conform to their 
expectations. 
Another shared trait between the Chinese and Taiwanese cases consists of experiencing an 
“emotional distance” from parents and this applies to both generations. In the parental 
generation, this distance was often precipitated by patriarchal notions of parental authority 
and a preference for sons. Mrs Fan, the energetic mother of Shu-fen, had told me that her 
mother had unsuccessfully tried to abort her. This feeling of being unwanted had 
overshadowed their relationship throughout childhood until today. Likewise, Xiao-xiao’s 
deceased grandmother had tried to put her mother up for adoption shortly after her birth. 
Her mother had confided this in her only recently and this opened Xiao-xiao’s eyes to the 
underlying reason for her mother’s distanced relationship with her mother. Lisa Rofel notes 
in this context that daughters born in the reform era were often surprisingly unknowing of 
their parents’ experiences. They had formed narratives of their parents’ struggles during the 
Communist era more by way of popular movies and literature than by way of their own 
accounts of the past (Rofel, 2007 pp. 117-118). This was also clearly the case among many 
Chinese informants and was an important factor that obstructed the deep, mutual 
understanding that the young men and women longed for. To most of my Chinese and 
Taiwanese informants, their mother’s life-choices, especially in terms of marriage, appeared 
rather arbitrary and difficult to comprehend. Many felt that their parents were guided by 
“outdated traditions,” “questionable political or religious beliefs” or “misguided advice” 
from parents and in-laws.  
The tendency for Chinese mothers to demonstrate a greater acceptance of early 
independence in their children may stem from their experiences as they came of age during 
the Cultural Revolution. Although they had not necessarily unquestioningly accepted the 
political ideals propagated by the CCP during their youth, they came of age under a 
political system that did not endorse familial hierarchies and that supported youth’s 
autonomy from parents. Later in their lives, these concepts may have been blended with 
concerns for a secure old age, which led them to return to more conservative expectations 
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of children. The realization that, by contrast to their parents, they only had one child 
available for future support might have aggravated their worries. Kuan notes that “Chinese 
social reality is tremendously contradictory and inconsistent, and this poses constant 
challenges for actors on the ground - challenges that require the reconciliation of 
contradictory moral goods and the location of opportunities for exercising personal 
efficacy” (Kuan, 2015 p. 8). This chapter has illustrated that the diverse moral values that 
have influenced parent-child relationships in different ideological eras are now closely 
entangled. With changing personal, societal and individual circumstances, also mutual 
expectations between parents and children shift. For this reason, notions of 
intergenerational obligations appeared rather ambiguous within the families of my Chinese 
informants and had to be renegotiated continuously over the life course. 
In Taiwan, KMT party ideology had not contested traditional notions of filial piety. 
Accordingly, the concepts of filiality to which parents were exposed while growing up were 
not as seriously challenged during their youth. However, due in part to the women’s 
movements of the late 1970s and 1980s and increasing access to international media, new 
discourses on gender equality and personal autonomy started to contest ideals of parenting 
and filial obligations (Rubinstein, 1999 pp. 384-386). Nevertheless, the comparatively 
traditional values that the parents of my Taiwanese informants conveyed to their children 
were less ambiguous than those of their Chinese counterparts. However, this does not 
mean that these values were also easier to realize in modern Taiwan. Whereas their Chinese 
peers benefited from the independence that they had already established from their parents 
and that made it easier for them to ignore or negotiate certain demands, Taiwanese young 
adults were usually more dependent on their parents, making it more difficult to defy their 
requests. Pei-chun, for instance, felt morally bound to stay in his mother’s household in 
Taipei; this was due to his position as her only son and the only remaining male in the 
family. Likewise, Shu-fen, her mother’s eldest child and close confidant, felt obliged to 
return home to Taipei after her studies abroad. Liang, by contrast, had promised his 
mother to stay with her in Beijing until she was in better health, yet refused to make any 
commitment to stay in the city for the future.  
Xiao-xiao and Ma-ling were - perhaps due in part to their relative financial independence - 
rather successful in distancing themselves from their mothers. However, whereas Xiao-xiao 
lived unobserved by family members in Beijing, Ma-ling shared her flat in Taipei with her 
sister and future brother-in-law; this made her more susceptible to her family’s control. 
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Despite these differences, in both societies parents’ expectations were countered by their 
children yearning for parental affection and mutual understanding. It is at the intersection 
of these different expectations that most intergenerational conflicts emerged. Whereas 
parents expected their offspring to reciprocate and be appreciative of the educational 
opportunities they had offered them (often at considerable personal sacrifice), children 
yearned for emotional closeness and communication.  
However, young Chinese and Taiwanese increasingly started to challenge traditional 
parenting and notions of filiality by asserting their needs. They criticized concepts of 
parental care that focused solely on the provision of material support and education but 
neglected their need for emotional warmth and understanding. Many deplored the fact that 
their parents had not equipped them to discover their personal interest as they were pushed 
to fulfil normative societal goals which let them struggle to find individual purpose in their 
later life. Moreover, the particularities of the different education systems in China and 
Taiwan additionally reinforced the different trends in terms of personal autonomy from 
parents.  
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Chapter Two - Educational Choices and the Fostering of Independence  
2.1. Introduction 
Ming-yue and I were clinging to our seats as the bus sped up, winding through the crowded 
streets of  Beijing’s central Haidian district. “I think you are right about what you wrote in 
your research proposal,” Ming-yue suddenly burst out. Ming-yue and her friend, Chao, both 
PhD students at the university where I was a research associate, wanted to take me on a 
boat trip around the lake in the Purple Bamboo Park close to the National Library. Chao 
had found a seat at the back of  the bus, leaving Ming-yue and me a few minutes to talk in 
private. “My professor gave me your proposal to read before you came. You wrote that 
many Chinese parents have problems understanding their children and cannot give them 
very good advice for their future. I have the same problem with my parents.”  
Ming-yue and her classmate, Chao, shared the experience of  having left their rural Hebei 
home villages as adolescents to continue their education. Since that time, not only the 
educational but also the spatial gap between them and their parents had widened. Although 
Chao was very assertive and, as a Party member, already had a clear plan for his future as a 
government official, Ming-yue appeared to be shier and less confident about her studies 
and career plans; Chao often teased her in my presence because of  this. Ming-yue had told 
me that her parents were farmers who had received little formal education and who could 
thus read and write only with difficulty. As they were not acquainted with the education 
system, they could not offer her any advice during her schooldays. Instead, her elder 
brother, who had studied at a polytechnical college, supervised her performance and 
educational choices.  
We did not have any more time to chat as the bus came to a halt and we rushed to get off  
before new passengers pushed through the doors. It was one of  those rare, clear days when 
there was no smog darkening the sky and, like us, many people had taken the opportunity 
to enjoy the last rays of  the warm autumn sun. Compared to the bustling streets, the park 
seemed serene. Willow trees swayed in the wind, their branches brushing the surface of  the 
glistening water of  a lake. Colourful boats carrying young couples and families glided 
through the waves, searching for pathways through the dense fields of  water lilies. As we 
strolled along the pathways, we observed groups of  elderly people square-dancing to 
Chinese pop songs that blasted from crackling speakers, while others played cards under 
the shade of  trees or practised taijiquan. “We will only be able to do this once we’ve 
retired,” Ming-yue sighed as she considered the relaxed scene.  
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It was the first time in months, they told me, that they had taken some time off  from 
studying. Both were rushing to finish their PhDs in order to free their rural families from 
the strain their prolonged studies had placed on them. At the same time, they were unsure 
about how to reconcile their busy city lives with their filial obligations to their parents in 
the future. Chao was unsure whether his plan to bring his parents to the city once he had a 
job would work out; Ming-yue was unsure whether she should return to her home province 
even though job prospects in Beijing were brighter. Having lived in school and university 
dorms since their teenage years, Chao and Ming-yue had got used to being beyond parental 
control. Yet their impending graduation reminded them that they would soon have to 
decide whether they wanted to stay in the city; this risked turning their temporary 
separation from their parents into a permanent one.  
Many young Chinese students and professionals I met in Beijing struggled to reconcile the 
multiple obligations they felt towards their families. They wanted to increase their families’ 
social status and wealth by having a successful career in the capital. To achieve this goal, 
they needed to excel at their studies into which their parents had invested many of  their 
resources. In most cases, this could only be realized through rigorous studying which 
compelled many of  my informants to remain on campus instead of  visiting their families 
for important holidays. Similarly, those who worked in professional jobs could mostly only 
visit their families once or twice a year during the short vacations. An extended separation 
from their parents was thus the price many young Chinese paid for their ambitions.  
I started my fieldwork in Beijing shortly after I had left my first field site in Taipei. With the 
memories of  my Taiwanese informants and their close relationships with their parents still 
fresh in my mind, I initially found it striking that many Chinese parents, urban and rural 
ones alike, seemed to be relatively accepting of  a long-lasting spatial separation from their 
children. Most of  my rural Chinese informants had to leave their homes upon entering 
junior or senior high school. Likewise, many young urbanites I got to know had been sent 
to boarding institutions, sometimes as early as at kindergarten age. In Taiwan, leaving the 
family home before starting tertiary education would have been a rare experience for my 
informants. In the few cases in which this did occur, it mostly applied to those from well-
off  upper middle class families who were pursuing a specialized education or who spent 
parts of  their high school years in the US or Canada. In Taiwan, leaving the family home at 
a young age for educational purposes could thus rarely be attributed to deficiencies in the 
local social infrastructure; it was more a symptom of  a family’s financial affluence. 
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Thus, my Chinese and Taiwanese informants had quite distinct experiences during their 
school careers which, in the long run, might have had a significant impact on 
conceptualizations of the parent-child relationship and expectations of future support. In 
addition, the different degrees of personal autonomy these experiences fostered may also 
have played a decisive role in the way in which young adults approached major life choices 
and their willingness to assume responsibility for their decisions.  
 
2.2. Education and Separation from Family Members in China and Taiwan 
Ming-yue still vividly remembered an incident that took place during her first weeks at 
senior high school (gaozhong) after she had moved out of her parental home in rural Hebei. 
Full of excitement, she was counting down the days to her parents’ first visit to the school. 
A parental visit was something special, even more so in these first weeks when her 
separation from them was still fresh in her mind and thus all the more painful. On the 
morning of the long-awaited day, however, she received the disappointing news that 
parental visits had been cancelled at short notice. She and her classmates were devastated 
and hid crying in their dormitory together. “In these first days,” she recalled, “I had a very 
heavy heart” (wo de xinqing tebie bu hao). 
Like many of my Chinese informants, Ming-yue could not recall many pleasant memories 
from her time at high school. She had to leave her home village when she was sixteen years 
old in order to continue her education in a neighbouring city. Since then, she was only 
allowed to return home once a month. In the beginning, she found it difficult to adjust to 
sharing a dormitory with her classmates and obeying the strict rules at the boarding school. 
The students were woken up at half past six in the morning and, from then on, their day 
was strictly scheduled. Even at weekends they had to follow a rigorous study plan.  
Ming-yue soon suffered from the stifling pressure that became even more intense before 
the national exam (gaokao). At that time, her busy schedule did not leave her much time for 
resting. “I never felt happy at high school at all,” she complained to me, “for three years, I 
had no time to enjoy myself. I would have liked to finish high school earlier, but if I had 
dropped out, I would not have known what to do instead […]. If I had quit school, my 
parents would have been sad and I did not want to let them down.”  
Ming-yue’s account is by no means exceptional but resembles the memories many young 
adults had of their childhood in both rural and urban China (Hansen, 2015; Kipnis, 2001; 
2011; Roberts, 2013). Like Ming-yue, many Chinese have to leave their natal homes in their 
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early teenage years or even earlier to prepare for the national exam at boarding schools. 
Rural students often live in places too remote to be able to commute to school every day. 
Consequently, they have to move to neighbouring cities to complete their education after 
finishing primary or junior high school. However, there are also urban middle class families 
who prefer to send their children to special boarding institutions in the same city in order 
to secure the best education possible for them.  
The memories of my Chinese informants resonate strongly with Hansen’s observations at a 
rural boarding school in Zhejiang (Hansen, 2015). She remarks,  
“[…] because of the needs of parents to make ends meet and at the same time have their 
children attend school and be taken care of, compounded with the growing expectations 
for their children’s future success, most children were sent to boarding schools or private 
homes from  the age of twelve or younger” (p. 45). 
Hansen also notes the psychological challenges parents and children encounter due to 
separation during the school year. She reports that students were “[…] suffering from little 
contact with parents and other close relatives, living lives that were structured by the 
demands for schooling and in which daily emotional support and contact depended on 
their peers or on the personalities of the teachers […]” (p. 44). Moreover, she explains how 
schools stylized the stress elicited by the achievement pressure and long absence from 
home into an individual willpower challenge. Directing the responsibility for psychological 
stress back onto the students compounded their problems: it contributed to the perception 
that failure in the classroom or homesickness had to be attributed to personal weakness 
and an inability to adapt rather than to the structural shortcomings of the schooling system 
(p. 139).  
Pressure to perform often starts far earlier for Chinese children. From kindergarten 
onwards, they are prepared to succeed by the many preparatory tests that will eventually 
lead to the national exam (gaokao). This exam will decide their professional careers as it 
assigns them to universities of different ranks according to their performance. In particular, 
entrance to an urban university offers the opportunity to obtain employment in the cities 
and an urban residence registration (feinongye hukou). Formal residence in the cities facilitates 
access to the urban housing market and certain state benefits that are restricted to the 
urban population (Jacka et al., 2013 pp. 65-81). Accordingly, especially rural families regard 
formal education as their children’s only opportunity to climb the social ladder and 
exchange their unfavourable status as peasants into the more prestigious position of a 
government official or employee at a successful private company (Kipnis, 2001; 2011).  
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The only valid ticket to these desirable positions and to modern city life in China’s coastal 
areas is thus a university degree, preferably from one of the first-tier urban universities (yi 
ben daxue). For this, China’s rural students compete with the urban population with the 
latter being granted considerable advantages in the application process (Kipnis, 2001 pp. 
20-21). Moreover, many urban students, whose families are often equipped with greater 
financial resources than rural ones, attended important key point schools; this increases 
their competitive advantage in securing a place at a popular university (Kuan, 2015). A 
strict school education that often involves sending children away from home at a young age 
was thus perceived by many of my informants’ families as the only way to succeed in the 
national exam that will decide not only the students’ but the whole families’ futures.  
The feeling of longing for home that Ming-yue described above was a feeling many young 
Chinese closely associated with adolescence. Hence, anticipating the return of family 
members from migrant work or long business trips often became an integral part of their 
childhood. Children were generally left in childcare facilities or with relatives during their 
parents’ absences; often, they struggled with feelings of being “left behind.”  
Stafford notes that separation and reunion are highly significant themes in Chinese culture 
(Stafford, 2000 b). This is not only reflected in the variety of religious rituals that revolve 
around the greeting and sending off of ancestors, gods and spirits, but also in the 
importance placed on the proper welcoming and bidding farewell to family members and 
guests (ibid.). Partings and returns are moments when family ties are reconfirmed and they 
remind family members of the contingencies that every separation entails. Farewell and 
welcome dinners, sending family members off to train and bus stations and longingly 
awaiting their return were thus in many cases incisive events that may have had a deep 
impact on the way in which my Chinese informants conceived of their own future. 
Moreover, for many families, partings also signified a renewed hope for a better future that 
could be achieved through academic and professional successes in the cities. Stafford notes 
in this context that  
“[…] many families in modern rural China and Taiwan accept the necessity for their 
children to go away, at least for a while, to places where opportunities are greater. 
Sometimes, they even express the hope that their children will “become dragons” (chenglong) 
and eventually “leap the dragon gate” (tiaolongmen): i.e. become successful by jumping over 
the gates which symbolically, and sometimes literally, separate the powerful from those 
outside. It is assumed that if this were to happen, they would then share their success, and 
their insider-access which accompanies it, with their own families” (Stafford, 2000 b p. 97). 
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Seeing siblings, friends and neighbours leaving their homes to attend schools in the cities, 
their own educational itinerary appeared to be laid out for them already. Educational 
achievement and the chance to get a secure workplace were thus strongly associated with 
separation from family members for an indefinite period of time.  
Chao was one of these young people who had experienced early on the absence of a parent; 
his account of his school career illustrates that separation was a recurrent motif in his 
family’s striving for a better future through which they hoped to be reunited in the end. 
Chao’s parents were both migrant workers who had moved from their home village in 
Hebei Province to Guangzhou where his mother worked as a cleaner and his father had 
found employment at a chemical plant. When Chao was a child, he and his mother lived on 
the farm of his paternal grandparents. He only saw his father on his annual visits home at 
Chinese New Year. However, his father wrote him letters regularly which Chao still 
cherished and kept stacked together in his closet. In these letters, his father urged him to 
study diligently so that, one day, he would be able to have a better life than his parents. 
Chao’s father had a middle school education whereas his mother had only finished 
elementary school. As his father resented his lack of education that restricted him to low-
skilled jobs, he instructed Chao’s mother to carefully supervise their son’s schoolwork. 
Chao confessed to me that even at primary school, he felt a lot of pressure (yali) to excel in 
class.  
As he was a good student, it did not take long for Chao’s teacher to ask if he wanted to 
become a team leader (dang duidao) with the Young Pioneers (shao xiandui), a group for 
schoolchildren organized by the Youth League of the Communist Party to which teachers 
could assign students based on their performance in the first grade (in second grade, every 
student will usually become a member by default) (Woronov, 2008). Chao liked being part 
of the group and eventually became the school leader. His task was to check if the pupils 
were wearing their red scarves (hong lingjin) properly and if the classroom had been cleaned 
satisfactorily. Every Monday, they had to assemble to raise the Chinese flag and sing the 
national anthem. Afterwards, a cleaning check was announced and the chairman gave a talk 
during which he encouraged them to study harder. Chao admitted that this was a rather 
boring ritual; nevertheless, he enjoyed his responsible role.  
In junior high school, the pressure to excel intensified. At the age of fourteen, Chao moved 
into the dormitory of the school. His memories of these years are rather bleak as he 
resented his crowded room and the bland food at the school canteen. From this time 
onwards, and throughout his years at senior high school and university, he boarded at 
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school. While the periods of separation from his parents grew longer, he increasingly 
became involved in the political youth group. Chao remembered proudly how his high 
performance enabled him to be one of the first of his classmates to be admitted to the 
CCP’s Youth League. Only the top ten students were accepted early; the others had to wait 
another year. 
As his involvement with political work deepened, Chao increasingly reflected on his 
family’s history. His paternal side of the family had been exceptionally poor. His great-
grandparents had been disabled and thus they were reliant on handouts from fellow 
villagers. Chao’s grandfather and his siblings had thus profited immensely from the land 
reform in the 1950s and the employment that was assigned to them in state enterprises. 
Even though his family was still struggling to get by, Chao felt a strong urge to “give 
something back” to the party for the assistance his family received decades ago. Chao was 
especially inspired by his paternal grandfather’s brother who had been in a leading position 
at a state-owned factory. Although he did not have any higher education, Chao often asked 
him for advice during his studies when his parents could not help him. At this time, his 
aspiration to continue his political work in his future career took shape and, after long 
consultations with his great uncle, Chao decided to study for a degree that would allow him 
to pursue a career in government.  
As an initial step towards realizing his dream, he wanted to become a member of the CCP, 
which could only be achieved at that young age through extraordinary commitment. 
However, as he was involved in a number of extracurricular activities at senior high school, 
he was indeed selected for CCP membership due to his organizational skills at the school’s 
sports competition. He also scored highly enough in the gaokao to be admitted to a 
renowned university in Beijing where he was eventually offered a place on a PhD 
programme. Close to realizing his dreams, he looked to the future with confidence. As 
soon as possible, he wanted his parents to quit their migrant work and buy a house for 
them in the city where he would find a job. He regretted, he once told me, that he had not 
had the opportunity to spend much time with them during his childhood. He now wanted 
to make up for that lost time. 
In Chao’s case, separation did not weaken his feeling of filiality to his parents as he and his 
parents were committed to a common goal that tied them together across the geographical 
distance. They hoped that their investments in Chao’s education would pay off not only in 
terms of securing their old age but that it would also enable them to be permanently 
reunited again in the future. Many of my Chinese informants’ parents did not seem to 
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consider their children’s sense of filiality to be endangered by their long absences as long as 
they actively contributed to the family’s future well-being. Daniel Roberts argues along 
similar lines and notes that  
“ […] contemporary kinship morality in China […] is not, nor does it need to be, internally 
consistent (one can both wish to see one’s children often while encouraging them to work 
in faraway cities); and […] very different strategies can be chosen or praised based on 
competing priorities and circumstances” (Roberts, 2013 p. 165). 
James Johnston has observed similar transformations in the notion of filiality among rural 
college students in Anhui (Johnston, 2013). He notes that students’ experiences of 
extended periods of separation from parents and other family members during childhood 
did not only form certain expectations in terms of their personal future, but also shaped a 
perception of spatiality based upon “moral judgments associated with movements in 
particular directions” (p. 56). They observed villagers who had obtained permanent urban 
residence returning from the cities in fashionable, modern clothes sporting all kinds of 
modern consumer goods. Further, also their own trips from their humble village to the 
more developed neighbouring towns alluded to children that a movement away from the 
home village did not only entail a spatial move but also a material advancement from 
poverty to wealth (p. 58). Associating status and wealth with urban life, many Chinese 
informants from rural backgrounds thus regarded separation from their parents as 
inevitable, at least until they had firmly established themselves in Beijing.  
In Taipei, things appeared quite different. Many of my Taiwanese informants had relatives 
in the countryside but it was their parents who had made the move from farms to the city. 
Most of these parents now worked in corporate jobs or for small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the urban areas of Taiwan. Due to the relative affluence they had achieved, 
most of the young Taiwanese I got to know were less concerned about securing their 
parents’ old age and were more interested in fulfilling their families’ expectations so as to 
continue their successes in the future.  
As Taiwan is significantly smaller and more urbanized than China, children usually do not 
leave their parental homes until graduation from senior high school (gaozhong); boarding 
schools are rare. Many young people, especially those living in the highly urbanized regions 
of Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung, often continue to live at home while attending 
university. Moreover, as recent research has shown, those who leave to study at other 
locations in Taiwan often return to their natal homes after graduation (Huang, 2013).  
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Similar to the Chinese gaokao, the Taiwanese national exam (liankao) takes place after the 
last year of senior high school; like its Chinese counterpart, it assigns the subject to be 
studied and the rank of university to students. The higher education market in Taiwan is 
highly saturated; accordingly, after passing the national exam, almost every student will be 
able to secure a place at one of the many public or private universities scattered all over the 
island. Yet the competition to be admitted to one of the high-ranking public institutions of 
higher education, promising better opportunities on the job market, remains fierce. Even 
though most of these elite universities are situated in Taipei and along its urban fringe, 
there are renowned universities to be found in most parts of the island. Thus, many young 
people choose a university close to the parental residence in order to avoid any extra 
expenses for accommodation or food in the relatively expensive Taiwanese cities.  
Whereas in China parents and students alike worry that their children’s exam scores will 
not be high enough to be admitted to a high ranking urban university facilitating the 
acquisition of an urban residence registration, in Taiwan, parents often have quite contrary 
concerns about their children’s future residence. They fear that they will get into a 
university which is too far away from home. First, this would limit some of the authority 
parents have over their children. Second, having to pay for their children’s livelihood in 
another city would mean an extra and, in many parents’ eyes, an unnecessary expense. 
Although the reputation of a university undoubtedly plays a major role in their decision as 
well, location is another key aspect. Especially families that already reside in one of 
Taiwan’s urban centres expect their children to remain living at home. This was the case 
with Shu-fen’s family; Shu-fen’s sister wanted to study at a university in a part of Taiwan 
too remote for a daily commute from their house in Taipei. Her mother refused to let her 
leave home and only allowed her to apply for universities in Taipei. 
Whereas moving to the capital signifies economic progress for many rural Chinese, many 
Taiwanese families prefer to live outside of Taipei. Apart from the rising real estate prices 
and high living costs that make the city less and less attractive to many Taiwanese, Taipei 
also has the reputation of being too damp and cloudy compared to other areas in Taiwan 
that are considered more favourable in terms of climate and scenery (Chao, 2014). Likewise, 
many young Taiwanese I met dreamt of moving to a more pleasant location on the island 
in the future.   
Extended separation from parents during childhood and adolescence was thus rather rare 
for the generation of my Taiwanese informants. Because of the relatively coherent level of 
78 
 
infrastructure development across the island, notions of the “urban” were not as charged 
with ideas of modernity and progress as in the Chinese context. 
The case of You-peng, a twenty-five year old medical student, demonstrates the rather 
typical biography of an ambitious young adult from an urban middle-class family in Taipei. 
When I met him through a mutual friend, he was still living with his parents and younger 
brother in an affluent Taipei suburb. You-peng and I got along well immediately. He was 
extremely interested in my studies and we often met at tea shops in the afternoons after he 
finished his part-time job as an academic assistant of his supervisor. You-peng had a strong 
interest in Taiwanese and US politics and was eager to discuss his opinions with me. He 
was planning to apply for a master’s degree abroad at that time and each opportunity to 
practice his English appeared to be welcome. You-peng’s father had a lucrative job so his 
parents could afford to generously sponsor their sons’ education. You-peng was about to 
graduate from a postgraduate programme at one of the country’s most prestigious 
universities located in the city centre. He had never left his parental home as all the 
educational institutions he had attended were located in his immediate environment. 
After primary school, You-peng was accepted by one of Taipei’s most renowned all-boys 
high schools; the school was famous for its high success rate in sending students to first-
class Taiwanese universities. Due to his high liankao score, he was admitted to a popular 
medical programme right after graduation. His parents always had high ambitions for him 
and, as the eldest son, he felt that the pressure to achieve weighed more heavily on him 
than on his more adventurous, younger brother. From early on, You-peng told me, he had 
felt that he was supposed to act as a “model son” and he internalized his parents’ wish for 
him to have a successful career in a prestigious profession. When he was still a schoolboy, 
they made it clear to You-peng that they wanted him to become a surgeon and he accepted 
their wish without much opposition. You-peng was a diligent student and did not greatly 
question his parents’ authority over his educational choices at that time. It seemed self-
explanatory for him to apply for a prestigious medical study programme after he had 
graduated from senior high school. He confessed to never having decided much on his 
own until the beginning of his twenties. However, things changed during his time at 
university. Although he genuinely enjoyed studying medicine, he could not picture himself 
working as a surgeon, the career his parents had envisaged for him. Instead, he would like 
to stay in academia to do research.  
During the time You-peng participated in my study, his parents pushed hard for him to 
apply for a placement on a residency training programme at a hospital as the next step 
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towards becoming an accredited surgeon. You-peng refused, arguing that once he had 
started the residency, there would be no turning back for him as his parents would 
continue to push him to work as a physician afterwards. They could not understand why he 
would jeopardize his chances of a highly prestigious career for a low-paid position in 
academia. You-peng insisted on his choice and started to prepare his application for a PhD 
programme at a renowned university in the US; he wanted to study epidemiology.  
In many of our conversations, he exhibited a profound interest in US political history and 
the American lifestyle. He once confessed to me that he would love to have experienced 
growing up in North America, where, he imagined, one could be “in charge of” one’s life 
decisions without parental interference. In Taiwan, he complained, parents could be very 
authoritarian even with their grown-up children. They would “suggest” things with the 
expectation that their orders would be followed.  
However, after a few months, his parents seemed to have calmed down a bit; they consoled 
themselves with the prospect of their son’s plan to study at an Ivy League institution; this 
would mitigate the loss in status incurred by not becoming a surgeon. Moreover, You-peng 
had made it clear to me, and most likely to his parents as well, that he intended to return to 
Taiwan after he had completed his education abroad as he could not imagine building a 
career or family abroad. For the time being, however, he needed to “break free” from the 
restraints of his parental home. Indeed, after he graduated from his programme and 
completed his military service, he secured a place for a Master’s at Stanford University; he 
started it hoping to be able to enrol in a PhD programme afterwards. When he failed to 
secure the study place he desired, however, he returned, as promised, to Taipei to pursue 
his career path there. 
Unlike Chao, the Chinese PhD student introduced above, You-peng had been living in the 
parental household up until his mid-twenties; many of his problems stemmed from this 
close cohabitation with his family. Whereas Chao’s parents hoped that their son would 
achieve financial security for the family, the ambitions of You-peng’s parents were more 
centred on him maintaining their middle-class status in the ever more competitive 
environment of Taipei. Like in China, university education had become increasingly 
standard for the generation born after 1980. Degrees at renowned international universities 
were thus new “status markers” that could open doors to prestigious careers amidst the 
steady devaluation of university degrees in Taiwan (Chen and Chang 2010). Even though 
You-peng appeared to be self-confident and independent in the way in which he pursued 
his degree and plans to study abroad, he struggled to convey his wish for autonomy over 
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his decisions to his parents. Whereas Chao had been able to find his own peer group within 
the Party’s youth organization, You-peng had not been able to carve out a niche for 
himself. He was very active in the local Catholic church but so were his parents; their 
surveillance thus extended into his leisure activities. Their invasion of his private sphere 
was a constant topic in our conversations.  
You-peng started to date a Taiwanese woman from a southern city during my fieldwork; 
ever since, his parents had been constantly “on guard,” fearing that his romantic 
relationship with a young teacher would interfere with his studies. She was a junior high 
school teacher and had not taken the national teacher qualifications certification exam. 
Thus, she only had a comparatively low salary. His parents, You-peng complained, saw her 
as a disappointment. In today’s Taiwan, he added, only “brand name” universities and 
exams counted.  
Unlike many of the Chinese informants, You-peng did not have to worry about financing 
his education or his parents’ old age. However, having achieved a relatively high 
socioeconomic status and comfortable lifestyle, his parents expected You-peng to surpass 
their achievements in his professional career. At the same time, they did not appear to be 
willing to give up on rather conservative filial ideals and they expected to have a say in their 
son’s choice of partner.  
In China, I experienced a comparable obsession with “brand name” education and 
professional status in some informants from urban and more affluent backgrounds. Social 
positioning in the urban environment of Beijing appeared to take place against the 
background of the state-sponsored notion of “population quality” (renkou suzhi). This 
notion was employed not only to create a distance from the migrant population but also so 
that one could stand out from the “nouveau riche”. 
 
2.3. The Concern for Quality and Status in the Urban Environments of Beijing and 
Taipei 
Shortly after introducing the one-child policy strictly regulating women’s fertility in 1979, 
the CCP designed new measures that went beyond merely controlling population growth 
(Fong, 2004 pp. 70-75). In the 1980s, the Chinese government developed a concept of 
human quality (suzhi) that set standards against which the degree of a citizen’s moral 
cultivation and educational attainment was measured (Fong, 2007; Kipnis, 2006; 2011 p. 
65). Accordingly, whereas during the Mao era, children and adolescents had been expected 
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to be fierce adherents of the party and support the communist cause, expectations altered 
in the reform era. The Chinese government recognized the need for highly educated 
professionals in order to advance the modernization of China’s economy (Chan, 1985 pp. 
60-69; Kipnis, 2011 p. 68).  
Elizabeth Croll points out that this new responsibility for forming high-achieving, patriotic 
subjects according to standards imposed by the ruling party was not left only to teachers. 
In order to form model citizens, parents now had to contribute to the state’s endeavour by 
laying the foundation for their children’s academic excellence, moral integrity and 
willingness to obey superiors in early childhood. Croll remarks that  
“[t]he new investment in, and significance attached to, the family or domestic group as a 
unit of socialisation follow thirty years of its marginalisation in this respect. […] To 
legitimise domestic socialisation and reduce the opposition between the influence of family 
and school, community and society, the family has been designated ‘the first school’ and, as 
such, a valid instrument for state intervention” (Croll, 1990 p. 149). 
The state did not only curtail couples’ powers of decision over their desired family size due 
to its comprehensive population control programme (the one-child policy) but also 
subjected parenting methods to the party’s agenda. In order to produce a citizen considered 
valuable by the state, parents thus had to ensure that their child attained the proper 
“human quality” through the correct formal and informal education. This situation was 
further exacerbated by the fact that those men and women who became parents in the early 
1980s had grown up during the Cultural Revolution when schools were either closed or, 
with the curriculum’s heavy emphasis on party ideology, did not receive the same education 
that deemed the Party valuable during the reform era. Hence, parents resorted to state-
sponsored parenting courses and evening schools that conveyed the knowledge needed in a 
society that increasingly rewarded educational success and professionalism (Croll, 1990 pp. 
149-150).  
The previous case studies from China have already given an impression of the difficulties 
parents faced when confronted with the new demands that a globalized economy and the 
urban labour market made of their children. So far, mainly the struggles of rural students 
who tried to bridge the spatial and socioeconomic gap between them and their parents in 
the countryside have been discussed within the context of education. However, this does 
not mean that students from urban backgrounds did not encounter similar feelings of 
alienation from their parents during their education. As the case of Liang in the previous 
chapter has illustrated, long separations from parents were also common in the cities. 
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Often these separations were a consequence of parents’ ambitions to provide the best 
education possible for their children. Many of them had come to Beijing from rural areas 
and accumulated wealth in the post-reform era but they fell short of the educational 
standards set by the state. Imbuing their children with “human quality” (suzhi) by enabling 
them to receive the best education possible was thus one of their priorities.  
Xing was one informant who had grown up in an affluent family in Beijing and whose 
parents were willing to make huge investments in his education. His case illustrates the way 
in which the spatial separation his parents enforced to cultivate suzhi in their son caused 
not only an emotional rift between them but also worsened any mutual understanding 
between them as Xing started to resent his family for what he perceived as their lack of 
“moral quality.” 
Xing’s parents grew up in rural Anhui and came to Beijing in the early 1990s to start a 
business. They were highly successful and ran a building supplies company. However, as 
they only had high school certificates, it was difficult for them to shed the rather derogative 
status of being “nouveau riche” in the capital. They thus decided to use their resources to 
offer their son an education that would enable him to earn those “signifiers of quality” that 
they had lacked and establish himself firmly within the capital’s educational elite.  
Kajanus has described the way in which Chinese families attempt to increase their 
socioeconomic status by making strategic educational choices in order to position their 
children within networks of the national and international elite; this endeavour often 
requires meticulous planning from childhood onwards, especially for those people who do 
not belong to the socioeconomic top layer of society (Kajanus, 2015). Whereas Xing’s 
parents seemed to have the money to enable their son to have an elite education, they 
lacked experience on the educational market; accordingly, they had to rely on the 
knowledge they acquired from parenting magazines, teachers and acquaintances so as to 
decide how they could place their son within China’s educational elite. 
I met Xing in a coffee shop close to his university. He was in his early twenties but looked 
very young for his age. He seemed friendly and attentive but I could not shake off the 
feeling of being unable to “reach” him. Even though he was not very reluctant about 
revealing intimate details of his private life, at times it seemed as though he was talking 
about another person instead of himself, almost as if he were playing a well-rehearsed role. 
Unlike other informants, Xing did not appear to be very interested in the research itself, 
nor did he wonder what I would make of the information he provided me with. 
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Throughout our long conversation, this apparent detachedness from his personal story 
never really dissipated. 
Xing was four years old when he was sent to an international boarding kindergarten in 
Beijing. He still remembered finding it difficult to adjust to this new environment and cried 
a lot. As he saw his parents only at weekends, Xing soon started to feel estranged from 
them. After kindergarten, Xing was sent to a boarding elementary school and the gap 
between them widened. At that time, however, he had already got used to living separately 
from his parents and his tight schedule at school left little room for homesickness.  
In the fifth grade, Xing’s life took an unexpected turn. He was offered the opportunity to 
travel to Canada with a group of students and teachers. In Toronto, he lived with local host 
families and he still remembers today how much he enjoyed this new environment. For the 
first time, he experienced the intimate familial atmosphere that he had missed out on at 
home. Looking back now, he realized that he had wished to feel a “parental love” that went 
beyond the financial care his family provided for him. His experience abroad prompted 
Xing’s wish for a future in North America, where he thought he had found a society that 
suited him better than the one he grew up in. 
When it was time to select a junior high school, Xing followed his mother’s advice who had 
studied Beijing’s school rankings exhaustively. He applied successfully to the city’s number 
one junior high school where he always ranked among the top of his class right from the 
outset. But his performance decreased towards the end of junior high school and he was 
not accepted by the senior high school of his choice. Conceiving of this failure in highly 
individualised terms, he attributed his dropping marks to his lacking working morals at that 
time; in particular to his love for reading comics. Full of remorse for his low scores, Xing 
was determined not to cause any more disappointment to his parents. His ambitions were 
additionally reignited by another school excursion to the US during which his class visited 
several Ivy League universities. Determined to study at one of these institutions one day, 
Xing studied even more devotedly. However, not only Xing himself was full of ambition 
during his preparations for the gaokao. In the months preceding the national exam, Xing’s 
mother attended seminars for parents and also read magazines about education to find out 
which subject would be most promising for him for the future. Together with Xing, they 
decided on his subject choice while also considering his ambition to study at a renowned 
American university. Eventually, Xing scored highly in the national exam and was admitted 
to study engineering at a first-tier university in Beijing.  
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Around this time, Xing’s relationship with his father became complicated when the latter 
left the family home to live with his mistress. After the separation, Xing’s mother was left 
in a dire financial situation which further motivated Xing to provide a secure existence for 
his mother. When talking about his family, Xing sometimes appeared full of resentment for 
the paternal side of his relatives whom he described as highly selfish and unreliable. 
Stressing their rural origins and lacking education as underlying causes for their “unethical” 
behaviour, his criticism was strongly informed by the government-informed discourse of 
“quality” (suzhi). Achieving independence through education was thus his way of setting 
himself apart from them and freeing himself from their influence.  
In his first year at university, Xing continued his strict study regime as the competition 
became even fiercer than at senior high school. In his second year, however, he became 
more socially active; he started to surround himself with Westerners in order to become 
accustomed to their culture and language and he set himself the goal that, after his 
graduation from the undergraduate degree, he would apply to a US university. Accordingly, 
whereas Chao exhibited “civilized” suzhi through his party involvement and reflections on 
his contributions to China’s future, Xing laid claim to a distinct urban notion of “superior 
human quality” perceived through the lens of international education and cosmopolitan 
desires.  
The case of Xing seems to suggest that the urban, affluent middle classes in Beijing are 
driven by a notion of suzhi that conceives of “quality” mostly as the ability to navigate a 
globalized urban intellectual culture. This culture is exclusive in the sense that economic 
assets are needed to become part of it, yet these assets are not sufficient in themselves to 
guarantee acknowledgement by its members. Likewise, Fong has stressed that among her 
young urban informants, high suzhi represented an “ideal personhood associated with 
urban modernity” (Fong, 2007 p. 88). Moreover, she observed different conceptualizations 
of suzhi in youth from different socioeconomic backgrounds; these are also reflected in the 
different notions of “personal quality” held by Chao and Xing: 
“To justify their claims to high quality, they emphasized definitions of quality that favored 
their own strengths: for instance, those who were wealthier defined quality in terms of the 
cosmopolitan associated with possession of a wide range of expensive hobbies, talents, and 
experiences; those who were poorer defined quality in terms of patriotism, morality, and 
good citizenship; those who were academically successful defined quality in terms of 
educational attainment; those who were academically unsuccessful defined quality in terms 
of a modern, cosmopolitan attitude and appearance” (pp. 86-87).  
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The stories of  Xing and Chao also both highlight parents’ - in particular mothers’ - 
responsibility for providing an environment where children can realize their academic 
potential and attain the standards of  high suzhi. Whereas Chao’s father was absent from 
home due to his work commitments in the south, Chao’s mother, who had only a limited 
education, was solely responsible for her son’s moral and academic development. Likewise, 
Xing’s mother felt responsible for guiding her son in terms of  important decisions in his 
educational career; this required her to rely on purportedly “professional” information 
from specialized literature and parenting courses.  
Referring to Hansen’s argument concerning the individualizing processes she observed in 
the Chinese educational sector, it thus appears as though responsibility for academic 
successes is not only diverted from the education system to students, but also to parents 
(mainly mothers) (Hansen, 2015 pp. 141-142). The mothers of  Chao and Xing were both 
highly anxious, according to their sons’ accounts, to fulfil their task of  providing adequate 
educational guidance. They worried about having to take the blame not only for their sons’ 
academic failures, but, in the same vein, for their inability to raise children who fulfilled the 
quality standards imposed by the state.  
Bayly describes similar observations in late-socialist Vietnam (Bayly, 2013). In Hanoi, she 
met mothers who felt responsible not only for the demands of  their families, but also for 
the demands of  the state and the nation to rear children who would excel in the 
educational system and thus help propel the country into an advanced state of  economic 
development. Besides their workplace tasks, she argues, “[Vietnamese] women must be 
successful as domestic nurturers” (p. 159). Yet at the same time, these mothers worry about 
conveying the image of  the notorious “tiger mother,” depicted by the international media 
as overambitious women pushing their children to their very limits to produce academic 
success (ibid.).  
This and the previous chapter seem to demonstrate that the same problems afflict Chinese 
and Taiwanese women in a similar way: first, the integration of  women’s dual work 
obligations; second, the conflict implied by satisfying children’s individual needs while 
preparing them for the competitive world of  work. Even though an evaluation of  children’s 
performance at schools is less governed by state-set standards of  “human quality” in 
Taiwan, academic achievement has moral connotations to the traditional concept of  filial 
piety and thus serves as a yardstick against which good parenting is measured. In this sense, 
the notion of  personal “quality” was not exclusive to my Beijing informants but could also 
be discerned in Taiwan. Even though it was not as politically charged as in China, specific 
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notions of  an individual’s suzhi also surfaced during my fieldwork in Taipei. I described 
above how You-peng’s parents disapproved of  his girlfriend because of  her low career 
ambitions which seemed to reflect badly on her overall qualities as a suitable wife for their 
son. Instead of  striving for the prestigious status of  a civil servant, she was content 
working in a lower-paid teaching position. It thus appears that in Taiwanese society, 
achievements in the educational and professional sectors are also conceptualized as a 
“moral achievement” within the framework of  filial duties that affect how a person’s 
“quality” is perceived. By realizing the potential their parents have “planted” by way of  
their care and support, children fulfil an important obligation in the intergenerational 
contract. Not striving for the highest achievements but, like You-peng’s girlfriend, being 
content with less prestigious positions, could thus imply a certain degree of  neglect of  
one’s filial duties - and idleness; this could have an unsettling effect, especially on the more 
traditionally minded Taiwanese parents like the ones of  You-peng, who might hope for the 
support of  a daughter-in-law in their old age.  
Furthermore - and this was more palpable among my Taiwanese than Chinese informants - 
expectations that women will rear high-performing children were closely formulated within 
the context of their obligations to the ancestors and future descendants of their husband’s 
lineage. As Pei-chun’s case in the previous chapter has illustrated, mothers tried to shield 
their children from misfortunes by providing them with protective charms, by praying for 
them at family shrines or temples or by consulting fortune-tellers about how to avoid any 
traps of fate. Most Taiwanese flats I visited had a prominent shrine around which the 
family gathered daily to ask for support and give offerings. Bayly made similar observations 
in urban Vietnamese houses: “It is before the altar that householders make their prayerful 
incense presentations, thereby making contact with the departed kin in whose responsive 
presence they aspire to lead a purposeful and achieving life” (Bayly, 2013 p. 169). Likewise, 
in Taiwan, the daily dialogue with ancestors might have contributed to parental notions of 
indebtedness to secure children’s prospering for the continuity of the family line.  
 
My younger informants were also concerned about ensuring the best spiritual support 
possible. This ranged from offering ID cards and exam information to Wenchang, the god of 
literature, to reflecting on which god might have the best expertise within their field of 
study. One young woman considered praying in a Christian church for an upcoming 
English exam since she expected that Jesus, whom she thought would have a better 
knowledge of Western languages, would be of greater assistance in this subject than 
Wenchang. Hence, similar to Bayly’s Vietnamese informants, the young Taiwanese I met 
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were highly concerned with the question of which instance one had to address “when 
wishing to fulfil one’s intricately intertwined achievement obligations to the living and dead: 
someone reliable, skilled and honest in the use of the appropriate psychic arts; in short, an 
achiever in the realm of supra-mundane achievement fostering” (p. 171). Spiritual 
protection was also an important matter for the parents of the Taiwanese woman 
introduced in the next case study. Yu-ching’s parents suffered from the death of their 
youngest child and the estrangement of their eldest daughter. The protection of Yu-ching’s 
spiritual and physical well-being was thus as closely observed as her academic achievements. 
 
Yu-ching was one of my closest female informants in Taipei. She had an exceptionally 
affectionate relationship with her parents, in particular to her father, and at times her life 
seemed to revolve around the urge she felt to realize the hopes they had placed in her. 
Several tragic events in the family had compounded the pressure on her since childhood. 
Yu-ching’s younger brother, her parents’ only son, died from complications during a 
childhood disease. Helpless in the face of her parents’ grief, Yu-ching decided to make up 
for the loss of her brother by realizing the dreams her parents had invested in him. Her 
elder sister, however, reacted in a very different way to her brother’s death and started to 
rebel against their parents’ strictness. She eventually left the family home and, soon after, 
became pregnant out of wedlock. Yu-ching’s parents were devastated and even though they 
continued to support their eldest daughter, they almost entirely broke off contact with her.  
For a long time, I assumed that Yu-ching was an only child, an impression that was 
reinforced by her remarkably close and caring relationship with her parents. I was thus 
surprised when she revealed after months that she had a dead brother and an estranged 
sister. Yu-ching explained that her parents, afraid that she would attract “bad company” at 
a regular school, sent her to an expensive private high school. Her parents owned a 
successful logistics company in Taipei and were thus affluent enough to invest in her 
private education. But they also anxiously watched over her physical and spiritual health. In 
Yu-ching’s childhood, her mother had consulted a fortune-teller who warned her that her 
daughter was at risk of having a car accident in her teenage years. Thus, her parents only 
allowed her to take her driver’s license in her early twenties. Moreover, since the death of 
her brother, her parents had found comfort in the Buddhist belief. Every Saturday, Yu-
ching and her parents attended a seminar with a Buddhist master (shifu) who gave her 
advice on private questions ranging from her career plans to her romantic relationships. 
This shared practice of belief appeared to strengthen ties between Yu-ching and her 
parents. 
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When Yu-ching was fifteen years old, she and her parents decided that she would continue 
her education in the US. However, unlike her Taiwanese peer, You-peng, who wanted to 
temporarily break free from his family bonds by way of a foreign education, Yu-ching had 
no such ambitions and returned home to Taipei after completing high school and an 
undergraduate degree in English in the US. Moreover, in contrast to him, she was rather 
indecisive about which educational path she should follow afterwards. She relied on the 
advice she received from her shifu and parents with regard to her subject and choice of 
university. They eventually agreed that she would study for a postgraduate degree in 
accounting, a subject her parents considered a suitable profession for her. They also 
remembered that a fortune-teller whom they had consulted years before had predicted that 
their daughter would work in a bank in the future. This confirmed their belief that they had 
made the right choice.  
Yu-ching admitted that even though she had lived relatively independently during her stay 
in the US, she found it difficult to make any independent decisions. Moreover, her parents, 
she complained, still treated her like a little girl, which made it even harder for her to free 
herself from their authority now that she was living at home again.  
I spent several days living in Yu-ching’s family home during a visit to Taipei in the late 
summer of 2013. At that time, not much had changed in her life. In the winter of the same 
year she had almost become engaged, but following the advice of her parents and her shifu, 
she ended the relationship. They were concerned that the young man was not as sincere 
and hard-working as they had hoped and they worried that he might not provide Yu-ching 
with the guidance and support they wished for. Yu-ching had already ended a previous 
relationship due to the disapproval of her parents and Buddhist teacher. In the same year, 
she also failed several assessment examinations at local banks. For these reasons, she 
appeared increasingly hopeless in still being able to find a suitable husband and starting the 
career her parents expected. As she neared the much feared mark of thirty years of age, the 
pressure of her parents on her to marry increased enormously. At the same time, they were 
unwilling to lower their expectations of Yu-ching.  
Yu-ching did not appear to be especially interested in the career she was pursuing but she 
stuck to her resolution to meet her parents’ ambitious expectations. Like You-peng, Yu-
ching could only prove her moral integrity in the Taiwanese context by returning to Taipei 
where she could reconcile her professional success with filial obligations of care. Like him, 
she worried about how she could fulfil her parents’ high expectations in terms of her career 
and marriage. Yet while You-peng pursued his career plans with determination, Yu-ching 
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often wavered. In one of those moments of doubt, she went to a local temple to ask the 
gods for guidance by drawing fortune sticks (chou qian), a popular divination practice5 in 
Taiwan. She was stunned by the accuracy of the response: the small paper slip she received 
said that she should decide on one single goal and focus her energies entirely on its pursuit. 
She could relate well to this advice but she had difficulty following it in her love life and 
career.  
Yu-ching’s and You-peng’s cases seem to demonstrate that parental and filial support in 
Taiwan is closely oriented on a spatially bound concept of mutual care which, it seems, has 
been partly transcended by Chinese parents and their children. Being physically present 
appears to be a cornerstone of the very definition of filial duties in Taiwan and thus even 
children’s absence for educational purposes is mostly only accepted for a restricted time 
period. This created a conflict among Taiwanese informants that was not as pronounced 
among their Chinese peers: on the one hand, they had to meet their filial obligations to 
achieve academic successes which, often, could only be realized through a prolonged 
absence from home (especially if it involved the pursuit of higher education abroad); on the 
other hand, they could only really be filial if they were physically present in their parents’ 
everyday lives. Another interesting difference is the greater interest in my Taiwanese 
informants to seek help and guidance through religious classes or divinatory methods; this 
was less prevalent among Chinese informants. Even though some of their parents had 
consulted fortune-tellers about their children’s well-being and visited temples, young 
Chinese often claimed to be not very familiar with such practices and often shrugged off 
any references to religion and divination. This may stem from a certain bias in my type of 
informant, from their perception of me as a Western researcher or from different 
ideological discourses that relegate folk religious beliefs to the realm of “backwardness” 
and rurality that, to them, indicates “low” suzhi. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In China and Taiwan, education is highly valued; parents will usually do their utmost to 
ensure that their children perform well at school so as to secure a place at a high-ranking 
university. However, due to the different demographic and spatial landscapes of China and 
Taiwan, the pursuit of a higher education and career was more often connected with an 
indefinite period of absence from families among Chinese informants than among their 
                                                 
5 See chapter six for a detailed explanation of chou qian. 
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Taiwanese peers. Accordingly, many parents of my Chinese informants seemed to consider 
a certain amount of independence as a prerequisite for future success in the competitive 
urban environment, whereas Taiwanese parents were afraid that too much autonomy might 
divert their offspring from the path of filial piety.  
Whereas academic and professional successes are pronounced goals of Chinese and 
Taiwanese families, expectations of filial support in China take into account the difficulties 
involved in bridging the geographic distance from children. In Taiwan, however, most 
parents expected their children to be physically present during their old age. This does not 
mean that Chinese parents did not possess the ideal of living close to their children in the 
future; however, this wish could only be realized as long as it did not compromise the 
careers of their children which would also very probably benefit supporting parents in their 
old age. In Taiwan, by contrast, parents were less expectant that their children’s career 
choices would cause an indefinite separation in the long run; they thus appeared less willing 
to compromise on their future expectations of support. 
The cases of Chao and Xing illustrate that, in China, early childhood experiences of the 
absence of parents facilitated children’s familiarization with the long periods of intra-
familial separation required to pursue secondary and tertiary education in later years. 
Especially the aspirations of rural Chinese people to improve the social position of their 
families, as Chao and Ming-yue’s stories illustrate, required a spatial relocation to cities. 
Notions of success among young Chinese people did not only imply a stable, highly paid 
job that was supposed to ensue after graduation, but also urban residency and the 
attainment of a superior “quality” (suzhi) through patriotic engagement in Chao’s case, or 
the cosmopolitan expertise that Xing aspired to.  
Successfully securing an urban hukou or, in rare cases, a foreign residence permit, and thus 
being able to relieve one’s parents of their arduous lives in the countryside, was considered 
the ultimate hallmark of success (Fong, 2011). In Taiwan, however, success had to be taken 
back home. Most of my informants felt compelled to return to their parents’ after having 
achieved a certain educational or professional status in order to demonstrate their sense of 
filial responsibility. This was the case with You-peng and Yu-ching. You-peng longed to 
realize his vision of freedom in the US but was determined to return home to Taipei to his 
parents after completing his degree. Yu-ching, who left home to attend high school and 
university in the US, returned to the parental home after completing an undergraduate 
degree; she planned to stay with her parents until marriage.  
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With regard to their residence choices, Yu-ching and You-peng were representative of 
those Taiwanese informants who had grown up in Taipei. Most of them lived with parents 
until marriage and only interrupted this form of co-residence for studies abroad. As they 
were from upper middle-class families, their educational choices were also rather typical 
since they did not stray too far from parental expectations and, in You-peng’s case, they 
tried to compensate for deciding against parental preferences by striving to be highly 
successful.  
However, You-peng was rather unusual in terms of the determination with which he 
pursued his career choice as well as his highly idealized image of US society. I only 
encountered such an idolization of a Western society again with Xing. Whereas You-peng, 
an ardent supporter of political liberalism, associated the US with his ideal of economic and 
political freedom, Xing pursued a notion of higher moral “quality” that he regarded as 
more realizable in a Western society than in China. While I heard other Chinese and 
Taiwanese informants talk longingly of life in a Western country, it was rare that they did 
so for reasons of such specific political or moral ideals. Moreover, the determination with 
which Xing and his parents pursued an elite education for him was almost unmatched by 
my informants in China and Taiwan. The case of Xing also highlights the problematic 
consequences of long-term separation from families addressed by Hansen (Hansen, 2015 
p.45). Xing had felt estranged from his parents, in particular his father, since early 
childhood. He had difficulties to closely communicate with them. Like Liang, the young 
man who worked with me at the consultancy who I introduced in the previous chapter, 
also Xing struggled with feelings of insufficiency when he could not meet his parents’ high 
demands on academic excellence. Both young men appeared to be torn between their love 
for their parents and their resentment for the perceived abandonment they experienced in 
childhood. 
The cases of Chao and Ming-yue, meanwhile, appeared to be highly representative of 
students who came to Beijing from rural areas and who succeeded in the educational 
system due to their willingness to study diligently, driven by the pursuit of a better life for 
themselves and their families. Almost at their goals, they were now unsure about how to 
continue with their plans. Would they be able to secure an urban hukou or should they 
return to their home provinces where they would be closer to their parents but where they 
would have to compromise on their careers?  
The socioeconomic differences between my Chinese and Taiwanese informants were 
undoubtedly responsible for Chinese families’ limited residence choices, whereas 
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Taiwanese families could prioritize location over potential income. While the parents of my 
rural Chinese informants in particular had invested a substantial share of their household 
resources in their children’s education and expected to rely on their financial help in old age, 
Taiwanese parents had more leeway as they had largely accumulated enough wealth to 
support themselves on retirement. Recent research has shown that Taiwanese elderly 
people do not only increasingly rely on personal savings but also that financial transfers 
within families have been reversed - from the older to the younger generation (Lai and 
Tung, 2015). This was reflected in the experiences of my Taiwanese informants who 
received generous support from their parents during higher education which, at the same 
time, created dependencies. Traditional expectations still manifest themselves in the wish of 
parents to live in close contact with their adult children in old age; often, children will feel 
pressured to meet these expectations due to the assistance they received in their youth (Hsu, 
2007; Whyte, 2004; 2005). However, this was becoming more and more difficult due to the 
globalization of the economy and the growing desirability of international studies and work 
experience.  
Although financial aspects play an important role in these different family dynamics, social 
prestige is another determinant that influenced parental attitudes towards children’s 
educational and professional careers. Academic credentials from first-tier or even foreign 
universities enhanced the whole family’s status in both societies. However, recognition was 
also garnered from children’s filiality. Children’s prolonged absences during periods of their 
education or career appeared to be more problematic in Taiwan than in China, where 
urban residence was more considered a marker of success. In Taiwan, by contrast, it 
seemed to be more likely that prolonged absence was perceived as filial neglect. Separation 
from children thus had to be weighed up against the gossip and emotional distress that 
their apparent lack of filial responsibility might cause in the long run.  
According to my observations in Beijing, Chinese parents seemed to be increasingly willing 
to follow their children in old age, whether to Beijing or abroad. This phenomenon might 
also be a consequence of parents’ own migratory experiences which may have influenced 
their sense of belonging to a certain place. The idea of returning “home” appeared to be 
becoming more and more obsolete among young Chinese people and their parents. Alex 
Cockain has observed the same development during his research among teenagers in 
Beijing. He describes how the high mobility that migrant work and the educational system 
bring about transformed the meaning of “home” (jia) from being understood as a 
permanent, steady settlement based on ancestral origins into a more fluid and mobile 
concept (Cockain, 2012 p. 78). Moreover, “[g]eographical movement also meant that 
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informants re-organized their personal networks, especially when they moved 
independently of parents, either following divorce or as a consequence of attending 
boarding school” (ibid.). In Taiwan, the older as well as the younger generations seemed to 
be significantly more attached to their home places than their Chinese counterparts.  
Johnston attaches a moral dimension to this loosening concept of “jia” (Johnston, 2013 pp. 
49-50). He distinguishes between antagonistic moral forces that drew his Chinese 
informants back to their families while simultaneously pushing them away. He argues that 
the “centripetal morality,” the moral importance placed upon attachment to the family that 
keeps persons close to their natal homes, stands in opposition to a “centrifugal” force that 
commands children to increase their families’ socioeconomic status through education and 
work in the cities (ibid.). I would like to take this theory further and argue, based on the 
case studies presented in this and the previous chapters, that this centripetal morality was 
substantially dissolved by the Communist campaigns. Further, the new economic demands 
emerging during the reform and post-reform era added to its weakening. Its demise might 
have been further fuelled by the discourse on suzhi and the one-child policy that both 
played to an overriding need for education in order to produce children that would 
function as ideal citizens and simultaneously as sole providers for aging family members 
(Fong, 2004). In Taiwan, these two discourses have started to diverge only recently; as a 
consequence, young Taiwanese felt caught between antagonistic forces; being pulled back 
and forth between different obligations and aspirations.  
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Chapter Three - Working towards the Future - Professional Aspirations  
3.1. Introduction 
Yue-ling looked stressed as she tried to navigate the car through the busy Saturday morning 
traffic in Taichung’s city centre, constantly having to evade speeding taxis and incautious 
pedestrians weighed down with bulging shopping bags. Yue-ling had invited me to join her 
on a visit to her paternal grandparents’ home for a weekend trip during which she wanted 
to unwind from her stressful job in Taipei. On a sunny Saturday in September, we thus set 
out southwards. Having been stuck in the traffic for some time, our conversation turned to 
her problems at work. Yue-ling was an accountant at her father-in-law’s company. The 
family business made electronic kitchen appliances and had its office with a number of 
employees situated in a suburb of Taipei. As she not only shared a workplace with her in-
laws, but was also living with them in the same apartment block, she felt increasingly 
stressed as concerns at work threatened to take over her private life as well. Just recently an 
incident happened that had reconfirmed that her boss and father-in-law did not 
acknowledge her as a full employee but only saw her in her role as his daughter-in-law.  
Recently her husband, Yang-wei, had a business meeting with a client in Tainan, a city 
located a four-hour drive south of Taipei. Despite the approaching typhoon and his 
father’s warning not to take the car under these conditions, he decided to drive to Tainan. 
When Yue-ling’s father-in-law learned that his son had disregarded his advice, he wrote an 
angry email to Yue-ling, accusing her of not taking enough care of his son. Perhaps due to 
a lack of media savvy, or in an effort to shame Yue-ling in front of her colleagues, he did 
not sent his complaint to her privately but to the whole staff mailing’ list. Yue-ling’s anger 
boiled up again as she talked about the incident. When Yang-wei discovered the email, she 
continued, he became furious about his father’s antiquated views of marriage as well as his 
unprofessionalism. Yue-ling asked her husband to talk about this issue with his father 
personally as she did not want to reply and take the blame for his misconduct towards his 
father. Yang-wei, however, asked his mother to tell his father that he was not willing to 
tolerate his behaviour. Yue-ling and her mother-in-law, originally only bystanders in the 
incident, were now caught in the crossfire.  
Yue-ling’s difficulties in dissociating her work relationships from those with her family 
were experienced by many young men and women I talked to in Taipei. Not only people 
working in family businesses but also young professionals employed in corporate jobs or by 
the government complained that their families directly or indirectly tried to get involved in 
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their career decisions. As a consequence, many of my informants made professional 
choices not according to their personal skills and aspirations but according to their feeling 
forced to pursue a career path that had been approved by families and their partners or 
spouses.  
In Beijing, parents for various reasons usually had less authority over their children’s 
professional decisions. The previous chapters have explained that my Chinese informants 
lived more autonomously and learnt early on to make decisions independently. This trend 
could also be observed in their career choices. The greater acceptance of long-term 
separation by families facilitated the absence of young Chinese people’ from home, at least 
during the initial years of their working lives. 
Moreover, many of my Chinese informants had already far surpassed their parents’ 
educational achievements and socioeconomic status when starting work. This endowed 
them with a sense of empowerment that was also reflected in the willpower with which 
they pursued their careers and fended off unwanted advice and pressure from families. 
Taiwanese parents, by contrast, had often been very successful during Taiwan’s economic 
boom and set their expectations for their offspring correspondingly high. Having provided 
their children with an excellent education, they expected them to surpass their past 
achievements.  
However, the Taiwanese labour market looked bleak when my informants graduated and it 
became increasingly difficult to find adequately paying jobs. Many young Taiwanese were 
doubtful if there was any chance of living up to their families’ expectations at all. Even 
those young graduates who, like Yue-ling, entered family businesses struggled to assert 
their place. I experienced that intergenerational rifts were further deepened by the older 
generation’s tendency to blame their children’s struggling on their apparent lack of 
ambition and not on structural changes of the economy. Having missed out on the 
empowering experiences of socioeconomic ascent their Beijing peers had had, many young 
Taiwanese were hesitant about taking risks to advance their careers; this only exacerbated  
their situation and created even stronger dependencies on their families. These factors 
further reinforced the impression of the seemingly stronger traditionalism in family life in 
Taiwan, as compared to China, that has been noted by Whyte and colleagues (Chu and Yu, 
2010; Whyte et al., 2003; Whyte, 2004). 
Despite all these differences in their early careers, young Chinese and Taiwanese 
encountered similar challenges in their working environments. Most notably, young people 
tried to strike a balance between achieving job security and realizing their aspirations for a 
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cosmopolitan lifestyle that employment in international corporations promised. Many of 
them felt pressured by their parents to pursue safe careers in the government or other 
prestigious professions that were believed to provide a safe income, whereas they 
personally aspired to professions that required more risk-taking in the initial phase of the 
career but which might provide them with a more exciting lifestyle in the future.  
No matter which path they chose, most graduate jobs in Beijing and Taipei were highly 
competitive and placed strict requirements on their employees’ performance. Hierarchies 
based on seniority often hindered promotion to higher level jobs. Gendered stereotypes 
required female employees in particular to adopt certain forms of conduct that threatened 
to undermine their authority and assertiveness. Feelings of inadequacy at work were thus 
pervasive among informants from both locations and the stress and anxiety caused by these 
factors often resulted in doubts about personal choices. Additional pressure was brought to 
bear if the career in question had been facilitated by huge collective sacrifices by the family 
-quitting a job and the prestige it entailed was hence often more a family’s than an 
individual’s decision.  
 
3.2. Gendered Expectations and Ambitious Goals - Female Graduates’ Striving for 
Professional Success in Taipei and Beijing  
Yue-ling’s tension eased noticeably in Taichung. Chatting with her grandparents and 
cousins while enjoying the sumptuous meals of her grandmother in the intimate 
atmosphere of their home, Yue-ling seemed able to forget her worries for a while. It had 
not been the first time that Yue-ling had complained to me about her father-in-law. He 
often asked her to convey his advice or criticism to his son as he thought that her influence 
on Yang-wei made it more likely he would listen. This, however, drew her into arguments 
she could otherwise have avoided. Working under these conditions was difficult, Yue-ling 
sighed. However, life at home was strained by the same problems. Every night, she and her 
husband ate dinner with his parents and conversations inevitably revolved sooner or later 
around the company. As Yue-ling expressed her wish for lighter conversations at the 
dinner table, her father-in-law changed to his next favourite topic -the lack of a grandchild 
from Yang-wei. Urging Yue-ling to follow the “normal course of life” and to bear an heir 
to the company - preferably a son - only worsened the pressure on her. So far she had been 
able to convince him of the lie that she was trying to conceive but she knew that she was 
only buying time.  
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Yue-ling’s marriage had been affected by her in-laws’ expectations from early on and she 
and her husband had been pressured to marry as they neared their late twenties. Then, 
when they wanted to buy their own apartment after living with his parents for several years, 
her father-in-law had interfered with their plans. He presented them with an apartment he 
had already bought for them without their consent -right above the one he and his wife 
lived in in the same building. Due to this close proximity to her in-laws, Yue-ling’s 
obligations as a daughter-in-law and employee in the family business also increasingly 
interfered with her relationship with her husband. 
The problems Yue-ling encountered when entering her husband’s family business were far 
from unusual. Family businesses have flourished in Taiwan since the 1960s and most of 
them are still run by their original owners; these owners often struggle to set up a “plan of 
succession” and, like Yue-ling’s parents-in-law, anxiously try to secure their company’s 
continued existence by way of future generations (Sui, 2014 b). Moreover, the power 
imbalances along gender divisions that were fostered by the peculiar work relations 
pertinent in family enterprises are only diminishing slowly; a factor that further complicates 
women’s status at the workplace (Simon, 2003 p. 10; Takenoshita, 2012).  
The foundation for the emergence of Taiwan’s family businesses was laid when an import-
substitution strategy was set in place during comprehensive economic modernization in the 
early 1950s (Rubinstein, 1999 p. 367). This was accompanied by a new emphasis on 
production for export and the introduction of regulations that favoured the development 
of small- and medium-scale enterprises. As a consequence, family businesses that 
specialized in textile production and assembling electronic goods flourished (Lu, 2001 pp. 
263-265; Rubinstein, 1999 pp. 367-370). To maintain competitive prices on the world 
market, these enterprises relied largely on informal labour provided by relatives (Hsiung, 
1996 p. 145; Lee, 2004 a; 2004 b; Lee and Hirata, 2001 p. 102). The main elements in this 
cheap, unskilled labour force were young women who had formerly helped in the 
household; however, also married women participated in the trend and took on assembly 
work of weaving to increase household funds (Lee, 2004 a; Yu, 2001 p. 238). The 
government recognized this trend quickly and utilized it to advance the industrialization of 
the country. With the promotion of a campaign entitled Living Rooms as Factories, the KMT 
aimed to draw more women into the workforce by offering home-based piecework that 
could be combined with household duties and that did not require extensive training 
(Hsiung, 1996). “Under the satellite factory system,” Ping-chun Hsiung argues, “women are 
simultaneously converted into wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law on the one hand and 
waged, unwaged and casual homeworkers on the other” (p. 145).  
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Mostly born in the mid to late 1980s, my female informants had surpassed the educational 
limitations of their mothers and grandmothers that meant they could only do low-skilled 
work on the shop floor or at home. Thanks to their tertiary education, they now worked in 
highly skilled jobs. However, they still struggled to assert their place within the strict 
hierarchies of Taiwanese working environments not only at family businesses but also at 
larger corporations and within the government.  
The situation for young women on the Taiwanese labour market closely parallels the 
situation for highly educated young women in Japan. Karen Kelsky reports that young 
Japanese women - despite their high education - often have difficulty advancing in their 
careers as they are expected to quit their jobs upon marriage and childbirth (Kelsky, 2001). 
For this reason, superiors do not adequately support them in the development of their 
skills but relegate them to the status of receptionists and personal secretaries. Thus, they 
often have to take care of tasks that men, who were hired in equal positions, are not 
required to do. Kelsky notes that many Japanese women “confront the imposition of a 
quasi-domestic role in the workplace” (p. 95). To outperform their male colleagues by 
means of their expertise is perceived by many to be the only effective method to prevent 
being subjected to preconceived notions of gender roles at the workplace. For this reason, 
Kelsky’s informants often pursued a highly specialized education in Japan and abroad (p. 
101).  
The same problems were often compounded for Taiwanese women by the special 
workplace relationships found in family businesses. The interplay of the relatively strict 
hierarchies of the company with those of the family environment also constituted a huge 
stress factor for Yue-ling. Nevertheless, despite her university education in the US and her 
foreign-language proficiency that could have opened up international career opportunities 
for her, she agreed to work at her father-in-law’s business. 
Like many other parents in the latter half of the twentieth century, Yue-ling’s parents 
wanted their children to profit from an education abroad, preferably in a Western country 
(O'Neil, 2003). Hence, they decided Yue-ling and her two brothers would continue their 
school careers in the US. At that time, Yue-ling’s grandfather owned a light bulb factory in 
which the whole family was employed. It was thus decided that Yue-ling’s mother would 
accompany Yue-ling and her two brothers to San Francisco, while Yue-ling’s father stayed 
behind to assist in the family business. When I first met Yue-ling, her mother and two 
brothers were still living in San Francisco. Yue-ling, however, had rather involuntarily 
returned to Taiwan in her early twenties.  
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Yue-ling got to know her future husband, Yang-wei, at a San Franciscan university where 
they were both studying on undergraduate programmes. After her graduation, Yang-wei 
suggested that she could intern at his parents’ business to gain some initial work experience. 
His parents owned a highly successful company that produced industrial kitchen appliances 
and his family resided in one of the most expensive districts of Taipei. Yue-ling thus took 
up this opportunity but had to promise her mother to return to San Francisco once she had 
finished the internship after three months. However, upon her arrival in Taipei, she learnt 
that her boyfriend’s parents had kept a full-time position of an accountant vacant for her, 
expecting she would work permanently in the company. After the extensive training she 
received from them in the following weeks, she did not want to disappoint her future in-
laws. “What would his parents have thought of me, if I just went back to the US after a few 
months?” Yue-ling asked me over dinner one night. In the months that followed it became 
clear that her future-in-laws expected her to assist their son in leading the company in the 
future. There was thus no turning back for Yue-ling if she wanted to stay with her 
boyfriend. 
Yue-ling confessed that the first year had been especially difficult and, even now, she 
sometimes felt isolated. She had still not found close friends in Taipei as her colleagues 
avoided establishing any close relationships with her; after all, she was the wife of their 
future boss. Regular business trips to China were mostly done by male staff as they 
involved frequent banquets and visits to hostess clubs, an entertainment programme the 
female employees were not considered suitable for.  
Moreover, she struggled to assert her authority in important business decisions. She had to 
do the accounts for the money that her husband’s elder brother had offset from his parents’ 
company account for his business start-up. Yue-ling was reluctant to respond to his 
repeated requests - as he had already received vast amounts of money - and she complained 
that her parents-in-law granted their eldest son too many freedoms. After all, her own fate 
depended on the success of the company as well. Nonetheless, she was reluctant to openly 
contest her father-in-law’s authority. Her job thus slowly ceased to offer her personal 
validation but increasingly took on the role of a marital obligation. She thus looked forward 
more and more to having a child that would free her from her obligations at work for some 
time. The following year, she got pregnant; several months before the baby was born, she 
returned to her family in the US where she stayed until her daughter was a few months old. 
She only returned to Taipei, she confessed, because her parents-in-law longed to see their 
granddaughter. 
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Yue-ling returned to the family company after a break of about ten months; most other 
young women who had children during my fieldwork tended to resume their jobs after 
even fewer months of maternity leave. However, until recently it was not unusual for 
women in Taiwan to quit formal employment upon marriage and childbirth. Lee Yean-Ju 
and Shuichi Hirata note that in the 1990s, the rate of labour force participation of 
Taiwanese women reached a peak during their late twenties after which it declined rapidly 
in their early thirties (Lee and Hirata, 2001 p. 96). In the early 2000s, not much had 
changed as still almost thirty percent of women quit their jobs and interrupted their careers 
for several years because of marriage and childbirth (Yu and Manrique., 2009 p. 50). One 
of the reasons underlying this trend could be the continuation of a rather conservative 
attitude towards gender roles in Taiwanese society which is supported by the particular 
structure of the labour market that makes it difficult for women to re-enter the job market 
as mothers of young children. This argument is supported by Wei-hsin Yu who examined 
attitudes toward the family and employment in Taiwan. She found that Taiwanese women 
struggled to integrate formal employment and family obligations and thus preferred to quit 
formal jobs once they had become wives and mothers (Yu, 2009).  
However, due to the rise in educational attainment, this trend seems to be abating in 
Taiwan. In 2012, the labour force participation rate of women with children under six years 
of age was significantly higher (64 percent) than the labour force participation rate of all 
married women (49.05 percent) (National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan)). In China, 
however, female employment trends changed already with the restructuring of the labour 
market in the Mao era. Since then, dependencies on family members in the work 
environment have decreased. Moreover, expectations on women to interrupt or even 
terminate their careers upon marriage or childbirth are less dominant than it has been in 
Taiwan until recently.  
In the course of China’s major economic restructuring in the 1950s and 1960s, the CCP 
tried to streamline agricultural and industrial production. Private farms were replaced with 
rural communes (renmin gongshe) and urban labourers were assigned to different kinds of 
work units (danwei). For the first time in Chinese history, most women worked in public, in 
work teams. Moreover, workers employed in the urban danwei system were also offered 
social benefits like accommodation, healthcare, childcare facilities and primary schooling 
that were intended to further liberate women from traditional care obligations (Coase and 
Wang., 2012 pp. 14-15; Liu, 2007). However, these welfare services, propagated as steps 
towards greater gender equality, mainly aimed at making urban women available for full-
time work in the industries. For this reason, Liu notes, they often failed to encourage a 
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rethinking of traditional gender roles, a point that will be important in the following 
discussion of Chinese women’s problems at the workplace (Liu, 2007 p. 3; 65).  
Although the work unit system was dissolved in the reform era, Chinese women’s 
participation in the workforce has stayed exceptionally high, in comparison both 
internationally and to Taiwan. In 2013, the total female labour force participation rate in 
China was 64 percent, whereas in the same year in Taiwan, it was 50.5 percent (Statista: 
The Statistics Portal; The World Bank). One factor influencing these numbers might be 
that, in China, most women work in full-time employment during most of their working 
lives and this is usually interrupted only for a short time by childbirth (Cooke, 2013 p. 287). 
However, this does not mean that Chinese women do not have to face gendered 
expectations in terms of their career goals and preconceived notions of women’s suitability 
for certain tasks. Wei-xin was one of these young Chinese women who struggled to balance 
gendered expectations of her role in the office with personal career objectives. 
Wei-xin worked as a secretary at the Austrian consultancy where I was interning during 
part of my fieldwork in Beijing. This young woman was one of the first colleagues with 
whom I became acquainted. Originally from Dalian, she had come to Beijing to study a 
master’s degree and then decided to pursue a career in the capital. During our long 
afternoons at work, we often met in the office’s kitchen and exchanged gossip. Work 
relationships at the consultancy were tense and strained by competition for the all too rare 
promotions. We thus looked forward to our daily tea breaks during which Wei-xin often 
vented her irritation about our boss and other colleagues who burdened her with menial 
work that was time-consuming but unchallenging. After her graduation from Qinghua 
University, one of the most renowned institutions in China, she felt lucky to be hired 
immediately by an international company. Wei-xin had spent a part of her childhood in 
Austria due to her father’s work engagement in Vienna and could speak German fluently; a 
strong asset that helped her securing the job.  
She expected the job as a secretary to be a stepping stone to a more responsible position. 
Now, however, she feared she was wasting her time. Her senior colleagues anxiously 
coveted their influence and did not assign Wei-xin any work that could have provided her 
with an opportunity to shine. In addition, her superiors complained that Wei-xin did not fit 
the image of a dutiful and docile young secretary. Her self-confident appearance and close-
fitting dresses were, in their eyes, inappropriate for an office environment. Worse still, her 
Western boss was constantly bullying her, many examples of which I witnessed during the 
weekly team meetings. He had supposedly even harassed her verbally with suggestive 
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sexual comments at the office Christmas party. Meanwhile, Wei-xin was assigned less and 
less important work by the head secretary and she feared her contract would not be 
renewed at the end of the year.  
In Chinese society, notions of suitability for certain jobs are, similar to Taiwan and Japan, 
closely linked to gendered expectations of women in which appearance and age play major 
roles. Since the expansion of the service sector in the reform era and the accompanying 
growing demand for low-skilled, mostly female workers, the popular Chinese concept of 
the “rice bowl of youth” (qingchunfan) has encouraged women to capitalize on their youthful 
beauty and to consider outward appearance as their major assets (Hanser, 2008 p. 17). This 
“pink-collar class” as Zhang Zhen terms it, “suggests femininity and carries sexual 
innuendo” as an “imagery [that] clearly opposes that of the iron rice bowl – the 
permanence and security of glamourless and low-paying state sectors” (Zhang, 2000 p. 98). 
However, for young women born in the 1980s and early 1990s, notions of the “ideal career” 
have changed. After the introduction of the one child-policy and the increase in educational 
opportunities, parents’ hopes for their children’s academic credentials and professional 
careers rose indiscriminate of their children’s sex. Now, both sons and daughters are 
expected to increase their family’s socioeconomic status and secure their parents’ old age 
by entering prestigious professions (Fong, 2002; Hong Fincher, 2014). All the while, images 
of the “gentle” and “physically appealing” female employee have persisted and, as Wei-
xin’s experiences illustrate, as soon as women diverge from this ideal, they risk conflict with 
colleagues and superiors. Moreover, parents’ also expect that, despite continuous 
employment, daughters will not neglect their filial duties of marrying and providing 
grandchildren and this causes significant pressure. However, like Wei-xin, many young 
Chinese women contest these gendered norms and try to achieve more autonomy in the 
pursuit of their career aspirations.  
One day as we were sipping our tea, Wei-xin angrily told me that she had tried discussing 
her plans to quit her job with her parents. They did not react very understandingly. The 
consultancy had a prestigious name and made a good impression on her CV, they argued: 
why would she jeopardize this opportunity? Wei-xin did not often return to her parents in 
Dalian but if she did visit, her lifestyle in Beijing regularly gave rise to arguments. Wei-xin 
enjoyed going out with her friends dancing and drinking in the party districts of the capital 
almost every weekend. This had earned her the rather unfavourable reputation of a “party 
girl” among office staff. In the eyes of her family, colleagues and more conservatively 
minded peers, at twenty-seven years of age she was too old for this lifestyle and many, she 
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told me, accused her of being promiscuous and wasteful. This reputation did not only 
curtail her opportunities in her career but also on the marriage market. Wei-xin complained 
that last time she visited her parents her mother sat on her bedside with a sad look on her 
face, complaining that she could not recognize her own daughter anymore. Why was Wei-
xin turning against everything she and her husband had taught her? In Wei-xin’s eyes, the 
only way out of her misery was to make the final move abroad where she would be able to 
live a freer life. 
When we met in Beijing, Wei-xin had already gained considerable independence from her 
family. Her wish to study a doctoral programme in the US that, she hoped, would 
eventually catapult her permanently into a position abroad was a topic of many our 
conversations. She resented how her parents still tried to exert influence on her. Especially 
her mother was dissatisfied with the amount of money that Wei-xin spent on herself on 
clothing and nightlife. While Wei-xin was still studying and dependent on her parents’ 
financial support, her mother threatened her to stop her monthly remittances until Wei-xin 
had learnt to live a more frugal life. Unwilling to let her parents dictate her lifestyle, Wei-xin 
took on a part-time job at the weekends and then refused their financial support. This 
enraged her mother even more and made her complain about neglect by her only daughter. 
Wei-xin remained steadfast and did not change her mind. She could now easily support 
herself without part-time employment as the consultancy was paying her well and her salary 
matched that of her father’s. However, to Wei-xin’s concern, her parents had come up with 
a new strategy to force her to adopt a more conventional lifestyle and regain financial 
control over her: For some time already, her parents had pressured her to buy an 
apartment in Beijing with their support. This, Wei-xin explained, was a strategy to tie her to 
Beijing in the future. Moreover, as she would only be able to buy housing with her parents’ 
assistance, they would try to dictate to her how to spend her income and not allow her to 
go abroad. So far she had been successful in finding excuses for not making the investment 
in the property but she was not sure how long such excuses would work with her parents. 
Even though Wei-xin perceived her career as restricted by parental and societal demands, 
she had carved out a relatively independent life for herself in the capital and had deferred 
her parents’ wish for her to marry to an undetermined date in the future. Living far away 
from her family and able to prevent the financial dependency on her parents that would 
grant them authority over her lifestyle, she was considerably more autonomous than many 
young single women I met in Taipei. However, her independent lifestyle and refusal to 
conform to societal conventions also hampered her career and quest for a partner as she 
suited neither the image of the “subservient secretary,” nor that of the “frugal wife.” 
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The cases of Yue-ling and Wei-xin exemplify the gendered struggles young Chinese and 
Taiwanese women face in pursuing their careers. Yue-ling, who like Wei-xin was highly 
educated and spoke different languages, was used as a mediator by her husband and father-
in-law due to her supposed female diplomatic skills. Moreover, it was impossible for her to 
gain any complex insight into the dealings of the business as she could neither accompany 
her husband on business trips that involved negotiations in exclusively male entertainment 
venues, nor could she establish relations with other colleagues due to her family 
connections to the company owner. Unable to leave the job as she did not want to anger 
her in-laws who counted on her help, she was forced to conform. 
Even though Wei-xin had more personal autonomy over her lifestyle and choice of 
workplace, she also struggled with gendered stereotypes in her work. Her Chinese as well 
as her Western superiors did not take her seriously due to her youth and style and relegated 
her to administrative jobs that made it difficult for her to demonstrate her professional 
knowledge and skills. Besides being unable to advance her career in the consultancy, Wei-
xin was angered by her colleagues’ disparaging comments which, she claimed, were mostly 
caused by their misconception of her as a hedonistic young woman. 
 
3.3. Striving for Security and Success - New Ideals of Masculinity and Professional 
Achievement in Beijing and Taipei 
Whereas young urban women were eager to exploit the relatively short time span during 
which socially acceptable singledom and youthfulness could open doors to employment 
opportunities, young men in their twenties strove to secure jobs that seemed to promise 
long-term success as well as prestige, making them desirable on the marriage market (Fong, 
2004 pp. 98-99; Hong Fincher, 2014; Osburg, 2013). Traditional expectations of men were 
relatively similar in China and Taiwan; they had to be able to provide for their future 
families and parents as the main breadwinners. In practice, this was often unnecessary due 
to parents’ wealth (especially for Taiwanese informants) and the extra income of a spouse. 
Nevertheless, most men felt expected to meet these standards, not only to satisfy their 
families but also so they could prove themselves to be reliable husbands. At the same time, 
young women increasingly preferred partners who could not only provide financial security 
but whose careers also fitted in with their own desires for a cosmopolitan, urban lifestyle. 
Jobs that had earlier been valued for the stability they provided had lost their appeal as new 
economic opportunities on the globalized market arose. As indicators of success changed, 
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formerly important criteria that attracted women on the marriage market ceased to be as 
convincing. 
Dao, originally from Jilin City, had studied law in Dalian before passing the civil service 
exam; he was then hired by the central government of Beijing. His parents, whose 
educational careers were complicated by the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, had 
always hoped that Dao would become a civil servant and they encouraged him in his 
studies at school and university. Now, after having worked in Beijing for several years, Dao 
had finally obtained a local residence registration and, with the help of his parents, he 
bought an apartment close to the city centre. Dao liked his job that frequently took him 
abroad, However, he complained, the salary was not very high compared to jobs in the 
private sector. Nevertheless, he felt lucky to have been able to buy an apartment. He 
explained that most women would like to compare their partner’s economic assets with 
those of their friends’ husbands. Without his own apartment, his chances of finding the 
urban, highly educated wife he was looking for would have been even slimmer. Moreover, 
he added, parents tended to be very protective of their daughters and he doubted they 
would agree to an engagement if he could not provide housing. Nevertheless, he still faced 
difficulties competing with high-earning professionals in the private sector; they could 
afford luxuries during courtship that were beyond his means. So far, his search for a 
potential wife had been unsuccessful. 
In China, the popularity of civil service employment has decreased in recent years and 
powerful state companies and international corporations have taken over as the workplaces 
favoured by graduates (Riley, 2015; The Economist, 2015). Yet, the education necessary to 
pursue a career in these prestigious companies is mostly expensive and long. Often, it 
requires parents to sponsor several years of preparation for university entry exams, job 
assessment centres and foreign-language courses at home and abroad (Fong, 2011). 
Likewise, in Taiwan, professional aspirations were changing among the young, even though 
the popularity of civil service jobs with the central government remained unbroken 
(Jennings, 2014). Whereas before, employment at a local factory or small family business 
had provided a stable income, several news sources reported that young Taiwanese 
increasingly strove for jobs at international companies which not only offered higher 
salaries than local employers but also the possibility of business trips or even job 
placements abroad (Chen, 2015; Sui, 2014 a). Thus especially male informants in Beijing 
and Taipei felt trapped between these different ideals. On the one hand, pursuing new 
ideals of masculine success could provide personal validation and improve their 
opportunities on the marriage market. On the other hand, and this was particularly the case 
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among young Chinese men from less affluent backgrounds, the time and money necessary 
to realize such an endeavour could mean a significant burden to their families. Moreover, if 
they did not achieve their goals, it might be impossible to catch up on their careers and 
family plans within the normative time frame. 
One night in early December, I met Dao and Li-ling, a Beijing local who was a mutual 
friend, for dinner in one of the glitzy malls in Wangfujing where young professionals liked 
to spend their evenings. Li-ling had told me before that she had got to know Dao on a 
blind date (xiangqin). At first there had been a mutual interest but she then decided that he 
was not suitable for her, though they did become friends. While we were eating, Dao, 
obviously in the mood to impress us, took out his mobile phone and showed us pictures of 
a banquet at the Korean embassy that his boss had sent him to the previous day. 
Apparently unimpressed, Li-ling teased him about the young waitresses in traditional attire 
that Dao had obviously taken many photos of. He laughed shyly and showed us more 
pictures from his recent trip to the US which he had made as part of a government 
delegation. Li-ling, an employee at a powerful state-owned company, was regularly sent on 
business trips to exotic destinations all over the world. She did not seem interested in the 
least (or so she pretended) in the military parades and US officials in his snaps. Instead, she 
started to tease Dao again by reminding him of the private trip to Laos he had recently had 
to cancel because of his financial concerns. Worried by the expenses the trip would involve, 
Dao had to withdraw from a planned vacation with his friends at the last minute. I 
wondered if her reluctance to be impressed by his professional accomplishments and 
emphasis on his financial shortcomings were connected to her rejection of him as a suitable 
partner. Li-ling had never told me the details that led to her decision, but coming from a 
local, well-off cadre family and highly successful in her career herself, it was obvious that 
marriage to Dao would have resulted in certain material deprivations for her.  
Later on the subway, after Li-ling had left in another direction, Dao confided in me that his 
male friends often expressed their envy of his freedom. Burdened with responsibilities for 
their children and wives, they assumed that he could just pursue his personal interests and 
go out whenever he wanted. However, his words seemed full of regret and it seemed as 
though his friends’ half-hearted words of comfort were lost on him.  
While Dao worked hard to fulfil parental and societal expectations, he still struggled to 
meet the material demands made of males in the capital. As he was neither from a local 
influential family nor did he own any real estate beyond his personal residence, he had 
difficulty attracting a highly educated, urban wife. He had made his career decisions in 
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accordance with his own and his parents’ ambitions for secure government employment, 
but he had not reckoned with the low wages and lack of local connections that would 
obstruct his marriage plans in Beijing. 
In Guangzhou, John Osburg observed his young male informants struggling with similar 
problems while trying to strike a balance between economic security and new ideals of 
masculinity. As aspiring teachers, they had chosen a relatively safe but unglamorous 
profession. Thus they did not meet the standards of “an increasingly normative masculinity 
based on taking entrepreneurial risks and achieving success in the market economy” 
(Osburg, 2013 p. 2). Their marriage options were considerably curtailed by their 
comparatively low status as teachers -a profession that promised neither the high income 
nor the prestige that could be expected from a successful entrepreneurial career or from 
employees of powerful corporations (ibid.).  
I made similar observations in Beijing. Xiao-xiao looked down on one of her suitors, a civil 
servant from her home town who now worked for the government in Beijing. She 
criticized him for his gambling and drinking and complained about her dates with him 
when she had been terribly bored. Civil servants, in her opinion, were much too focused on 
security and social prestige whereas she was searching for a partner who had more 
unconventional plans and could match his career with her cosmopolitan dreams. Likewise, 
in Taipei, my female informants increasingly valued know-how in navigating the private 
sector or even the international job market. Jobs in these sectors invested young men with 
the allure of the cosmopolitan professional. 
Whereas men were expected to succeed in the working world to become desirable matches, 
Chinese and Taiwanese women had to make sure not to pursue too ambitious educational 
paths and careers. Many of my female informants who worked in highly competitive jobs 
in banking or international trade complained either about a lack of suitable partners or 
about the pressure they felt to quit their ambitious careers to make time for children and 
housework. Osburg observed that among young female teachers in Guangzhou it was - 
paradoxically - their relatively low educational status and training in a traditionally feminine 
profession, combined with their physical beauty, that provided them with important assets 
on the marriage market: 
“Because they were educated (but not overeducated), poorly paid (relative to a potential 
husband), and employed in jobs considered morally appropriate for their gender, these 
women had no trouble finding a suitable (and wealthy) spouse” (Osburg, 2013 p. 2). 
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Whereas many young women feel forced to capitalize on their youth on the jobs and 
marriage market, young men in their twenties have to compete for high-flying corporate or 
entrepreneurial careers that promise financial success and social prestige to be eligible 
candidates for wedlock.  
Moreover, a certain willingness to take risks was deeply ingrained in ideals of masculinity in 
both societies. Even under Mao, risk-taking in the name of the Party was a desirable male 
attribute, promoted by propaganda stories such as the one of the model soldier, Lei Feng, 
and others who had risked and lost their lives for the revolution (Chan, 1985; Unger, 1982 
p. 99). Later, risk-taking became essential in a successful career as an entrepreneur and also 
in other desirable jobs that emerged with the opening of the market in the reform era 
(Osburg, 2013). Similarly, in Taiwan, a willingness to take risks became a precondition for 
success during the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s. In my interviews, grandfathers 
in particular used to tell me proudly of their rags-to-riches biographies and the immense 
risks they took in realizing their business ideas, eventually freeing them from farm work. 
However, despite the older generation’s experiences, they encouraged their offspring to 
take more secure career paths which, as the case of You-peng in the previous chapter has 
shown, resulted in conflicts between the generations. Whereas You-peng’s parents 
envisaged the job security that being a surgeon would provide for their son, he aimed at the 
less secure career of an academic. These intergenerational problems were aggravated by the 
close contact between parents and children during their everyday life at home. 
Dao struggled to fulfil the various requirements for marriage as the next biographical 
milestone. At the same time, however, the pursuit of his career granted him independence 
of parental supervision. This distinguished him significantly from many young men I 
encountered in the Taiwanese capital. In Taiwan, young men’s career plans were not only 
closely interconnected with concerns about social prestige and financial well-being but also 
with the obligation they felt to stay close to the parental home in later life. Even in cases in 
which family members also resided in Taipei, integrating these different demands could 
involve strenuous efforts, disappointment and cutting back on certain plans. 
I got to know Shang-yan when a mutual friend asked me if I could help him practise 
English in preparation for the civil service entrance exam. Like many other young 
Taiwanese I met, becoming an official at the ministry of foreign affairs was his major career 
aspiration. Besides offering the opportunity for frequent travel, the job promised lifelong 
employment and a stable salary; it thus constituted a workable compromise between 
parental requirements for job safety and the cosmopolitan aspirations of the younger 
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generation. At that time, Shang-yan was in his early thirties and worked as an electrical 
engineer at a company in Taoyuan, a medium-sized city an hour south of Taipei.  
Shang-yan felt dissatisfied in his current job. He disliked the tense office atmosphere, his 
little room in a dorm on the company grounds and the limited leisure activities in the 
neighbourhood. He returned to his family in Taipei every weekend and also applied for 
relocation to his company’s Taipei branch. One Sunday afternoon, during a walk around 
Daan District, he pointed to a shining white tower and explained that this was his 
company’s head office. If he could work there, he could move back to his parents and have 
a much more pleasant life.  
Another of his major concerns was that he had no girlfriend, a problem he felt was 
exacerbated by his male-dominated work environment. In recent years, Shang-yan’s efforts 
at courtship had always been bitterly disappointing. He complained that when a new 
woman was added to the team, she was quickly surrounded by a swarm of suitors. As he 
could offer neither a high salary nor a prestigious position to impress these women, he 
feared his marriage prospects were bleak.  
After investing months of diligent preparation, Shang-yan finally passed the civil service 
exam on his third attempt. Before being offered a post, he had to participate in extensive 
training in Taiwan and abroad. The training was relatively easy but he complained that 
most of the new recruits had only recently graduated and were in their mid to late twenties. 
Moreover, most of them held degrees from Taiwanese elite universities and were very self-
confident and assertive. Shang-yan, a rather reserved and quiet man, felt it was difficult to 
hold his ground in discussions. Even though he could look back on ten years of corporate 
work experience, his younger colleagues confused him with their patronizing behaviour. In 
addition, his salary was now lower than in his previous job in the private sector. His new 
position might earn him some prestige and had taken him back to Taipei but he realized 
that finding a girlfriend was still difficult. Meanwhile, his parents’ pressure on him to marry 
was increasing. He soon had to embark on a nine-month language training programme 
overseas and was thus desperate to find a potential wife before he left the country. 
Unfortunately, the last woman he dated had refused to meet him again after she learnt 
about his imminent move abroad.  
One afternoon we were having tea at one of the ubiquitous chain stores in the city centre. 
During our conversation, Shang-yan’s eyes were glued to the screen of his mobile phone. 
Slightly impatiently, I asked him if he was waiting for a call. Indeed he was, he admitted; he 
was waiting for a text from a female colleague. He had befriended a young woman on the 
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government training programme. They had not established a close relationship but he 
interpreted her tender teasing as a promising sign. That day, he took a chance and asked 
her out for dinner. She gave him an ambiguous reply which, to me, sounded like a polite 
excuse. Shang-yan, however, hoped that she would meet him again. The woman, a recent 
graduate, was more than ten years younger than him although he did not consider this a 
problematic factor in potential marriage.  
As we waited for the woman to reply, our conversation turned to the strategies he could 
apply to increase his chances of finding a wife. One of his friends, Shang-yan complained, 
had suggested he should move out of home as greater independence might ease his search 
for a girlfriend. Shang-yan disagreed. Once he married, he could move out, he argued; but 
why would he spend money living alone when he could just as well live with his parents? 
What about more privacy, I asked. That was not a problem, he objected - there were hotels 
he could take her to. After marriage, Shang-yan intended to move into his parents’ second 
house in a rather unpopular suburb of Taipei, far from the city centre. When I asked him 
what he would do if his future wife refused to move there, he just shrugged his shoulders. 
In that case, he might have to rent another place, he replied in a surly tone. With his 
current entry-level salary, he could not even think of buying a house. For young people, he 
muttered, buying a house in Taipei without heavy family investment was impossible. When 
I left the tea shop around dinner time, the young woman had still not got back to him.  
In contrast to Dao whose job in Beijing had taken him far away from home, Shang-yan’s 
work for the central government led him back to his parental household. Although the two 
men were pursuing similar goals, the spatial moves required to accomplish them led them 
in opposite directions; this would also affect their future plans. Shang-yan expected to live 
close to his parents even after marriage. Dao, meanwhile, was eager to meet the 
requirements that would enable him to settle far away from his natal home, with only vague 
plans to permanently reunite with his parents in Beijing in the distant future. However, 
both men noticed that although a career with the central government was reputable and 
would enable them to realize their personal and family’s hopes for secure employment, it 
did not provide the high salaries or allure certain jobs in the private sector offered. 
Especially in Shang-yan’s case, his comparatively high age on entering the government and 
his entry-level salary complicated his position on the dating market where he was 
competing with men of the same age who had considerably greater economic assets. 
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3.4. Conclusion  
The case studies above seem to illustrate how the differently structured labour markets in 
China and Taiwan impact on young people’s strategies to pursue their career aspirations 
and negotiate their ideals with their families and potential partners. Whereas young Chinese 
are often more successful in establishing an independent lifestyle through their careers than 
their Taiwanese peers, both groups of informants struggled with gendered expectations of 
their performance and career objectives in different realms of their professional and private 
lives. 
My young Chinese informants tend to make career choices that do not only let them 
advance in the highly competitive urban job markets but that also grant them enough 
spatial and financial independence from family members to be able to lead their daily lives 
relatively unburdened by their parents’ authority. Parental strategies to regain financial 
control over their children by assisting them in major investments for the future are only 
partially successful. Wei-xin, the young Chinese secretary, successfully fended off her 
parents’ efforts to exert financial control over her through shared investment on the real 
estate market. Even though Dao’s parents had helped their only son to buy an apartment, 
their authority was weakened by the spatial distance between their different places of 
residence.  
In Taiwan, by contrast, parents and their grown-up children more often reside in close 
proximity to each other and, in many cases, they even share a residence and workplace. 
Whyte claims that it was this expansion of family businesses in the 1950s and 1960s that 
encouraged greater family coherence in Taiwan compared to China and thus facilitated 
conditions in which seemingly “traditional” work and residence patterns could be 
maintained (Whyte, 2004). Hence, the particular structure of the Taiwanese labour market 
reinforced certain family dependencies that, even today, make it more difficult for young 
Taiwanese to make autonomous decisions about their careers. 
Moreover, different experiences of parental work lives might have influenced my 
informants’ expectations of their own careers. Young Chinese told me about the often 
almost “nomadic” biographies of their parents caused by the Cultural Revolution and 
relocation for jobs and education; thus, they were more accustomed to the idea of having 
to leave parental homes to pursue careers. Meanwhile, the accounts young Taiwanese gave 
me of their past were more reminiscent of a more traditional family life. Their mothers had 
often moved into the household of their in-laws after marriage and assisted in the family 
businesses or were housewives. Many had maintained a close attachment to their home 
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places into adulthood and thus were reluctant to leave their parental homes without having 
the objective of returning.  
However, Yue-ling’s story shows that Taiwanese parents were also willing to relocate, in 
her case even to another country, in order to improve their own and their children’s 
opportunities. However, in her particular case, her parents became estranged during the 
long separation. Even though she appeared to be close to both her father and mother, she 
seemed to be determined not to make the same mistake in her own marriage. Yue-ling was 
rather exceptional, compared to other young Taiwanese women, in her determination to 
please her natal family’s as well as her in-laws’ demands. Most of the times we met, she was 
about to run an errand for a family member or was under the pressure of time due to an 
important work appointment.  
Wei-xin was, in many aspects, Yue-ling’s polar opposite. Like many other Chinese young 
women I met, she stressed the importance she assigned to her personal autonomy. 
However, she stood out from most of them in the freedoms she claimed for herself and in 
her rejection of traditional gender role models. Nevertheless, both women felt pressured by 
the expectations their families had of them, whether they could identify with them or not.  
Even though young men had to face less discrimination at the workplace, they also 
suffered from gendered notions of achievement in their roles as sons and prospective 
husbands. Despite working in comparatively stable positions, Dao and Shang-yan found it 
difficult to assert themselves on the competitive urban dating market that increasingly 
valued entrepreneurial skills, a cosmopolitan habitus and connections with the upper layers 
of society. Discouraged that their huge investments in their careers were not yielding the 
success they had hoped for, both men became increasingly unsure whether they could 
satisfy their parents’ demands for grandchildren in the near future. Their stories appear to 
be rather typical of their generation. During my fieldwork, many (almost all) young men in 
China and Taiwan complained in some way about the rising demands on their professional 
achievements and financial position. These growing expectations simultaneously delayed 
the time in which they could marry and feel economically secure enough to start a family. 
Moreover, they also created additional dependencies and simultaneously stronger 
obligations to parents. Both Dao and Shang-yan relied on parental assistance in the 
provision of apartments without which their search for marriage partners might have 
looked even less promising. 
Especially in Taiwan, the problematic situation on the labour market added to the 
problems young adults faced. In 2012, the year of my fieldwork in Taiwan, wages had not 
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only failed to keep up with inflation; their real value had decreased since the early 2000s 
(Dou and Hsu, 2012; Jennings, 2014; Rigger, 2011 p. 200). As a consequence, independent 
living in the capital was hardly sustainable if one only had a graduate job. The continuous 
dependence on parents after graduation caused many of my Taiwanese informants to feel 
depressed and inadequate. They had expected to excel in their careers as they had in their 
education. However, on graduation, with the economy stagnating, many felt their chances 
to realize their ambitions were dwindling. Their distress was aggravated by the high 
expectations their families had instilled in them. Many parents and grandparents had 
achieved impressive successes while Taiwan’s economy was booming. By offering their 
children the best education possible, so parents thought, their children could easily surpass 
their successes if they only worked hard enough. This might explain why, in conversations 
with me, parents often criticized the younger generation for being too spoilt and, unlike 
them, for not having experienced hardship. “Eating bitterness” (chi ku) was an expression 
often used to express the sufferings parents’ had endured in the past but which were 
overcome with hard work. Taiwanese youth, by contrast, criticized their parents’ lack of 
farsightedness. They complained that older family members were prone to blame failure on 
their purported lack of “work mentality” while refusing to recognize economic changes 
that underlay the difficulties they encountered in pursuing a career. In sum, my Taiwanese 
informants’ prolonged economic dependency on parents was exacerbated by the feeling of 
failure that resulted from disappointed expectations of their future careers. In this context, 
acting against family members’ advice and preferences became even more difficult. 
In China, the economic situation of young graduates was not much different from in 
Taiwan. Similar to Taipei, entry level jobs in Beijing hardly provided the income to 
maintain living in the city, let alone making investments in real estate (Chen and Si, 2014). 
However, unlike their Taiwanese counterparts, young Chinese interpreted their experiences 
against the background of their confidence in their skills and a hopeful attitude towards the 
future; this was shared by family members of older generations (Kleinman, 2011; Sharma, 
2014). Like Dao and Wei-xin, many young people had to rely on parental support to buy 
housing in the capital. However, most parents were willing to support their children’s wish 
for independent living in Beijing as, in their eyes, they had achieved impressive successes by 
asserting themselves in the highly competitive race for first-tier education. Finding a job in 
Beijing after graduation could, so parents hoped, open the door to a promising career in 
the city and would eventually secure their children an urban household registration that the 
entire family might profit from. Moreover, for those young adults whose family homes 
were far removed from Beijing or in rural areas, leaving the city might have been more 
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detrimental to their future careers than sticking out the first years of their careers under 
financial constraints in the capital. Leaving a social and professional network behind to 
return to their home places where they might have only found work they were highly 
overqualified for was not an option for most of them.  
Beijing parents shared in this hopefulness. Liang’s mother, who was introduced in chapter 
two, was highly impressed by her son’s achievements and eagerly supported him upon his 
return to Beijing after his studies abroad. She told me, beaming with pride, of her son’s 
talents. Her belief in his bright future did not appear to be weakened by his temporary 
struggles to assert himself at work or his concerns about how to carve out a niche for his 
skills on Beijing’s saturated job market. Kleinman made similar observations during the 
Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 (Kleinman 2011). He notes that in particular the elderly, 
who have gone through times of extreme political upheavals and deprivation, appreciate 
the relative political stability of the country today. Comparing conditions they grew up 
under with those of young people today, they are having a markedly hopeful stance on the 
future of Chinese society (Kleinman 2011: 267). 
These different parental attitudes towards children’s achievement had an incremental 
influence on the way in which young people experienced their successes and, as a 
consequence, influenced their perceptions of self-efficacy. Bandura notes that past 
experiences of success, in particular if the achievement was perceived as resulting from 
personal ability (rather than luck or fate), fortify an individual’s sense of efficacy and make 
it more prone to aim at high goals that involve a certain degree of risk-taking in the future 
(Bandura, [1995] 1999 pp. 10-12). Moreover, he explains, relating to a study by Eccles 
Elder and colleagues, that “objective economic hardship […] has no direct influence on 
parents’ perceived efficacy” (p.15). He stresses: “Parents’ belief that they can affect the 
course of their children’s lives is a more influential contributor to beneficial guidance under 
disadvantaged conditions than under advantaged conditions […]” (ibid.).  
My case studies from urban China and Taiwan show close parallels to Bandura’s theory. 
Even though both sets of parents appeared to have started out with high hopes in their 
children, this seems to have had a particularly beneficial effect on those Chinese informants 
who came from rather disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. Chao and Ming-yue, the 
PhD-students from rural Hebei I introduced in the previous chapter, are examples of such 
cases. Their parents had invested a large share of their hopes and resources into their 
children, convinced that their efforts would pay off in the future. Thriving in their 
independence and feeling validated by their parents’ pride, they were relatively confident 
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that they could overcome the difficulties they faced as career entrants in Beijing. However, 
also young Chinese from more affluent families, like my female colleague Wei-xin and Xing, 
the young man aspiring to study in the US who I introduced in the previous chapter, 
showed a strong sense of agency in realising their personal goals. In these cases, their early 
independence from parents and extended experience of living abroad might be more 
important factors contributing to their strong sense of efficacy than parental 
encouragement (which in Wei-xin’s case was not perceived as such).  
However, many Taiwanese informants from more privileged backgrounds felt rather 
discouraged by their parents’ ambitious goals. I described the case of You-peng, who felt 
pressured by his parents to become a surgeon while he wanted to become a researcher, in 
chapter two. You-peng’s parents openly showed their disappointment in him when he 
repeatedly failed to meet their high hopes for his professional future. Shang-yan, the young 
man finally securing a job at the central government in Taipei, was subjected to less 
pressure from parents in regards to his career. Yet, he felt increasingly despaired as his new 
job did not appear to increase his options on the dating market. It was difficult for these 
young Taiwanese to maintain confidence in the future if their families, with whom they 
lived closely together, were continuously pointing out their shortcomings. Their feelings of 
inferiority often undermined projects for the future and held them back from reaching the 
next biographic milestone - marriage.  
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Chapter Four - Courtship and Marriage in Beijing and Taipei 
4.1. Introduction 
Even inside the house, the Taiwanese summer heat was stifling at this time of the day. 
While the bride and the other bridesmaids dozed under the purring fan, a Harry Potter 
movie was playing in the background. Chia-ling, the bride, had loosened the corset of her 
dress that had restricted her movements ever since the long drive to her future husband’s 
home in the morning; we bridesmaids also made ourselves as comfortable as our tight 
polyester dresses would allow. Forbidden to use the bed prepared for the wedding night, 
we sprawled across the floor of the small bedroom. After the hour-long journey from 
Taipei to Chiayi City, we yearned for a nap and worried how we could stay awake through 
the banquet at night. Most exhausted, however, was the bride. While we bridesmaids had 
been treated to a lavish lunch with the groom at a local restaurant, Chia-ling had to follow 
the custom of waiting in the room at her in-laws’ house that she and her future husband 
would move into.  
Her new home appeared cramped and humid compared to the villa Chia-ling’s family 
owned in the suburbs of Taipei. But it was not only a spacious house that Chia-ling had left 
behind for this marriage; she had also left the comfort of her close work place in her 
family’s business. From now on, she would have to commute from Chiayi to Taipei several 
times a week to help in her father’s company; this she would do until the baby was born 
that she was already carrying.  
Sleepily, I gazed at my friend Yu-ching who also had her eyes half-closed. I introduced Yu-
ching, the accounting student who had a remarkably close relationship to her parents, in 
the chapter two. To escape our lethargic mood, we decided to go downstairs to visit the 
groom and his best men who were smoking and chatting on the veranda. By contrast to the 
languid atmosphere in the bridal chamber, the groom and his friends were in high spirits, 
laughing and arguing; the alcohol that was generously served for lunch was having a 
noticeable effect. We sat down on shaky plastic chairs under the canopy and observed the 
goings-on for a while until the young men noticed us and included us in their conversation. 
Quickly, one of them took a liking in Yu-ching and tried to attract her attention by 
involving her in a heated discussion. Yu-ching, however, soon prevailed by countering his 
bold statements with well articulated arguments; this triumph, it turned out later, had been 
observed critically by the male bystanders and this would discredit her in their eyes as a 
potential match for their friend. 
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Yu-ching was still single and, as I described in chapter two, she was nearing the end of her 
twenties and her family was pressuring her to find a suitable husband. Being asked by Chia-
ling to be a bridesmaid at her wedding, a role only unmarried women could do, 
strengthened her mission to find a partner. On the bus ride to Chia-ling’s family home the 
previous evening, Yu-ching complained to me that she was tired of dating. Just a few days 
before, she had experienced another failed date with a young man chosen by her mother. 
At first glance, her dating partner appeared promising. He also came from an upper 
middle-class family and had received his education abroad, just like Yu-ching. However 
perfect that match appeared to be to her mother, upon meeting the man, Yu-ching quickly 
realized that their characters and interests were not suited. She was now close to giving up 
on a quest for a partner and wondered how her friends who were already married had had 
the patience to wait until they found “Mr or Mrs Right.” Moreover, she feared that her 
chances of finding a suitable match were fading as she approached her thirtieth birthday. 
At the same time, she was aware of the concessions many of her female friends had made 
to reach married status and she was not sure if she was prepared to follow suit. 
Concerns about finding a suitable match were omnipresent in conversations with young 
men and women in both Taipei and Beijing. However, not only the different and, at times, 
contradictory expectations of family members and friends but also the reconciliation of 
diverging relationship ideals between partners emerged as problematic as relationships 
progressed and different attitudes towards family life and gender roles became obvious. 
Even though the topic of marriage was handled with equal importance by my Chinese and 
Taiwanese informants, significant differences became apparent in courtship practices as 
well as in the way young adults negotiated their new roles as potential spouses and sons- 
and daughters-in-law. 
In Taipei, where residence in the natal household until marriage was common for men and 
women, dating took place more or less under the watchful eyes of parents. Even if the 
partner had been accepted by family members, meetings did not usually take place in the 
parental home but at one of the many dating venues that Taipei offered. Especially popular 
in this regard were restaurants, coffee shops and KTV lounges, as well as hotels that 
offered one-night getaways for young couples, mostly in one of the greener suburbs and 
hot spring areas of Taipei.  
Especially young Taiwanese women who were still living in their parents’ household often 
regarded marriage as a chance to “break out” of the authority of their natal families. 
Cohabitation with a partner before marriage was rather uncommon and often looked down 
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on, especially by the older generations. Hence, marriage was for many young women the 
only way to leave the parental household. However, more often than their Chinese 
counterparts, they also feared the high expectations of their future in-laws who tended to 
be more demanding in Taiwan due to the more orthodox approach to Confucian family 
ideology. This stronger traditionalism was reflected especially in the common practice of 
patrilocal residence for at least several months after the wedding; the in-laws of the young 
bride, Chia-ling, also expected this. For this reason, many young adults did not only 
abruptly plunge into cohabitation with a partner upon marriage - they also had to adjust to 
the habits and demands of their in-laws which placed additional stress on young wives, 
especially on those who conceived of their duties from a more traditional perspective. The 
obligation to swap lively evenings out for nights at home with the in-laws often caused 
tensions within families. Women’s seeming emancipation from the natal family through 
marriage thus bore the risk of being restricted by an even more powerful authority - this 
step therefore required careful consideration. 
By contrast, my Chinese informants enjoyed relatively greater personal freedoms in the city. 
This was especially the case if their families were not resident in Beijing. Living in student 
dormitories and flat shares, they could easily hide their romantic adventures from parents 
and were less constrained in meeting romantic partners in the urban environment of 
Beijing. That being said, parents’ expectations for their children to marry within a certain 
time frame as well as high material responsibilities revolving around courtship and marriage 
also placed significant pressure on young Chinese. Even though patrilocal residence was 
less common in Beijing, I found that young Chinese also feared the responsibilities that 
marriage could entail, in particular the high costs of housing in the capital. 
Despite the increased freedom in mate choice, the more liberal attitudes to premarital 
sexual relationships and the delay in the age of one’s first marriage that could be observed 
in both societies, taking care of future obligations to parents and in-laws after marriage was 
still a key concern of young couples in China and Taiwan. Deborah Davis and Sara 
Friedman point out that the increasing deinstitutionalization of marriage in East Asian 
societies is not accompanied by other social phenomena, like an increase of childbirth out 
of wedlock and an erosion of intergenerational ties that are often attributed to 
demographic changes in Western societies. They note that “it is important to distinguish 
the deinstitutionalization of marriage from the deinstitutionalization of multigenerational 
family formation” (Davis and Friedman, 2014 p. 5). In many cases, as the following will 
show, parents regarded it as their responsibility to assist their children in the search for a 
suitable partner. Often, they feared that their children’s prolonged singledom would not 
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only aggravate their marriage options but also risk their own old age security and prospects 
of grandchildren. Hence, just as parents tried to assist their children with educational 
choices, they also perceived it as their responsibility to support them in their search for a 
partner.  
Leta Hong Fincher describes how many Chinese parents and young women fear the 
derogatory status of being a “leftover women” (shengnü) – this is an urban female 
professional who, in her late twenties, has succeeded in her career yet has failed to attract a 
suitable husband (Fincher, 2014 p. 2). Although the perpetuation of this concept was a 
political concern in China, fuelled by conservative state agencies and the state media 
lamenting the alleged selfishness of young women who shun family responsibilities, the 
term was not as widely used in Taiwan (pp. 1-4). However, the notion of the 
“overambitious career woman” who missed out on “the right time” to marry was also a 
popular concept that inspired fear in young Taiwanese women and their parents. 
Sometimes, as the following case studies illustrate, parents took rather extreme measures to 
find a suitable partner for their single children. Jun Zhang and Peidong Sun interviewed 
parents in Shanghai who tried to find potential matches for their daughters by frequenting 
“matchmaking corners” where they met like-minded parents (Zhang and Sun, 2014). 
Encouraged to concentrate on their education first, many of these daughters remained 
single far beyond the age normatively considered suitable for marriage. Their parents feared 
that they might not find a spouse matching their high achievements if they waited any 
longer and advanced in their careers. They tried to support their daughters by pre-selecting 
promising bachelors for them (ibid.). Even though I observed that Taiwanese parents were 
more successful in convincing their children to meet potential matches who they had 
chosen, mostly because they had more immediate influence on their offspring’s life than 
the parents of my Chinese informants, Chinese and Taiwanese parents were both highly 
concerned about their children’s marital future; they were prone to intervene if they were 
dissatisfied with the partner choices of their children. Moreover, as the cases of young 
women in this chapter will show in particular, mothers as well as female peers would 
criticize their appearance, public conduct and attitude towards sexuality in an effort to 
improve their marriage prospects. The notion of being inadequate and having to change to 
find a marriage partner weighed heavily on many female informants in both locations and 
often seemed to engender great insecurities in them. 
The case studies presented in this chapter will show that, in China and Taiwan, marriage is 
to varying degrees still conceived of through the lens of intergenerational obligations by 
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parents and children. Even though, as James Farrer notes, the social stigma surrounding 
premarital intimacy and cohabitation have lessened (especially in China) and passionate and 
romantic feelings are increasingly conceptualized as key aspects in relationships, parental 
approval is still considered essential as soon as marriage is approaching (Farrer, 2014). This 
becomes obvious from the importance bestowed on the formal introduction of the partner 
to parents. Farrer remarks that his urban informants perceived the willingness to introduce 
one’s parents to one’s partner and the time frame within which such a meeting was realized 
as important yardsticks that measured the seriousness of a relationship (pp. 76-77). This 
was also true of the young urbanites I met in Taipei. Sometimes, however, as the case 
studies below will reveal, it was the introductory meeting with parents in itself that sowed 
doubt about the partner as well as the family life one could expect after marriage. 
 
4.2. The Ambiguous Search for Romance and Fears of Falling Behind - the 
Pressure on Young Women to Marry in Taipei and Beijing 
The morning of Chia-ling’s wedding was hectic as we rushed to prepare the final items in 
her luggage -a child’s bathtub filled with baby paraphernalia symbolizing fertility that the 
bride traditionally had to take to her husband’s home (in this case of actual, immediate use). 
However, Chia-ling repeatedly stressed that she would return to her parental home the day 
after the wedding; this was a custom practised by many families in Taiwan. As she would 
also return home regularly afterwards, there was no need to rush with the packing. It 
almost seemed as if the prospect of returning to her family immediately after the wedding 
day consoled her while the atmosphere of departure hung over her house. However, 
whereas I expected to see a nervous, excited bride, Chia-ling appeared absent-minded and 
indifferent throughout the preparations and the banquet. Initially, I did not understand her 
lack of euphoria but I soon learnt that Chia-ling had already had her big day -the 
engagement party her father had arranged for her several weeks before. Yu-ching showed 
me pictures of the banquet and, from the venue to the dresses, everything looked very 
luxurious and stylish, somewhat different from the more “local” wedding that was planned 
by her in-laws. The father of Chia-ling’s future husband also owned a business but his was 
much smaller than her family’s company. Whereas at Chia-ling’s engagement party a high 
ranking politician from the central government gave a speech - indicating her father’s 
sphere of influence - only local officials would make an appearance at her wedding in 
Chiayi. This fact had not escaped the father of the groom, who, at the banquet, apologized 
upfront for not being able to match Chia-ling’s father’s business prowess. It soon became 
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clear that Chia-ling, in order to get married within the socially accepted time frame, had 
conceded to a match that did not fulfil the normative expectations on women to increase 
or at least maintain their socioeconomic status (Chu and Yu, 2010 p. 110). 
When I first met Chia-ling, she enthusiastically told Yu-ching and me the story of the 
romantic engagement her boyfriend had organized as a surprise at a luxurious hotel and 
proudly showed us her engagement ring. However, when I talked to Yu-ching in private, 
she did not seem equally impressed. Chia-ling had admitted to Yu-ching that she feared not 
finding another partner if she broke up with her current boyfriend. She thus wanted to 
marry him, even though he might not be the best match for her. Like Chia-ling, Yu-ching’s 
parents also owned a successful family business. Her parents, however, expected her future 
husband to match her not only in terms of educational background but also in his potential 
to offer her the material comfort to which she was used at home. Clearly, this was not the 
case with Chia-ling’s husband and her friends were well aware of this. Nevertheless, the 
pressure to marry had eventually outweighed all material arguments and that day, watching 
fantasy movies while waiting to get married, Chia-ling seemed the somewhat “resigned 
bride,” acceptant of the things to come.  
Whereas Yu-ching had repeatedly stressed her wish to start a family soon, she was also 
unsure about leaving her parental home that had offered her emotional and material 
comfort. She clearly stated that she did not want to realize her aspiration of marriage at any 
price; she hoped for a partner who could facilitate the lifestyle she was used to from her 
parental home - she was not willing to lower her expectations in this regard.  
The step to marriage is an ambiguous experience for many young Taiwanese women. On 
the one hand, young Taiwanese perceive marriage as a means to break free from parental 
authority. On the other hand, this also implies a transition to a life phase that is, for some 
brides, characterized by more responsibilities and even frugality. Whereas many women 
look forward to being acknowledged as an adult and self-responsible person, a state 
difficult to achieve living in their parental homes, the flipside of these new responsibilities 
often scares them. For these reasons, Bonnie Adrian notes, many Taiwanese women in 
their mid-twenties find it increasingly difficult to give up the comforts of this relatively 
carefree stage of life at which they can spend large shares of their salaries on themselves 
(Adrian, 2003 pp. 82-107).  
Among my female informants in Taipei I observed that especially young professionals who 
still lived at their family homes and who had most of their salary at their own disposal 
(despite small monthly remittances to their parents) feared the economic responsibilities of 
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marriage. These changing attitudes are also reflected in a shift to a later age of marriage in 
Taiwan; this is now in one’s late twenties for women and one’s early thirties for men – this 
shift has taken place in recent decades (Huang, 2013 pp. 77-78). Nevertheless, parental 
concerns increased if daughters had not found themselves committed relationships by the 
latter half of their twenties. During this time, as Yu-ching’s case shows, the pleasure initially 
derived from personal freedom changed into stress due to the need to find a suitable 
spouse. The process of choosing a partner was, from then on, largely determined by 
mounting time pressure and parental expectations. 
Our preparations the night before the wedding were frequently interrupted by Chia-ling’s 
many family members peeking into her room to greet us. Besides her parents, her elder 
brother, his wife and their new-born son also lived in the house. The bridesmaids were 
especially thrilled by the new-born and took turns cuddling the baby. Yu-ching, however, 
was noticeably quiet throughout the evening. She later told me that although she had been 
very close to Chia-ling’s elder brother -almost on the verge of dating -their relationship 
cooled after he got to know his current wife. They more or less rushed into marriage and 
soon had a child. Yu-ching was baffled by his behaviour and had largely avoided him since. 
His wife sensed their tense relationship and, according to Yu-ching, behaved jealously 
when they met to visit Chia-ling. However, I did not observe any tension between them 
that night. Yu-ching started a relationship with a classmate but since they had broken up, 
she found it difficult to find somebody she was truly interested in. One by one her female 
friends were getting married and she nervously asked herself when she would leave her 
parental home and start her own family. For that reason, and much to Yu-ching’s 
displeasure, her mother had taken matters into her own hands and was now actively 
searching for a spouse for her daughter. 
Even though professional matchmaking services are still used and relatives also often 
introduce prospective marriage partners to one another, “self-determined spouse selection 
has become a status marker” as romantic love, Adrian points out, is “’the idiom’ for 
discussion of marriage” in contemporary Taiwan (Adrian, 2003 pp. 80-81). Whereas semi-
arranged matches among the parental generation are not uncommon, marriage for 
romantic love is now interpreted as a crucial marker of modernity - most young people 
want to conform to this ideal and use romantic feelings not only as social legitimization for 
their marriage plans but also to show progressiveness in contrast to the older generation 
that maintains more traditional values (p. 81). Although ‘romantic love’ was undoubtedly 
an important concept in the courtship rituals of my Taiwanese (and Chinese) informants, 
best exemplified by the lavish proposals scripted according to Hollywood romances that 
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were increasingly expected, I observed that, as they got older, my female and male 
informants were increasingly willing to accept their parents’ help or even professional help 
from dating agencies. This, as Yu-ching’s case illustrates, meant that parents also had more 
influence on partner choice – this increased the pressure on young adults during courtship.  
From an upper middle-class background, Yu-ching had grown up in one of the most 
affluent parts of Taipei and had received an expensive education at Taiwanese private 
institutions and schools abroad. However, she confessed to me that despite her high 
academic credentials, she still felt very dependent on her parents not only in questions 
concerning her education and career but also in her choice of future spouse. Yu-ching 
knew that her time in the safety of her parental home was limited since her mother was 
desperate for her to get married. Yu-ching’s mother confided in me during one of my visits 
at their family home that she believed women developed a psychological “imbalance” if 
they married too late. Beyond that, she was convinced that through marriage, a woman 
could improve her skills of socializing in an unfamiliar environment.  
After a string of disappointing experiences with men, Yu-ching’s mother arranged several 
dates for her daughter. I met Yu-ching after one of these introductory meetings where her 
family and the family of the young man had been present. At the restaurant, their parents 
shared a table while Yu-Ching and the young man were placed at a separate table to have 
the opportunity to get to know each other in more privacy. However, as Yu-ching told me 
with some annoyance, her mother had overheard their conversation and criticized her 
afterwards for her frequent, noisy laughing. On a first date, she expected a more demure 
demeanour from her daughter. Yu-ching lamented that the young man had not been very 
interested in her and she had not heard back from him. A few days later, on a second date 
with the family of the man, he revealed that he had a girlfriend his parents did not know 
about. He had gone on this date just to hide his secret relationship. Even though Yu-ching 
did not seem to feel sorry about this lost opportunity, her worries about not finding a 
suitable match before the end of her twenties became more palpable during the following 
months. She attributed her difficulty in finding a partner to her perceived lack of gentleness 
and a ‘cute’ (ke’ai) appearance that her ex-partners had already criticized her for. She 
complained that her previous dating mishaps had only confirmed her inability to “entertain” 
men. Indeed, one of her ex-boyfriends whom I met several times during my fieldwork 
repeatedly stressed his rather conservative outlook on relationships, in particular his 
preference for Japanese women who he assumed to be more docile, caring and more 
“family-focused” than Taiwanese women. For this reason, Yu-ching told me, her mother 
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had recently advised her to ‘just obey’ her dating partner and not to be too opinionated if a 
controversial topic came up. 
Tzu-i Chuang analyzes the notion of “cuteness” (ke’ai), a concept adopted from the 
Japanese “kawai”, that Yu-ching refers to (Chuang, 2005). He notes that ke’ai does not only 
refer to a certain sexually non-threatening female attractiveness but condenses a number of 
character attributes such as docility, playfulness and vulnerability that are ascribed to ideal 
femininity. I often observed among my female informants, as Chuang has described, that 
they actively performed “cuteness” to their boyfriends by talking in high pitched, nasal 
voices (sajiao) as well as appropriating an infantile habitus – this ceased abruptly as soon as 
their partners left the scene or grew tired of this behaviour (p. 22). Even though Chuang 
attributes a certain form of female empowerment to this “playing cute,” I mostly observed 
the ostentatious performance of cuteness in situations in which young women behaved 
pointedly non-assertive; situations in which they tried to downplay their intellect to bolster 
the self-confidence of their male partners. Moreover, I had the impression that young 
women “played cute” (or were required to do so) in public situations, especially service 
sector jobs (this was more often the case in Taipei than in Beijing). One juice shop at a 
Taipei night market that was frequented mostly by young students even earned itself 
questionable fame by ordering its female employees to attract customers with extremely 
high pitched cat imitations. This sounded strangely like a real cat and regularly made people 
turn around in the street.  
However, my female Beijing informants were also familiar with gendered expectations of 
their behaviour and appearance – some feared being perceived as tomboyish or as too 
strong-minded women (nühanzi). Chao once described his friend, Ming-yue, as a nühanzi in 
my presence, which drew loud protests from her. Ming-yue, nearing her mid-twenties, was 
anxious that she might not find a husband soon. Her worries were aggravated by Chao’s 
and her parents’ teasing her singledom.  
In contrast, Sun-yi - a young Chinese woman in her early thirties with an impressive career 
in the media - appeared proud of being associated with the image of a nühanzi. One 
afternoon I met her and her former classmate who was now a successful academic. The 
young women talked about their circle of friends and remarked with a sense of pride that 
most of the women they were close to could be considered nühanzi: they were all ambitious, 
headstrong and had successful careers. Similarly, in Taiwan, especially single female 
informants who had already passed the normative age for marriage found pride in their 
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perceived “otherness.” They placed a heavier emphasis on their independence and 
assertiveness -attributes that younger, single informants more often tried to play down. 
In any case, Yu-ching considered her lack of skills and willingness to adopt a subordinate, 
flattering demeanour as one of her biggest obstacles on the marriage market. The events 
after our conversation with the group of young men in the courtyard on the day of Chia-
ling’s wedding might have contributed to her assessment of this dilemma. 
Even though her role as bridesmaid at Chia-ling’s wedding roused ambiguous feelings in 
Yu-ching, it also offered her an opportunity to meet potential dates. It turned out that the 
introduction of bridesmaids and best men - a relatively new custom borrowed from 
Northern American wedding rituals – seemed largely to serve the purpose of offering 
single friends of the bridal couple an opportunity to get to know each other. After our 
conversation with the groom’s best men in the courtyard, however, Yu-ching found that 
even though the young man who engaged her in conversation seemed nice, he was far 
from the ideal Yu-ching and her parents possessed of her prospective partner.  
I gained an insight into the men’s impression of Yu-ching on the way back to Taipei. One 
of the groom’s best men offered me a lift – while alone with him in the car, he revealed his 
thoughts about the events in the courtyard. He was married, had a young child and was in 
his late thirties. For these reasons, he seemed to take on the role of an experienced mentor 
for his younger single friends. He said that at first he had thought that Yu-ching would be a 
good match for the young man. However, after the conversation he had overheard in the 
courtyard, he had some doubts about their suitability. As she studied law, he explained, she 
would be very headstrong. His friend, although a law student himself, was a more relaxed 
type. Consequently, their mindsets did not match. Moreover, he argued, no man wanted a 
wife as inquisitive as Yu-ching so he would not recommend that his friend pursue her. 
Baffled by his assessment of the situation, I probed the aspect of unsuitability further; he 
admitted that he feared that Yu-ching would stop his friend from going out at night and 
partying as she appeared too assertive. His ideal type would be the Japanese model of a 
wife, he stated, one who supposedly focused on her obligations within the household and 
would also keep a pleasant appearance while her husband pursued life at work and beyond. 
Like Yu-ching’s ex-boyfriend, he thus subscribed to a stereotypical image of Japanese 
women as incorporating the feminine values of demureness and domesticity. 
Recent research shows that despite the demographic trends that are conventionally 
attributed to modern industrial societies – such as decreasing birth rates, an older age on 
one’s first marriage and childbirth as well as rising divorce rates - the division of housework 
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and marital decision-making is still heavily influenced by patriarchal Confucian family 
values in Taiwan even in young birth cohorts (Yu and Liu, 2014). Women assume a 
considerably heavier share of the housework and have less influence in important financial 
decisions. This tendency is also reflected in the young men’s attitude towards Yu-ching’s 
confrontational argumentation. They might have feared that she could display the same 
behaviour in marital decision-making. Likewise, Yu-ching’s mother’s directive to “just obey” 
her dating partners suggests that she was concerned that Yu-ching’s perceived 
stubbornness could be an obstacle to finding a husband.  
However, Yu-ching was also criticized by her close female friends. She had engaged in 
sexual relationships with several of her previous partners so they accused her of agreeing 
too readily to physical intimacy. Yu-ching explained that young women often feared that 
their partners would lose interest in them after sex and thus postponed it for as long as 
possible in order to enforce a commitment to the relationship. Her friends found that Yu-
ching’s behaviour lacked strategy; they feared she was gambling with her chances of 
marriage. Her mother, unaware of any details about Yu-ching’s past relationships, even 
expected her daughter to still be a virgin and to remain so until marriage. If she lost her 
virginity before wedlock, her mother had threatened Yu-ching that “she would break her 
legs.” 
Whereas recent studies about the age at which one has one’s first sexual encounter in East 
Asian societies point to a growing tolerance of premarital sexual relations, this was a 
controversial topic among my informants in Taipei and Beijing (Farrer, 2002; Farrer et al., 
2012; Pei, 2011; Wong and Yau, 2011). Premarital virginity in women was rarely expected 
(even though preferred) by young men. However, as also found by Farrer and others, the 
number of premarital sexual partners and the context in which sexual experience had been 
gained clearly played a role in the assessment of a woman’s suitability as a wife (Farrer, 
2014 pp. 83-84; Parish et al., 2007 p. 746). Not only female Taiwanese but also Chinese 
informants told me about what they perceived as an annoying double standard that allowed 
young men to gain premarital sexual experience whereas women risked their reputation as 
suitable wives if they engaged in non-committed intimate relationships. It was not 
uncommon, they reported, to be bluntly asked on first dates about the number of partners 
with whom they had had sexual intercourse.  
Even though my female Chinese informants - mainly due to their autonomous lifestyle in 
the capital - had more opportunities for premarital sexual relationships without being 
controlled by their social environments, the fear of being stigmatized as promiscuous (jian) 
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also were manifest there. Becoming a “leftover woman” (shengnü), a derogatory term coined 
by the supposedly feminist Women’s Federation of the CCP which describes high-
achieving single woman beyond their late twenties, was an overarching fear among many of 
my Chinese informants (Fincher, 2014 pp. 2-3). The following case study will illustrate how 
young women in Beijing, despite being less constrained than their Taipei peers, still had to 
carefully consider sexual encounters and partner choices so as not to risk their 
marriageability.  
Xiao-xiao looked excited as we entered the tunnel-like underground market close to 
Beijing’s zoo which is famous for its bargain clothes and accessories. We arrived early on 
this Saturday morning but the streets around the subway station leading to the market halls 
were already buzzing with young people. At weekends Xiao-xiao usually tried to escape 
early from the narrow room she shared with another girl in a suburb of Beijing. She 
suggested showing me around the Zoo Market, a chaotic conglomeration of stores that 
draws young people, especially women, at the weekends. She complained that her flatmate 
too often invited guests to play cards deep into the night. Despite these inconveniences, 
Xiao-xiao had not considered moving out as the room was relatively inexpensive compared 
to the soaring rent prices in the city. While we strolled through the bold coloured items on 
display, Xiao-xiao updated me on her recent problems with her mother who was pressuring 
her to marry soon, preferably a young man from her hometown in Henan. Xiao-xiao, 
however, aspired to a husband with cosmopolitan allure and a sense of adventure, 
something she did not expect from a local man from her home province. She told me how 
she was annoyed about her recent unsuccessful date with a former classmate from her 
hometown who, with the help of his parents’ bribes, had been promoted to the central 
government in Beijing. She quickly became bored by his conservative opinions and his 
passion for playing majiang, a game she considered more suitable for older generations. 
Since then, she had rejected his invitations to meet despite her mother’s urgent plea to 
hurry up with her quest for a husband. 
While talking about her love life, our conversation turned towards her recent romance with 
a French student. Even though the relationship lacked the commitment she was hoping for, 
he had impressed her with romantic gestures and adventurous outings, something she 
found lacking in relationships with local men. Despite the immense emotional pain which 
the instability of the affair caused her, she would not give up the hope for a future together. 
She reminisced about the night he took her to the top of the CCTV Tower from which 
they enjoyed the view over the glittering lights of the city. That night, she smiled, had been 
“like in a movie.” He inspired her interest in politics and history and, for the first time she 
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had the feeling that a man was interested in her personal thoughts and opinions. At that 
time, she really felt like her life was taking a turn for the better.  
Her mother, however, had not been impressed by the young men. Xiao-xiao had taken him 
with her on a visit to her home town. She introduced him as a friend but her parents 
understood immediately that they were in a relationship. When her little brother asked the 
young man if he had a girlfriend and he replied no, her parents became very concerned. 
Even Xiao-xiao’s stepfather, who rarely interfered with her personal life, took her to one 
side and warned her that her boyfriend was playing with her feelings. If she continued the 
relationship, he feared that he would humiliate her. During that trip, Xiao-xiao had been 
out drinking with her date in her hometown. She was sure, she added, that her parents’ 
neighbours had gossiped about them. Her mother had been so exasperated that she cried 
the whole night. After the trip, Xiao-xiao became thoughtful and ended the affair. She even 
deleted him from her online contacts. However, her resolve did not last long and they soon 
talked again. She was deeply hurt when his affections for her diminished and she found out 
that he had planned a romantic trip to Paris with his new Chinese date. However, she still 
found it difficult to ignore his allure. 
A growing emphasis on romantic performance among young Chinese, Yan points out, was 
promoted by the increased access to national and international media during the reform era 
and has profoundly changed courtship practices as well as the concept of the ideal spouse 
over recent decades. Whereas an ability to endure hard physical labour and a suitable family 
background were desired attributes in a man during collective times, men are now 
measured by their emotional expressivity and their ability to convey their feelings through 
“romantic” speech and acts modelled on popular TV dramas and Hollywood movies (Yan, 
2003 pp. 72-85). Moreover, since the restrictions on the household registration system have 
been loosened and people can leave their rural home places to pursue an education and a 
career in the cities, the ability to navigate the urban environment has also become a primary 
concern in terms of a marriage partner. Matthew Kohrman points out that  
“To be a competent man or woman in China today one must be willing if not eager to 
venture away from home and use skills to earn a better living. […] Chinese men, more than 
women, are expected to occupy and control mobility within most public arenas: being a 
man in contemporary China demands demonstrating and generating status by exiting and 
moving around quickly outside the home and by having greater agency over where and 
how movement is made […]” (Kohrman, 1999 p. 894). 
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Like Xiao-xiao, many female informants in Beijing valued insider knowledge of the urban 
environment and, beyond that, international travel experience as desirable assets in males 
because it proved to them that their partners had shed their “backward” rural lifestyles. In 
some cases, Western foreign men were considered as reliably possessing these assets and, 
for this reason, they proved to be desirable dating candidates among those female 
informants who aspired to a more adventurous, cosmopolitan lifestyle (Farrer, 2013).  
The rising heat in the market hall and the ever stronger stream of people shoving along the 
narrow passages made us feel increasingly uncomfortable and we decided to have lunch at 
a nearby shopping mall. As we were sitting in front of our steaming hot pots, Xiao-xiao 
told me that for a short time, she had moved into the apartment of her French date. I was 
surprised since she had never mentioned it before. As he was hesitant to enter into an 
official relationship with her, she explained, she was wary of sleeping with him. One night, 
he tried to approach her and when she refused to let him get closer, he shouted angrily at 
her. She asked me if I thought that it was a mistake not to give in to his advances as, soon 
afterwards, he started dating somebody else. 
Farrer argues that some of his female Shanghai informants entertained “a fantasy of 
liberation from Asian patriarchy by embracing western education and also an idealized 
version of western romance […]” (Farrer, 2013 p. 14). Xiao-xiao was notably impressed by 
the closely followed script of Hollywood-like dating romance she experienced with her 
foreign affair in the beginning of their relationship. At the same time, however, she was 
highly aware of the fleeting nature of their encounter when she very matter-of-factly 
explained that her date was very volatile in his affections and he soon found another affair. 
Despite her seeming independence, Xiao-xiao was worried about passing the acceptable 
age for marriage without having found a partner and was torn between her strong feelings 
for the French man and the hopelessness of the affair. However, even though she stressed 
that the advantages of a foreign passport was not a consideration for her in this match, she 
found it difficult to let go of her dream to go abroad that seemed to have receded into the 
far distance when their affair broke apart.  
Whereas among my female Beijing informants, sexual relationships that did not have the 
clear objective of marriage could flourish to a greater extent due to a more autonomous 
lifestyle, this rarely occurred with their Taipei counterparts. As they mostly lived with their 
families, it was difficult to pursue fleeting affairs without raising unwanted parental 
attention. Especially romantic relationships with a foreigner, at least in the Taiwanese upper 
middle classes, were almost frowned upon as Western men often had the reputation of 
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being promiscuous and were unwilling to permanently settle in Taiwan. One of my female 
Taiwanese informants who started a committed relationship with a Western man repeatedly 
stressed that he was a visiting professional of a renowned international company and that 
she originally did not want to date him as she wanted to stay in Taiwan with her parents. I 
knew several other Taiwanese women who had a profound interest in Western culture and 
dreamt of travelling and living abroad, yet emphasized that they could not imagine a marital 
future with a Western man due to different cultural expectations. Decisions to pursue 
romantic relationships with foreigners among women in Beijing and Taipei thus seemed to 
be influenced by the socioeconomic differences and the demographic profiles of the places 
that determined how promising relationships with Westerners appeared. 
As noted in the introduction, Xiao-xiao had found effective ways to conceal her 
adventurous trips and private life from her mother; this allowed her to explore Beijing’s 
dating scene without being reprimanded. Nevertheless, during their telephone calls, her 
mother would pressure her to marry soon while her “value was still high.” Xiao-xiao feared 
that if she had not found a husband by the age of thirty, her mother would surely “go 
crazy.” A fear that their daughters would pass child-bearing age before they found a partner 
was very prominent among the parents of young Chinese and Taiwanese people. Many, like 
Xiao-xiao’s and Yu-ching’s mothers, expressed their fears that, after a certain age, their 
children would be difficult to place on the marriage market and would spoil their often 
only chance of grandchildren. This was especially true of the Chinese cases. In China the 
threshold that made parents worry about their daughter’s marital prospects was set in the 
mid-twenties and thus a few years earlier than in Taiwan (Fincher, 2014 pp. 1-3). However, 
like Yu-ching’s experiences in Taiwan, in China young women like Xiao-xiao who had a 
higher education and pursued successful careers often had the reputation of being non-
desirable spouses as many men were reluctant to marry wives who outperformed them 
academically and professionally (Zhang and Sun, 2014).  
Moreover, like Yu-ching, Xiao-xiao was also accused by her peers of giving herself away 
“under her value.” Upon hearing that Xiao-xiao had slept with her foreign date, her female 
boss, with whom she had a very close relationship, criticized her for not demanding any 
material compensation for the intimacy she had offered the young man. In her eyes, Xiao-
xiao could at least have “cheated” (pian) him into taking her on a trip to France. Xiao-xiao 
explained to me that it was common to consent to sexual intercourse only if one was 
certain that a marriage proposal would soon follow. It was easier to find a husband if one 
was still a virgin. If a woman claimed to be a virgin but there was no blood after first 
intercourse, she might get into trouble with her partner. Her mother had advised her to 
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stay a virgin until she married. However, she would not listen to this advice and also did 
not mind showing her solidarity with her flatmate as she knew how difficult it was to 
maintain privacy in the crowded dwellings young people occupied in Beijing. When her 
flatmate invited her boyfriend to their place, Xiao-xiao mostly stayed out late or spent the 
night at a friend’s place.  
However, during our lunch at the mall, Xiao-xiao seemed to be discouraged by her dating 
experiences in Beijing and doubted ever finding a partner she could be happy with. “If you 
marry a guy,” she sighed, “your life ends, especially, if you marry a Chinese guy. We won’t 
have an option for seeking more things.” 
Yu-ching’s and Xiao-xiao’s stories exemplify the different problems young women face 
searching for future spouses in Taipei and Beijing. Whereas young women from affluent 
middle-class backgrounds in Taipei often struggled to overcome the limitations their 
protected family environment placed on their search for a partner, young women in Beijing 
more often had more autonomy over decisions due to their spatial and economic 
independence from parents and they found it easier to distance themselves from parental 
demands. However, they also felt suppressed by patriarchal norms that restricted their 
sexual freedom and status as equal partners in romantic relationships and marriage. Like 
their Taiwanese peers, they felt the pressure to conform to standardized notions of female 
behaviour and beauty and were warned by parents and friends not to “sell themselves 
under their value” and to observe certain rules of intimacy to protect themselves from 
supposedly exploitative male sexuality.  
However, the following case studies that will shed light on courtship and marriage from the 
male perspective will show that these norms are not only criticized by women, but also by 
young men. They will also offer insight into an issue that so far has only been addressed 
briefly, namely the impact that the repercussions of different state-sponsored ideological 
campaigns and welfare measures have had on partner choice and decisions about post-
marital residence in Beijing and Taipei. 
 
4.3. Pressures of Responsibility and Success - Searching for Wives in Taipei and 
Beijing 
Pei-chun, and his new girlfriend were already waiting as I arrived at Longshan temple in 
Taipei’s Wanhua District. I introduced the young man in the first chapter where I told the 
life story of his mother and described the severe losses the family had to endure when Pei-
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chun was an adolescent. At that day, Pei-chun and his girlfriend wanted to meet me at the 
temple to introduce me to the god who had, they explained, helped them find each other. 
As we entered the temple, we were immediately wrapped in a swathe of incense that hung 
like a heavy cloth over the inner courtyard. Under the jarring chants emanating from the 
loudspeakers, groups of worshippers were moving from shrine to shrine. As we walked 
into the inner courtyard, Pei-chun explained that he would usually visit this Buddhist 
temple that also hosted Chinese folk deities if he wanted to pray for a certain matter that 
concerned him. Especially during his studies, he often came here to ask for divine 
assistance with his exams. As we arrived at the shrine of Yue Lao, a god believed to help 
love-seeking singles find the right match, we were confronted by an impressive crowd of 
young people. Pei-chun’s girlfriend explained to me that she had asked Yue Lao to help her 
find a partner and that Pei-chun matched perfectly her requests to this god. He was kind-
hearted and considerate and, most importantly, had an income of over 45,000 TWD6. Pei-
chun chimed in and confirmed that he had also been here to ask for the god’s help in his 
search for a wife; shortly afterwards, he had met his girlfriend. His requirements, however, 
had been slightly different. The most relevant request on his list had been that his girlfriend 
should respect his mother. 
It was not unusual for my Taiwanese informants to rely on divine help in searching for 
partners. However, especially in cases like that of Pei-chun and his girlfriend, who had 
quickly started out on a committed relationship after getting to know each other, references 
to divine approval or destiny (yuanfen) were made to justify their fast progress towards 
marriage. I observed that especially when confronting ambiguous situations in their love 
lives, young Taiwanese tended to consult fortune-tellers, temple oracles or religious 
specialists more often than their Chinese counterparts. Likewise Yu-ching had sought the 
advice of a Buddhist master when her desperation over her unsolved relationship problems 
grew too great. Although a revival in folk religious practices could be observed in China, 
the number of adherents to folk religion was considerably higher in Taiwan; in addition, 
Yang and colleagues have found, unlike in China, the younger generations (below the age 
of forty) were most active in ancestor worship and the veneration of local deities (Yang and 
Hu, 2012). These observed differences were also reflected in the ways my young 
informants approached important life choices, in particular those pertaining to romantic 
love and marriage – this was one of the spheres young Taiwanese appeared to perceive as 
especially amenable to influence by supernatural powers.  
                                                 
6 Approximately 960 GBP in the summer of 2012. 
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Returning to the request Pei-chun and his girlfriend made to the temple god, it must be 
noted that it was not uncommon to articulate requirements for a future spouse’s earning 
potential or preferences for rather traditional gender role models in marriage. Recent 
studies point out that despite profound demographic and economic changes in Taiwan, an 
adherence to traditional family values has remained strong, also in young adults (Chu et al., 
2011; Yu and Liu, 2014). However, the heavy emphasis that Pei-chun placed on his future 
wife’s harmonious relationship with his mother was rather unusual, even by Taiwanese 
standards – this could be explained by the close relationship he and his mother had shared 
since his father’s early death. 
When I got to know Pei-chun in spring 2012, he was thirty-one years old. From the outset, 
most of our conversations revolved around the topics of marriage and partner choice. He 
had worked as a computer engineer for a software company in the outskirts of Taipei for 
several years and had found that he was financially stable enough to think about marriage. 
His former girlfriend did not get along well with his mother. As Pei-chun planned to live in 
his widowed mother’s household after marriage, he broke up with her. Since then, he had 
found it difficult to find a new partner. For a woman, he insisted, getting married implied 
that she would have to live with the family of her husband. At the same time, he did not 
consider a close relationship with his in-laws to be essential: “If her parents don’t like me, 
it’s ok, because I won’t live with them.”  
A few months after our first meeting, Pei-chun was excited to tell me the news that he had 
found a girlfriend. He had participated in a singles dating event (lianyi) that had been 
advertised online. The young woman he eventually arranged a date with brought another 
friend along.7 He soon realized he preferred this female friend to his original date. After a 
few more dates, he was sure that she was a suitable partner. He had introduced her to his 
mother only a few weeks after they started dating officially, a rather unusual gesture 
compared to the reluctance my other male informants showed in this respect, fearing the 
pressure to marry such meetings often brought to bear. 
Pei-chun’s new girlfriend was working as a teacher and was thirty-two years of age. She did 
not want to wait much longer to get married either. She was preparing for the civil servant 
exam and thus they met only once a week on Saturday afternoons at a coffee shop. They 
could not talk much as she brought her exam preparation material and he worked on his 
laptop during these meetings. However, they soon felt very close to each other and, one 
                                                 
7 It was not unusual to arrange group dates or to bring a friend to a first date in Taiwan. This was to prevent 
the occasion from becoming too formal and threatening, especially to rather shy young men and women. 
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Saturday, Pei-chun took heart, confessed his feelings and asked her to be his girlfriend. She 
agreed but it was clear to both of them that, from now on, they would quickly gravitate 
towards marriage.  
Farrer stresses that in China, the verbal declaration of love is an important step in the 
transition from a more ambiguous love interest to a formal relationship (Farrer, 2014 p. 72). 
This was also clearly the case among my female Taiwanese informants who often 
complained about the half-hearted interest of their male dating partners; the women also 
often required a formal statement of a man’s sincere intentions before allowing sexual 
intimacy to occur. Many of my female informants feared getting stuck in dubious 
relationships (aimei) that did not imply any commitment and that might jeopardize their 
chances of marriage. For this reason, it is not surprising that Pei-chun’s girlfriend, who had 
expressed her wish for marriage and who had already passed the age threshold for accepted 
singledom in Taiwan, was expecting a clear articulation of Pei-chun’s willingness to commit.  
Soon after our meeting at the temple, they started to plan their married life.  Their choice 
of residence turned out to be particularly complicated as Pei-chun discovered that although 
his fiancée liked his mother, she did not want to live in the same household. She was also 
not as economical as he had hoped. One evening, when I met Pei-chun after work, he 
complained that whereas he was making long-term plans and was thinking about the high 
costs of education for their future children, she focused only on short-term pleasure. He 
sighed: “Because you know, my girlfriend is [...] still a girl, even though she is one year 
older than me but [her] thinking is still like a little girl. Work, money and so on...” 
A few months later - I had already left Taipei at that time - they married and moved into 
their own flat, which, despite Pei-chun’s concerns, was closer to the natal home of his wife. 
When I asked Pei-chun during an online call what his family thought about him having 
moved out, he replied that they had found a fair solution that would, in his eyes, be a 
suitable compromise: during workdays, they lived in their own flat but on Friday night, he 
and his wife moved to his mother’s house until Monday morning. By way of this patrilocal 
weekend residence, they had found a compromise that fulfilled his mother’s and his wife’s 
needs.  
As Pei-chun’s case demonstrates, an important factor that influenced partner choice among 
young Taiwanese men was their future wife’s willingness to integrate into their natal 
families. In Taiwan, post-marital residence was often a disputed topic among young 
couples and their families. Often, as in the case of the young Taiwanese bride introduced 
above, parents would request that a newlywed son and his wife should reside in their 
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household for at least several months before moving into independent housing. As Yue-
ling’s case in the previous chapter demonstrates, a commonly practised form was for a 
couple to move into the immediate neighbourhood (Chu et al., 2011 p. 133). This often 
caused tensions, especially between the young wives and her parents-in-law, and many 
quickly started to resent this living arrangement. 
By contrast to their Taiwanese counterparts, most of my informants in Beijing, whether 
from urban or rural backgrounds, expected to lead a relatively independent life from both 
sets of parents after marriage. Few intended to return to their home cities and none of 
them planned to move into the same household as parents or in-laws after marriage even if 
their parents also lived in Beijing. One reason why the practice of neolocal post-marital 
residence was relatively firmly established in China was that already the parental generation 
had lived independently in flats or dormitories provided by their work units after marriage. 
During collective times, the “iron rice bowl” (tie fen wan) had provided people not only with 
employment and various social services but had also allocated housing to young workers 
(Ikels, 1993). However, since these welfare measures had been abolished in the course of 
the reform era, young Chinese have also become increasingly dependent on parental 
support in the provision of apartments. 
The expectation to provide independent housing before marriage placed a heavy strain on 
young men, especially due to skyrocketing real estate prices in many urban areas of China. 
Li Zhang has observed in the urban environment of Kunming that for young adults, 
“[h]omeownership has undeniably become one of the primary concerns in their decision 
making and how they assess the worth of a potential spouse. This is particularly true for 
men who are largely held responsible for providing a place to live” (Zhang, 2010 p. 168). 
Fong made similar observations in urban Northern China where parents could not hope to 
marry off their son unless they could provide him with adequate independent housing 
(Fong, 2004 p. 113). Similarly, Friederike Fleischer found that in Bejing housing played an 
important role in the process of social differentiation; as such, especially residential 
compounds have become the new marker of Chinese urban middle class identity (Fleischer, 
2007). She describes that the ability to pursue a Western-inspired life style in one of the 
capital’s prestigious suburbs was considered an important status enhancement. Fleischer 
notes that with the increasing stratification of the urban real estate market, “[…] the 
consumption of space has turned into a special realm, and housing is one of the prime 
markers of socio-economic status” (p. 297). 
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In Taiwan, the situation was not that different. Modern apartments in prestigious urban 
neighbourhoods were highly coveted status markers among my informants. However, 
soaring real estate prices and stagnating wages made it almost impossible for young 
graduates to afford to buy housing (Chen et al., 2007). In most cases when couples moved 
into independent housing after marriage, young men had to rely on parents to support 
them in their investment or transfer them property they already owned. The economic 
dependencies created by these expectations only reinforced parents’ authority over their 
children and, in an interplay with the more traditional expectations of spouse selection 
described above, made young men even more susceptible to parental interference in 
partner choice and other areas of their lives.  
Likewise, for young people in Beijing, certain freedoms gained during the Communist era 
were compromised by the increasing economic necessity to rely on parents in the provision 
of housing. In any case, as the following will show, important ideological differences 
persisted that granted young men more decision-making power in relationship questions in 
comparison to young Taiwanese men with similar economic dependencies on parents.  
Liang, my colleague at the Beijing consultancy who was introduced with his mother in the 
first chapter, was one of those young Chinese men who struggled to maintain their 
economic independence due to rising living costs in Beijing.8 Liang returned early from his 
studies abroad to move back to the flat of his separated mother to take care of her after 
complicated surgery. Liang was not satisfied with this situation - most of his life he had 
lived rather independently while his parents busily followed their professional engagements. 
Now that his mother had retired and was suffering from ill health, he was subjected to a 
form of family life he had rarely experienced before and he felt increasingly constrained by 
the obligations it implied. Thus, several months after he had started working at the 
consultancy, he decided to move in with his girlfriend. In Chinese urban areas, premarital 
cohabitation is becoming increasingly common and, as I observed with several informants, 
it is also more and more accepted by parents (Farrer, 2014 p. 68). Liang’s decision to leave 
his family home to move in with his girlfriend while staying in the same city was thus not as 
bold as it would have appeared in the Taiwanese context. 
However, despite their relatively well-paid jobs in international companies, Liang and his 
girlfriend did not have enough savings to finance their own flat. Liang’s mother thus 
offered them her apartment and she would rent a smaller place that had become vacant in 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion of the decreasing affordability of housing in Beijing and other major Chinese cities, 
see Mak, et al., 2007. 
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the basement of the same housing complex. By transferring the apartment originally 
assigned to her by her danwei to Liang, she thus curiously subverted the original intent of 
state allocated housing; the accommodation that had liberated her from dependencies on 
her parents was now, in times of increasing economic uncertainty, used to install a novel 
form of coresidence with parents. However, under closer inspection, Liang’s story reveals 
important differences in Chinese family and gender ideology that clearly distinguish his 
decision to move close to his mother from residential choices made by my Taiwanese 
informants and their families. At that time, Liang did not intend to ever marry and build a 
family as he wanted to focus on his desired career as an artist abroad. Even though his 
mother undoubtedly wished that her only son would change his mind and might even have 
intended her offer to encourage him to reconsider his plans, she was willing to provide him 
and his girlfriend with housing without them promising to marry. One reason contributing 
to her liberal attitude may have been her own disdain for marriage and child-rearing. Like 
her son, she grew up relatively independently from her parents and followed her 
professional ideals. Even though with increasing age her expectations became more 
traditional, something that often irritated Liang, she refrained from interfering in his 
personal decisions despite the economic dependencies between them that rendered her 
some authority. Her respect for her son’s autonomy distinguished her clearly from the 
more traditionally minded parents of the young Taiwanese men I met. You-peng’s parents, 
for example, made strenuous efforts to intervene in their son’s career and relationship. 
They even read the correspondence between him and his girlfriend and criticized their 
intimate exchanges. Moreover, You-peng’s girlfriend did not even stay at their house 
during a short visit to Taipei, fearing she would be considered “too loose.” Even though 
some parents of my male Chinese informants expressed more traditional opinions than 
Liang’s mother, none of them told me of having experienced such strict parental 
interventions in their love life at that age. 
Moreover, even though Liang did move into the same apartment complex, neither he nor 
his mother ever mentioned regarding this as part of his filial obligations. This is clearly 
different from the seemingly similar residential arrangements that Pei-chun strove for: 
Whereas Liang stayed in his mother’s flat out of economic necessity, Pei-chun intended to 
do so more out of a feeling of filiality. Even though economic concerns did play a part in 
his wish to stay at home, the dominant reason was a deep feeling of obligation to be 
present in his natal household. Liang was also highly filial; he returned from his studies 
abroad to assist his mother during a health crisis. This form of filial care did not, however, 
imply any obligation of continuous coresidence.  
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Nevertheless, Liang surprisingly accepted what may seem at first glance to be a more 
traditional living arrangement than Pei-chun, whose wife eventually convinced him to 
move into an independent flat in another part of town. Yet, whereas Pei-chun and his wife 
spent their free time at the weekends within the circle of Pei-chun’s family, Liang was 
plotting his escape. He renovated an old house in a hutong to use as his studio - he 
sometimes stayed there overnight and continued to dream of a career as an artist abroad.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Both my Chinese and Taiwanese informants complained that despite living in a modern 
metropolis that should offer them a variety of possible lifestyle choices, they perceived 
their actual range of choices as rather limited and restricted because, from a certain age 
onwards, the pressure to marry sets in. Even though young adults in Beijing and Taipei can 
approach their selection of partners with varying degrees of freedom, their lifestyle choices 
are curtailed by the imperative of marriage and by future obligations towards their natal 
families and in-laws. Furthermore, far from completely abandoning traditional concepts of 
the need for matching family backgrounds and socioeconomic status between partners, 
they try to justify their choices according to traditional parameters; yet, modern notions of 
romantic and passionate love are equally important. The many expectations potential 
spouses have to fulfil complicate a consensus with parents in terms of what constitutes a 
good choice of partner. 
Nevertheless, similar trends in decision-making that were observable in the areas of 
education and career planning are also present in partner choice and residential 
arrangements. The case studies cited above illustrate how in Taiwan not only the more 
traditional gender and family ideology but also certain demographic specifics benefit 
parents’ influence on the selection of their children’s spouses and future residence.  
Chia-ling, the young Taiwanese bride, was supposed to move directly from her natal 
family’s home into that of her parents-in-law; she thus exchanged one parental authority 
for another. She actually lived in their household for much longer than the several months 
originally planned. A few months after her marriage, she gave birth to her first child. She 
thus did not only have to take care of her new responsibilities as a wife and daughter-in-law 
in the months after her marriage; she also had to grow into her new role as a mother in her 
in-laws’ household. The request of Chia-ling’s in-laws for her to move into their household 
after the wedding was not unusual among my Taipei informants. However, many managed 
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to turn down this request, fearful of having to spend more time than previously agreed at 
the husband’s parents’ apartment. It was especially striking that Chia-ling agreed to this 
arrangement as her father would have been able to finance independent accommodation 
for them from the outset of their married life.  
Likewise, Yu-ching still lived at home which increased her mother’s authority over her 
dating behaviour. Her parents’ say (as well as the influence of her shifu) in her choice of 
partner was so influential that she ended relationships with several boyfriends because they 
did not consider them suitable. Her case was unusual in terms of the very close yet 
emotionally stressful relationship she had with her parents. Despite their close proximity to 
parents, most of the young Taiwanese I met who felt greatly pressured by parental 
demands had found some way to distance themselves from parental critique more 
effectively by a certain age. 
Yet, also Pei-chun conceded that he would only marry a woman that his mother and 
grandmother got along with and who was willing to spend a great deal of her free time with 
his family. His case demonstrates that as neolocal post-marital residence becomes common 
in Taiwan, young people still have to make heavy concessions so as not to seem neglectful 
of their filial duties. 
Even though my informants in Beijing also felt pressured to marry before a certain age, 
their parents usually had far less direct influence on them. Xiao-xiao’s case shows that 
young women who live independently in the capital have comparatively greater personal 
freedoms in testing different forms of relationships and change partners without their 
parents’ intervention. She had moved into the flat of her foreign date for a certain time 
period but moved out when she did not like their cohabitation. Likewise, Liang was not 
entirely sure whether he wanted to stay with his girlfriend in the long-term when he moved 
in with her. His mother placed only mild pressure on him to marry but Liang was not 
willing to compromise on his career to lead a conventional family life. Even after he moved 
in with his girlfriend, I observed him living a pointedly single lifestyle which included long 
nights out with our colleagues and withdrawing to his studio at weekends.  
Even if the parents of my Chinese informants voiced their disapproval of certain partner 
choices they were not very effective in preventing their children from pursuing their love 
interests. Once Xiao-xiao’s mother had the opportunity to get to know her daughter’s 
boyfriend, she made her disapproval known in a rather dramatic way. Initially, Xiao-xiao 
was so impressed by this incident that she ended the relationship -only to re-establish 
contact with the man once she was back in Beijing. In this regard, Xiao-xiao’s attitude was 
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very similar to that of many other young women I met in Beijing whose parents were not 
around. Most of them offered only highly selective insights into their lives in the capital to 
their parents. 
In conclusion, all these cases show that despite the significant changes in dating behaviour 
and marriage expectations in both societies, questions of intergenerational responsibilities 
are still highly relevant in decisions on marriage. The “continuities in the ‘rules of the game’ 
for family formation” observed by Davis and Friedman, in particular with regard to duties 
toward parents, were also reflected in the accounts of my Chinese and Taiwanese 
informants (Davis and Friedman, 2014 pp. 26-27). Moreover, whereas premarital sexuality 
has become more accepted in both societies and, in China, premarital cohabitation is 
increasingly common, the notion of marriage has remained largely unchanged. Evans notes 
that her Beijing interviewees made “little conceptual distinction between marrying and 
having a child” (Evans, 2008 p. 172). This also pertains to my Chinese and Taiwanese 
informants. Both sets of informants predominantly equated marriage with the obligation to 
have children. The few young people I met who tried to uncouple these expectations and 
strove for childless marriages encountered serious conflicts with partners and other family 
members.  
Likewise, having a child without marrying was unthinkable to most of the young Chinese 
and Taiwanese I met. I did not experience the birth of a child out of wedlock among any of 
my informants. However, cases I was told of were reported in tones of commiseration, 
suggesting that neither the mother nor the child would have a promising future. Davis and 
Friedman note that the government of Taiwan, despite incentivising an increase in births, 
still refrains from destigmatizing childbearing out of wedlock (Davis and Friedman, 2014 p. 
22). Restrictive policies - such as China’s one-child policy that was in force until 2015, as 
well as traditional notions of family life in Taiwan - thus continue to define marriage as the 
only possible domain within which childbirth is possible. 
Whereas young Chinese appeared to be as concerned about their parents’ future well-being 
as young Taiwanese, they were nevertheless more autonomous in their pursuit of 
relationship ideals and partner choices and they seemed more willing to accept personal 
responsibility for their decisions. The demographic specifics of the two locations, as well as 
diverging approaches to traditional family ideology, had a significant influence on these 
observed differences. The question remains, however, whether the more autonomous 
approach to romantic relationships of my Beijing informants will be sustainable as they 
grow older. As most of them were in their mid twenties to early thirties, their parents were 
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mostly still able to lead a relatively independent life. As soon as additional care obligations 
for parents such as physical assistance in their everyday lives enter the scene, filial 
obligations might become more pressing and parental demands more traditional, also 
among Chinese informants.  
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Chapter Five - Making Choices 
5.1. Introduction 
Mei-ling waited impatiently until the waitress had taken our orders before she announced 
that she had finally visited the fortune-teller (suanmingzhe) her friend had recommended. 
The young Taiwanese woman had cancelled a previous appointment with him. She was 
uncertain if she wanted to know about her fate. Eventually, she decided to give it a try and 
inquire about the future of her relationship with her boyfriend of over a year. During the 
session, she learnt that the yuanfen9 connecting her with her partner would only last for two 
years. As according to this prediction there was not much time left for them, she admitted 
that she felt like breaking up right away. There was no doubt about the credibility of the 
fortune-teller, Mei-ling affirmed, since her friend had tested him. He showed the fortune-
teller several pictures of women, including one of his actual sweetheart and asked whom he 
should pursue. The fortune-teller pointed out her friend’s real love interest and said that 
she was the only one he had feelings for. However, he also recommended he give up on 
her as she was in a relationship. All of this was true, which, Mei-ling insisted, confirmed 
that the fortune-teller was reliable. 
Mei-ling and her boyfriend, a young man from Italy, met during their master studies at a 
French university. Since she had returned to Taiwan, they were continuing their 
relationship via online chats and video calls. However, Mei-ling was careful not to let her 
father know about her romance with the young foreigner. She was certain that he would 
not approve of the relationship since the young men was unemployed. Keeping their 
romance a secret became increasingly difficult for Mei-ling since she had moved back into 
the family household that included not only her parents and sister but also her maternal 
grandfather and several unmarried aunts. Her father regularly inspected her room and his 
discovery of her relationship seemed imminent.  
However, I had already noticed before our dinner meeting that Mei-ling was becoming 
increasingly insecure about her feelings towards her boyfriend. It slowly emerged that she 
was thinking about breaking up with him as she feared that planning a future together 
would be too problematic. Quickly after her return from Europe, she had found 
employment in a renowned consultancy in Taipei while her boyfriend, who had decided to 
stay in France after his graduation, was still searching for a job. Mei-ling felt increasingly 
annoyed by his calls during which he sought consolation for his job seeking and 
                                                 
9 Predestined binding force in relationships.  
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confirmation of her unwavering love. She was in her late twenties and there was not much 
time left to find a suitable husband if this relationship did not work out. Torn between a 
feeling of obligation towards her emotionally unstable boyfriend and her doubts about the 
feasibility of the relationship, she decided to consult the fortune-teller that her friends had 
praised for his reliable predictions.  
A few weeks after our meeting, Mei-ling terminated the relationship. She insisted that her 
visit to the fortune-teller had not influenced her decision to eventually go ahead with the 
break-up. She had made up her mind to end the relationship independently of his 
prediction. Nevertheless, this was not the last time that she would ask the fortune-teller for 
advice on her love life. Only a few weeks after her break-up, she found herself in an 
ambiguous relationship (aimei) with a Taiwanese man who had a girlfriend. Before she 
invested too many feelings in it, she wanted to consult the fortune-teller again. When he 
advised her strongly to give up on that man, she decided that getting involved more deeply 
in this affair was too risky and let their contact fade out. 
The previous chapters illustrated that, for young Chinese and Taiwanese, making important 
decisions was often a difficult and problematic task since not only personal doubts but also 
conflicts of interests with parents had to be resolved. While both young Chinese and 
Taiwanese adults had to deal with these intergenerational disputes to a certain degree, I 
observed that my Taiwanese informants were more hesitant about making choices that 
went against societal norms. Moreover, young Taiwanese appeared to be more reluctant to 
take risks and to assume personal responsibility for their decisions than their Chinese 
counterparts. This was even more surprising as they had, in most cases, a more stable 
financial and emotional safety net than my Chinese informants. In the previous chapters I 
described how differences in personal autonomy impact on young people’s educational, 
professional and partner choices. This chapter will take a closer look at these decision-
making processes and the factors that influence young adults’ willingness to take risks and 
assume personal responsibility.  
Whether Mei-ling was certain about terminating her relationship before consulting the 
fortune-teller is difficult to assess. However, what is certain is that she realized this plan 
only after she consulted him. Since Mei-ling had grown increasingly estranged from her 
boyfriend and a separation would also have been supported by her parents (had they 
known about him), the social and emotional risks of a break-up did not appear very high. 
Still, it was only after the fortune-teller revealed that their common fate (yuanfen) would not 
last that she made the decision to leave her boyfriend. As will be shown in the following, in 
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the course of my fieldwork it became clear that notions related to fate (ming) played a key 
role in the decision-making of my Taiwanese informants. However, the fear of 
misinterpreting fate and taking a wrong path also let them ponder on decisions for a long 
time. The more they waited, the more their doubts and fears of failure surged.  
When I started fieldwork in Beijing, however, I was surprised to find a situation very 
different from the one in Taipei. Young people still battled with insecurities in making 
important decisions. However, as the previous chapters have illustrated, the young Chinese 
I met approached decisions in a more independent and confident way. They were less 
tormented by fears of potential failure even though they had less secure financial and social 
support networks to rely on than young Taiwanese urbanites. Moreover, the more liberal 
approach towards gender and family ideology, as well as the more subordinate role played 
by folk belief and other religions, had a direct influence on their decision-making. First, 
they mostly did not encounter as severe moral conflicts originating from discrepancies 
between their own and their parents’ ideals as many young Taiwanese did. Second, because 
of their spatially and financially more independent lifestyle, they often did not have to deal 
with parental disapproval as urgently as if they had lived in the same household, as was 
mostly the case in Taipei. Third, religious and spiritual concepts of fate and destiny did not 
play as dominant roles in their decisions; for this reason, divination practices were rarely 
used to gain reassurance.10 
However, the immediate influences of the current states of the local economies contributed 
to my informants’ different decision-making attitudes. As I have discussed before, at the 
time of my research in 2012 and 2013, young adults in China and Taiwan had very different 
outlooks on the future. Young Taiwanese were becoming increasingly hopeless because of 
the stagnating economy as well as Taiwan’s deadlocked position in the international 
political arena - in China, meanwhile, the atmosphere among young adults was markedly 
different. Encouraged by the state media’s forecasts of consistent economic growth and the 
government’s assertive claims of being a global power, young people envisioned a brighter 
future for themselves and their families (Holland, 2013; The Economic Times, 2015).  
                                                 
10 At this point I would like to emphasize that this observation refers specifically to my sample of students 
who shared a highly educated background and who predominantly came from northern and central Chinese 
provinces. Current research has shown that in China, age, education and income have an important impact 
on religious practices. Especially people below fifty years of age, those who received college education and 
members of the middle classes appear to be less prone to engage in religious activities (Yang, et al., 2012 pp. 
516-517). However, Julie Y. Chu has found that folk religious concepts of destiny and fate play a pivotal role 
in the decision-making of young, aspiring migrant labourers in Fuzhou in southern China (Chu, 2010). Hence, 
beyond socioeconomic and educational background, geographical location seems to importantly affect young 
people’s attitude toward folk religion. 
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Their different future perspectives were further supported by their experiences during their 
coming of age in these different economic and political environments. The previous 
chapters illustrated how many young Chinese had already far outperformed their parents in 
regard to academic and professional achievements. Especially those who had migrated 
from the countryside to the city had achieved this through extraordinary educational 
successes. Having become a part of Beijing’s aspiring middle class, they had realized an 
economic potential that was beyond their parents’ reach. Moreover, many parents of 
Chinese informants had invested a great proportion of their financial resources in their 
children’s education. Not only for rural parents, but also for those parents with middle-
class backgrounds, this often implied a considerable risk. However, these investments had 
paid off in most of the cases I encountered as they had indeed enabled my informants to 
achieve the successes they aspired to. These experiences might have contributed to their 
greater willingness to take risks in advancing their educational and professional careers 
compared to Taiwanese peers who had less confidence in their achievements. 
The situation that my young Taiwanese informants found themselves in was very different. 
I have described how, far from matching their parents’ economic success stories, they 
mostly worked in low paid graduate jobs and worried about maintaining their 
socioeconomic status without their parents’ help in the future. The fear of not being able to 
realize parental expectations caused an air of disenchantment among them. Envisioning 
their future from such different positions of empowerment thus undoubtedly affected the 
degree of confidence with which young Chinese and Taiwanese approached personal life 
choices.  
A comparison of ethnographies from societies in different phases of economic transition 
illustrates how collective sentiments of hope and despair influence individual perceptions 
of choice and risk. Pedersen conducted research among aspiring entrepreneurs in Mongolia 
in the early 2000s (Pedersen, 2012). Despite Mongolia’s bumpy transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy - accompanied by rising unemployment and 
lengthy phases of stagnation - Pedersen’s young informants remained markedly unaffected 
by the rather dim economic outlook. Instead, they were counting on soon being able to 
exploit the new economic opportunities that they expected to emerge with the 
liberalization of the market. Being jobless but still “surprisingly hopeful,” as Pedersen puts 
it, they did not get discouraged by recurrent experiences of failure but chose to “continue 
to act as if tomorrow will be a better day” and adjusted their economic decisions 
accordingly by “making new debts and entering into new trading adventures” (Pedersen, 
2012 p. 137).  
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The situation that Brinton observed among young Japanese graduates struggling with 
unemployment is decidedly different (Brinton, 2011). Japan’s transition to a post-industrial 
economy was accompanied by surging unemployment and job instability that complicated 
young people’s entrance to the labour market. Having internalized the parental faith in 
meritocracy that was based on experiences the post-war generation had had in an 
expanding economy, many young Japanese felt betrayed when their degrees did not 
translate into secure jobs after Japan plunged into recession in the early 1990s. Not 
managing the transition from school to stable careers, many young adults started to suffer 
from low self-esteem and feelings of inadequacy. They realized that they would not be able 
to attain the financial independence to establish a lifestyle that matched their expectations 
(Brinton, 2011 p. 157).  
The parallels with the current situation of young adults in China and Taiwan seem salient. 
Like their Mongolian counterparts, young Chinese came of age in a period of reform. 
However, unlike Mongolia, the Chinese economy experienced rapid growth during the 
reform era. Nevertheless, the abolition of the state welfare system and the increasing 
privatization that were part of the restructuring resulted in growing insecurities for the 
individual. Despite that, my young Chinese informants were confident of their abilities to 
carve out their personal success stories in a China rising and looked full of optimism to the 
future. By contrast, like Japan’s “lost generation,” many of their Taiwanese peers were 
increasingly suffering from unstable labour conditions and low graduate wages and felt 
paralyzed in their decision-making. They were increasingly giving up, faced with growing 
job insecurity and the hopelessness of ever meeting parental expectations. 
In the following, I will examine how these factors have an impact on young people’s 
decision-making in Beijing and Taipei. How do young adults integrate their personal wishes 
with those of family members and partners, how much risk is acceptable to them and how 
do they overcome insecurities and fears?  
The cases presented in this chapter focus on the experiences of young women. Due to 
gendered expectations of male behaviour, young men did not let me share in their decision-
making as closely as my female informants. Of course, young men also experienced 
conflicting situations in their life choices and discussed these with me, as the next chapter 
on disenchantment will show. However, I did not gain as deep an insight into the actual 
decision-making process they went through; for this reason, I decided to draw on data 
mostly collected among young women for this chapter. 
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5.2. Decision-Making in Taipei 
Two weeks after our meeting at the restaurant, I met Mei-ling, this time in the company of 
her elder sister Hui-yu, at a busy night market close to their house. Hui-yu was excited. On 
the same evening, she had an appointment at the fortune-teller’s whom Mei-ling had 
consulted previously. She intended to ask for advice in a conflicting decision that involved 
the future of her career as well as her relationship with her boyfriend. Hui-yu had pondered 
on leaving her secure job at the council of agriculture for several months to visit her 
boyfriend who was on a work and travel trip to Canada. He had been dissatisfied with his 
lack of career options and low salary as an insurance broker in Taiwan and hoped to be 
able to save some money working in Calgary. At the same time, Hui-yu also wanted to take 
a particular government examination which, if she passed, could secure her a more 
lucrative position. Hui-yu was unsure if it was feasible to align her travel plans with the 
exam preparations. Moreover, knowing that her parents would neither approve of her 
taking time off so early in her career, nor of her moving in with her boyfriend for the 
duration of the visit, she especially feared her father’s reproaches if he learnt about her 
plans. He did not like her boyfriend as he had not yet established a promising career. Their 
relationship was a reason for constant arguments and resentment between Hui-yu and her 
father. Now that her boyfriend had decided to extend his stay abroad, she feared that he 
would only fall lower in her father’s esteem. Hui-yu thus hoped that a consultation with the 
fortune-teller would provide her with some clarity regarding this decision. 
After an hour had passed, Hui-yu returned to our meeting point, looking exhausted and 
sweaty, while still pondering the predictions the fortune-teller had made. She told us that 
he had confirmed that thanks to some very benevolent ancestors, her family was suited to 
working in the government. Upon hearing this, Mei-ling shrieked with excitement; the 
fortune-teller had predicted the same thing to her several weeks ago, not knowing they 
were sisters. In her eyes, this was more proof of the legitimacy of his claims. However, he 
also told Hui-yu that she would always only be mediocre in her current job and that her 
fate would be to work in tax. Somewhat paradoxically, he recommended she look for work 
in the private sector where she would be successful in the long run. While the fortune-teller 
supported Hui-yu’s plan to take the government examination to increase her prospects in 
her current position at the council of agriculture, he encouraged her to delay the exam to 
the following year which would be more auspicious for her. Moreover, he did not 
recommend her to visit her boyfriend in Canada. However, as he could see that she was set 
on this plan, he would not elaborate on this matter any further but only advised her not to 
stay longer than five months. Mei-ling chuckled when she listened to the lengthy, slightly 
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confusing career advice the fortune-teller had given her sister and revealed that she had her 
doubts about how accurate his detailed recommendations were. He had recently advised 
her good friend to work at an important company. When she replied that she was working 
at the Bank of China, he had asked her if that was actually an important company. This 
might indicate, she claimed, that despite his young age, he was not especially well-versed in 
worldly things.  
However, the fortune-teller also warned Hui-yu that her boyfriend had not found his path 
yet and that they might encounter problems in the future. When I asked Hui-yu if she 
would change her plans after hearing his warnings, she was adamant that the fortune-
teller’s advice would not make her reconsider her career decisions. However, when I talked 
to her a few weeks later, she had decided to postpone the preparations for the exam to the 
next year but she still wanted to go travelling. Even though her parents did not approve of 
her decision, she appeared to be relieved to have avoided the stressful examination this 
time and would see her boyfriend very soon. 
Mei-ling and Hui-yu both appeared relieved to have received approval for decisions they 
had been prone to take from the outset but which they feared finalizing. Instead of 
wholeheartedly following the fortune-teller’s advice, they picked the recommendations that 
aligned with their personal preferences. Mei-ling chose to ignore his advice that she would 
have a more prosperous career in the government and continued working in the private 
sector, while Hui-yu decided to ignore his warnings concerning her boyfriend’s unstable 
professional future.  
Consulting a fortune-teller or employing other divinatory methods to confirm one’s 
decisions seemed to be rather common among my Taiwanese informants. A reluctance to 
make independent decisions, so it seemed, originated less in confusion about which route 
to choose than in insecurities about making self-informed decisions and assuming 
responsibility for their consequences. Hence, rather than seeking advice, most of the young 
Taiwanese I knew sought first and foremost a valid rationale for their choices when 
consulting divinatory specialists.  
This kind of reassurance was not only necessary in decisions that might result in 
interpersonal conflicts or that challenge societal norms. Divination practices were also used 
to cope with inner conflicts which resulted from decisions that were made to maintain 
harmonious relationships within the family but which implied huge personal sacrifices. 
Despite young people’s worries about living up to parental expectations, the pursuit of 
one’s personal aspirations and, in this context, more autonomous decision-making, was a 
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growing concern among many highly educated young adults in Taipei. Yet, while many 
young Taiwanese in their early to mid-twenties appeared highly motivated to pursue 
personal ideals regardless of parental opposition, their determination often dwindled as 
they approached their thirties and they realized that following individual ideals would have 
immense consequences on their family life or partnership. The need for compromise or 
even the abandonment of certain aspirations in favour of marriage, childbirth or a career at 
home in Taiwan often caused inner turmoil. In this situation, as the next case of a young 
Taiwanese woman will illustrate, reassurance was sought so as to feel able to let go of one’s 
dreams and adjust to the expectations of family members and spouses.   
I was introduced to Ming-yan, a young consultant in her early thirties, by Shang-yan, her 
former colleague. She was unhappy in her current career and had decided to finally realize 
her long-held dream of pursuing a PhD degree in the US. She hoped that I could help her 
prepare for the mandatory English language exam she had to pass to obtain a place. 
However, it soon emerged that her family was not very supportive of her plan. 
Ming-yan had married shortly before we met. Her husband had recently founded a tech-
company for mobile phone applications and expected her to assist him in her free time. 
More importantly, he wanted them to start a family soon and tried to convince Ming-yan to 
have a baby before she began the PhD programme. Ming-yan confessed to me that she and 
her husband had very different lifestyles and hobbies. Sometimes, it was difficult to find a 
compromise. Initially, she was reluctant to start a relationship with him since she was 
hoping that she would find a partner who would match her character type better. 
Eventually, however, she gave in to his courting.  
During our first meetings, Ming-yan appeared ambitious and driven but I soon noticed that 
under the pressure of her husband and in-laws her personal career aspirations were 
increasingly receding into the background. Over the following months, she fell behind in 
her preparations for the PhD applications and was increasingly consumed by other 
undertakings that swallowed up most of the couple’s already scarce resources. Ming-yan 
explained that her husband had persuaded her to buy an apartment in the suburbs which, 
he thought, would be a good investment for their future. She was also still trying to have a 
baby as her husband and mother-in-law were increasing their pressure, warning her not to 
become too old to have a child. Her husband had even visited a temple to ask the gods for 
help in her difficulties to conceive. “Maybe,” Ming-yan laughed, “the gods don’t want me 
to have a baby right now.” She felt torn between the expectations of her husband and 
mother-in-law that were difficult to integrate with her personal ambitions. Her husband, 
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however, had also promised that once his company pulled in higher sales, she would be 
able to pursue her PhD. For this reason, she claimed, she might have to defer her studies 
for a year but she had not abandoned her plans yet. 
A few weeks later, Ming-yan called me to ask if I wanted to accompany her to the Xingtian 
Temple. This temple in the Zhongshan district of Taipei was devoted to Guan Yu, a god 
revered for his business skills and often asked for assistance in financial matters. Ming-yan 
had told me before that she did not often go to temples. Only when she felt insecure did 
she ask the gods for support. She argued that even though the reason behind this might be 
“psychological,” she felt better after having prayed at the temple, knowing she could count 
on the gods’ assistance.  
Upon our arrival at the temple, heavy rain was pouring down as a harbinger of an 
approaching typhoon. However, Ming-yan was determined to follow through with her 
requests to Guan Yu and pulled me into the inner courtyard. We were not the only ones 
undeterred by the torrential rain. Amidst the crowd of worshippers and heavy incense 
fumes, Ming-yan revealed that she had to inquire of Guan Yu about the prospects for her 
husband’s business which, over the last months, had consumed more and more space in 
her own life. Her husband had ultimately been successful in convincing her to delay her 
preparations for her PhD proposal to assist him in an application for a start-up 
competition that had been advertised by a renowned Taiwanese technology company. Now, 
she wanted to ask about their chances of success and appeal to Guan Yu for his support.  
She drew a numbered fortune stick (chou qian) from a vessel next to the shrine and took 
two of the crescent-shaped wooden divination blocks (jiao bei) from a bowl. She then 
kneeled down to tell Guan Yu her concerns together with her name and address.11 Next, she 
tossed the blocks and was delighted to see them coming to the ground, one facing up and 
one down, meaning that she had received a “yes” from Guan Yu. This confirmed she could 
proceed with the next step of the ritual. We then went to a chest of drawers on one side of 
the temple that contained oracle-like messages stored in drawers labelled with numbers that 
corresponded to the ones found on the fortune stick.  
On reading her message, Ming-yan feared that she had not received especially promising 
advice and she nervously decided to ask for the opinion of an expert. Thus, we queued up 
for a consultation with one of the Daoist monks who volunteered to interpret messages for 
worshippers. The young monk who greeted us could quickly dispel Ming-yan’s worries and 
                                                 
11 I was repeatedly told that this part of the divination procedure had to be taken very seriously, as giving an 
incomplete address could result in a delay in one’s request being granted. 
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assured her that the god’s advice could also be interpreted as encouragement but she would 
have to work hard and steadily on the new business. Ming-yan appeared relieved by the 
monk seemingly resolving her concerns about the potentially inauspicious stick. However, 
it was difficult to discern whether her relief was due to the prospect of forthcoming 
business successes or that, indirectly, she had obtained justification for shelving her study 
plans.  
Stevan Harrell notes that despite openly expressed doubts about the precision of divination 
techniques, most of his Taiwanese informants considered it important to know their fate 
(Harrell, 1987 p. 97). He further argues that the concept of fate is a welcomed rationale in 
cases where general societal values do not apply. Although in theory, he claims, fate can 
only be predicted by a divination expert, “practically, it is more than anything a kind of 
post-hoc rationalization, a catchall explanation when others fail, a way of acknowledging 
that even the most moral and diligent human beings cannot necessarily guarantee their own 
success in life” (p. 101). However, my informants did not seem to be satisfied with having a 
“post-hoc rationalization” available if their plans failed. Like Ming-yan, many preferred to 
hear the opinion of an expert with a certain accredited competence before finalizing a 
decision. In this sense, the idea of basing a choice on the assurance that one was not 
working against fate seemed to guide many decisions. Accordingly, receiving an expert’s 
confirmation that her business would soon flourish may have given Ming-yan a strong 
reason validating her decision to abandon her personal career wishes. 
When I returned to Taipei nine months later, Ming-yan had indeed quit her job as a 
consultant and worked full-time for her husband’s company. She told me that her husband 
still maintained that as soon as the company generated revenue, Ming-yan could travel to 
wherever she wanted. However, until then, she sighed, she had to stay put in Taipei and 
help him.  
The cases in this chapter have so far shown that divinatory practices were quite popular 
among young women in Taipei to resolve conflicting situations. However, why did they 
perceive these decisions as so fraught with conflict in the first place, if their educational and 
professional careers had thus far shown that they were quite successful in navigating the 
high expectations of their environment? A comparison with observations made among 
young Japanese might offer some answers.  
Similar fears of failure and insecurity in autonomous decision-making were observed 
among Japanese adolescents and young adults who came of age during the increasing 
economic uncertainty caused by the recession (Cook, 2013; Brinton, 2011; Kawanishi, 
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2004). Yuko Kawanishi argues that more and more Japanese youths suffer from a “lack [of] 
autonomy, endurance, and self-motivation” which, she claims, persists into adulthood and 
makes them incapable of tackling “even trivial problems” (Kawanishi, 2004 p. 25). She 
locates the reasons for young people’s low self-esteem in an increasingly tense societal 
atmosphere caused by economic crisis. This general insecurity, she claims, creates anxieties 
they cannot be resolved independently by young Japanese (p. 24). The young Japanese high 
school graduates Brinton interviewed also appeared to be increasingly hopeless of 
achieving entry to a stable career due to the insecure economic climate; they were drifting 
between lethargy and complete withdrawal from society (Brinton, 2011).  
Likewise, in Taiwan, economic stagnation and low wages have made it increasingly difficult 
for young people to establish careers. Even though my informants were not as paralyzed by 
anxieties as those cases described by Brinton and Kawanishi, their reluctance to take 
economic risks and their insecurity in assuming responsibility for important decisions were 
clearly palpable. Hui-yu’s parents feared that her boyfriend might not succeed in 
establishing a career in Taiwan after his return from Canada; they also disapproved of her 
decision to put her own career on hold to visit him. Even though she appeared resolute to 
pursue her plan, she hoped for the fortune-teller’s reassurance in her decision to act against 
her parents’ wishes. Ming-yan, however, opted to support her husband in establishing his 
career instead of creating additional financial insecurities by pursuing her wish to study 
abroad. Her decision appeared to be economically less risky as well as in line with gendered 
expectations. Yet, at the same time she jeopardized an opportunity to realise her dream of 
studying for a PhD degree. Gaining reassurance that her sacrifice was not in vain seemed to 
reinforce her decision to shelve her own plans.  
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber note that humans “systematically look for arguments to 
justify their beliefs or their actions” (Mercier and Sperber, 2011 p. 72). Individuals thus 
strive to base their decisions on a convincing rationale that increases their confidence in 
their choices and also to convince others of the legitimacy of their decisions (Mercier and 
Sperber, 2011; Shafir et al., 1993 p. 33). Unsurprisingly, Eldar Shafir and colleagues found 
that selecting from options is highly guided by the context they are presented in. 
Accordingly, the most compelling reasons on which to base a choice were those that best 
conformed to the standards and rules provided by the particular situation and social 
environment (Shafir et al., 1993). The issue they point out is that choices individuals make 
are much more dependent on the particular context than on immutable preferences or 
cost-benefit analyses. In the study mentioned above, Shafir and colleagues do not 
differentiate between the cultural backgrounds of subjects (ibid.). However, their findings 
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may allow one to suppose that particular cultural beliefs will have an important impact on 
context-based choices.  
In the introduction, I discussed several studies that compare cross-cultural differences in 
decision-making. These studies deal with the question of how cultural variations in the 
perception of the environment affect reasoning and choice. Of particular interest in this 
context is the research conducted by Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett, 
2003). As mentioned, they found that participants from East Asian cultural backgrounds 
tend to pay more attention to the context than their Western counterparts in the 
assessment of a given situation. These perceptual differences, Nisbett argues, allowed 
participants to draw different inferences about certain events which are ultimately reflected 
in their choices. Accordingly, what is commonly considered a convincing rationale within 
one cultural group need not seem convincing to members of another one (Nisbett, 2003 pp. 
165-190). This stronger reference to societal and cosmological interconnections Nisbett 
points out might give some indication of why many of my female Taiwanese informants 
felt highly conflicted if their choices were not consistent with the expectations of their 
families and wider social environment and why, in certain cases, they needed supernatural 
reassurance that they did not obstruct their predestined paths to success. 
From these studies it follows that: a) people’s choices are highly context depending; and, b) 
the scope of the context that influences choices is subject to cultural variation. Notions of 
the convincing power of a rationale can thus be expected to vary within and between 
cultural groups. Moreover, Shafir and colleagues note, rationales have to serve a range of 
different purposes: “We often search for a convincing rationale for the decisions that we 
make, whether for inter-personal purposes, so that we can explain to others the reasons for 
our decision, or for intra-personal motives, so that we may feel confident of having made 
the ‘right’ choice” (Shafir et al., 1993 p. 33). Many of my young Taiwanese informants 
appeared not only to search for a working rationale to convince their immediate social 
environment of their choice but, first and foremost, they did so to overcome feelings of 
doubt that accompanied a decision. This need for a rationale to erase indecisiveness and 
tormenting doubts might be closely interconnected with the insecurities, discussed above, 
that were roused by societal uncertainties.  
Further, Shafir and colleagues assert that concerns about the benefits of certain choices as 
well as the risks involved in them can be rationalized based on widely shared assumptions 
and beliefs about the state of the world (pp. 33-34). In the Taiwanese context, this was 
especially reflected in young people’s references to notions of fate. In cases in which young 
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Taiwanese felt particularly torn, divination was considered a legitimate way to substantiate a 
rationale. This does not necessarily offer any conclusion with regard to their genuine belief 
in these practices, which they often questioned openly to me. It does, however, offer an 
important insight into the urban environment of Taipei that provides a context in which 
divination is considered a legitimate means to dispel doubts. In my conversations with the 
mothers of my informants, the topic of fortune-telling was often addressed. It appeared 
common to consult fortune-tellers when children were young to inquire about their fate 
and receive recommendations about how a child could be raised and avoid the 
ensnarements of fate. In some cases, my informants confirmed that they were made to 
follow these recommendations meticulously. Most of my informants, however, gave rather 
vague answers when I asked them about their actual belief in the divination methods they 
used. Some, like Ming-yan, even alluded to the “psychological” reasons behind their 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous preoccupation with fate in Taiwanese society 
definitely influenced why those arguments could pass as powerful rationales for their 
choices in the first place. It appears that when faced with ambiguous choices, obtaining 
reassurance for not pursuing a path that fateful events would sooner or later block was a 
decisive step in their decision-making.  
 
5.3. Decision-Making in Beijing  
The conference room of the luxurious hotel in Beijing’s city centre was buzzing with 
students in business attire who, brandishing their CVs, rushed between the different desks 
where representatives of international universities were handing out information brochures. 
Xin-wen looked nervous but determined as she pushed through the groups gathered at 
each table. She was looking for the representatives of an American university with whom 
she had arranged a consultation session in advance. Weeks before, Xin-wen had expressed 
her high hopes for this international studies fair. Now that she would soon graduate and 
her grades looked promising, the realization of her long-held dream to do a PhD in the US 
seemed to be within close reach. However, each of the students in the crowd looked just as 
determined to make a good impression. Xin-wen was not deterred by the competition and, 
accustomed to asserting her rightful place, she was soon involved in a lively conversation 
with the representatives and eagerly absorbed their advice on the application and selection 
processes.  
Xin-wen was studying for a Master’s in economics at a renowned university in Beijing 
when I met her in spring 2013. Her parents still lived in her home city of Harbin in 
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northern China. The years leading to the completion of her degree had been difficult since 
she could only see her parents, to whom she was very close, a few times each year. Xin-wen 
was very ambitious; often she spent vacations at school, studying for exams or improving 
her English.  
Xin-wen had not always been a diligent student. At high school, she caused her parents 
much trouble and refused to concentrate on her studies. At that time, her arguments with 
her ambitious mother had escalated to such a degree that her parents decided to send her 
to boarding school. She still thought of this period of her life with unhappiness. At the new 
school, she had suffered from isolation from her friends and from her classmates’ bullying. 
Recalling these experiences still brought tears to her eyes. When she told her mother about 
the bullying, she advised her to be strong and learn to rely on herself. Xin-wen took this 
advice to heart and, studying diligently, she was eventually accepted by a Beijing university.  
Although Xin-wen reckoned that her opportunities of being accepted on a PhD 
programme at a Chinese university were greater, she dreamt of experiencing life in a 
Western country. Her parents were supportive of her plans but they were also adamant that 
their financial assistance was limited. Especially in light of the vast expense for luxury items 
that would be required for Xin-wen’s future dowry, they worried that they would not be 
able to finance her education and her wedding expenses in the future. If she pursued a PhD 
abroad, they warned, she might not be able to meet the material requirements for marriage. 
Xin-wen did not seem very worried about this. A few months before, she had started 
dating an American student so Chinese marriage customs were not on her mind. Besides 
hoping that she could secure a scholarship, she was confident that her boyfriend would 
help her settle in the US. Living far away from her parents, she was relatively free to do 
what she liked and had already moved in with him partially. Certain that this relationship 
would last, Xin-wen wanted to apply for a university in his home city.  
However, she had her own concerns about leaving China. Her parents were getting older 
and her father’s health was deteriorating since he had been diagnosed with diabetes. 
Despite her long absence from home, she was close to her parents and she knew that they 
hoped that, one day, she might relocate to her home province. Nevertheless, she felt 
confident about taking the financial and emotional risks connected with her plans as she 
was determined to make the most out of her education to realize her dream of becoming 
an academic.  
Julie Y. Chu has observed among aspiring migrants in Fuzhou that the hope for a better 
future, fuelled by tales of individuals who had supposedly achieved a better life abroad, 
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generated a willingness to take substantial risks that could even endanger the livelihoods of 
entire families (Chu, 2010). She has illustrated that despite her informants’ relatively scarce 
resources and the high risks connected to illegal migration to Western countries, they 
invested their entire savings in migration projects that offered only vague promises of 
success. Accounts of failed returnees and media coverage of health dangers and formal 
punishment experienced by migrants should have conveyed a discouraging message of the 
disproportionate high risk included in illegal migration. Yet, her informants showed 
surprisingly little concern about potential negative consequences of their endeavour. 
“[L]onging and belonging,” Chu notes, was “about inhabiting the world in a particular 
cosmopolitan and future-oriented way -that is, as a valorized subject of a modernising and 
globalizing China” (p. 12). 
Although Xin-wen’s study plans did not involve risky, illegal endeavours and she was also 
from a more affluent background than Chu’s informants, like them she exuded a 
determination and boldness that I observed among many young Chinese who were certain 
that a better future for themselves and their families was possible. It was this very yearning 
to belong to a “modern” and “globalizing” China addressed by Chu which shaped Xin-
wen’s orientation on the future and encouraged her to take relatively high risks. “I want to 
experience things!” she once passionately burst out as she explained her vision for her 
future. Her urge for adventure as well as her wish to excel allowed her to accept the risk of 
remaining unmarried should her relationship fail.  
It was thus understandable that when we met at the student fair that morning, she was 
nervous about making a good impression. Gaining a place of study and, if possible, a 
scholarship would not only determine her professional but also her private future. She was 
thus disheartened when the advisor of her first choice of university in Denver - the home 
town of her boyfriend - said that she should not count on getting one of the highly 
competitive university scholarships; she would need sufficient funding from an external 
source.  
Despite this discouraging news, Xin-wen was not willing to give up on her plan. Her 
boyfriend also guaranteed his support. He suggested that if Xin-wen could secure a place at 
Denver University, they could both move into his parental home. While he worked, Xin-
wen could study. She was aware of the risk that she was taking, dependent on her 
boyfriend throughout the programme – but this was a risk she was willing to take.  
Even though not all of her relatives had instantly accepted Xin-wen’s boyfriend, her 
parents had been tolerant of her choice and agreed to her leaving the country with him. 
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Xin-wen valued her parents’ approval but was determined to lead a different life than they 
did, especially when it came to her romantic relationship. Her mother had warned her that 
she should adopt a more rational attitude towards romance; her mother feared that Xin-
wen might be disappointed by the realities of everyday life as a couple. Nonetheless, Xin-
wen decided to pursue her romance:  
“I just want to follow my heart. If I have a feeling for this guy, I will go for it. […] Love 
will last for a long time, I choose to believe this. I don’t know if it’s right or wrong but I 
just don’t want to go through my parents’ life; to repeat my mum’s life. I want to be 
different. I don’t know: does it exist or not? But I want to try -at least, I will try.”  
Even though Xin-wen was not blind to the financial concerns of her parents, or to their 
warning not to rush into a relationship with her foreign boyfriend, she was self-confident in 
her decision-making and risk-taking. From adolescence onwards, Xin-wen had been highly 
self-reliant and independent in dealing with her schoolwork and social relationships. This 
had endowed her with the self-reliance she now demonstrated in making decisions about 
her personal and professional future. Living far away from her parents and being able to 
keep certain details of her personal life secret from them certainly contributed to the 
relative ease with which she made decisions. I observed that this was a common pattern 
among my Beijing informants, especially those who lived independently in the city. Letting 
parents know about decisions only after they had been made limited parents’ scope of 
interference. This was also true of another female informant who had moved in with her 
boyfriend long before her parents even knew about his existence. When her mother visited 
her in Beijing, she took her boyfriend to the station to welcome her. Her mother, delighted 
by the fact that her daughter had finally found a partner, did not protest when she later 
revealed that they were already sharing an apartment. By applying such tactics, relationship 
or career choices could first be “tested” until they were revealed to the family. In Taiwan, 
this was largely impossible due to the close spatial contact of family members. This might 
also explain why my Chinese informants, like my next case Sun-yi, tended to face less 
severe inner conflicts; they thus appeared to be less dependent on external advice to justify 
their motives.  
Sun-yi was introduced to me by a mutual friend. At first she was reluctant to participate in 
my research as she was rather introverted. However, we soon started meeting regularly and 
she was eager to help me understand “her society,” as she put it. Sun-yi’s parents lived in a 
city in Shandong. She was able to see them a few times each year during her vacations but 
the distance made more regular meetings impossible. She was glad about this as she soon 
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ran into arguments with her parents when they spent more time together. Even though 
Sun-yi did not have a partner, her mother was pressuring her to have a child soon. Sun-yi 
was in her early thirties but her mother was so afraid that she might miss the right age for 
childbirth that she even offered to raise the future grandchild herself  while Sun-yi pursued 
her career. Sun-yi rejected her mother’s offer - if  she wanted a child, she would prefer to 
raise it herself. However, the atmosphere within the family was currently rather tense.  
Sun-yi led a very independent life in Beijing. She had studied at a university in Hong Kong 
and then started a successful career in the media. After a few years during which she had 
saved a considerable amount of  money, she decided to make a career change and applied 
for graduate studies in sociology in the US. This decision implied an immense risk as she 
had to quit her well-paid job and had spent her entire savings, enough to buy an apartment, 
on the degree. She admitted that many of  her peers may have found her behaviour strange. 
However, she was convinced she was making the right choice. On hearing that she had 
been accepted by a famous American university, her parents also agreed to her plan. 
Although they were conservative with regard to marriage, they were rather liberal when it 
came to her educational choices, she explained.  
Now, a few months after her return to China, she was contemplating which step to take 
next. On the one hand, she would like to study for a PhD. On the other hand, she felt it 
was time to resume her career. She had received a tempting offer from an international 
company where she could start working at the end of  the year. During our regular 
meetings, she reflected on her choices. She felt torn between the prospect of  returning to 
her studies and the advantages a career in Beijing offered. As she was not reliant on 
parental support or the preferences of  a partner, her considerations mostly revolved 
around the kind of  future she could imagine for herself  and how she could finance her 
plans. She said clearly that she would eventually return to China where her assets - fluent 
English and a degree from a Western university -would guarantee her a top career.  
After pondering for a few weeks, she decided to take up the job offer in Beijing and 
postpone her plans to study for a PhD for a few years. She had to save some money before 
studying again, she explained. Her new job was not stressful and paid very well so she 
could imagine working in it for a while. However, this did not mean that she would follow 
her parents’ wish for her to marry. She was determined not to lower her expectations of  a 
potential partner and was adamant that she would not enter marriage just for the sake of  
social prestige. Sun-yi did not feel any obligation to please her mother by agreeing to a 
“mediocre” match. She had several male friends she spent her time with but she had not 
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yet found a man who she could imagine sharing her life with. Until this happened, she was 
determined to enjoy city life with her friends. 
Like Xin-wen, Sun-yi longed for an adventurous and cosmopolitan lifestyle that she 
realized through studies abroad. However, her long-term plans also focused on a life in 
China where she expected her career opportunities to be most promising. She had taken a 
considerable risk in quitting her safe job and spending her savings to realize her dream of  
an international education - she was willing to do the same again to study a PhD. Sun-yi 
was aware that not everybody approved of  her lifestyle. Studying the humanities was often 
regarded as less useful than subjects that promised a high-earning career in business in 
Chinese society. Even though her parents had a rather liberal attitude in this regard, 
returning to university also made it more unlikely that Sun-yi would enter the more 
conventional path of  marriage they envisioned for her. However, as she personally bore the 
financial risks which her studies involved and she did not expect to rely on her parents’ 
support, she was relatively unrestrained by their opinion and made her decisions without 
relying on external validation.  
Both Sun-yi and Xin-wen conceded that asking their parents for advice about their careers 
was not helpful. Most parents, Sun-yi explained, had grown up in a rather “closed system” 
and could thus not give them any career advice. Instead, Xin-wen and Sun-yi placed their 
trust in the hope that their diligent work ethic and their willingness to take personal risks 
would pay off  in the future. Since childhood, this had been their experience -their 
strenuous years of  studying had enabled them to attend renowned universities and, in Sun-
yi’s case, to attain highly coveted career opportunities.  
It thus appears that experiencing success in the education system as well as learning 
independent problem-solving at boarding school had a decisive influence on my Chinese 
informants’ self-reliance in decision-making; this made them less dependent on external 
validation in risky decisions. This resonates with Bandura’s theory saying that experiences 
of  success strengthen the belief  in one’s efficacy and encourage the taking of  risks in the 
future (Bandura, [1995] 1999). Moreover, their parents’ encouragement of  independence 
and self-reliance (especially apparent in Xin-wen’s case) was also manifest in their nuanced 
sense of  responsibility as adults. Hansen and Pang note that the strong sense of personal 
responsibility that young Chinese exhibit can be attributed to the fact that the 
socioeconomic and political reforms of recent decades have increasingly placed the 
responsibility to earn a livelihood on the individual. This development, they claim, has also 
transformed the way young people conceive of personal choices and responsibility (Hansen 
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and Pang, 2010 pp. 51-52). Likewise, Arthur Kleinman and colleagues remark, “[a] new 
understanding of meritocracy has led many individuals to accept personal responsibility for 
their failure in career development” (Kleinman et al., 2011 p. 4). While the young Chinese 
Hansen and Pang interviewed were considerate of their parents’ opinions, “notions of 
freedom,” “personal development” and “the importance of their own personal choices” 
were important goals to which they aspired (Hansen and Pang, 2010 pp. 51-52). As the case 
studies above illustrate, increasing notions of freedom and the ideal of personal 
development were also important aspects that my Chinese informants aspired to. However, 
as observed by Hansen and Pang, this does not mean that they strove for highly 
individualized lifestyles since, at the same time, they did not dismiss their obligations 
towards their parents. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided examples that suggest that the experiences young women had 
while coming of age in the different socioeconomic and political environments of China 
and Taiwan also influence the degree of self-reliance with which important decisions about 
their private and professional future are made. Whereas the young Taiwanese women I met 
were reluctant to make important decisions and take risks without obtaining reassurance 
from a higher authority, young Chinese women showed more confidence in relying on 
their individual judgment. Moreover, they also appeared to assume more easily personal 
responsibility for taking comparatively high risks. Growing up more autonomously than 
their Taiwanese counterparts, they had to make everyday choices without immediate 
parental advice from a relative early age. This might have contributed to the relative ease 
with which they approached important decisions later in life. Further, usually living 
independently from parents, my female Chinese informants were less exposed to 
immediate parental evaluations and criticism of their choices compared to many Taiwanese 
women who lived at home, with siblings or in close proximity to other family members. 
This may also help explain why young Chinese women were in less need of external 
reassurance when facing conflicting choices. However, this does not mean that young 
Chinese were inconsiderate of their parents’ opinions. Despite the high value young 
Chinese women attributed to independent decision-making, in important matters they 
strove to achieve consensus with parents. Yet, given their relatively stable position of 
power due to their successes in the educational system or through professional careers, 
their opinion had considerable weight in negotiations with parents.  
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Like my female Chinese informants, young Taiwanese women also increasingly idealized 
personal development and independence. However, as they were exposed to a more 
traditional family ideology and experienced direct criticism and tacit resentment from 
family members at home if they did not live up to certain ideals, many decided to abandon 
or amend their personal aspirations to maintain family harmony.  
Increasing insecurity about the future and an increasing lack of trust in one’s abilities to 
achieve important markers of adulthood might have contributed to the reluctance and 
comparably low self-esteem with which young Taiwanese women approached pivotal 
decisions. Their lack of confidence, as the case studies above make clear, was closely tied to 
their prospects in Taiwan’s stagnating economy. Similar to young people’s experiences in 
Japan in the 1990s, although work and life course expectations remain unchanged, the 
economic reality of Taiwan today does not allow one to reach important milestones such as 
financial independence and marriage within the socially accepted time frame (Brinton, 2011; 
Cook, 2013). Cook notes that due to their precarious employment situation, young 
Japanese men feared having to give up on their career aspirations or on their plans to have 
a family (Cook, 2013). The fear of failing “no matter what they did” was also palpable 
among my Taiwanese informants (p. 30). This overpowering fear of failure seems to be the 
main factor which, reinforced by a prominent societal discourse on the younger 
generation’s lack of willpower and stamina, stifled young people’s agency. Like those young 
Japanese who felt less and less adequate to compete on the labour market and increasingly 
withdrew from important decisions, helplessness translated into a low sense of self-efficacy 
also among young Taiwanese.  
In order to overcome doubts about their decisions, young Taiwanese women in particular 
resort to divination methods that seemed to convey a certain sense of security. The cases of 
Mei-ling, Hui-yu and Ming-yan show that divinatory methods are used by young Taiwanese 
to support different kinds of decisions that either conform to or contest societal 
conventions. Divination helped reassure Hui-yu in taking a risk and her sister, Mei-ling, as 
well as Ming-yan felt justified in not pursuing their romantic interests or personal career 
aspirations. Without the external validation of their “safe” choices, Mei-ling and Ming-yan 
might have felt like betraying the emancipated ideals they advocated in other areas of their 
lives. In all cases, divination helped create powerful rationales that seemed to support the 
biases of my young informants.  
Mei-ling, her sister Hui-yu and the slightly older Ming-yan are representative of many of my 
Taiwanese female informants. While their family backgrounds differentiated -Mei-ling and 
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Hui-yu had very protective parents, whereas Ming-yan already lived with her husband and 
appeared not to be on good terms with her parents, the ways in which they dealt with 
conflicting events was rather similar and reminiscent of many cases I observed. The same is 
true of the Chinese informants introduced in this chapter. Xin-wen appeared far closer to 
her parents than Sun-yi but in their attitude towards their filial obligations and the 
compromises they were willing to make in pursuing their aspirations, their assertiveness 
and willpower were representative of many, if not most, of my female Chinese informants. 
Although Chinese informants seemed to be familiar with the Chinese concept of fate, they 
did not mention it as important in considering important decisions. One may ask whether 
this different attitude to divination practices is related to communist campaigns against 
“feudal beliefs” during the Cultural Revolution. In any case, my observation that the 
Chinese concept of fate was rarely used by my Beijing informants to explain certain 
incidents might point to their having a different attitude to the notion of fate and destiny. 
The topic of religion or divination usually emerged when I asked about it. However, several 
of my female informants told me that as adolescents and undergraduate students, they had 
a keen interest in Western signs of the zodiac. Some still had subscriptions on weibo or 
other social networks where they were sent their personal horoscope every day. However, 
they rarely referred to these horoscopes and it appeared as though they mostly applied to 
romantic matters. Moreover, such online services offering Western horoscopes were also 
common in Taiwan but were not an important topic among my informants there either. 
In Beijing, stories about visiting fortune-tellers or temples were mostly set in rural home 
towns and they were told in a way that clearly demarcated the story teller’s personal 
convictions from the “backward” beliefs of the countryside. I remember a conversation 
with Xing when he told me, obviously amused, how he had visited a ritual specialist with 
his grandmother in his parents’ rural home town. He introduced the topic by emphasizing: 
“My grandma is very superstitious -very.” His grandmother thought that some serious 
health problems from which Xing suffered could be attributed to a spell cast on him. The 
specialist performed certain rituals to free him from the supposed spell. As Xing explained, 
“it’s not scientific at all.” He attributed his subsequent recovery to the Western medicine he 
took. However, he complained, the traditional healer “took the credit” for it. Moreover, 
“another funny thing” Xing continued, was that his grandmother, he believed, took him for 
the reincarnation of a certain god famous for his intellect (Wen Qu Xing). Each year she 
went to the temple and asked for his success. When Xing was accepted by a prestigious 
university, his grandmother attributed this to her visits to the temple. He explained: “I 
think, I didn’t tell her, but I think if I am that god, I wouldn’t have to study at all! I could 
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just sit at home, eat crisps, watch television and then go to Qinghua University. I can get 
one hundred every time. [..] I would never try to convince her to believe me, because it’s 
useless, because she believes in this way.”  
Other Chinese informants who talked about their experiences at temples and with fortune-
tellers often did so with the same disbelieving and amused undertone as Xing. I rarely 
heard similar rationalizations of religious beliefs from my Taiwanese informants. Though 
they conceded, like Ming-yan, that their consultation with the gods might have a 
“psychological” effect, they remained vaguer about their beliefs. It is difficult to assess 
whether this way of talking about religious beliefs and divination was indicative of how the 
young Chinese I met personally felt about these matters, or, as they were talking to a 
Western researcher, perhaps they were responding to a certain notion of modernity that 
excludes superstitious beliefs. Xing especially liked to be regarded as particularly open-
minded and Western and these stories were clearly told to entertain me. 
Apart from the different ways in which my informants employed religious arguments to 
form convincing rationales, they also had rather different perceptions of risk. My 
Taiwanese informants were very reluctant to make decisions that could also adversely affect 
their families and partners. Their Chinese peers were however more confident about 
making decisions that involved family resources or which risked their opportunities for 
marriage. Young Chinese women, similar to Pedersen’s Mongolian informants, appeared to 
feel justified in their risk-taking by a collective hopefulness which was sponsored by party 
propaganda forecasting a better future (Pedersen, 2012). In believing that personal success 
was more dependent on their willingness to take risks and work hard than on societal 
developments beyond their sphere of influence, their attitude to the future was significantly 
different from that of their Taiwanese counterparts. Self-agency in decision-making, so it 
seems, was closely interconnected with the societal context in both China and Taiwan. 
While the positive economic climate and government-supported belief in meritocracy 
encouraged young people’s sense of agency in China, young Taiwanese women felt greater 
insecurity in their decision-making that was exacerbated by concerns about Taiwan’s 
economy and fears of disappointing parental expectations. Due to their greater confidence 
in making decisions, my female Chinese informants seemed to be less conflicted and hence 
less in need of seeking external validation for their choices.  
In this chapter, I have mostly drawn on case studies of women so it is difficult to assess 
whether the differences observed in decision-making are exclusive to them. The 
observations I made among young men in both societies suggest that the general 
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tendencies I observed in the risk-taking and acceptance of responsibility among women are 
also reflected in their decisions. Young Taiwanese men also frequented fortune-tellers and 
applied other divinatory methods. However, I had the impression that they did not as often 
allude to concepts of fate or religion in our conversations. Perhaps they were not entirely 
open about such issues with me as particular notions of masculinity prevented them from 
addressing these topics. In any case, my male Chinese informants, like Xing, rejected 
religious and divinatory practices more firmly than their Taiwanese peers.  
Young people’s sense of personal agency in decision-making and their attitude towards 
risk-taking was hence closely linked to the societal climate of either despair or anticipation 
of a better future. Moreover, young Taiwanese women appeared to also let their decisions 
be guided by concepts of fate and destiny which was less common among young Chinese 
and which could be attributed to the different religious environments they grew up in. The 
decisions of both sets of informants were thus strongly affected by the particular 
socioeconomic context they were embedded within. A willingness to assume responsibility 
for one’s choices was highly dependent on which kind of future one imagined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
Chapter Six - Disenchantment and Escape 
6.1. Introduction 
Li-ling sighed with relief as she sank into her seat and kicked off her black heels. For the 
last few hours she had been stuck in a meeting, she complained. While she was trying to get 
as comfortable as her tight business dress would allow, she explained that she did not like 
appointments that required her to dress formally. Since her return from a work and study 
tour abroad that had lasted for a few years, Li-ling was now working for a state company in 
Beijing. Initially, she had not liked the work but since she was sent on business trips abroad 
more often, she had started to enjoy it. Nevertheless, she planned to apply for a PhD 
programme in the UK as she was longing to return to the free lifestyle she had led abroad. 
When I asked her how her application was progressing, Li-ling pulled a face. This whole 
summer, she admitted, she had been consumed with relationship problems. A few months 
before, Li-ling had rekindled contact with a male friend from Shanghai whom she had 
known for years. They had started to talk regularly via a popular chat application and, over 
several months, they developed romantic feelings for each other. However, when the man 
requested Li-ling quit her job to move to Shanghai for him, she drew a line and ended the 
burgeoning romance. It annoyed her, she argued, that he had not even considered coming 
to Beijing for her where she had a successful career. Li-ling lamented that, in her opinion, 
men would always try to push women into marriage. “They have this illusion,” she claimed, 
“that having a wife is like having a live-in maid. There is always somebody for them to 
wash their laundry and cook them food.” However, more serious than her concern about 
not becoming a housewife seemed to be her suspicion that this man had a liking for fragile, 
innocent-looking women; Li-ling feared being measured against this ideal and could not 
identify with it. She found out that the former girlfriend of her date had been a rather 
feeble, fragile type. Li-ling compared her to the character Lin Daiyu from the famous 18th 
century novel Dream of the Red Chamber (hong lou meng) who was praised for her beauty and 
refined composure. Li-ling, in contrast, regarded herself as a strong, confident woman. 
However, she feared that men who were initially attracted to her free spirit would revert to 
their more conservative preferences as soon as marriage was approaching. She claimed to 
feel lucky to have seen through the young man’s strategy of making her as needy and 
dependent as his ex-partner before moving to be with him. “Men construct the social 
norm,” she criticized. By claiming that women would be “leftover” if they were not 
married by the age of twenty-seven, Li-ling continued stridently, men placed pressure on 
women to settle for marriage early.  
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Her ambition to pursue a PhD, however, appeared to have been strengthened by this 
experience. When I met Li-ling a few months later, she confirmed that she could not wait 
to leave the country to continue her education. She knew that she might eventually have to 
return to Beijing, as her job opportunities looked best in the Chinese capital, but her 
parents had agreed to support her plans. “My parents were worried about it [marriage] two 
or three years ago,” she explained, but they had realized it would be difficult for her to find 
a husband in China due to her high education and the relatively conservative mindset of 
many young men who preferred women of lower educational status. For this reason, her 
parents had promised to support her, whether she chose to marry or do a PhD abroad.  
The previous chapter described the impact that societal factors have on individual decision-
making. I illustrated how collective views of the future, which emerged from the specific 
socioeconomic and politico-ideological landscapes of China and Taiwan, influence young 
women’s perceptions of their choices and their willingness to assume responsibility and risk.  
This chapter shows that despite these societal differences, many of my Chinese and 
Taiwanese informants shared feelings of frustration and disenchantment as they 
approached their late twenties. Those who were unable or unwilling to meet normative 
expectations of marriage and who decided to pursue other goals often experienced 
rejection and criticism by their social environment. High achieving young adults felt 
especially frustrated by the change in parameters measuring success. Whereas before, their 
diligence and endurance in the education system and their early career had been praised, 
they now faced mounting criticism of their unwillingness to compromise on their 
professional aspirations to pursue marriage. Young women were particularly disappointed 
that their hard-won academic and professional successes were receding into the 
background as they were increasingly measured according to their marital status. However, 
young men also felt frustrated by expectations to settle for less attractive jobs in order to 
fulfil expectations in terms of their future roles as fathers and husbands. The realization 
that - apart from the dominant script of family and marriage - there were no alternative life 
designs available to them often fed into their desire to escape to a social environment that 
offered them greater freedom of choice. 
Chinese and Taiwanese parents place an equal emphasis on the education of sons and 
daughters and for this reason, young men and women alike could gain recognition through 
educational successes well into young adulthood. However, expectations on children 
become more gendered once they have completed their education and marriage emerges as 
the next biographical milestone. As they approach their mid-twenties women in particular 
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are increasingly measured by a highly gendered set of criteria that determines their potential 
on the marriage market. This change often happens so quickly that they hardly find the 
time to adjust to these new expectations that frequently collide with previously set goals in 
their careers (Zhang and Sun, 2014 pp. 123-124).  
In her study of Chinese student migrants, Anni Kajanus has observed similar patterns in 
the gendered notions of success within the families of her informants. She found that 
parents often direct their daughters toward jobs that can be integrated with their future 
tasks as wives and mothers (Kajanus, 2015 p. 95). Moreover, as the cultural preference for 
hypergamous marriages remains unbroken, the higher women perform in their careers, the 
weaker their prospects become of finding a partner of higher professional and economic 
status. In this context, Kajanus stresses that “[o]n some geographical scales (for example, 
parent-child ties in the family) gender has little influence on the educational aspirations and 
achievements of sons and daughters. But on other scales - namely, the job market and 
marriage - gender matters” (p. 100).  
Men also struggled when the pressure to marry set in. Young Chinese and Taiwanese men 
often complained that their opportunities to find a wife were too tightly linked to their 
professional performance which put them under high stress to succeed right after they had 
finished their educations. The young men introduced in this chapter felt trapped in an 
increasingly desperate situation as their private and professional aspirations were difficult to 
integrate with meeting ideals that would confer social status upon them. 
Like Li-ling, many of the young Chinese and Taiwanese women who felt disenchanted with 
their opportunities to pursue their academic and professional aspirations beyond marital 
age did not have the urge to completely abandon their social environments. Instead, they 
were considering taking “time-out” during a phase of life that many considered one of the 
most stressful times -the short time window when marriage and childbirth were 
overbearing expectations. The young people whose story this chapter tells seem to yearn 
for an opportunity to make life choices at their own pace or, more rarely, evade them 
altogether. They stand out from their peers by way of their very clear ideas about their 
future and their unwillingness to make compromises. They are also exceptional in their 
readiness to take enormous risks to realize their dreams. Disenchanted by a society that 
does not offer them much space to choose a life design with which they could identify, 
they opted to escape, at least for a while, to pursue their aspirations in Western societies 
that they imagined to be less restrictive and judgmental of their choices.  
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The case studies in this chapter also point to an increasing flexibility in parents to grant 
their children these (temporary) escapes. Especially mothers, it seems, could identify with 
their daughters’ problems and were considerate of alternative life plans that involved 
marriage to foreign men or the exploration of career opportunities abroad. Whereas the 
previous chapters have illustrated the difficulties that young Taiwanese men and women 
faced in breaking free from their close-knit families, this chapter shows that many found a 
way of nearing this goal by pursuing an education, a career or even marriage abroad. Even 
though not all of the young adults introduced here realized their aspirations, their belief 
that they had found a route to escape from an environment they perceived as confining at 
that particular time in their lives provided them with confidence.  
Li-ling’s passionate critique of the societal pressure which single women are often exposed 
to in China made me think of my Taiwanese informant Ma-ling. I described in the first 
chapter that Ma-ling felt increasingly pressured to dress and behave more femininely to 
increase her chances of finding a spouse. Not only her parents and relatives pressured her 
to conform to a standard ideal of femininity; her female colleagues also advised her to 
exhibit a more demure and thus gender appropriate behaviour. In the course of my 
fieldwork, Ma-ling felt increasingly desperate about her situation, especially as everybody 
around her appeared to be happily in love. One night as we were strolling through a 
department store, she confessed that she felt especially pressured by her friends’ presence 
on social media. They were constantly updating their status and location on their social 
network profiles. Some of her friends’ favourite pastime was to discover new restaurants 
with their boyfriends. They would then post online pictures of the food and statements 
about the fun they had had with their partners. Being single, she felt under pressure to find 
a partner with whom she could share such activities. She confessed that when she saw 
fashionable girls in department stores who seemed to revel in cosmetics and clothes, she 
asked herself why she was so different and not as gentle and smiling. Ma-ling enjoyed doing 
combat sports and outdoor pursuits. Due to their masculine connotations, she mostly 
practised these activities with male Taiwanese and Western friends. She thus feared that she 
was drifting away from other Taiwanese women in her interests. As her career as a web 
designer had stalled, she was contemplating leaving the country for a while. In the coming 
year, she told me decisively, she planned to travel to the US where she wanted to look for 
work, hoping to lead a life that was less constrained by the worry of not fitting in. 
Like Li-ling, Ma-ling had a master’s degree from a Western university and spoke several 
languages. She had acquired a certain “cosmopolitan competence” and appeared to have 
attained all important markers of educational success; however, she was increasingly 
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measured by her position on the marriage scale (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002 pp. 13-14). 
Both young women feared that it was the very traits of their characters -their willpower and 
determination -that had enabled them to realize academic successes that were now 
preventing them from being considered suitable marriage partners. Disenchantment with 
their opportunities was thus closely tied to burgeoning feelings of inadequacy and self-
doubt. Both young women hoped that going abroad would reinstall the confidence and 
self-affirmation they lacked in their current environments. There are close parallels between 
their future hopes and the international aspirations that have been observed among young 
female professionals in other parts of East Asia. 
Since the early 1980s, Kelsky argues, cosmopolitan aspirations among Japanese women 
have soared; this is a direct reaction to their disenchantment with local gender structures 
and values that suppress their free development and success on the labour market. As a 
consequence, a form of internationalism has emerged that projects “the West as a site of 
deliverance from Japanese gendered structures of family and work” (Kelsky, 2001 p. 86). 
However, whereas Kelsky describes strategies to circumvent gendered obstacles on the 
labour and dating market by going abroad as exclusively female, my observations in urban 
China and Taiwan show that in these societies, young men also consider this option. 
Although men face different stress factors than women, these are no less restrictive and 
constitute an equally forceful impetus for contemplating at least temporary migration to a 
Western country. However, as the previous chapters have shown, young men are 
simultaneously confronted with different obligations to their families which constrain their 
migratory plans in specific ways.  
In the following, I will compare the cases of young Chinese and Taiwanese who, for 
various reasons, aspired to leave their home societies. With a focus on the gendered 
dimensions of the experience of disenchantment, I will analyze the underlying reasons for 
young men’s and women’s apprehensions of not fitting in and the options they envisage to 
circumvent the restrictions of societal expectations and limited options on the labour 
market. 
 
6.2. Young Women’s Disenchantment and Aspirations to Escape in Beijing and 
Taipei 
The humidity that lay over Tainan would have been unbearable had it not been for the 
slight breeze drifting in from the nearby ocean. It was autumn already but the summer heat 
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had not yet abated in the southern part of Taiwan. Chin-ying looked absentminded as we 
slowly strolled along the alleys in the neighbourhood of her family’s house. The streets lay 
sleepily as most people seemed to have withdrawn into the air-conditioned comfort of their 
apartments. Chin-ying, however, seemed to be less affected by the boiling heat than by an 
inner turmoil. By the strained expression on her face, I could tell that something was 
weighing heavily on her and she was contemplating how to tell me. Then she suddenly 
burst out: “I will maybe have an arranged marriage in the US!”  
As we sat down in a nearby restaurant, it emerged that by “arranged marriage” Chin-ying 
meant her relatives’ assistance in setting her up with a number of dates with Taiwanese 
American men in the US. It was important to her, she argued, that her future husband 
should have a Western passport. She wanted to have the opportunity to leave Taiwan for a 
Western country as she could not imagine her future here. She was especially disillusioned 
with the Taiwanese job market. The salaries paid to graduates in Taiwan, she argued, would 
not allow one to lead an independent life. Chin-ying’s frustrations with her stagnating 
professional career as a translator in Taiwan and her aspirations to leave the country have 
to be understood against the background of her international experiences as a student. 
Chin-ying had spent several years in the US and Ireland where she first learned English and 
then studied for a degree in translation. However, her subsequent attempts to establish a 
career in Ireland had been met with repeated failure. When she was pursuing her education 
abroad, Chin-ying could rely on her family’s social network and generous financial 
assistance. However, this also meant that she had to follow her family’s call back to Taiwan 
when her parents decided not to support her search for employment abroad any longer.  
When I met Chin-ying in her hometown, it had been a year since her graduation and the 
disenchantment with her failed career abroad still weighed heavily on her. She was working 
as a freelance translator and was struggling to find a fulltime job that rewarded her 
expensive foreign education. No longer willing to put up with the conditions on the labour 
market, she decided to find a way to leave the country. Her aunt lived in Houston, Texas 
and had agreed to introduce her to suitable bachelors. She had already made contact with 
an unmarried man that seemed promising. When I asked Chin-ying who he was and if she 
had seen a picture of him, she shook her head. She did not want to build her hopes up and 
had turned down any further information. She stressed that, to her, it was only important 
that he could speak Chinese, had a similar cultural background and was willing to work on 
their relationship. She had arranged to fly to the US on Chinese New Year where her aunt 
would then introduce her to the selected men who, Chin-ying assumed, were unsuspecting 
of her intentions. 
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Unlike Kelsky’s Japanese informants, Chin-ying’s aspirations for a life in a Western society 
were not a form of resistance to Taiwanese values. She emphasized that although she 
despaired of realizing her professional ambitions in Taiwan, her future husband should 
have a Taiwanese cultural background and be understanding of her Taiwanese values. Her 
disenchantment with her opportunities in Taiwan was not based on a notion of Taiwanese 
cultural values and practices as “backwards” and Western ones as “progressive,” as Kelsky 
observed among Japanese women (Kelsky, 1996 p. 29). Kelsky has noted that Japanese 
women with international aspirations move in “ambiguous, hybrid, ‘transnational’ spaces 
that radically destabilize Japanese ethnicity and implicate them in Western agendas of 
universalism and modernity” (ibid.). Chin-ying, by contrast, was consciously trying to 
prevent any such national and cultural ambiguities in her future marriage. In contrast to 
Kelsky’s informants, who hoped for emancipation from Japanese gendered expectations 
through marriage to a Westerner, Chin-ying formulated her aspirations less in terms of 
feminist ideals. Instead, her goal was to extend the time frame within which she could 
attain the normative benchmarks of adulthood as well as avoid the crisis of the local labour 
market.  
When I met Chin-ying during a visit to Taiwan almost a year later, her mood was low. She 
had been to the US for Chinese New Year and met several of the young men her aunt had 
selected. She showed me pictures of them on her mobile phone and described their 
different characters and reactions to her. She had mixed feelings about her dates and was 
insecure about how the men perceived her. After her return, she had stayed in contact with 
just one of them who was already in his late thirties. To her distress, he had soon stopped 
returning her emails. His parents were eager for him to marry, she explained. However, 
now she was unsure whether his interest had been serious. With every day that passed 
without a reply in her in-box, she became increasingly hopeless.  
After Chin-ying had already accepted that her visit to the US had been in vain, she learnt 
from her aunt that the parents of another man she had met during her stay had inquired 
after her. They had also asked if she had married yet. Chin-ying was surprised, as she had 
assumed that she had not made a good impression on this particular family. However, she 
was willing to give it a try. With rekindled hope, she arranged another visit to Houston a 
few months later. When she was interviewed by an immigration officer on arriving in the 
US, she lost her nerve and admitted she also intended to seek employment during her stay. 
As she only had a tourist visa, Chin-ying was deported.  
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I skyped Chin-ying a few months after her second visit to the US. Resignedly, she 
explained that she had eventually given in to her parents’ demands and started working at a 
local company. For the coming years, she would have to stay in Taiwan and work. Perhaps 
she would try to go to the US in a few years’ time. Until then, she wanted to save money to 
be able to study another postgraduate degree at an American university. Living once again 
in her parental home in a suburb of Tainan and working in a corporate job, she led the life 
of many of her single female friends. However, as she was nearing her mid thirties - and 
with her younger sister newly engaged - she felt the increasing pressure to marry weighing 
on her heavily. 
Chin-ying stood out from my female informants with ambitions to go abroad by voicing 
her intention to realize an international career by securing work permission in a Western 
country through marriage. She was also exceptional in her demand that her future husband 
should have Taiwanese cultural roots and be able to speak Chinese. Other young women 
who were as adamant as Chin-ying in their desire to live abroad, for example Ma-ling, did 
not exclude the possibility of a non-Taiwanese partner. For some of my Taiwanese and 
Chinese informants, similar to the Japanese women Kelsky interviewed, avoiding the 
gendered pressures of the local dating market by finding a foreign partner even appeared to 
be the main goal of their cosmopolitan endeavours. My Chinese colleague Wei-xin, whose 
workplace difficulties I described in chapter three, was one of those young women whose 
aspirations to undertake postgraduate studies abroad were not only driven by her 
disenchantment with her stagnating career but also by increasing frustration at the 
problems she encountered during her quest for a partner in Beijing.  
Wei-xin’s room was light and spacious. Pieces of clothing and accessories were scattered 
across the floor and the French bed took up the centre of the room. Like so many other 
days, she had left her home in a rush in the morning. She always had trouble waking up in 
time, she explained, Sometimes, when she was especially late, she did not take the 
underground but called a taxi to reach the office in time. Wei-xin lived in a flat share in 
Wudaokou, a Beijing district popular with international students as it was close to different 
universities and offered a variety of Western-style restaurants and entertainment venues. 
With its international flair and colourful lifestyle, it had also attracted Wei-xin; for a while, 
she had been willing to pay the high rents common in this area. Now, however, she had 
become weary of the pleasure-seeking crowds of students populating the noisy streets at 
night. Having turned twenty-seven, she felt she was too old to live among students.  
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As we stepped out of the apartment block, the sun had set and the vendors and food stall 
owners were getting ready for the groups of students who spilled out of the underground 
station looking for dinner and drinks to unwind. Wei-xin led me to her favourite bistro just 
around the corner from her house. A narrow staircase led to a wide room that, with its 
bookshelves at the back and small table lamps, had the ambience of a Western-style living 
room. Wei-xin ordered a salad, saying that she had gained several pounds in the last few 
months that she now had to lose. She always gained weight when she felt stressed, she 
explained. Due to her insecurity about the near future, the multiple challenges posed by her 
moody boss and her upcoming graduate admission exams, she felt exceedingly tense.  
Later she revealed to me that the verbal sexual harassment of her boss during a company 
outing had made it clear to her that her career was stuck in a dead-end. As soon as she had 
the confirmation of a study space, she said with a decisive tone, she would quit her job. She 
had planned to leave the company earlier but her parents had been against it. The 
relationship with her parents had grown increasingly tense over the recent years but now 
they had agreed to her plan to continue her education in the US. They found that studying 
a PhD degree was a reasonable alternative to having a family. While her parents would like 
to have her close in old age, she told me, her mother had already declared, maybe to 
provoke her, that she feared that Wei-xin was not suitable as a caregiver. For this reason, 
she did not want to be cared for by her daughter in old age.  
Not only Wei-xin’s mother but also her ex-partners complained about her lack of feminine 
qualities. Her first boyfriend looked down on her international aspirations and frequent 
visits to night clubs with foreign students. Wei-xin remembered that they had made plans 
for marriage but then broke it off as he became increasingly dissatisfied with her lifestyle. 
From an affluent background, she had enough money as a student to indulge in small 
luxuries from time to time. Her boyfriend, from a rural, less well-off family, had little 
understanding of her needs and aspirations. All he wanted, Wei-xin claimed, was to make 
money to help his family. Seeing her spending money on consumer goods he found 
unnecessary, they often quarrelled. When she became more deeply involved in the 
international student community and went out more frequently with her group of new 
friends, he snapped: “I have never heard that you have to go out to learn English, you are 
the only one who learns English in a club.”  
However, their different lifestyle preferences had not been the only reason for alienation 
between the couple. Wei-xin also suffered from the pressure he exerted on her to adjust to 
a certain image of femininity that Li-ling had also criticized. Wei-xin remembered that her 
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ex-boyfriend had once criticized her for ordering too much food in a restaurant, warning 
her that she was already “fat.” She left the restaurant in tears, especially as it was not the 
first time he had insulted her weight. Some time before, he had asked her to lose some 
weight to save him face (mianzi) when they were out together. When she later told a female 
friend about her relationship problems, she recommended slimming down to find a partner.  
After these discouraging experiences, Wei-xin tried to regain her self-confidence by 
surrounding herself with Western friends whom she did not perceive as critical of her looks. 
She started going out more often and consumed more alcohol. She soon had the reputation 
of a “party girl” among her classmates, a rumour that even reached her professors. Wei-xin 
complained that due to her classmates’ gossiping, she had never been able to establish a 
trusting relationship with her supervisor. She put much effort into her master’s thesis but 
in the end, she feared that her professor had not taken her ambitions seriously. Her 
situation on the dating market also suffered from her contact with the international scene. 
Many Chinese men she dated immediately inquired if she had had sexual experiences with 
Western men. She felt more and more estranged from her Chinese peers and for this 
reason she mostly spent her time with Western or Western-minded Chinese friends. 
When I asked Li-ling, the young Chinese woman who also wanted to resume her studies 
abroad, about the seemingly popular strategy among highly educated women of avoiding 
marriage by studying for a PhD abroad, she confirmed that this was a strong trend. 
Nowadays, she explained, people said that there were three types of women in China: 
married women, single women and women with PhDs. The increase in time spent taking 
higher education could be considered to be a strategy to prolong the period during which 
success was measured on the relatively gender equal scale of academic success mentioned 
by Kajanus (Kajanus 2015). Choosing to study abroad not only kept options open to settle 
outside of China but also prevented young women from being continuously measured 
against local gender standards by family, friends and romantic partners. Wei-xin’s case also 
shows that the scales measuring professional success and marriageability are not neatly 
separate but often permeate each other. With increasing age, behaviour that runs against 
gendered expectations is not only detrimental to a woman’s private life but also discredits 
her in the eyes of her colleagues and superiors.  
When I met Wei-xin a few months later, she looked devastated. Her test results had been 
very low, she confessed. She had been so disappointed about this failure that she relapsed 
into her old lifestyle of clubbing and drinking too much. The other night, she had collapsed 
drunkenly on the floor of a karaoke hall and her friend had to bring her home. These days, 
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she sighed, she did not have the strength to write applications or concentrate on a job. 
However, the way things seemed, she could not quit her work but would have to wait for 
new opportunities to open up for her.  
In Beijing, Wei-xin had strategically positioned herself - both spatially and socially - within 
an international subculture of Western students and young Chinese aspiring to a Western 
lifestyle. Having spent parts of her childhood in Austria due to her father’s work postings, 
she was fluent in German and English. This had allowed her to shift her professional life 
into an international environment. Wei-xin had thus effectively reduced to a minimum her 
contact with the local Chinese. During my fieldwork in Beijing and Taipei, I observed that 
this immersion in the subculture of foreign exchange students and Western language 
teachers was not uncommon for those who felt disenchanted with society. These young 
people displayed “internationalism as resistance” but they practised it within the 
subcultures of their home society, often for years, without ever leaving the country (Kelsky, 
2001 p. 85).  
Others, like the young men described in the following case studies, use this lifestyle as a 
springboard to realize their aspirations of a life abroad. By immersing themselves in the 
international subcultures of Beijing and Taipei, they can acquire a cosmopolitan habitus as 
well as language abilities which, they hope, may catapult them into an academic or 
professional career in a Western country. In the next case study I will return to Xing, who 
was introduced in chapter two. I have already described how his growing estrangement 
from his father and his disdain for his rural relatives compelled him to increase his “quality” 
(suzhi) through education. I will describe how his disappointment with his family members’ 
perceived lack of morality translated into a more overarching disenchantment with China’s 
moral landscape and into a strong wish to leave the country indefinitely. 
 
6.3. Young Men’s Disenchantment and Aspirations to Escape in Beijing and Taipei 
Xing asked me to meet him at the cafeteria of his university. With its large parks and 
peaceful streets the campus seemed like a peaceful island within this otherwise busy part of 
Beijing. Upon entering the cafeteria that resembled an American-style coffee shop, I 
noticed that the environment was highly international. Many of the student groups 
gathered at the tables were conversing in English. Most of them exhibited a pronounced 
urban style that reminded one of the clothes worn by young people in capitals in Europe 
and North America; such clothes were seen less often in the streets of Beijing. As we 
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navigated our way through the crammed room, balancing full cups of tea and coffee in our 
hands, Xing was repeatedly greeted by other students with whom he casually exchanged a 
few words. It seemed as if he knew most of the young people filling the cafeteria this 
afternoon. Speaking flawless English, he moved seamlessly within the cosmopolitan 
environment that made up the campus of one of China’s best renowned universities. As we 
made our way to our table, Xing eased into the conversation with no inhibition. Despite 
not knowing me well, he appeared unperturbed about a foreign researcher asking him 
about his private life. Throughout our meetings, I was repeatedly taken aback by the 
candour with which he told his story. It almost seemed, by narrating his life story, that his 
resolve to strive for his goals was strengthened. Only when I inquired about his 
relationship with his family, his eyes darkened. I found out little by little that his strong 
ambition to realize a career abroad was propelled by an outright rejection of his family’s 
values. 
Since Xing’s childhood, his father had had extra-marital affairs. As the owner of a 
successful building supplies agency, he was affluent enough to entertain numerous 
mistresses for whom he bought several apartments. His mother was aware of her 
husband’s infidelity but as she was economically dependent on him, she did not intervene 
for several years. Nevertheless, Xing’s mother was infuriated by the thought of the amount 
of money her husband had spent on his affairs -money that could have been invested in 
Xing’s future. When Xing started senior high school, his mother decided to leave the family 
home to move in with her elderly parents who had come to Beijing. Since then, Xing’s 
father shared his apartment with one of his mistresses. He had never made a serious effort 
to hide his affairs but he relied on Xing’s complicity to save face before relatives and 
friends. He had informed his teenage son that the woman he was living with and who 
frequently accompanied them on weekend trips was a younger relative he should call 
“auntie” (ayi). Xing was too tired of his father’s lies to question this new addition to his 
family and tried to accept things as they were. However, he refused to stay the night at his 
father’s apartment and always returned to his student home in the evenings.  
Things worsened when his father experienced legal difficulties related to his business that 
forced him to leave the country. Xing and his mother, still financially dependent on the 
father, were left without a regular income. Thus, his mother was forced to take action. She 
tracked down her husband’s current mistresses, one in Beijing and another in their rural 
home city. She also managed to strip them of the apartments and cars her husband had 
given them as gifts. Unfortunately, their situation did not improve much after this. 
Knowing that her absent husband’s financial resources might run out soon, Xing’s mother 
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struggled to find a way to generate an income. She thus decided to grant private borrowers 
loans at high interest rates. However, with no experience in the credit business, she was 
soon cheated by one of her clients and lost most of her investment. Xing added that his 
parents did not only experience betrayal by business partners but also by close relatives. 
The relationship with the paternal branch of Xing’s family was thus severely strained by 
their dishonesty and material greed. He especially distrusted his paternal aunt. She had 
borrowed a substantial sum of money from his father to set up a business before he left the 
country. However, as she had helped his father solve his legal issues, she felt entitled to 
keep the money.  
Upon his return to China, Xing’s father rekindled his relationship with a previous mistress, 
a young socialite, who pushed him to make investments in her career. Xing, however, was 
too tired to care about his father’s affairs and was more concerned about his mother’s 
psychological well-being. As his parents had been avoiding each other for years, Xing was 
forced to spend time with them separately during important family holidays. The decision 
with whom to spend the holidays caused him increasing psychological distress. “I just hate 
Chinese New Year,” he explained, “there was one thing that happened that just makes me 
feel so bad. One year I spent my Chinese New Year Eve with my dad and my mum tried to 
kill herself. After I got the call from my waigong [maternal grandfather] […] I just ran to my 
mum and I spent the New Year’s Eve with my mum. She cried the whole night.”  
Xing’s great remorse for not having been there for his mother still seemed palpable when 
he recounted his story. It appeared as if this incident had been the turning point when he 
decided to escape the moral decay that, in his eyes, defined Chinese society to achieve a 
better life for his mother and himself abroad.  
According to Kleinman, “[r]emorse, regret, and other complexes of emotions and values 
are strongly influenced by interpersonal relations and meanings that contribute to the 
building of subtle and elaborated sensibilities that constitute who we are” (Kleinman, 2006 
p. 18). Xing’s moral self-image appeared to be set against his relatives’ unscrupulous and 
corrupt acts that roused his disdain. “Every time they get a chance to get money, they use 
this chance,” he said as he explained his revulsion for his paternal family members’ 
materialistic characteristics. In attributing their ruthless behaviour to their rural, low 
educational background, he seemed to be echoing the popular discourse about population 
quality (suzhi) that imbued urban residency with a superior moral quality (Kipnis, 2006). If 
one conceives of morality in these geographical terms, it becomes apparent that a 
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permanent move to a Western metropolis could help consolidate his higher moral status 
vis-a-vis his rural family members.  
Xing explained that his ambition was not just to go abroad but stay abroad. He had 
observed that many Chinese students had to return once they had finished their education 
in a Western country. “I want to stay,” he emphasized, “I know it’s [...] important for me to 
find a way to create an environment just like America or other countries. So I started 
spending more time to join some activities like volunteer work or some student societies 
and tried to find as many international students as possible. […] Right now, I have more 
international friends than Chinese friends. I feel like I finally made it; to create my own 
environment, to speak English and to get to know a foreign culture even if it’s hard in 
China to do that.”  
However, he also wanted an independent life abroad to free himself from his parents’ 
desires for him to have a family. “I’m actually gay,” he told me upon our second meeting. 
“I haven’t said that to my parents yet, I don’t think they can accept it. So what I want to do 
is to go to America and be individual enough. As long as I can find a way to live on my 
own, I don’t want to depend on them anymore.” By becoming financially self-reliant, Xing 
hoped to be able to establish relationships based on trust instead of on financial 
dependencies. However, as he was close to his mother, he had defined plans on calling her 
to the US once he had established himself and to provide for her during her old age. 
Kleinman and colleagues point to the “open moral space” that emerged in China after 
Confucian values and then socialist ideology lost their validity during the political and 
economic changes of the Cultural Revolution and the reform era (Kleinman et al., 2011 p. 
8). They claim that although this moral flexibility was abused to justify reckless business 
practices and political corruption, it also caused the emergence of a new moral 
consciousness, especially in the young. Among Chinese youth, they note, there is  
“an increasing awareness […] of global values and that China must engage in these values. 
This recognition informs what is regarded as locally legitimate. That in turn can encourage 
practices that promote real local reform. Both in moral and psychological spaces, 
individuals push for changes that in the larger political space may not be realizable” (p. 25). 
However, it was Xing’s recognition of the futility of hoping for permanent changes in the 
political and societal spheres that drove him out of the country. Moreover, Xing did not 
appear to have any desire to take part in political activism to change the situation in China. 
Despite his articulate critique of Chinese society, Xing was almost ostentatiously apolitical 
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and self-absorbed in his rejection of Chinese values and in his uncompromising focus on 
his departure.  
Yi-chuan, a young web designer originally from the south of Taiwan, resembled Xing in his 
rejection of societal conventions and a materialistic orientation. However, while Xing’s 
disdain for Chinese values did not rouse any form of political activism, Yi-chuan saw a 
direct connection between the social pressures in Taiwanese society and the ossified 
structures of the government. He regularly expressed his anger about the political lethargy 
and complacency of Taiwanese youth.  
Yi-chuan had recently turned thirty and was working for a small branch office of an 
international marketing agency in Taipei. He told me of his frustrations with the high 
expectations of his social environment on his professional performance and personal 
lifestyle. He confessed that he lacked a sense of belonging in Taiwanese society; he aspired 
to a life abroad which he expected to be less restricted by traditional norms and parental 
demands. Since having studied for a master’s degree in France, he was certain that a 
Western lifestyle would suit him better than the one he foresaw being forced to assume in 
Taiwan. However, he was repeatedly disappointed in his efforts to achieve his goal of 
entering the diplomatic service and he sought escape from his problems by frequenting the 
expatriate scene of Taipei where he felt liberated from the social pressures of Taiwanese 
society.  
When I accompanied him one night on his usual tour of Taipei’s expat bars, I was 
surprised that he seemed to know most of the guests, mainly international students and 
American Taiwanese. Over the months I realized, that his romantic relationships and 
friendships seemed to fluctuate with the waves of language students and foreign English 
teachers that arrive in Taiwan each autumn and leave the island a year later. Yi-chuan did 
not seem to mind the instability of his social life. However, he was aware that the time he 
could lead this liberal lifestyle, freely roaming the fun-filled, fast-paced expatriate scene of 
Taipei, was limited. This might explain why he regarded a job in the diplomatic service as 
his only opportunity to pursue his personal aspirations while also fulfilling his parents’ 
demands for a stable career. However, his repeated failure to pass the civil service entrance 
examination slowly undermined his hopes. 
Yi-chuan regarded his current job in the marketing agency with disdain. To him, his 
workplace exemplified all the shortcomings of the strict office hierarchies typical in Taiwan. 
He despised the highly competitive atmosphere at the agency, the stifling of creativity by 
superiors and he often criticized his colleagues for their uncooperative behaviour. Shortly 
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after I got to know him, he was fired from his position as the result of major cutbacks. 
Since then, he was working as a freelancer. Losing his job had not hit him hard, he 
confessed. He had planned to quit for a long time but his mother warned him not to let 
this opportunity of a stable career go. However, he was able to convince his parents to 
support him financially during his preparations for the civil service entrance exam which he 
planned to take again that year. He was not worried about finding a new job for the coming 
months.  
Yi-chuan’s mother was especially unhappy about his lifestyle and often criticized him for 
his unstable career and relationships with foreign women. However, Yi-chuan was not 
willing to compromise on his romantic preferences to please his parents. He had observed 
his elder brother getting trapped in an unfulfilling marriage that was burdened by the high 
demands of his in-laws. Yi-chuan’s brother had married a Taiwanese woman a few years 
ago. Since then he had faced constant criticism from his parents-in-law and had to 
withstand their demands for a grandchild. Yi-chuan suspected him of having an extra-
marital affair as his brother received suspicious phone calls in his presence. He did not 
want to address the topic as he was not very close to his brother but his marriage served as 
a deterrent for him. To express his rejection of societal norms, Yi-chuan had even refused 
to attend his brother’s wedding banquet which had caused a great stir among his relatives.  
Yi-chuan was not only frustrated with parental expectations but also complained about the 
demands many Taiwanese women made of prospective romantic partners. He was critical 
of the common expectation that men would pay the bills on dates and give expensive 
presents. Yi-chuan had decided not to support a phenomenon which the local media had 
dubbed “princess disease” (gongzhu bing) -a term alluding to young women who expect 
expensive presents and entertainment from their suitors. However, his strategy to only date 
Western women turned out to be problematic as well. Due to the fleeting character 
inherent to most contacts made on the fast-changing expatriate scene, many of his 
relationships quickly broke down when the women returned home after finishing their 
language studies or work placements in Taipei.  
Brinton and Cook have illustrated the difficulties young Japanese men encountered as soon 
as the lack of stable employment prevented them from marrying and founding families. 
Many Japanese graduates who struggle to realize their aspired careers at some point feel 
forced to take on less prestigious jobs in order not to jeopardize their opportunities of 
marriage (Brinton, 2011; Cook, 2013). The situation was similar in Taiwan. In their late 
twenties, young men were expected to have settled into a stable job to create the 
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foundation for their future family. Even though Yi-chuan was not pursuing marriage, his 
ardent critique of local dating practices might also partly be based on his dissatisfaction 
with his diminished competitiveness caused by gendered pressures on men to provide. His 
constant lack of money also made it also difficult for him to fulfil his obligations to his 
parents. His mother had expressed her wish for him to send her a certain sum of money 
each month soon; this was common among young professionals in Taiwan and a major 
factor in determining a child’s filiality. It was thus clear that his parents would not excuse 
his stagnating career much longer due to his time-consuming preparations for the civil 
service entrance exam.  
A year after I left the field, a change appeared to have taken place in Yi-chuan. First, he had 
settled into a job at a non-profit organization in Taipei which, despite its international 
orientation, tied him to Taiwan for the time being. Moreover, his critique of the 
government became more articulate as demonstrated by his social media posts. It was not 
uncommon for my Taiwanese informants to voice online their dissatisfaction with the 
KMT government or the unfavourable employment conditions in Taiwan. Especially on 
the cusp of the 2014 Sunflower Movement (which will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter), critique of the government’s strengthening of economic ties with China was 
a popular topic on social media forums. However, Yi-chuan appeared especially sharp in 
his criticism. He also mostly published in English so as to make his numerous international 
contacts aware of the situation in Taiwan. During the protests and occupation of the 
Legislative Yuan in March 2014, he followed the developments closely and expressed open 
regret that a business trip prevented him from participating. It appeared as if his 
disenchantment with Taiwanese society faded with the increasing political agency of his 
peers. Shortly after the occupation, he hopefully proclaimed on his social media account: 
“[T]he gov. [sic.] is making the biggest mistake if they ever underestimate the courage and 
power of this civil grassroots movement. Feel proud of my folks!” His optimism was not 
short-lived. In November 2015, more than one and a half years after the occupation 
movement, his confidence in Taiwan’s sovereignty as well as his criticism of the leading 
party was still fervent:  
“Taiwan is actually quite important geopolitically, u don’t find any county in the world [that] 
has such […] deep connection with [the] 3 biggest superpower / economies in the world. 
The question is just how we play [our] cards and if we r confident enough, as biggest 
investor in China, nr 3 Weapon importer of US military-industry importer, and most 
important partner for Japan we could do it better and get our interest without this ducking 
president […].”  
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In contrast to Xing, Yi-chuan transcended his disenchantment with Taiwanese society by 
way of a newly found hope in a better future that was animated by the political awakening 
of his generation. He realized that he was not alone in his criticism of the stifling 
conditions for young employees. Having found common ground with his peers in their 
critique of the political and economic state of affairs, he appeared to have shed his self-
image of an outsider from Taiwanese society.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that young adults are not only greatly influenced by social factors 
in the way they approach and justify decisions but also in the way they define their range of 
choices. Having excelled in the area of education, many young Chinese and Taiwanese fall 
behind rigid social expectations as they approach marital age. Those young people whose 
stories have been illustrated above are not only connected by their feelings of 
marginalization and alienation in light of these gendered pressures. They also share a sense 
of disenchantment about the future that fuelled a strong wish to leave their home societies 
behind to pursue their aspirations. 
Young women in particular experienced that failing to meet gendered norms to marry 
would not only have an impact on their private relationships but also on their professional 
careers. The cases of Ma-ling and Wei-xin demonstrate how young single women who did 
not subscribe to normative life goals were often openly criticized for their choices, looks 
and demeanour by male and female colleagues and superiors. This often led to fears of 
having come to a dead-end as they felt obstructed in their professional progress.  
Further, many young women described in this chapter felt increasingly insecure when they 
compared themselves with female peers. These negative feelings were compounded by the 
critique they received from friends and acquaintances. Moreover, the powerful media of 
microblogs and online social networking services were highly successful in setting norms 
and expectations. Many young people regularly post images showing the various forms of 
entertainment they have enjoyed with their romantic partners. This often intimidated my 
single female informants since these virtual posts were supposed to showcase success in 
reaching biographic milestones aspired to; this shut out those who had not yet attained that 
stage of life. Faced with friends posting details of their romantic dates, wedding 
preparations and apartment purchases, their desperation increased and they considered 
looking for a job abroad to escape their increasing social isolation.  
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However, despite much opposition to their lifestyle choices from more conservative peers 
and superiors, many parents of my informants were surprisingly understanding of their 
urge to break free from societal constraints for a certain period of time. Li-ling, who was 
exceptionally close to her parents, was encouraged by them in her wish to go abroad even 
though her mother suffered immensely from her frequent absences and increasing wish to 
leave the parental home. Likewise, Chin-ying’s mother and maternal aunt supported her in 
finding a husband in the US, a plan that would also lead Chin-ying away from Taiwan 
indefinitely. Xing, though not close to his father, was supported by both his parents to go 
abroad to study and build up a career. Especially for his mother, who cared for her parents 
in Beijing, the prospect of being separated from her close confidante for several years until 
she could join him must have been difficult. 
Although I had the impression that my young male informants were usually less exposed to 
discrimination due to their private lifestyle choices in the professional sphere, they also felt 
pressure to conform to gendered norms to avoid the criticism of family members and 
friends. Xing and Yi-chuan, who due to their sexual orientation and relationship 
preferences rejected marriage and starting a family, told me of the increasingly strident 
demands of their parents and relatives to enter into a stable heteronormative relationship. 
However, their desires to emigrate were not only fuelled by this mounting familial pressure. 
They were also disappointed with their immediate social environment which they perceived 
as hypocritical and amoral; shortcomings they considered symptomatic of a deeper societal 
crisis in values.  
More than explaining the multiple hopes young Chinese and Taiwanese entertain for the 
pursuit of their goals in Western societies, this chapter has also shown, that the reasons why 
young people want to leave their home societies are multiple. Some want to escape local 
heteronormative ideals while others assume that their career chances might be more 
promising abroad. These rather practical objectives are intersected with moral and 
ideological concerns which emerged out of their dissatisfaction with the social and political 
environment in both China and Taiwan. In this sense, my observations resonate closely 
with those of Schielke, whose account of the multiple desires bound to the migratory 
dreams of young Egyptian men I described in the introduction (Schielke, 2012).  
Although many of their peers shared similar frustrations, the young men and women 
described in this chapter stand out due to their determination not to settle for 
compromises but to pursue their personal aspirations by leaving their home societies 
behind. They were willing to make significant financial and emotional sacrifices and 
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demonstrated remarkable endurance in the pursuit of their plans. At the same time, it must 
be noted that all the young adults whose stories have been presented in this chapter were 
from the higher end of the affluent middle classes of their respective societies. Thus, the 
risks they took with their endeavours abroad might not have been as huge to them as they 
may have been to young professionals from less affluent backgrounds. In China, the 
fathers of Li-ling and Wei-xin were both academics and had relatively well-paid jobs. Xing 
came from a well-off family of business owners. In Taiwan, the parents of Ma-ling, Chin-
ying and Yi-chuan were also university educated and worked as medical doctors and 
teachers. Their professional backgrounds and international study experiences might have 
complemented their understanding attitude towards their children’s aspirations. As 
mentioned before, compared to their peers, most of the young adults presented here were 
surprisingly uncompromising and, except for Ma-ling who was more reluctant, they 
unswervingly pursued their plans. This was one of the main reasons for selecting their 
stories. In this chapter, I wanted to present cases which, though rather exceptional, might 
point to growing trends in both societies: young people who are increasingly dissatisfied 
with their limited opportunities and who thus choose more liberal, unorthodox life forms 
and parents who can increasingly sympathize with their children’s dissatisfaction.  
At the same time, the cases presented here and in previous chapters illustrate the complex 
impact that individual emotional needs have on personal choices. For some young Chinese 
and Taiwanese like Wei-xin, Xing, and Yi-chuan previous stays abroad motivated 
aspirations for a more permanent escape that have to be understood against their individual 
family backgrounds and childhood experiences; others with similar international 
experiences, though equally critical of societal values, prioritised being close to the 
emotional warmth of their families and were willing to compromise personal aspirations. 
This was the case with Yue-ling, the young Taiwanese woman working in the business of 
her father-in-law instead of returning to her mother in the US, and Yu-ching who returned 
to Taipei to live with her parents after having spent several years abroad. Likewise Li-ling, 
who had spent several years studying and working in Western countries, could not imagine 
leaving her parents behind in Beijing indefinitely as their relationship was exceptionally 
close. Hence, emotional needs often trumped international aspirations even among those 
young people who had already spent several years separated from their families pursuing 
independent lifestyles abroad. The heterogeneity of their personal experiences and mental 
dispositions thus had an important influence on how their dissatisfaction with societal 
values affected their choices. 
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In the previous chapters, I discussed that due to socioeconomic and demographic factors, 
young Chinese appeared to have a stronger sense of personal agency and were more willing 
to take risks. I could not find similar divergences between the young people described in 
this chapter. One reason for this might be that those who aspire to leave their home 
societies to settle for an indefinite period in another society might share a strong sense of 
personal agency and a readiness to take risks. However, it appeared that my Taiwanese 
informants often had an extended network of relatives overseas that made such migratory 
endeavours easier for them than for my Chinese informants. 
Kajanus notes that since the 2008 global economic crisis, young Chinese have increasingly 
been returning to China after graduation from international institutions. This might point 
to a new trend in regard to the desirability of international careers (Kajanus 2015: 84). I 
observed a similar trend among my Chinese informants who, unlike their Taiwanese 
counterparts, expected their career options to be more favourable in China (even though 
the allure of an international lifestyle appeared to remain unbroken). One of them was Li-
ling who assumed she might have to return to China to exploit the full potential of her 
foreign degree. However, first and foremost she wanted to temporarily leave the country to 
pursue a more adventurous lifestyle unrestricted by societal pressures. Hence, many of 
those who expected to return to their home countries considered a time-out abroad until 
societal expectations to marry subsided. 
However, in case Li-ling returned home after having completed a doctorate still being 
single, her difficulties of finding a partner could likely be exacerbated. After acquiring post-
graduate degrees and “cosmopolitan competence” at foreign universities, many women 
realized that these credentials only made their search for a partner more difficult after their 
return (Zhang and Sun, 2014 p. 122). The stark divergence between the parameters 
measuring success on the scale of marriage and education thus has an especially 
disadvantageous effect on young women who sought temporary escape from societal 
pressures by furthering their education abroad (Kajanus 2015). 
A stay abroad did not lessen the desirability as spouses of young men but, in the long run, 
it made the fulfilment of their filial duties more difficult. For this reason, Xing planned to 
bring his mother abroad with him once he had attained financial independence; Yi-chuan 
felt less pressure in this regard as he had an older brother in Taiwan. 
In conclusion, the cases above do not only demonstrate young people’s disenchantment 
and frustrations with their families, careers and romantic relationships. They also highlight 
how international aspirations have to be understood within the context of the limited 
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niches these societies offer to those who do not follow normative cultural scripts. Many 
young people in China and Taiwan are dissatisfied with having to follow pre-formulated 
life paths that leave little room for personal aspirations that go beyond normative 
biographies; they also yearn for fulfilling partnerships and careers that they feel unable to 
establish in their current situations. Furthermore, many of them draw direct parallels 
between their unfortunate situations and what they perceive as wider societal shortcomings 
in the moral and political spheres.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Chapter Seven - Perspectives of Hope 
7.1. Introduction 
On a damp afternoon in late November 2012, I met Yi-chuan on a street corner in 
Zhongzheng district, not far from the Chiang-Kai Shek Memorial Hall. Although the 
memorial of the deceased KMT leader was a much visited sight, surprisingly popular with 
the many Chinese tourists who now visited Taiwan every year, he wanted to show me an 
attraction that only few visitors to Taipei got to see but which, to him, was far more 
constitutive of Taiwanese identity -the National 2-28 Memorial Museum. The nondescript 
red brick house, a remnant of Japanese colonial architecture, stood hiding behind green 
foliage on a street corner in Nanhai Road. With its dull façade and dark entrance hall, it did 
not look inviting and we understood why few tourists found their way to this hidden 
reminder of one of the darkest periods in Taiwanese history. In the friendlier looking lobby, 
two young receptionists - happy that the museum had attracted at least some visitors on 
this gloomy afternoon - eagerly equipped us with brochures and maps. As the only visitors, 
Yi-chuan fully engaged in his role as a tourist guide and avidly translated complicated 
tablets and historical documents to bring this long neglected part of Taiwanese history to 
life for me. Whenever he could not answer a question, he apologized, explaining that 
during his time at high school in the 1990s, the 2-28 Incident and the ensuing White Terror 
had been only a footnote on the curriculum. He criticized that, even today, the events of 
this time were taboo for many families. Although none of his relatives had fallen victim to 
the suppression of the uprisings in February 1947, he knew of many people who had only 
learnt long after the incident that family members had been killed during the White Terror. 
Especially during the period of martial law, criticizing the government for its brutal 
methods to crush protest could have caused disastrous repercussions for one’s relatives and 
friends. Thus, Yi-chuan explained, many families chose to be silent about the real reason 
for the deaths of their loved ones.  
As he reflected on these tragic events that took place more than sixty years ago, the tone of 
his voice grew determined and I was reminded that Yi-chuan was an ardent critic of the 
then current KMT government. Moreover, from our frequent discussions and from Yi-
chuan’s regular online postings of articles critical of the KMT’s pro-China agenda, I knew 
that he was a strong advocate of Taiwanese independence. Shortly after the annual 
anniversary of the event, Yi-chuan commemorated the 2-28 Incident with a comment on 
his social network profile that highlighted the close connection between Taiwan’s national 
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history and his personal family narrative. Published in English, the comment was clearly 
intended to raise awareness of this controversial event among his foreign friends:  
“1947 2 .20 my father was born, a week later on 28th of 1947, one of the darkest event in 
the chapter of Taiwan history breaked out, my father as a baby still in the basket had to 
hide with my grandparents in the mountains for few weeks. They r afraid that my grandpas 
working experience for the Japanese (although not voluntarily) will endanger their life. The 
228 incident and its consequence let the development of Taiwan fall at least 30 yrs behind 
and let the most people wake up from their "china dream" […].”12 
Yi-chuan, like many young people I met in Taipei, sharply criticized Ma Ying-jeou, 
Taiwan’s president at that time, for his promotion of pro-China policies and his lacking 
interest in the concerns of the young. The Economic Co-Operation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) which had been signed under the KMT in 2010 and which was 
supposed to facilitate and strengthen economic relations with the mainland roused concern 
in many young students and graduates. Critics of the agreement feared that the loosening 
of trade restrictions with China “would open a floodgate of cheap Chinese goods” which 
would increase Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland and have a detrimental 
effect on the Taiwanese labour market (Wei, 2012 p. 95). In March 2014, nationwide 
student demonstrations following the negotiations of a controversial follow-up agreement 
of the ECFA (CSSTA) culminated in a three-week long occupation of the Legislative Yuan 
(Lu, 2014; Rowen, 2015; Tiezzi, 2014).13  
As the previous chapters have illustrated, young Taiwanese were indeed facing a precarious 
situation. Salaries of college graduate entry-level jobs had not risen since the late 1990s, 
while at the same time prices on the real estate market had soared, fuelling fears of a 
housing bubble which rendered the acquisition of property almost impossible for young 
people who could not fall back on family support (Guilford, 2014). Yi-chuan was fighting 
ambiguous feelings for his future. On the one hand, he felt an overpowering urge to escape 
his dreaded situation of unemployment and feelings of estrangement from Taiwanese 
traditionalism by going abroad. On the other hand, he still clung to his dream of an 
independent Taiwan and a society more tolerant of alternative lifestyles.  
During my fieldwork in 2012, I sensed a general air of hopelessness about the political and 
economic marginalization of Taiwan among many of my Taipei informants. Few believed 
                                                 
12 Quote as in original text. 
13  The protests against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) were ignited by the KMT’s 
attempt to let the Legislative Yuan ratify the trade agreement without clause-by-clause review by the 
opposition - an incident that many Taiwanese perceived as the violation of a key rule of democratic 
governance (Lu, 2014; Pai, 2014). 
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that the country’s political isolation and stagnating economy would be remedied any time 
soon. Their despair was reflected in the disheartenment with which many of them steered 
into their future. In 2014, however, the situation was about to change. This chapter will 
illustrate how several events concerning the quest for Taiwan’s economic integrity and 
national sovereignty dispelled the apparent lethargy of Taiwanese youth and rekindled 
hopes for the political future of Taiwan and their personal lives. At the same time, I will 
look at the very different stance of the young Chinese I met and examine the factors that 
framed their more hopeful outlook for their personal and collective future. 
 
7.2. The Self and the Other in China 
It has been argued that young adults in Beijing perceive their futures in brighter colours 
than their Taiwanese peers, a vision that is fuelled by the CCP’s optimistic rhetoric of 
incessant economic growth and a popular nationalism that promotes China’s growing 
potential to claim it is a global power (Bradsher, 2012; Cary, 2013; Cohen, 1991 p. 101; 
Hughes, 2011 pp. 602-603; Zhao, 2000 pp. 12-13). Moreover, by contrast to their 
Taiwanese peers who had the opportunity to openly voice dissatisfaction with their 
national government, young Chinese channelled most of their discontent towards 
neighbouring Japan (Chao, 2012; Gries, 2004 pp. 843-847; Hughes, 2011 p. 603). Western 
nations’ criticism of China’s dealings with human rights and its minority populations also 
raised anger that was publically expressed in protests, especially by young people (Rosen, 
2010 p. 172; Chao, 2012). In 2012, the strength of young people’s national consciousness 
was once again revealed as they feared China’s sovereignty contested. In September of that 
year, Japan bought an island from a private Japanese owner in the Senkaku archipelago 
(Chinese Diaoyu) over which China, Japan and Taiwan claimed territorial sovereignty 
(Perlez, 2012). In China, the incident sparked major protests against Japan that took 
thousands of “angry youths” (fennu qingnian) to the streets in a rare moment of 
unsuppressed collective political action (Chao, 2012; Tisdall, 2012).  
These protests evoked memories of those that occurred in March 2008 as a reaction to 
foreign criticism of China’s handling of the uprisings in Tibet. The journalist Evan Osnos 
has described that in the run up to the Summer Olympics, emotions ran high as “China’s 
young élite rose again […] — not in pursuit of liberal democracy but in defense of 
sovereignty and prosperity” (Osnos, 2008). In this context, Osnos notes, “a mood of 
nationalism surged through China” that found its expression not only in protests in front 
of Western supermarket chains but increasingly also within the virtual world of social 
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networks and blogs in a new wave of cyber-nationalism (Osnos, 2008; Wu, 2007). These 
displays of nationalism by “angry young men,” Christopher Hughes notes, dispelled 
previous fears about a “lack in national self-confidence” and shaped a new patriotic 
heroism (Hughes, 2011 p. 603). In conversations with young students in Beijing, I would 
be reminded of how deeply these incidents as well as other collective memories of foreign 
humiliation remained ingrained in the national consciousness. 
The self-perception of young people in China of being at the global centre of economic 
progress contrasted starkly with the feelings of marginalization among young Taiwanese.  
 
7.2. Taiwan - Nationalism on the Periphery 
Masahiro Wakabayashi defines Taiwanese national identity as being an outcome of the 
island’s “historical and geopolitical peripherity” (Wakabayashi, 2006 p. 5). Taiwan’s history 
as a neglected frontier that was exploited by various foreign regimes can be traced back to 
colonization by the Dutch and Spanish in the early 17th century (Wills, 1999 pp. 84-200). 
The island’s peripheral status did not change under Japanese rule. From 1895 to 1945 the 
Taiwanese were positioned “at the southern rim of Japan’s empire” and were subjected to 
an ambitious agenda of “nationalization” by the colonial power (Wakabayashi, 2006 p. 6). 
After the KMT’s takeover in 1945, the Taiwanese experienced a “second change in 
nationality,” Wakabayashi stresses, as they were remodelled from Japanese imperial subjects 
to Chinese citizens who were to support the party’s plan to project itself as the true bearer 
of ancient Chinese cultural values (Phillips, 1999 pp. 275-319; Wakabayashi, 2006 p. 6). 
Already at this time, hope among the Taiwanese rose and fell in tandem with the 
vacillations of the political sphere. Steven Phillips notes that  
“people talked of ‘three hopes’. First, there existed hope (hsi-wang) from the time of Japan’s 
surrender through the arrival of the Nationalist administration […]. Next was lost hope 
(shih-wang) that resulted from the performance of the new government. Finally came chueh-
wang (hopelessness) as the people felt that ‘the future was black’” (Phillips 1999: 284).  
Shortly afterwards, Taiwan was transferred to a new position of geopolitical “peripherity” 
as the United States intervened in Mao’s efforts to bring Korea under the PRC’s sphere of 
influence in 1950. In the course of these events, the island was made “an outpost in the 
Cold War;” positioned “in a peripheral position to the United States, the new hegemon of 
East Asia” (Wakabayashi 2006: 6).  
191 
 
In the following years, as China’s political and economic power in East Asia grew, the 
Nationalist government of Taiwan was no longer able to maintain its recognition as the 
legitimate Chinese representative in the international political arena. In 1971, it was forced 
to withdraw from the United Nations and had to cede its seat to the PRC. Shortly 
afterwards, Taiwan lost its seat in the WHO and, in subsequent years, it also had to 
withdraw from the World Bank and the IMF (Hickey, 2006 pp. 68-69). In the early 1980s, 
Taiwan had not only been excluded from most major international organizations but 
increasingly found itself in diplomatic isolation as global powers recognized China and 
severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Hickey, 2006 p. 69; Jacobs, 2006 pp. 85-109). Being 
expelled from the international political arena and devoid of diplomatic power, Taiwan 
now found itself on the periphery of the global geopolitical map. Since the 1980s, the 
Taiwanese government has not found any effective strategy to lift this isolation and propel 
itself back into political centrality. Such a project, as several hostile confrontations during 
recent decades have shown, would undoubtedly rouse the anger of the Chinese 
government that considers Taiwan as the 23rd province of the People’s Republic. “In the 
view of […] Chinese nationalism,” Wakabayashi explains, “Taiwan should be an extension 
of the Qing dynasty’s rule into the modern era” (Wakabayashi, 2006 p. 7). This explains 
why the CCP is striving to end what it considers to be an “anomalous” state of affairs that 
has lasted since the Qing’s ceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 (ibid.). However, 
Wakabayashi stresses that, to the Taiwanese, the state of “living in ‘anomaly’” has become 
deeply ingrained in their collective consciousness; it has become one of the defining 
elements that constituted Taiwanese identity as they conveyed from one generation to the 
next the hopes and disappointments that each change of regime had brought about (ibid.). 
Wakabayashi argues that  
“[c]hanges in nationality were forced experiences that imposed ceaseless re-questioning of 
one’s own identity in relation to a new center. […] Taiwanese nationalism […] reflects the 
historical resentment of the Taiwanese people over this “peripherity”, as well as their 
strong aspiration to put an end to a history taunted by “peripherity” (pp. 7-8). 
This fear of increasing marginalization manifested itself in the everyday lives of the young 
Taiwanese I met during my fieldwork in Taipei.  
Ma-ling, the young woman with whose travel plans I introduced this thesis, was one of 
those young Taiwanese who perceived the closer ties with China as a threatening intrusion 
on her personal life and career. The media company she worked at had recently been 
bought by an investor who was widely known as a pro-unification sympathizer. Since then, 
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Ma-ling lamented, the online magazine they published was increasingly turning into a 
mouthpiece for the popular mainland Chinese media outlet. Ma-ling was harshly critical of 
this development, not only because the editors were heavily restricted in the processing of 
news they were allowed to publish but also because of what she perceived as a markedly 
Chinese working atmosphere that her new superiors were trying to establish. To Ma-ling’s 
embarrassment, she and her colleagues were now supposed to engage in collective morning 
sports in the form of group dances; these reminded them greatly of the ones one could 
observe in front of restaurants and beauty parlours in the early morning in Chinese cities. 
Moreover, she was growing increasingly frustrated with the kind of work she was assigned; 
it consisted increasingly of processing material that had been supplied by the mainland 
Chinese branch than designing original work.  
Ma-ling and Yi-chuan both felt trapped in a marginalized position of society. As the 
previous chapter has shown, Yi-chuan attributed his failure to reach his professional goals 
partly to the ossified structures of the Taiwanese government as well as to Taiwan’s 
peculiar political status that denied him access to jobs at international organizations that 
could have provided him with an international career. Ma-ling interpreted the introduction 
of a Chinese office culture at her workplace as an ideological encroachment that roused 
fears of a slow subversion of Taiwan’s democratic freedoms in her. Like Yi-chuan, she did 
not only feel marginalized politically but she also felt increasingly pushed to the 
socioeconomic periphery of Taiwanese society. Earning only slightly more than the 
minimum wage, Ma-ling saw her chances of an economically secure life as significantly 
curtailed. When I last talked to her in autumn 2014, she was convinced, still single at 31, 
that she would not marry and would have to care for her security in old age alone, a 
frightening prospect considering her current salary.  
Both Yi-chuan and Ma-ling were torn between aspirations to leave Taiwan to realize their 
dreams of alternative lifestyles, unbounded by Taiwanese traditions abroad, and the deep 
connectedness they felt with their home society. This Taiwanese consciousness was not 
only expressed at moments of crisis when they perceived the foundations of Taiwanese 
democracy were being threatened but also in everyday life. In Taiwan, as well as in China, 
the internet played an important part in fostering a national consciousness among the 
young. Whenever Taiwan was mentioned in the Western media, Yi-chuan and Ma-ling, like 
many other young Taiwanese I knew, instantly circulated these articles and video clips that 
discussed topics as mundane as Taiwanese cuisine or travel destinations. It was as if with 
posting every foreign media acknowledgement of Taiwan’s existence, its sovereignty could 
be reclaimed at least in the virtual world. As the excerpt from Yi-chuan’s social network 
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profile above illustrates, young Taiwanese were not restricted by a national firewall and 
could thus use international networks like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram which did not 
only connect them with their local friends and acquaintances but also to Taiwanese abroad 
and the global online community. By posting and reposting articles, videos, images and 
personal comments in English, they were effective in letting news and opinions “go viral” 
globally. As each of their postings generated a multitude of comments and reposts, it 
seemed as if Taiwanese netizens were aligning to maintain the island’s presence in the 
media as effectively as possible.  
The paradox of a deeply felt Taiwanese identity and the urge to flee Taiwan’s “peripherity” 
to countries that were perceived as offering more job opportunities manifested itself in the 
surge of working holiday immigrants to Canada, New Zealand and Australia (Chung, 2013). 
Many shared Yi-chuan’s and Ma-ling’s feelings of “not being at the right place” to realize 
their aspirations for their private lives and careers. Like them, these young people hoped 
that a year or two in a Western country could offer them at least temporary relief from the 
overpowering feeling of marginalization. The unstable working conditions and the prospect 
of the menial labour involved in those working holidays rarely deterred young adults from 
the adventure. After all, the monthly wage as a labourer in Australia was on average higher 
than the salary of a college graduate entry-level salary in Taiwan (Taipei Times a, 2012; 
Taipei Times b, 2012). Thus, young people flocked to Western countries offering them a 
work-and-travel visa.14  
As mentioned in chapter five, the boyfriend of Hui-yu quit his job as an insurance broker 
to work as a waiter on a temporary contract in Calgary. He hoped to save enough money 
during this time to marry her after his return. Another young Taiwanese I met also left his 
girlfriend in Taiwan to embark on a working holiday in Canada. When I met him in 
Vancouver in 2012 right after his arrival, he looked confidently to the future despite the 
overcrowded housing and limited jobs open to temporary workers. Two years later, he told 
me that due to the better salary options in Australia, he had moved to Sydney after a year in 
Canada and started an apprenticeship as a car mechanic. After returning to Taiwan to open 
a car repair shop, he was still considering returning to Australia to advance his education. 
He explained the reasons for his resolve to leave Taiwan again as follows: 
“Taiwan has no resources for a lot of industries and they tend to use very low salary to hire 
skilled persons. The employers and the government have a very shallow vision on almost 
                                                 
14 In 2012, the year of my fieldwork in Taiwan, the number of young people applying for a work-and-travel 
visa peaked. Almost 37,000 visa applications were lodged of which more than 35,760 were granted 
(Australian Government, 2014 pp. 13-20). 
194 
 
everything. The wage is low and the living expenses are extremely expensive, so people 
have no chance to save money if they are not living with their parents […]. ” 
Both of the young men had strong bonds tying them to Taiwan and it was unlikely that 
either of them could ignore their responsibilities for their families and partners left on the 
island indefinitely. Indeed, Hui-yu’s boyfriend returned after a year and soon afterward, 
they married. It was difficult for most Taiwanese to leave their families permanently. 
However, by searching for an escape from the repressive Taiwanese labour market and the 
stifling atmosphere of political marginalization, many decided to escape the island for at 
least a period of their youth.15 
 
7.3. China’s New Wave of Nationalism 
The situation in Beijing was somewhat different. On a crisp autumn morning in 2013, I 
met Sun-yi in a little park in an upscale residential neighbourhood near her apartment close 
to the city centre. I described the story of Sun-yi, who had returned to Beijing after she had 
completed her graduate studies in the US and who was now working in an international 
company, in chapter five. Whereas Sun-yi projected herself as highly cosmopolitan in 
conversations with her friends and me, she also felt deeply rooted in her identity as Chinese. 
Even though she often mentioned her difficulties in conforming to gendered expectations 
in China and lamented the political corruption at all levels of the government, certain 
situations made her feel compelled to defend her Chinese identity against what she 
perceived as foreign, hostile allegations. When I addressed the long-standing resentment to 
the Japanese that I had sensed in conversations with young Chinese in my interviews, her 
face clouded over. Forgetting about potential passers-by who could overhear our 
conversation, Sun-yi became agitated and her voice cut sharply through the morning cold. 
In her eyes, she explained, there existed a fundamental difference in mentality between the 
Chinese and the Japanese that was at the heart of the conflict. As an example, she cited a 
Chinese movie that had made headlines due to its controversial plot a few years ago. This 
movie, she stressed, illuminated the difference between the Chinese and Japanese from an 
“anthropological” perspective. While the Chinese were depicted as benevolent and selfless, 
                                                 
15  The fact that thousands of young Taiwanese left the island to pursue adventure and temporary job 
contracts abroad was not well received by all layers of society. During the year of my fieldwork, pronounced 
criticism was often voiced in the media. Such voices feared that young Taiwanese would be exploited as 
“cheap labour” abroad. The new trend of working holidays was even mocked as a new exporter of “cheap 
youth labour” (Shan, 2014; Taipei Times a), 2012). One particular story about a young Taiwanese bank 
employee who had quit his job in Taiwan to work at an Australian slaughterhouse to pay off his student debts 
caused a furore during my fieldwork (Yang, 2012).  
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willing to save the life of an enemy (in this case, a Japanese soldier during the Second Sino-
Japanese War), the Japanese were portrayed as a proud people that would not stop at 
merciless massacres to defend their national pride. 16 This movie, Sun-yi stressed, would 
illustrate the issues that lie at the heart of the tensions between China and Japan. Despite 
her extensive experience abroad and her admiration for Japanese art and cuisine, this 
purportedly “dark side” that she suspected to be immanent to the Japanese people 
frightened her and made her reluctant to engage with them.  
The antipathy to the Japanese that Sun-yi expressed so passionately could be seen as a 
reflection of a wider nationalist trend observable in China since the beginning of the 1990s. 
This popular nationalism has its origins less in state-led campaigns than in populist 
movements fuelled by nativist intellectuals’ anti-foreign publications and the media (Gries, 
2005 pp. 848-849; Hughes, 2011 pp. 602-603; Zhao, 2000 pp. 12-13).  
Before the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Chinese intellectual elite were 
discussing political liberalization as the next step following the economic reforms launched 
by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Especially the political and economic restructuring introduced 
by Mikhail Gorbachov, the general secretary of the CPSU, 17  were closely observed by 
Chinese intellectuals who envisioned a similar political transformation for the PRC in the 
latter half of the 1980s. However, in the aftermath of the demonstrations in June 1989, the 
Chinese government urgently had to find measures to reinforce its claims on power and 
silence critical voices urging China’s democratization (Zhao, 2000 p. 19). Instead of 
political liberalization, stabilization had now become the prime target of the CCP. In an 
effort to strengthen the Party’s legitimacy, it launched several campaigns that, according to 
Suisheng Zhao, were to “to impose nationalism on the Chinese people as the collective 
identity of the state” (ibid.). At the same time, Hughes explains, a growing nativist 
movement was winning ground among the intellectual elite that criticized Western 
hegemony and advocated a renewed Chinese self-consciousness. Especially the publication 
of several books by nativist authors in the mid-1990s that were directed against US-
American and Japanese hegemony tapped into this emerging popular nationalism. These 
works marked a surge in anti-foreign sentiments among the intellectual elite, Zhao notes, as 
                                                 
16 The movie Sun-yi alluded to is Devils on the Doorstep (guizi lai le), (2000) by Jiang Wen. It tells the fictional 
story of a Japanese prisoner of war whose life is saved by a Chinese peasant during the final months of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. The peasant is not rewarded for his benevolent deed. The commander of the 
captive’s camp perceives the peasant’s selfless act as a humiliation of Japanese national pride and takes 
revenge by burning down the village. The Chinese peasant is executed by the Japanese. The movie was 
immediately banned by the PRC’s Bureau of Film and Television Censorship because it did not let the 
Chinese peasants appear sufficiently hostile towards the Japanese enemy (Gries, 2005 p. 835; Net Ease, 2002). 
17
 Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
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they reinforced a “deep-rooted feeling of cultural superiority and resentment of foreign 
efforts to belittle or humiliate China” (Hughes, 2011 pp. 602-603; Zhao, 2000 pp. 12-13). 
Even though those “anti-foreign impulses” were consistent with the official nationalism of 
the CCP, the strong reactions that this growing nationalism evoked in the public were soon 
perceived as a threat to the Party’s hegemony (Gries, 2004 p. 20; Zhao, 2000 p. 23). Peter 
Hays Gries highlights that in the Chinese intellectual discourse, the publication of these 
works is seen as constitutive of a “first wave of Chinese nationalism” that was mainly anti-
American. This wave reached its height during the protests after US intervention into the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 
(Gries, 2005 p. 848). The “second wave” of Chinese nationalism, by contrast, was centred 
on increasing anti-Japanese sentiments. The emergence of this wave coincided with the 
growing popularity of the internet which came to play an integral part in the distribution of 
information and the exchange of opinions. Thus, this anti-Japanese outgrowth of popular 
nationalism was more successful in its efforts “to convert popular opinion into political 
action” as it exerted uncomfortable pressure on the government’s foreign policy-making 
(ibid.).  
As numerous incidents during the last decade have shown, anti-Japanese aggression has 
constantly simmered under the surface only to re-emerge when China’s political status is 
contested. As a response to its citizens’ increasingly hostile sentiments, the Chinese 
government displays an increasing assertiveness towards Japan’s challenges to its territorial 
sovereignty in the East China Sea. At the same time, the state-led media are further 
perpetuating Japan’s image as a violent aggressor with the regular airing of documentaries 
and shows that keep the collective memory of Japanese wartime atrocities alive and fuel 
claims for retribution for the suffering inflicted (Gries, 2005 pp. 849-850; International 
Crisis Group, 2013 pp. 12-15; Ramzy, 2014; Sevastopulo, 2014; Zhang, 2012). 
My conversation with Sun-yi made me recall one I had had with Chao and several other 
students of politics and economics at their local university shortly after my return to Beijing 
from Taiwan. Knowing that I had recently conducted a follow-up study in Taipei, they 
eagerly questioned me about the differences between my experiences in Taipei and Beijing. 
While we had tea at their campus cafeteria, I told them that many young Taiwanese held a 
deep admiration for Japanese culture. This manifested itself in fashion trends, tastes in 
music and the adoration of Japanese movies and celebrities. While I answered their 
questions, the face of Chao darkened. He threw in the comment that he did not like the 
Japanese. His paternal grandfather had told him about the atrocities his family members 
and fellow villagers had to endure during the Second Sino-Japanese War. After hearing his 
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gruesome account, he started to feel deep hatred for the Japanese. Especially the Japanese 
government’s reluctance to acknowledge the wartime atrocities committed by their soldiers 
in China enraged Chao.18 However, when I probed more deeply into his repulsion for 
anything Japanese and asked if he would feel the same way towards a Japanese exchange 
student he might encounter at university, he conceded that he might feel less hostile as that 
person was not even born during the war. However, I was left with an impression that 
Chao, like Sun-yi, conceived of the Japanese as intrinsically different from the Chinese.  
As the above vignettes illustrate, under the CCP’s rule Chinese nationalism had mostly 
defined itself against a foreign, external “other”. First, the US and then Japan have been 
constructed as the “other” in different waves of nationalism since the 1990s. In Taiwan, by 
contrast, nationalism was conceptualized against different ruling minorities that constituted 
the “other” throughout most of the 20th century (Suzuki, 2007; Wakabayashi, 2006). 
Taiwanese nationalism was also directed against the forced imposition of new cultural 
identities, first by Japanese colonialists and then by the mainland Chinese KMT. Only in 
recent decades has China, with its growing economic and political dominance in the region, 
emerged as an external entity against which Taiwanese nationalism was defined. 
Moreover, while during the 1950s and 1960s, the CCP succeeded in creating a collective 
vision for the future in the form of a communist China, the KMT failed in convincing the 
Taiwanese of its agenda to retake the mainland. In having to bear the economic burden of 
maintaining the military and the government apparatus, most Taiwanese were reluctant to 
support the leading party in its ambitious project (Roy, 2003 pp. 9, 61; Wachman, 1994 p. 
58). Instead of demanding political activism and deep commitment in the creation of a new 
society like the CCP, the KMT only required acquiescence and offered limited options for 
collaboration to its citizens. As a consequence, a vision of a political future of Taiwan that 
was formulated against the leading party slowly emerged in the underground opposition 
(Chan, 1985 p. 6; Gold, 1994 p. 49; Hughes, 1997 pp. 35-40).  
Meanwhile in China, the CCP was cementing its autocratic rule under the strategy of 
political inclusion and the creation of a political utopia that appealed especially to the lower 
social classes. Baogang Guo notes that by conveying a feeling of liberation to the peasants 
                                                 
18 According to Shogo Suzuki, “the fact that many prominent Japanese politicians and public intellectuals 
continue to deny their imperialist legacy results in a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ which reminds many Chinese of 
Japan’s atrocities and reproduces an image of Japan as a ‘victimizing Other’” (Suzuki, 2007 pp. 38-39). 
Moreover, when asked what the Japanese reminded them of in a 1999 Yomiuri/Gallop poll, the greatest 
number (39.2 per cent) of the Chinese respondents thought of the Sino-Japanese War or the Anti-Chinese 
War. Surprisingly, these categories also attained the highest scores among the younger participants within the 
18-29 age range (ibid.). 
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and workers, the CCP could generate substantial support and hence “[t]he gratitude and 
affection people showed towards their new leaders provided the strongest moral capital for 
the new government” (Guo, 2003 p. 10). Seemingly answering the yearning of the masses 
for socioeconomic equality, the CCP was thus more successful in rallying popular support 
and cementing its political legitimacy. 
The distinct trajectories of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism and the visions of the future 
designed by the state illustrate the following: in China, the CCP has been successful in 
creating a deep sense of Chinese identity that currently defines itself strongly against 
foreign powers and is confident in its claim of being a global power; Taiwanese nationalism, 
by contrast, first had to overcome its peripheral position imposed by a ruling minority - it 
now has to define itself against China’s rising authority that increasingly challenges 
Taiwan’s status in the international political arena and global economy.  
In which ways are these differences in national consciousness reflected in Chinese and 
Taiwanese young people’s vision of the future and sense of agency? Why did young 
Chinese living in an autocratic state have a stronger sense of self-efficacy than young 
Taiwanese growing up in a democratic system? 
 
7.4. Rhetorics of Individual Agency in Beijing 
On a rainy afternoon in October, I joined Ming-yue and Chao for a hotpot meal at one of 
Beijing’s underground shopping malls. I introduced the young PhD students in chapter two 
where I talked about their problems of integrating their obligations to their rural families 
with their aspirations for a career in the city. The shops and restaurant off the narrow 
basement corridors were crammed with students seeking bargains in the small boutiques or 
a meal at one of the inexpensive restaurants. The two students led me into a crowded 
restaurant where we were given a table in the midst of lively, chatting groups of young 
people. This meal was a special treat for them, they explained, as they were not able to 
leave the campus often due to their heavy workloads as PhD students. While we were 
waiting for our order to arrive, the conversation turned quickly to those lavish banquets 
that took place at Beijing restaurants at the other end of the price scale. In that autumn in 
2013, President Xi had caused a stir with the introduction of a harsh anti-corruption 
campaign that especially targeted the widespread practices of gift-giving and special treats 
for officials (Oster, 2014). Chao joked that if these campaigns proceeded, many Beijing 
restaurants that catered to the notorious “gift economy” would go bankrupt. When I asked 
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if he feared that the problem of corruption would get worse in the future, he shook his 
head. He was confident that with time, the government would resolve the problem. After 
all, Chao argued, the CCP’s leadership was relatively young compared to the long history of 
China.  
As a party member himself and aiming for a career in the government, Chao, like several 
other young people I talked to with similar aspirations, was critical of the ongoing 
corruption but rarely voiced any critique of the form of governance itself. But what about 
the offspring of wealthy officials, derogatorily called “second generation rich” (guan er dai), 
who often caused scandals due to their irresponsible and arrogant behaviour? Was it 
difficult for them, I wondered, to see the offspring of affluent and well-connected families 
being privileged in the education system and in their careers? Ming-yue thought a while and 
answered that even though she had many friends who came from well-connected families, 
she saw them working just as hard for their degrees as she did. Both of them believed that 
familial background could only take one so far but that with hard work, they could achieve 
success on their own account. However, Chao and Ming-yue also agreed that in their rural 
hometowns, personal connections were still very important. However, they were confident 
that in Beijing they would be able to achieve success based on their personal talents and 
efforts.  
Chao and Ming-yue’s opinion was shared by Yi-an, a young professional who worked for a 
Chinese fashion label. In early December 2013, I met her in a more upscale shopping mall 
during her break. Amid the kitschy coulisse of a snowy winter landscape with American 
Christmas songs blasting from the speakers, we had lunch in the trendy food court that 
offered imitations of Western meals. Our conversation quickly turned to a recent argument 
Yi-an’s parents had had with the family of her maternal uncle. Yi-an’s well-connected 
parents had tried to get a younger cousin fast-tracked for a highly competitive job through 
their contacts with the hiring committee. The cousin only had to pass the initial written 
exam to be forwarded to the interview round with the hiring committee. However, as Yi-an 
complained, her cousin had not invested much effort into the preparations and failed the 
exam. Afterward, her cousin had asked Yi-an’s mother again to help her secure another job. 
Yi-an was enraged by her cousin’s lack of determination and lack of agency. However, 
when I remarked that she might also have had a good start to her career due to her parents’ 
contacts, Yi-an became agitated. She had achieved success in her career without her parents’ 
help, she asserted, omitting to mention that her parents had been able to secure important 
references and paid “sponsorship fees” to enrol her in elite schools. She insisted that, 
unlike her cousins who had all relied on her family’s connections for their careers, she had 
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made it on her own. Even though she did not deny that her parents had often helped her in 
her choices, she was adamant that her academic and career achievements resulted from her 
determination to work hard rather than from her family’s privileged socioeconomic 
position. Her parents’ contacts, she was convinced, could not help her in Beijing - hard 
work would catapult her into the life she imagined for herself. 
Accordingly, among my Chinese informants, a high sense of empowerment and efficacy 
was palpable, not only among rural students whose experiences of progressing from a 
village school to a Beijing university had demonstrated to them the legitimacy of their belief 
in hard work as a key to success. Like Yi-an, even those from more affluent families who 
did not have to bridge such wide socioeconomic gaps on their way to first-tier educational 
institutions and professional careers drew self-affirmation from explaining their success by 
way of their personal efforts and sacrifices. Moreover, a belief in a merit system, despite the 
blatant corruption at schools, universities and in the government, was still very much alive 
among the young people I encountered in Beijing. Consistent with Hansen and Pang’s 
observations among rural Chinese students, my urban interviewees rarely justified failures 
at school or in their careers by referring to their disadvantaged socioeconomic situation – it 
was mostly attributed to their perceived lack of personal effort (Hansen and Pang, 2010 p. 
60). How can this strong belief in self-efficacy be sustained in a society riddled by 
corruption and experiencing a widening wealth gap? 
Insight into this phenomenon may be gained by taking a closer look at the transformation 
of the individual’s role since the CCP came to power in 1949. Whereas superficially, the 
CCP appeared to eradicate any personal autonomy, the individual was gradually pushed to 
the fore during collectivization and government campaigns that targeted traditional family 
and community organization (Yan, 2010 pp. 492-493). Yan explains that during the Mao 
era, “the individual was called upon to participate in party-state-sponsored political, 
economic, and social campaigns in public life and to reinvent herself/himself as a citizen of 
the nation-state instead of merely as a member of the family” (p. 493). Thus, by stressing 
the individual’s role and responsibilities in the collective and highlighting the importance of 
personal sacrifice, self-critique and improvement during the struggle towards an ideal 
society, the Chinese were forced to conceive of themselves as detached from those main 
social structures that had created personal identity before (Guo, 2003 pp. 9-11; Rene, 2013 
p. 15; Yan, 2009 pp. 119-122). With the stylization of model citizens, such as the story of 
the young soldier Lei Feng who sacrificed himself for the communist cause, the CCP 
created effective myths about the importance of each individual’s contribution to the 
common goal. These exemplary tales of individual effort were also supposed to enforce 
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personal reflection on one’s qualities as a revolutionary and possible ways for improvement 
(Chan, 1985 pp. 60-62).  
In the reform era, the individual’s role in the achievement of a better society was brought 
to the fore again -this time to realize Deng Xiaoping’s ambitious agenda of market 
modernization. Personal effort was now required to skilfully navigate the emerging free 
market. With hard work and entrepreneurial skill, so the propaganda declared, the Chinese 
would be able to exploit the new economic opportunities and lift themselves gradually out 
of poverty. The new economic pragmatism was introduced with slogans with which the 
party tried to rouse materialistic impulses among the people in order to awaken an 
entrepreneurial spirit (Chen, 2005 pp. 45-46; Kelliher, 1991 p. 321).  
Throughout the various eras of its rule, the CCP has thus continuously invoked the 
importance of individual agency and responsibility in the realization of its ambitious 
agendas. This ideological strategy may have contributed to the strong sense of personal 
efficacy that I observed not only in the Chinese young people of today but also in their 
parents. At the same time, this ideology may have averted a more encompassing structural 
critique of the political system. 
On a brisk evening in mid December, I met my former colleague Liang on a street corner 
near the Tuanjiehu Park to join him for a family dinner at his home. The temperatures in 
Beijing had recently fallen below zero and a sharp wind was blowing through the streets 
that night. A few months before, Liang’s girlfriend had got pregnant unexpectedly. Liang 
was not happy about this and appeared troubled by the obligations parenthood entailed. 
Moreover, in order to be able to register the baby, he had agreed to marry his girlfriend; 
another commitment he never wanted to make. While I tried to keep up with his fast pace, 
Liang confessed that he felt bad for not spending more evenings with his mother. Busy 
with his job at the consultancy and the renovation of his flat, he rarely found the time to 
eat with her at night. After a few minutes’ walk, Liang stopped in front of a drab-looking 
apartment building. His mother had already moved out from the fourth-floor flat into the 
basement of the same block to make space for her son and his wife. Liang’s face looked 
sombre as he asserted once again that the child had not been planned. He felt guilty for his 
mother’s relegation to a draughty, run-down flat because he could not afford to buy his 
own house in Beijing. 
We entered the dark concrete corridor and Liang opened the door to a bleak-looking flat. 
His mother greeted us warmly and, relieved to escape the evening cold, we entered the hall. 
The walls of the rooms were a bland grey and, despite the paintings that decorated almost 
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every bit of the walls, the flat appeared cold and damp. I could understand why Liang felt 
guilty about his mother, who was now in her seventies, spending her old age in this humble 
dwelling. However, Mrs Xi’s warm and affectionate appearance stood in stark contrast to 
the atmosphere of the flat. Upon entering the kitchen, she welcomed us joyfully and 
immediately urged us to eat the food her maid had already prepared. After dinner, she 
showed me around the rooms. Telling me the stories behind her son’s paintings and 
drawings, Mrs Xi seemed thriving. I followed her through the little music room she had 
arranged at the back of the flat. From there, we proceeded to a small living room and the 
adjacent bedroom that was not much more than a storeroom with a lounge. Every inch was 
covered by Liang’s works and she enthusiastically explained the different subjects and 
techniques. While Liang stood to one side looking slightly embarrassed, Mrs Xi praised the 
extraordinary artistic talent of her son. Liang had studied art at prestigious schools in China 
and abroad and even though he could not apply his talents in his current job, his 
international education had nevertheless landed him a prestigious position. In her eyes, his 
future looked bright. 
Later, when his mother had gone to bed, Liang asked me bemused if Taiwanese parents 
were as obsessed with their children as Chinese ones. Having worked as his colleague for 
three months, I knew that his prospects of carving out a career at the consultancy were 
rather dim. Due to the unexpected pregnancy of his wife, he had to abandon his plans to 
go abroad to further his career as an artist. However, his mother was brimming with 
confidence that Liang’s talent would be recognized in the future. Even though her personal 
living conditions had worsened due to Liang’s inability to afford a flat on the overpriced 
real estate market, she appeared to interpret this as a sacrifice on the way to her family’s 
success. As she later told me, she had managed to work her way up in Beijing’s competitive 
classical music scene despite the interruptions in her education due to the Cultural 
Revolution. Liang, by contrast, had been able to follow his education without interruption 
and, having observed his talent unfold throughout the years, Mrs Xi believed in her son 
and was eager to support him on whatever path he chose; even if this meant that he would 
go abroad again. 
Even though Liang had told me that his mother had sometimes voiced fears of loneliness, 
it appeared as if realizing the success she had envisioned for him counted at least as much 
to his filial duties as being physically present in her old age. Liang seemed to be 
embarrassed by his mother’s passionate praise of his talent but he had not given up on his 
dream of a career in creative arts either. Despite his mounting responsibilities, he had 
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opened a small studio to further his career in his free time and had still not given up on his 
dream to go abroad again soon.  
Mrs Xi’s confidence in her son’s ability to achieve success seemed to resonate with the 
accounts other Beijing informants gave me about their parents. It appeared as though 
parents and adult children did not always agree on their wishes for the future but both 
parties were confident that the future looked brighter than the past and reassured each 
other that the huge sacrifices they had made to pursue a better life would pay off one day. 
In this sense, Chinese parents seemed to look to the future with more optimism than their 
Taiwanese counterparts who often tended to relate to the younger generation with a mix of 
disappointment and frustration and who had a rather grim outlook on the future of 
Taiwanese society.  
 
7.5. Reluctance and Resistance among Youth in Taipei - A “Strawberry-Generation” 
with Revolutionary Potential?  
As the previous chapters have illustrated, compared with their Chinese peers, young 
Taiwanese seemed to have a rather weak sense of personal agency. This was even more 
surprising with regard to the achievements of their parents and grandparents. After all, they 
had realised - in less than a generation - a transition from an agricultural society to a 
flourishing industrial economy. Moreover, they had set an example; thanks to continuous 
underground political activism, that an authoritarian government could be pressured into 
democratizing itself and into allowing an opposition to exist (Roy, 2003 pp. 152-182; 
Rubinstein, 1999 pp. 367-402). So why had young Taiwanese lost the self-confidence and 
determination that their parents and grandparents must have displayed at their age? I was 
not alone in asking that question - the topic of the lethargy of youth had been discussed by 
the media for several years. Whereas the Chinese youth had earned themselves the title of 
“angry youth” (fennu qingnian) in defending their national pride, the Taiwanese generation 
born between 1981 and 1991 was widely mocked and criticized in the media for being a 
“strawberry generation” (caomeizu); comparing the softness and vulnerability of the fruit to 
Taiwanese youths. Their apparent lack of ambitions and reliance on parental support far 
into adulthood was at the heart of this criticism (Lu, 2014; Schott, 2008).  
In recent years, numerous articles surfaced in the Taiwanese media that warned against the 
country’s decreasing economic competitiveness due to the alleged missing initiative and 
weak risk attitude of its youth. In October 2014, a top Taiwanese negotiator to China 
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warned that Taiwan might encounter difficulties in maintaining its competitiveness due to 
China’s growth if the Taiwanese did not increase their assertiveness and entrepreneurial 
spirit. The parental generation was soon targeted for “spoiling” their offspring and 
“steer[ing] their adult children to look for safe jobs and schools and providing little 
inspiration” (Jenning, 2014). Although many grandparents and parents had engaged in risky 
ventures during the economic boom in the 1960s and 1970s, they seemed to have failed to 
pass on that entrepreneurial spirit to their children (ibid.). Another article in the Taipei 
Times warned that Taiwan was now quickly falling behind China in technological 
innovation and that young people have become increasingly reluctant to set up new 
businesses (Sui, 2013). At the same time, participation in the civil service exams has 
doubled in the last decade as more people compete for government jobs that are expected 
to offer more income security (Jennings, 2014).19 In the wake of an international opinion 
poll measuring future expectations where Taiwan ranked as one of the nations with the 
least optimistic outlook, the Taipei Times dubbed the Taiwanese a “nation of nay-sayers” 
(Lin, 2013).  
According to Lin Cho-Shui, a cultural policy expert from the National Taiwan University 
of Arts, Taiwan’s economic success in earlier decades has caused unrealistic expectations in 
the population - these unrealistic expectations are responsible for the current gloomy mood. 
Moreover, he links this pessimism to a national identity crisis and argues that “[i]f you don’t 
know where you are, you can’t think very optimistically about the future” (Lin, 2013). 
These fears were not only reflected in my conversations with my young informants - 
members of the older generations also told me of their disappointment in their children 
and grandchildren for not being able to emulate their parents’ success stories. 
The grandparents of Yue-ling told me their family story upon my visit at their home in 
Taichung. The family was doing well and had just recently built a new, spacious home 
which was attached to the factory that housed the family business. This new building was 
shared by Yue-ling’s grandparents, two of their sons and one of their grandsons with his 
family. While at first glance, their multigenerational household evoked images of a 
harmonious Taiwanese family overseen by a powerful patriarch, this first impression was 
deceptive. Yue-ling had already told me that her grandfather was hugely disappointed in his 
sons. Her uncles, as Yue-ling put it, were effectively “unemployed,” since the formerly 
                                                 
19 As has been mentioned in chapter three, in China, by contrast, participation in the civil service entrance 
exam has decreased in recent years. This development is attributed to the increased crack-down on 
corruption, in particular the ban on bribes, which shuns people away from employment in the government. 
The more lucrative options other employment sectors offer might however also play a role in this 
phenomenon (Riley, 2015; The Economist, 2015). 
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successful family business had not generated any profit since the 1990s. Only Yue-ling’s 
aunt had fulfilled her grandfather’s expectations as she had been able to marry into a 
wealthy family. Hence, Yue-ling advised me, when talking to her grandfather, I should not 
probe too deeply into his relationship with his children as this would upset him too much. 
However, he was surprisingly eager to recount his disappointment in the younger 
generation when he told me his life story that afternoon.  
Comfortably resting in his armchair, Mr Lin was obviously pleased that a foreign researcher 
had come from Taipei to listen to his story. He answered my questions in great detail and, 
looking back on his own life path, he portrayed the choices he had made as “self-evident” 
but emphasized the need for hard work as key to success. Born at the beginning of the 
1930s, he had grown up under the Japanese occupation. At the age of 12, he quit school. 
The curriculum newly introduced by the KMT was taught in Mandarin and it was difficult 
for him to understand his teachers who spoke mainland dialects. Moreover, the KMT had 
raised tuition fees and his parents were thus no longer able to finance his education. At that 
time, he had no aspirations other than being able to make a living. He first worked in a 
noodle shop, later he traded in sesame oil, bricks and garments in Taipei, moving from one 
job to the next.  
After marrying, Mr Lin bought a food stall for his wife. He taught her how to make 
noodles - a skill he had learned in his first job - and together they sold noodles and mantou 
(traditional pastries). He was lucky, he said, to have chosen a wife from a poor farmer’s 
family who was used to hard work and did not complain about their dire financial situation. 
They made a good team. At the same time, he was building up a transport company. 
However, not all of his businesses flourished. A few years later, he bought some land to set 
up an apple plantation. At that time, apples were popular luxury goods sold at high prices 
on the Taiwanese market. However, shortly before he set up his business, the Americans 
had signed a new trade agreement with the KMT to import apples at low prices. Thus, Mr 
Lin had to abandon this business before he had made any profit. However, he did not let 
this failure discourage him and soon afterwards, he tried his luck as a real estate agent. He 
bought some farmland that the state had converted to building plots and sold it as soon as 
prices started rising. He bought new land with the profit. He then pooled money with other 
family members and they invested in office buildings which they rented out to businesses 
so as to make the fortune on which he could build his future success.  
Mr Lin had wanted his children to inherit his entrepreneurial spirit and extend the family’s 
success into the future. Unfortunately, the light-bulb factory had not been able to match 
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previous success stories. Yue-ling told me later that he dreaded getting involved in the 
regular comparisons of their offspring’s success stories that his friends and neighbours 
liked to engage in. Other family members tried to console him by encouraging him not to 
measure his personal success as the father of his children but as the grandfather of his 
university-educated grandchildren. However, he had only found peace since realizing his 
dream of building his own home at the age of eighty. Indeed, when I asked him what had 
been the best time of his life, he replied “now” - he owned his own house and enjoyed 
economic security.  
Nonetheless, Mr Lin emphasized, he had experienced hardship and had “eaten bitterness” 
(chi ku) - unlike today’s youth, he also knew the value of money. Today’s young generation, 
he complained, only spent their parents’ money but had not experienced hardship in their 
lives. He worried: who would plant the rice in the fields once the older generation was gone? 
Mr Lin’s life story and his opinion of today’s younger generation were not unusual. The 
grandfather of two young women I befriended in Taipei recounted similar experiences. 
Their grandfather was from a poor Hakka family in Miaoli County, He had to quit 
education after primary school and migrated to Taipei to make his living as a shoe shiner 
throughout his teenage years. Despite his humble upbringing and the ruling KMT 
Mainlander’s discrimination against native Taiwanese in higher ranking professions, he 
worked his way up to become a bank employee at one of Taiwan’s biggest banks, thus 
rising from peasant to a member of Taipei’s middle class. During his first ten years at the 
bank, he was confined to clerical positions. Speaking only Japanese apart from the Hakka 
dialect (kejia hua), he was relegated to serving tea to his superiors. Now, he claimed, times 
had changed so much that his life was worlds apart from that of his children and 
grandchildren who had grown up in the capital. In his eyes, today’s youth was too 
dependent on their parents, splurging cash on luxuries and enjoying the wealth their 
parents and grandparents had accumulated. For him, his happiest memory was when he 
was promoted and he could offer his wife and children financial security. Having learnt to 
rely on himself and having achieved success as a result of years of personal sacrifice and 
hardship, he found young people’s passivity and their reluctance to stand on their own two 
feet hard to understand. 
These two elderly men were not the only ones who lamented the younger generation’s lack 
of agency. During my fieldwork, the death of several young men that occurred as a 
consequence of excessive computer gaming caused media outrage in Taiwan and sparked 
off new public discussion of the apathy and social withdrawal of young Taiwanese. These 
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young, mostly male, adults, who spent their time in their rooms or internet cafes and who 
preferred the world of online gaming to social interaction in the real world, were 
derogatively called zhainan. My female informants used the term to specify the kinds of 
men they would try to avoid as romantic partners. 
The zhainan (stay-at-home boy) is the Taiwanese counterpart to the Japanese otaku - a 
young person who isolates him- or herself from most social contact to escape into the 
virtual world or an obsessive fan culture (Niu et al., 2012 p. 714).20 The phenomenon of 
social seclusion by the young has assumed dramatic dimensions in Japan, a society that in 
many ways closely parallels Taiwanese society. The social phenomenon of the hikikomori, a 
young person who deliberately shuts themselves away from society to spend their time 
isolated at home, has increased since the Japanese socioeconomic system underwent major 
restructuring in the 1970s (Furlong, 2008 p. 315). However, the hikikomori did not receive 
wide media attention until the 1990s when Japan was hit by the Asian-Pacific recession that 
had a severe impact on the structure of the labour market and caused a sharp increase in 
youth unemployment and the casualization of the workforce (p. 318). Japanese youth 
responded to diminishing career opportunities by adopting a desolate, hopeless perspective 
on their future. Michael Zielenziger, who has researched the phenomenon of the hikikomori, 
found that the roots for the rising number of youths who choose to withdraw from society 
may be found in Japan’s rigid social system that allows for few alternatives besides the 
normative life path (Zielenzieger, 2006). When the economic crisis suspended such 
opportunities, young Japanese started to despair. Zielenziger notes that  
“[t]he most ominous aspect of Japan’s long stagnation – far beyond the obvious symptoms 
that regularly crowd the business pages – is the plight of its people. Young Japanese today 
face their own forms of adjustment disorder and concoct disturbing new ways to escape a 
society that annihilates their hopes and washes out any promise of self-realization in a 
torrent of rootless materialism” (p. 8). 
Some psychological studies suggest that social withdrawal is partly a result of parents being 
overprotective. As most cases of hikikomori come from highly educated middle-class 
backgrounds, high expectations of future success play a pivotal role in developing coping 
patterns to avoid interpersonal conflicts and failures in social interaction (Furlong, 2008 p. 
314; Umeda and Kawakami, 2012 p. 126).  
                                                 
20 In contrast to Japan, where otaku can describe a male or female person, I have only encountered the male 
term zhainan in Taiwan (zhai is an antiquated word for “house,” nan means “male”). My informants were 
bemused when I asked them if they knew about any zhainü (nü means “female”) within their circle of friends 
and acquaintances. Although some young women also escape to a virtual world in Taiwan, there was no 
special term to describe this. Hence, the phenomenon of the zhainan was widely perceived to be male.  
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A resemblance to the situation that young Taiwanese face today cannot be denied. 
However, public opinion about the younger generation changed dramatically when 
university students, civic organizations and NGOs from all over the island gathered in 
Taipei to protest against the signing of the CSSTA in March 2014. Accusing the 
government of having tried to let the CSSTA secretly pass to committee for approval by 
the Legislative Yuan without further review, thousands of students took to the streets to 
protest. Eventually, a group of students rushed into the Legislative Yuan and occupied it 
for three weeks - this forced the government to promise a comprehensive revision of the 
CSSTA (Rowen, 2015). Even though it is still unclear whether the Sunflower Movement 
(taiyanghua xueyun)21 as it is often called will be successful in reaching its aim of a revision or 
even an abandonment of the CSSTA, the young protesters have effectively communicated 
their opposition to China’s “one country, two systems” formula to an international 
audience and forced China to readjust its stance. The movement has also inspired the 
recent pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong (the Umbrella Movement, yusan 
yundong) that employed “symbols and rhetoric similar to the Sunflowers” (Cole, 2014).  
In the following months, interest in national politics remained high and reached a zenith 
with the local elections in November 2014. Many of my informants welcomed the crushing 
defeat of the KMT by the pro-independence DPP (The Economist, 2014). The night the 
election results were announced, Yi-chuan published the following appeal on his social 
network profile that was “liked” or reposted by dozens of his friends:  
The messages Taiwanese folks send tonight: 1. On your face! Xi! Now you can save your 
China dream for yourself! We don’t want to get involved with it. 2. Hong Kong, we are 
with u, please keep having hope. […] And my message: Taipei folks u win my heart, after 
so many years living here, I will never say I am living in China town again [alluding to the 
fact that Taipei was governed by the KMT until the local elections in 2014, while his 
southern hometown had been under DPP administration since the mid-1990s]. Congrats, 
Taiwan people, we are finally another step forward.”22 
The newly sparked hope palpable among young Taiwanese might not only be an effect of 
the empowerment they experienced in the collective endeavour of the Sunflower 
Movement (even if its actual success is contested); it might also be a result of discovering 
their potency of communicating their anger across the Taiwan Strait and to an international 
                                                 
21 According to Mark Harrison, a supporter of the protests took sunflowers into the occupied Legislative 
Yuan as a symbol for the light needed to bring more transparency to the negotiations between the KMT and 
the Chinese government. Instead of using the Chinese term for sunflower (xiangrikui), the literal translation 
from the English word (taiyanghua) was used. This alludes to the international orientation of the protesters 
(Harrison, 2014). 
22 Quote as in original text. 
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arena. By inspiring Hong Kong’s protests for democracy, young Taiwanese’s national self-
consciousness seemed to have strengthened in the rising awareness that a challenge to 
Chinese hegemony might not be out of reach after all. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
The aspect of hope within the context of societal change and an uncertain political future 
has attracted increasing anthropological interest in recent years. Especially the transition 
from socialist planned economies to market economies and the societal consequences of 
this have become the focus of anthropologists interested in topics such as hope, doubt and 
uncertainty (Bartha, 2013; Pedersen, 2012; Zigon, 2009). Pedersen has noted that by 
maintaining a hopeful stance towards the future - despite financial hardship and lacking 
career opportunities - his Mongolian informants were able to create stability and meaning 
when faced with the unpredictability which accompanies major societal transformations: 
“Their repeated experiences of failure [...] does [sic] not make them reach what at first glance is the 
only logical conclusion, namely, that there is nothing they can do about this state of affairs (short of 
bringing about radical political change). Far from accepting that the best they can aim for is to 
muddle pragmatically through the hardships of the so-called transition from state socialism to 
market capitalism or to indulge fatalistically in passive daydreaming of a better life, my friends 
continue to act as if tomorrow will be a better day [...]” (Pedersen, 2012 p. 137). 
Even though my Chinese informants did not embrace economic transitions “via a 
systematic unwillingness to plan” - quite the opposite - they appeared remarkably removed 
from the complications that executing their plans might involve for themselves and their 
families (p. 148). Just like the Mongolian youths described by Pedersen, young Chinese at 
times tended to blank out the realities of their personal situation as well as the societal and 
political barriers that might hinder the realization of their aspirations. Remarkably, far from 
“living in the moment,” a spirit Pedersen sensed among young Mongolians, young Chinese 
seemed to live mostly for the future, willing to accept temporary hardship in the hope of it 
being rewarded later on (ibid.).  
Whereas the young Mongolians Pedersen describes lived in poor socioeconomic conditions 
and appeared to have rather vague ideas of how to reach their goal of success and affluence, 
the aspirations of the young Russians interviewed by Zigon demonstrate striking 
similarities to my Chinese informants. Having come of age in a post-socialist society, these 
young Russians expressed hope in a way that was, according to Zigon, more reminiscent of 
“agency” than of a utopian definition of hope (Zigon, 2009 p. 257). Like Pedersen, he 
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argues that his informants maintained a state of hope in a situation which seemed rather 
hopeless in order to be able to “live a sane life in a specific social world” (p. 267). Their 
rather conventional aspirations such as a stable job and marriage, their conviction that hard 
work would eventually be rewarded as well as the occasional “denial of contingency” are 
highly reminiscent of my young Beijing informants (pp. 253, 261). Like those young 
Muscovites, they “are working toward the fulfilment of their hope. They are actively 
hoping […] in a situation of potential hopelessness” (p. 267). Even though my Beijing 
informants’ futures may indeed have seemed more hopeful than those of Pedersen’s and 
Zigon’s informants, an awareness that a sudden course change of the regime or personal 
stroke of fate could destroy their future plans often resonated in their deliberations on the 
future. In telling me their families’ stories, reflecting on their parents’ and grandparents’ 
memories of war and persecution and the arbitrariness of political campaigns, they were 
highly aware of the contingencies that could endanger their future plans yet were still full of 
confidence that they could overcome any potential obstacle. 
In contrast to my Chinese informants and those of Pedersen and Zigon, Taiwanese youth 
doubted their efforts would yield material success. Similar to Brinton’s observations among 
young Japanese, many of my Taiwanese informants complained to me that their parents 
still clung to the conviction that hard work would be rewarded (Brinton, 2011 pp. 13-19). 
For this reason, they tended to attribute their children’s difficulties on the labour market to 
a lack of effort rather than the detrimental economic and political situation of Taiwan. Like 
the young Japanese who, crushed by parental expectations, increasingly despaired of 
reaching normative goals like a stable career and family, many young Taiwanese wanted to 
find a way to withdraw from the pressures of society. However, the 2014 student protests 
and subsequent demonstrations in Hong Kong fostered hope in many young Taiwanese 
that their voice could have an impact within the political sphere after all. 
Even though young Chinese also often complained about feeling disconnected from their 
parents due to their fundamentally different experiences while coming of age, many of 
them shared in their parents’ conviction of being able to create a better future for 
themselves and their families. Unlike their young Taiwanese peers, they were convinced 
that hard work and perseverance would yield positive results. This belief, reinforced by 
party propaganda, kept personal and communal hope alive and strengthened their 
optimistic future outlook.  
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Conclusion 
My thesis set out by asking how the shared cultural traditions yet different demographic, 
economic and political landscapes of China and Taiwan affect highly educated young 
people’s visions of the future and their life choices. Would their hopes and aspirations 
differ due to the distinct political systems and levels of economic development to which 
they were exposed while coming of age? Or would common cultural values, unaffected by 
different state ideologies, have more weight in young people’s plans and hopes for the 
future?  
In chapter one, I analyzed the family backgrounds of my informants with the help of life 
history interviews. I found that my informants in Beijing had grown up more 
autonomously from parents than their Taiwanese peers. This was due to a prevalence of 
childcare facilities and boarding schools in the reform period that were a remnant of the 
danwei system in the Mao era. In 1980s’ Taiwan, by contrast, it was more common for 
women to take up informal employment after marriage, often in family businesses, which 
allowed them to also take care of the household and childminding. The different family 
propaganda disseminated by the leading parties during parents’ youth might have 
contributed to these particular modes of division of labour within the household in China 
and Taiwan. Whereas ideological discourses in China during the Mao era supported 
women’s full-time employment and children’s early independence from parents, the KMT 
on Taiwan tried to sponsor a conservative Confucian family ideology through its cultural 
campaigns from the 1950s to the 1970s. My interviews suggest that the parents of my 
informants appeared to have been influenced by these different ideological discourses and 
transferred them to their child-raising methods.  
In this chapter, I drew on the work of Evans, who traced the experiences of different 
generations of mothers and daughters in Beijing, as well as on Kuan’s recent research on 
the psychological effects which the high-pressure educational environment has on young 
pupils in Kunming (Evans, 2008; Kuan, 2015). Like Evans, I found that in Beijing, yet also 
in Taipei, mothers’ relationships with their adult children were riddled with conflicts that 
stem from the different experiences made coming of age as well as from diverging 
expectations with regard to marriage and future living arrangements. However, by contrast 
to their Beijing counterparts, the childhood experiences of Taiwanese mothers were not as 
dramatically affected by past ideological turns. For this reason, notions of the parent-child 
relationship appeared not to have changed as dramatically from one generation to the next. 
Hence, even though also young Taiwanese wished for more understanding from their 
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parents, conflicts did not arise as much about the underlying tenets of parenting ideals but 
more about parents’ failure to recognize that societal transformations made the realisation 
of certain filial ideals more difficult. Like their Chinese peers, also young Taiwanese 
struggled with the immense pressure caused by the requirements of the education system 
and the labour market. This constituted a major source of conflict within families.  
Kuan’s research describes the fatal consequences which the achievement pressure evoked 
by families and the education system has had on the psychological health of Chinese 
children in recent years (Kuan, 2015). My interviews with young adults in Beijing and 
Taipei showed that already in the late 1980s and early 1990s school children were exposed 
to a significant amount of pressure to excel. However, by contrast to the parents 
interviewed by Kuan, my interviews show that the negative effects this could have on 
young children seem to have been rarely acknowledged by parents and schools at that time. 
Despite the fact that not all my informants perceived this as having affected their lives 
negatively in the long run, most young adults I interviewed talked about the discomfort 
which feelings of insufficiency and exhaustion had caused in them during childhood. 
Overall I found in this chapter that early feelings of gratification or despair that my 
informants experienced as the consequence of their educational achievements or failures 
came to make an important impact on the formation of aspirations and the ways chosen to 
pursue them in young adulthood.  
In chapter two, I have illustrated how the prevalence of boarding schools in China 
compared to Taiwan further reinforced the different degrees of children’s autonomy from 
parents. It also shows that the specific demographics of China require most rural 
informants who pursued the goal of higher education to be accepting of an extended 
spatial separation from their families. In Taiwan, the young people I met mostly lived with 
their families at least until entering higher education, regardless of their urban or rural 
background.  
Of particular concern in this context were the different conceptualizations of separation in 
China and Taiwan. Here I referred to Stafford’s work on the traditions of separation in 
northern China and Taiwan, as well as to Johnston’s argument about the moral and 
geographic factors that work as contradictory forces in the realization of filial duties in 
China (Johnston, 2013; Stafford, 2000 b). I found that at both locations, separation could 
be conceived of as beneficiary to a family’s future well-being, a phenomenon Johnston and 
Stafford also observed in China. However, the aspect of temporality was decisive in 
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determining what was regarded as acceptable within the realm of filiality among the families 
of my Chinese and Taiwanese informants.  
Chinese parents tended to be more accepting of their children’s indefinite absence from 
home due to educational and professional reasons than the parents of my Taiwanese 
informants. In particular, parents from rural Chinese areas appeared not to want to risk 
their children’s career options by calling them back to their home villages and home cities 
where employment options were not as promising as in Beijing. Absence from home thus 
seemed to be not as much associated with the neglect of filial duties among the families of 
my Chinese informants, as long as children strove to realize their academic and 
professional potential. Some parents even actively supported their children’s pursuit of a 
foreign citizenship despite not being certain if they wanted to follow their children abroad. 
In Taiwan, my case studies demonstrate that a longer absence from home had to be 
justified by the promise of a significant improvement of the status of the family. As a 
relocation of the whole family abroad was rarely intended, parents seemed to expect their 
children to return to Taiwan after they had completed their education in another country.  
Important to the interpretation of these differences might be that many families of my 
Chinese informants could look back upon a long history of migration. Their families had 
often fled their home places during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they had been allocated 
work far away from their home places during the Mao era, or they had left the countryside 
to seek employment in the cities in the reform era. Hence, the separation from family 
members and a certain degree of spatial mobility has been a part of the Chinese family life 
for decades. Even though a few of my Taiwanese informants had mainland Chinese 
grandparents who had come to Taiwan in the 1940s, most families appeared to be more 
bound to their home places. If parents and grandparents had experienced separation from 
their natal families at a young age, this mostly occurred as they left their rural home places 
to seek better opportunities in the cities during Taiwan’s economic boom. These 
separations appeared less severe as the distances on the relatively small island were easier to 
bridge. Again, these different experiences and attitudes towards separation and filial 
obligations might have contributed to the greater decision-making autonomy I observed 
among my young Chinese informants compared to their Taiwanese peers. 
Chapter three has shown how these different degrees of autonomy manifest in young 
adults’ decisions on their professional future. Unlike many Taiwanese informants, young 
Chinese had often already surpassed the academic and professional successes of their 
parents which, combined with their relative spatial independence, provided them with a 
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powerful bargaining tool in making important decisions. Even though they did consider 
parental wishes, they appeared less compromising in pursuing the careers they aspired to 
than young Taiwanese.  
An important aspect discussed in this chapter was the gendered expectations placed on 
young men and women in the working world and the frustrations they caused in their early 
careers. Whereas young women felt that expectations of marriage and childbirth curtailed 
their career options and expectations of their professional achievements, young men felt 
pressured by the high demands in terms of income and social prestige their job should 
convey.  
Moreover, both young men and women in Beijing and Taipei saw their career choices 
having a direct impact on their marriage opportunities as well as their fulfilment of filial 
obligations in the future. They were of the age at which most educational choices had been 
already made and now had to be translated into achievements on the job market. Finding a 
career that satisfied personal expectations and at the same time those of their families was 
one of the major conflicts that I could observe most directly being played out during my 
research in Taipei and Beijing. Moreover, due to the short time window open for marriage, 
many young university graduates, male and female alike, felt stressed by the expectation of 
having to find a suitable match at the same time as they entered the job market.  
In chapter four I have examined how the differences in decision-making autonomy were 
reflected in the informants’ choice of marriage partner and post-marital residence. Young 
Chinese, often living far from parents, had more autonomy in the choice of partners and 
form of residence whereas young Taiwanese felt more inclined to consider parental 
demands concerning these aspects. Moreover, despite the strong ideal of living 
independently after marriage, patrilocal residence appeared to be a more dominant 
expectation among Taiwanese parents than among Chinese ones.  
My analysis in this chapter centred on recent research about changing concepts of 
premarital relations and marriage by Davis and Friedman as well as Farrer (Davis and 
Friedman, 2014; Farrer, 2014). Farrer’s study points to an increasing delinking of premarital 
sexual relationships from marriage in urban China (Farrer, 2014). My findings in Beijing 
and Taipei suggest that despite the increasing liberalization of sexual relationships in both 
societies, certain practices that allow people to test compatibility before marriage, for 
instance premarital cohabitation, were however more common among my Chinese 
informants. Moreover, my case studies have shown that premarital sexual relationships 
might have been common but not entirely accepted for women in both societies.  
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Further, I found that despite the significant transformations to which the concept of 
marriage has been subjected in both societies, intergenerational obligations still played a 
major role in the choice of marriage partner and the planning of married life. This trend 
has also been noted by Davis and Friedman with regard to marriage in China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. (Davis and Friedman, 2014 pp. 26-27). However, these concerns were 
especially pronounced in Taipei where post-marital patrilocal residence was still more 
common than in Beijing. Nevertheless, whereas the realization of filial duties might have 
looked different among young Chinese and Taiwanese, both sets of informants appeared 
highly aware of their responsibilities toward ageing parents. Moreover, as also observed by 
Davis and Friedman, parenthood was only considered desirable within the realm of 
marriage among both groups of informants (p. 21). Even though Chinese informants 
seemed to benefit from a more liberal attitude towards gender roles and marriage ideology, 
this did not include the aspect of parenthood. 
Chapter five has taken a closer look at decision-making processes. I found that Taiwanese 
female informants needed more reassurance from external sources than their Chinese peers 
when making decisions that did not conform to normative expectations or ran against long 
held personal aspirations. Further, they appeared more inclined to apply divination to arrive 
at decisions and justify their choices. The young Chinese women I interviewed did not 
usually apply such methods and appeared in general to be more confident about making 
independent decisions and taking risks. I compared the problems my young informants 
faced with phenomena observed among young adults in other societies in transition. 
Brinton’s and Cook’s analyses of the problems faced by young Japanese men in 
establishing their careers and making choices for the future closely parallel the experiences 
of my female (and also male) Taiwanese informants (Brinton, 2011; Cook, 2013). In both 
cases, the insecurities of the market translated into worries about one’s personal future -this 
weakened my young informants’ self-confidence in decision-making and their sense of 
personal agency.  
Young Chinese women, however, appeared to be more hopeful -for the Chinese economy 
as well as their personal future. Their positive stance towards the future bore many 
similarities with Pedersen’s description of young Mongolian men who hoped to profit from 
the country’s transition to a market economy (Pedersen, 2012). Even though the young 
Chinese I met seemed to have more promising opportunities than Pedersen’s informants, 
their firm belief in a better future encouraged them to take risks that, in comparison with 
their more reluctant Taiwanese peers, appeared rather bold and impulsive. Moreover, 
having grown up to parents who were willing to invest their relatively scarce resources into 
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the education of their children, they were more accustomed to financial uncertainty and 
risk-taking than their Taiwanese peers who mostly had grown up in greater material 
affluence. I could observe that these different experiences coming of age had an important 
impact on the way major life choices were approached. Young Chinese women seemed to 
hold stronger beliefs that taking risks would pay off in the future and appeared to have 
developed a greater resilience against uncertainty compared to the young Taiwanese 
women I met in the field. For this reason, they seemed to be more willing to take 
comparatively heavy risks in both their professional and private lives. 
Overall, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that young Chinese women seem to 
have a stronger sense of self-efficacy than their Taiwanese peers. They presented 
themselves as convinced they could realize their ambitious objectives despite structural 
constraints like financial hardship and parental disapproval. The young Taiwanese women 
introduced in this chapter were comparatively cautious in their expectations of future 
success. These findings parallel those of Bandura who claims that past experiences of 
achievements and the overcoming of obstacles have a decisive impact on an individual’s 
sense of efficacy and willingness to take risks (Bandura, [1995] 1999). Moreover, I have 
highlighted the impact that sociocultural aspects have on decision-making in terms of 
important life choices in the realms of one’s education, career or romantic relationships. In 
particular, I have illustrated that perceptions of self-efficacy are closely tied to the 
socioeconomic and political realities of each of the locations. I have also shown how 
structural changes in the political and economic spheres are linked to perceptions of the 
choices available and to individual strategies to deal with contingency. 
In chapter six, I have told the stories of the young Chinese and Taiwanese people who, for 
various reasons, have not attained normative life goals and who - disenchanted by society’s 
lack of acceptance of and understanding for their situation - tried various strategies to 
realize a marriage or career abroad. This chapter has demonstrated that despite the 
increasing urbanization, modernization and delay of age at first marriage and childbirth in 
China and Taiwan, alternative lifestyles are still limited for those that miss important 
biographic milestones. At the same time, it has shown that Chinese as well as Taiwanese 
parents appear to be increasingly open to the alternative strategies their adult children apply 
to reach their goals; this observation might point to important changes in gendered notions 
of success as well as in intergenerational obligations in both societies.  
In particular mothers seemed to sympathise with the problems their daughters had in 
integrating normative expectations on marriage and childbirth with their personal 
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aspirations. They facilitated their daughters’ choices by supporting them in the search of 
alternatives that might provide them with the opportunity to buy some time before making 
a decision or to find ways to combine the realisation of personal and normative goals. 
Young men appeared to find it more problematic to resist their families’ expectations on 
them, most likely due to traditional expectations on sons to guarantee the continuation of 
the family line by providing offspring. The young men I described in this chapter both 
regarded a life abroad as their only opportunity to realise their personal aspirations and to 
evade local heteronormative expectations. However, they were hesitating to fully disclose 
their reasons for wanting to leave their home societies. While they received family support 
in realising their plans, this was mainly based on their parents’ hope for their professional 
success. 
In the last chapter, I have taken a closer look at the reasons for the apparent hopelessness 
among many young Taiwanese, whereas their Chinese counterparts seemed to regard their 
future as brighter. I found that my Taipei informants’ disenchantment with their personal 
future was largely influenced by the stagnating economy and Taiwan’s political isolation 
that made it difficult for them to meet their parents’ ambitious expectations. Young 
Chinese, however, felt empowered by their personal success stories in the education system 
and their professional lives in a rising China. Many had exceeded their parents’ 
achievements already by their twenties. In addition, optimistic state propaganda declaring 
incessant economic growth also encouraged their positive outlook on the future. However, 
for young Taiwanese, things started to shift thanks to the 2014 Sunflower Movement; they 
seemed to regain their belief in change and the efficacy of political agency, whereas the very 
observant and critical among my Chinese informants appeared to feel slightly startled by 
the unknown political changes that loomed during the time of my research in China in 
2013.  
In this chapter I have described how my young informants and their families oriented their 
outlook on the future along the economic and political prospects of their home societies. 
This became especially apparent in the cases studies of members of the older generations 
whose expectations on their personal achievements had fluctuated with the ups and downs 
of the political and economic spheres over the life course. However, both the Chinese and 
Taiwanese parental generations had high expectations on their offspring. Chinese parents 
expected their children to succeed in China’s growing economy and also Taiwanese parents 
hoped that their children might surpass their own successes during the economic boom 
due to the educational opportunities they had granted them. Both young Chinese and 
Taiwanese found it difficult to convey to their parents the difficulties they encountered on 
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the highly competitive urban labour market. Nevertheless, young Chinese appeared more 
hopeful to be able to reach the goals their families envisioned for them as they shared in 
the collective optimism for a better future.  
In touching upon various chapters in the lives of young Chinese and Taiwanese in which 
important choices had to be made, my work illustrates the great impact that demographic, 
socioeconomic and political aspects can have on the formation of aspirations, the 
perception of life choices and the ways in which young people approach important 
decisions. My study also demonstrates that certain differences in family traditionalism that 
Whyte and colleagues observed almost two decades ago are still palpable in urban China 
and Taiwan; in particular with regard to residential choices and filial care practices, Taipei 
appeared more traditional than Beijing (Whyte et al., 2003; Whyte, 2004). However, as 
employment structures and family size change at both locations, it is likely that these 
transformations will also have an effect on family life.  
At the same time, I have found that despite these differences, a strong cultural heritage still 
connects Chinese and Taiwanese societies. These shared cultural traditions become 
especially apparent in the importance that is placed on the ideal of intergenerational 
support. All the young men and women I met, even those who felt estranged from their 
families, were concerned about their parents’ future well-being and perceived it as their 
responsibility to ensure a pleasant old age for them. Even though my Chinese informants 
lived more autonomously from their parents than their Taiwanese peers and were aware 
that they might not be able to care physically for their parents in the future, they 
nonetheless planned to assist them in other ways to express their love and respect. Whereas 
young Chinese and Taiwanese strove towards a degree of independence from their families 
that facilitated the pursuit of their personal aspirations, they did not aspire to a radical form 
of individualism that ignored their parents’ needs. In this way, my findings differ 
importantly from those of Yan who observed a more individualistic streak among Chinese 
youths (Yan, 2009). Rather than distancing themselves from dominant societal values, most 
of the young people I met in Beijing and Taipei aspired to reach conventional benchmarks 
of adulthood -however, they wanted to do so in their own time, with the opportunity to try 
out options before making choices in their professional and private lives.  
That is, in terms of decision-making both groups of informants were highly considerate of 
the potential consequences of their choices for their families. This means, young Chinese 
and Taiwanese adults approached decisions in a similar context-oriented way as the 
students of different East Asian backgrounds with whom Nisbett conducted his 
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laboratory-based study on cross-cultural decision-making (Nisbett, 2004 [2003]). The 
different state-ideological and economic backgrounds thus do not appear to have affected 
the importance accredited to the well-being of the family in the context of life-choices. 
Nevertheless, it became apparent that many young Chinese show more personal agency 
than their Taiwanese peers in the pursuit of their aspirations. Specifically, I found that the 
perception of risk and uncertainty differed between my Chinese and Taiwanese informants; 
a phenomenon I accredited to their different upbringings and experiences of achievement 
that affected their sense of efficacy (Bandura, [1995] 1999). Hence, while both groups of 
young adults tried to pursue personal aspirations while fulfilling parents’ expectations on 
future support, their different attitudes towards risk and uncertainty resulted in notable 
differences in the approaches they chose to realise their goals. 
This leads to another subject my work discussed, namely the changing notions of 
achievement among highly educated young adults in China and Taiwan. I found that 
concepts of achievement in China and Taiwan are influenced by Confucian and party 
ideological ideals as well as by global neoliberal discourses; observations that closely 
resonate with those made by Long and Moore who highlight the increasing intersection of 
local and global concepts of success (Long and Moore, 2013). Achievement in the Chinese 
and Taiwanese contexts is interpreted as the ability to provide for parents and offspring by 
means of creating economic stability and a harmonic, caring environment that will secure 
the flourishing of the family line into the future. At the same time, however, modern 
markers of success, like an international career and urban lifestyle, are highly coveted 
especially by the younger generations. In China, these different ideals are additionally 
impacted by the government’s concern for highly competitive and patriotic citizens that 
can advance the country’s economic success while remaining loyal to the state (Anagnost, 
2004; Hoffman 2010; Kipnis, 2006).  
My case studies have demonstrated that often, these diverse ideals of achievement collide. 
In both Beijing and Taipei the resulting value conflicts create uncertainty and despair 
especially in young adults who have yet to make a definite decision on their future. 
Nevertheless, I was surprised to find that young persons’ decisions to pursue challenging 
goals in these urban environments were not necessarily dependent on the economic 
resources and social networks available to them. Feelings of empowerment created by 
previous experiences of success in the educational sector or the job market appeared far 
more important in the decision to hang on to ambitious plans than existing socioeconomic 
means.  
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Long and Moore note that “[t]he things that happen when someone achieves are often not 
what anyone would expect, opening up unforeseen ways of imagining the self, both in its 
own right and in relation to others” (Long and Moore, 2013 p. 5). For this reason, they 
suggest that instead of focusing solely on not yet realised desires and aspirations, the 
experience of achievement itself should receive more attention in anthropological research 
(p. 11). I found that listening to the accounts of the hard-earned successes and shattering 
failures of my young informants contributed to my understanding of the experiences on 
which they based their decisions; in particular in terms of their risk-taking and dealing with 
uncertainty. Surprisingly, young Chinese who had often experienced more socioeconomic 
difficulties and setbacks than their comparatively affluent Taiwanese counterparts appeared 
more persistent in pursuing their ambitious goals. In the course of my fieldwork it emerged 
that their previous successes in the education system that had eventually catapulted them 
into universities in the Chinese capital conveyed to them the self-confidence to set high 
goals and to pursue them despite the high risks involved. Young Taiwanese having 
attended equally renowned universities, by contrast, seemed to draw less empowerment 
from their educational successes. They found it difficult to surpass their parents’ extremely 
high expectations in the contemporary economic climate of stagnation. Moreover, 
educational and professional achievements appeared to be more taken for granted by my 
Taiwanese informants and their families – an expected payoff of an expensive education 
with private tutoring and often international student fees – and thus they had a less 
empowering effect. That is, the experience of academic and professional achievements and 
the way it impacted self-efficacy was decisively influenced by prior expectations and the 
reactions of the social environment. These observations resonate with Bandura’s finding 
that “objective economic status” does not have a direct influence on people’s sense of 
efficacy; the decisive factor influencing children’s sense of agency is parents’ conviction of 
their children’s ability to succeed (Bandura, [1995] 1999 p. 15). In this sense, the 
investigation of past achievements within their particular socioeconomic context did indeed 
contribute to a deeper understanding of my informant’s dealing with risk and uncertainty 
and the self-confidence with which they pursued their aspirations.  
These findings further indicate that despite the above mentioned differences in the 
evaluation of success, in both China and Taiwan notions of achievement revolve closely 
around the fulfilment of filial obligations. Improving the socioeconomic status of the 
family and thus securing the family’s well-being in the future was in the eyes of many 
parents and their adult children a significant achievement (Fong, 2004; Johnston, 2013). 
Not reaching this goal due to academic or professional failure could raise debilitating 
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doubts in young adults, as several of my case studies have shown. Perceptions of failure 
and success among young adults were thus closely bound to their performance of filiality. 
Moreover, the societal atmosphere additionally affected young people’s self-confidence in 
the pursuit of their ambitions. As the previous chapters have shown, what is perceived as a 
realistic goal is as dependent on an assessment of one’s personal skills and experiences as it 
is contingent upon the collective mood which can either serve as an empowering or 
debilitating force. Arthur Kleinman highlights this issue in his discussion on happiness in 
China (Kleinman, 2011). Reflecting upon the general optimistic mood of the population 
during the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 he remarks: “[…] no one watching the 
crowds and observing the people in the street could fail to be impressed by two emotions: 
pride at what China had achieved as a rising power and happiness” (p. 266). He reminds the 
reader that especially the older generations of Chinese look back upon a lifetime impacted 
by political chaos and uncertainty. To them, he argues, China’s current political and 
economic situation appears stable and affluent and gives rise to a powerful hope for the 
future. Kleinman asks: “Against this troubled and troubling historical background, isn’t the 
audacity of simply being happy and enjoying life the most remarkable of collective and 
personal changes?” (p. 267). The hope for political stability and economic progress, as also 
my work has shown, is tangible among members of all generations of Chinese. That is, the 
collective achievements over the last decades inform an atmosphere of hope in China that 
is also reflected in the individual’s life goals and risk-taking in their pursuit of success.  
Meanwhile in Taiwan, collective feelings of despair and stagnation, resulting from Taiwan’s 
deadlock situation in the global economy and its lack of political sovereignty resulted in a 
gloomy atmosphere on the island that had a debilitating impact on young people’s hopes 
for the future. They found it difficult to draw empowerment from past generations’ 
achievements; a condition that was worsened by their mistrust of the KMT government as 
well as its neighbour China that was often mentioned in my interviews. However, with the 
rekindling of hope by the Sunflower Movement in 2014, many also appeared to feel 
empowered in the pursuit of their personal goals.  
Overall, my comparative analysis has highlighted the impact that economic and politico-
ideological discourses have on the formation of aspirations and decision-making on the 
individual as well as the societal level. Despite similar family values and concepts of filial 
responsibilities, the life-choices of young Chinese and Taiwanese were importantly 
influenced by the specific atmospheres of hope and despair in their home societies.  
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My analysis adds to the previous, mostly quantitative, comparative research conducted in 
the urban areas of China and Taiwan by providing the qualitative data necessary to 
understand how complex societal dynamics are reflected in the lives of individuals and 
families. While Chu, Whyte and colleagues described societal trends by referring to 
censuses and other statistical records, my work is largely based on observations made in the 
field and the personal accounts of young people and their families (Chu and Yu, 2010; Chu, 
et al., 2011; Hermelin, et al., 2003; Whyte, et al., 2003; Whyte, 2004; 2005; Yang and Hu 
2012). The life stories of the members of different generations of Chinese and Taiwanese 
are at the heart of my thesis. As such, my approach is also modelled on the research of 
Evans that, applying a multigenerational perspective, focuses on the autobiographic 
narratives of Chinese women. This thesis hence aims to connect Evan’s individual-focused 
approach with the comparative sociological analyses of Whyte, Chu and colleagues. In this 
way, I hope to contribute to an understanding of how individual aspirations and decision-
making change along with other socioeconomic and political transformations across time. 
However, at this place I would like to remind the reader that even though the comparison 
performed in this thesis required the highlighting of certain tendencies in the Chinese and 
Taiwanese societies, the case studies demonstrate that there was also great variation within 
the two cohorts of informants. Despite the undeniable influence of the different societal 
environments, the heterogeneity of my informants’ experiences cannot only be explained 
with reference to the structural factors traced in this work. After all, the groups of my 
informants consisted of young men and women with very distinct personalities - this was 
demonstrated in the ways in which they talked about their lives and tried to solve their 
problems. These differences also affected their relationship towards me as researcher and 
may have played a role in the topics which they addressed and how much information they 
were willing to reveal.  
In conclusion, behind the different approaches to conceptualizing one’s personal and 
collective future lie complex constructs of ideological, political and socioeconomic 
differences. These different factors also informed the evaluation of achievements and 
choices among young Chinese and Taiwanese. The cases presented in this work thus show 
how the political environment, demographic and socioeconomic structures as well as 
cultural traditions interact with young people’s perceptions of their subjectivity, their sense 
of agency and their notions of moral indebtedness towards their family and society. 
Although the Chinese and Taiwanese societies share many commonalities that are reflected 
in the life goals and aspirations of young people, their different political and economic 
realities decisively impact on whether and how these aspirations can be pursued. 
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Chinese Vocabulary Glossary 
aimei 曖昧 
ayi 阿姨 
bu heshi 不合適  
caomeizu 草莓族 
chenglong 成龍 
chi ku 吃苦 
chou qian 抽籤 
chuzhong 初中 
dang duidao 當隊導 
danwei 單位 
dizhi 地支 
feinongye hukou非農業戶口 
fennu qingnian 憤怒青年 
fu 符 
gaokao 高考 
gaozhong 高中 
gongchan 共產 
gongzhu bing 公主病 
guanerdai 官二代 
Guanyin (Pusa) 觀音(菩薩) 
Guan Yu 關羽 
gui yue鬼月 
guizi lai le 鬼子來了 
hong lingjin 紅領巾 
Hong Lou Meng 紅樓夢 
 
 
hukou 戶口 
hutong 胡同 
jia 家 
Jia chuqu de nü’er shi pochu de shui 嫁出去的女
兒是潑出去的水 
jian 賤 
jiao bei 珓杯 
juewang 絕望 
ke’ai 可愛 
kejia hua 客家話 
langman 浪漫 
liankao 聯考 
lianyi 聯誼 
majiang 麻將 
mantou 饅頭 
Mazu 媽祖 
mei you xiangfa 沒有想法 
mian xiang 面相 
mianzi 面子 
ming 命 
nan 男 
nü 女 
nühanzi 女漢子 
pian 騙 
qingchunfan 青春飯 
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renkou suzhi 人口素質 
renmin gongshe 人民公社 
sajiao 撒嬌 
shao xiandui少先隊 
shenghuo hen jianku生活很艱苦 
shengnü 剩女 
shifu 師傅 
sì 四 
sĭ 死 
shiwang 失望 
suanmingzhe 算命者 
suzhi 素質 
taijiquan 太極拳 
taiyanghua 太陽花 
taiyanghua xueyun 太陽花學運 
Taobao 淘寶 
tiaolongmen 跳龍門 
tiefan wan 鐵飯碗 
tuhao 土豪 
weibo 微博 
Wenchang 文昌 
Wen Qu Xing 文曲星 
wo de xinqing tebie bu hao 我的心情特別不好 
xiangqin 相親 
xiao 孝 
xiangrikui 向日葵 
xinfu 新富 
xiwang 希望 
yali 壓力  
yi ben daxue 一本大學 
yuanfen 緣分 
Yue Lao 月老 
yusan yundong 雨傘運動 
zhai 宅 
zhainan 宅男 
zhainü 宅女 
ziwo fazhan 自我發展
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Appendix 
Below the version of the survey I distributed in Taipei is presented. I adjusted it 
accordingly for my research in Beijing.  
In Taipei, 23 surveys were returned and in Beijing, 16 surveys were returned. 
我是倫敦政經學院人類學系的博士班學生，目前在台北進行我的博士論文研究。 
我的論文關注是台灣年輕人的決策過程和人生計劃，希望您可參與我博士研究的
問卷調查。這將有助於我理解台灣社會和年輕人對人生的看法.如果你有不想回答
的問題，可留下空白答案。你的答覆將做保密處理. 如果您有任何疑問，我的電
子郵件地址如下： d.remmert@ lse.ac.uk 
 
1. 一般資料 General information  
1.1. 名字 (中文/ 英文) name (Chinese/English) 
1.2. 出生日期  date of birth 
1.3. 出生地點 （市/縣）City/County of birth: 
1.4. 居住地點（市/縣）City/County of residence 
1.5. 你的母語是什麼？What is your native language? (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
          國語 Mandarin  
          台語 Taiyu  
          客家話 Hakka  
          英語 English  
          其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
          如有多項母語的情況下，請說明理由: Please explain reason in case of multiple 
choice: 
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1.6. 你與你的父母溝通時使用哪種語言？Which language do you use when 
communicating with your parents? (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
    國語 Mandarin 
台語 Taiyu  
    客家話 Hakka  
    英語 English  
其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
如有多項溝通語言的情況下，請說明理由 Please explain reason in case of multiple 
choice 
 
2.家庭與婚姻 Family and Marriage: 
2.1. 你的父親的出生日期 ？ Birth date of father 
       你的母親的出生日期？ Birth date of mother 
 
2.2. 你有多少兄弟姐妹？請註明他們的性別和年齡。How many siblings do you 
have? Please specify their sex and age. 
 
2.3.你的兄弟姐妹結婚了嗎？如果有，請註明他們的結婚的年齡。Are any of your 
siblings married? If so, please specify the age they got married. 
 
2.4. 您目前的婚姻狀況 Your current relationship status:  
          (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
         a) 單身 single 
         b) 交往中但未婚 in a relationship 
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          c) 結婚 married (If you ticked this box, at which age did you get married and how  
old was your partner at that time?) 
         d) 其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
 
2.5 你認為台灣女性/男性結婚的理想年齡是？請解釋您的想法。What do you 
think is the ideal age for Taiwanese women/men to marry? Please explain. 
女性: 
男性: 
 
2.6. 你認為台灣男女結婚時遇到最主要的障礙是什麼？ What do you think are 
major obstacles Taiwanese women and and men encounter when planning to marry?  
 
2.7. 你認為台灣男女婚後遇到最主要的障礙是什麼？ What do you think are major 
obstacles Taiwanese men and women encounter after marriage? 
 
3. Family Planning 
3.1. 你有孩子嗎？ Do you have any children?  
         (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
   沒有 No 
有（如果你勾選此框，請指定你的孩子的性別和年齡）yes (If you ticked this box 
pleases specify sex and age of your children) 
 
3.2. 您認為有第一胎的理想年齡是幾歲？ What do you think is the ideal age to 
have the first child? 
    (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
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女方： 
男方:  
 
3.3. 你認年輕夫婦養孩子遇到的主要問題是什麼？  What do you think are the 
major problems young couples encounter when having children? 
 
3.4. 你認為先婚在有小孩很重要嗎？請解釋您的答案。Do you think it is 
important to be married before having children? Please explain your answer. 
 
3.5. 您對您未來孩子有性別偏好嗎？Do you have any preference concerning the 
sex of your future child? (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
偏好女孩 Girl 
偏好男孩 boy 
沒有偏好 no preference 
 
4. 家庭 Household 
4.1. 您的住宿跟：Are you living with your : 
         (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
a) 父母 parents 
b) 其他親屬 other relatives 
c) 獨立 independently  (請註明) 
d) 其他 other （請註明） 
如果你勾選框 a), b)或 d)請繼續與第 4.2.1.題。If you ticked a), b), or d) please go on 
with section 4.2.1. 
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如果你勾選盒 c），請繼續與第 4.3.題。If you ticked c) please go on with section 4.3. 
4.2.1. 如果您與父母或其他親屬生活，有多少人住在一起？請註明他們的性別，
年齡，和與您的關係。If you live with your parents or other relatives, how many 
people live in your household? Please specify their sex, age, and relationship to you. 
 
4.2.2.如果有祖父母生活在你的家中，請註明，夫家或娘家。If there are any 
grandparents living in your household, please specify if these are the parents of 
your mother or the parents of your father. 
 
4.2.3.您將來打算會保持現在的住宿狀況嗎？請解釋您的答案。Do you expect to 
live in this household in the future? Please explain your answer. 
 
4.3. 您有沒有婚前和男/女友同居嗎？Have you ever shared a residence with a 
partner before marriage? 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
有 yes  
沒有 no  
（如果你選沒有，請繼續與第 4.5.題。) (If you answered with no please continue with 
question 4.5.) 
 
4.4. 如果你選"有"婚前和男/女友同居，同居狀況是：If you ticked “yes” in the 
previous question, have you lived/are you living with your partner: 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
a) 獨立居住 in an independent flat  
b) 和男/女友家長同居 with your partner's parents  
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c) 和你家長同居 with your parents 
d) 其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
如果您目前的關係狀態是“已婚”，請繼續與第 4.6..題。If your current relationship 
status is “married” please go on with question 4.6. 
 
4.5. 請問您婚後打算住哪裡？Where do you expect to live after marriage? 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
a) 獨立居住 in an independent flat 
b) 和家人同居 sharing a residence with your parents 
c) 和太太/先生的父母 sharing a residence with you parents-in-law 
d) 其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
 
4.6. 如果你是已婚人士，你有沒有曾經與父母或親家同居？If you are married, are 
you sharing/have you ever shared a residence with your parents or your parents-in-
law? 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
a) 和父母同居 parents 
b) 和太太/先生的父母 parents-in-law 
c) 其他（請註明）other (please specify) 
 
4.7. 您認為台灣新婚夫妻最有可能在哪兒居住？請解釋你的答案。What, in your 
opinion, is the most common residence for a newly married couple in Taiwan? 
Please explain your answer. 
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4.8. 您認為哪樣才是台灣新婚夫妻最理想的居住狀況？請解釋您的答案。 
What, in your opinion, is the most ideal residence choice for a newly married couple 
in Taiwan? Please explain your answer? 
 
5. 房地產 Real Estate 
5.1.你有沒有投資過房地產？Have you ever ever invested in real estate? 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
有 yes  
沒有 （如果你選沒有，請繼續與第 5.4.題。）  
(if you answered with no please continue with question 5.4.) 
 
5.2.如果你投資過房地產，你有沒有收到他人的財力支持（可多選）？If you have 
invested in real estate, have you received any financial support (multiple choice 
possible)?  
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
沒有 no 
父母的財力支持 from parents 
兄弟姐妹的財力支持 from siblings 
其他親屬的財力支持 from other relatives 
男／女伴的財力支持 from partner 
其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
 
5.3. 請問你需不需要還清這筆錢？Will you have to pay back this support? 
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        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
要 Yes 
不要 No 
 
5.4.你覺得擁有房地產（公寓/房子）是你人生重要的一件事？Do you think it is 
important to own an apartment/house at one point in your life? 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
重要 Yes  
不重要 no 
請解釋你的答案 Please explain your answer 
 
6. 家庭收入 Household income  
6.1.現任職位（可多選）Occupational status (multiple choice possible) 
      (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
a) 學生 student 
b)在全職工作 in full-time employment  
c)在兼職工作 in part-time employment 
 
d)自僱人士 self-employed 
e) 自由職業者 freelancer 
 
6.2. 你每週工作多少個小時？How many hours do you work per week? 
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6.3. 您每月的凈收入多少？What is your monthly net income in NTD?  
 
 6.4. 您對您父母的家庭收入是否有所貢獻（例如，每月匯款）如果有，請註明您
對您父母每月收入貢獻多少？Do you contribute to the household income of your 
parents (in the form of monthly remittances etc.) If yes, please specify your monthly 
contribution to the parental household income. 
 
6.5. 您有沒有收到家人的財力支持？Do you receive any financial support from 
your family members (several answers possible) 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
沒有 no  
有，父母 from parents 
有，兄弟姐妹 from siblings 
有，其他親屬 from other relatives  
 
6.6.如果有，請註明多少？If yes, please specify the amount of the monthly support 
you receive in NTD 
6.7. 你現在的家庭收入每月有多少？（請算新台幣淨收）What is the total 
monthly net income of the household you are living in in NTD  
 
6.8. 請註明收入是誰貢獻 
Please specify who is contributing to the total income of the household? 
 
7. 教育和事業 Education and career 
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7.1. 1. 請註明您父親的最高學位  Please state your father's highest degree 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線)) 
小學畢業 elementary school degree 
國中畢業 middle school degree 
高中畢業 high school degree 
大專畢業 vocational college degree 
學士畢業 undergraduate degree 
研究所／碩士畢業 postgraduate degree 
博士畢業 PhD degree 
其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
 
7.1.2. 請註明您父親現在的工作. Please state your father's current occupation. 
 
7.1.3. 請註明您母親的最高學位 Please state your mother's highest degree 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線)) 
小學畢業 elementary school degree 
國中畢業 middle school degree 
高中畢業 high school degree 
大專畢業 vocational college degree 
 
學士畢業 undergraduate degree 
研究所／碩士畢業 postgraduate degree 
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博士畢業 PhD degree 
其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
 
7.1.4. 請註明您母親現在的工作.. Please state your mother's current occupation. 
 
7.2. 請註明您的最高學位 Please state your highest degree 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
國中畢業 middle school degree 
高中畢業 high school degree 
專科畢業 vocational college degree 
學士畢業 undergraduate degree 
研究所／碩士畢業 postgraduate degree 
博士畢業 PhD degree 
其他（請註明）other (Please specify) 
 
7.3. 你高中念那種學科類組？Which subject group did you study at high school? 
         (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
 第一類組-文組 
 第二類組（自然組；理工學院為主） 
 第三類組（自然組；醫學院為主） 
 
 
7.4.如果你有念過大學或專科，請註明  主修科目？If you studied a degree at 
university or vocational college, which subjects did you study? 
236 
 
 
7.5. 請問您的學業過程所收到的財源支持從哪裡來？（可多選）Who supported 
you during your studies (multiple choice possible) 
 
(請您將正確答案畫底線 
父母 parents兄弟姐妹 siblings 
其他親屬 other relatives 
政府貸款 government loans 
銀行貸款 bank loan 
獎學金 scholarship 
其他（請註明） other (please specify) 
要是有多項選擇，請註明您主要財源支持的來源: 
In case of multiple choice please specify your main source of financial support: 
 
 
7.6.求學時（限高中以上的高等教育），您一個月總共領到多少錢？ 
 
How much total monthly support did/do you receive during your higher education?  
 
 
7.7. 大學時為什麼會選擇您所修的科系？（可多選） 
 
According to which parameters did you chose your subject at university/college 
(multiple choice possible)? (請您將正確答案畫底線 
個人興趣 Personal interes 
地點 location 
聯考分數 liankao scor 
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家長建議 parental advice 
朋友影響 friends 
學校名氣 school reputation 
其他（請註明） other (please specify)  
 
7.8. 您對選擇的科系滿意嗎？Are you content with your subject choice? 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
滿意 yes 
不滿意 no 
如果您回答不滿意，請說明不滿意的原因和你理想的科系: 
If you answered with no, please specify the reason and state your ideal subject 
choice: 
 
7.9.您的工作和學業領域是否相關？Do you work in the field of your study? 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
相關 yes 
不相關 no 
8. 你選擇職業時，有什麼重要因素？（可多選） 
What were/would be important factors in your job choice (multiple answers 
possible) 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
a) 與我學業相關的領域 related to my field of study 
b) 薪水 salary 
c) 具有挑戰性 challenging tasks 
d)地點 location 
e) 晉升機會 opportunities for promotion 
f) 其他（請註明） other (please specify) 
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8. 出國 Going abroad 
8.1. 你有沒有住過國外（3 個月以上？）Have you ever lived outside of Taiwan 
(three months and more) 
(請您將正確答案畫底線) 
有 yes 
沒有 （如果你選沒有，請繼續與第 8.5.題。） no (if you tick this box please continue 
with question 8.5.) 
 
8.2. 您在那些國家居住 3 個月以上？In which countries other than Taiwan have 
you resided three months or more? 
（請註明每單次留居的時間）(Please specify duration of single stays) 
 
8.3. 你當初國外居住的目的是什麼？What was the purpose of the stay? 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
渡假 Vacation 
念書 Studying 
工作和旅行 work and travel 
 
8.4.您是不是目前居住國外？Are you currently living abroad?  
       (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
不是 No 
是 （請註明居住時間和目的） Yes (Please specify length and purpose of stay) 
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8.5. 您目前有沒有任何計劃居住國外？Are you currently planning any stays abroad? 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
有 Yes  
沒有  （如果你選沒有，請繼續與第 9.1.題。）no (if you ticked this box please 
continue with question 9.1.) 
 
8.6. 您停留的目的: Purpose of your planned stay abroad: 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
渡假 vacation 
工作 study 
工作和旅行 work-and-travel 
工作 work 
婚姻 marriage 
其他原因（請註明）other reason (Please specify) 
 
8.7. 你打算留在國外多久？ How long do you plan to stay abroad? 
 
8.8. 你想回台灣嗎？Would you like to return to Taiwan? 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
想 yes 
不想 no  
請解釋你的答案 Please explain your answer 
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9. 對未來的人生目標 Aspirations for the future 
9.1. 請根據你個人認可的重要性排列以下的人生目標。請從 1開始排序。 
Please rank the following bullet points according the importance you accredit to 
them in regard to your personal life goals, from most important (1) to least 
important (7). 
優渥的薪資 good salary 
具有挑戰性和滿足感的工作  challenging and fulfilling job 
擁有房地產  owning real estate 
婚姻  marriage 
孩子 children  
旅遊 travelling 
在國外生活 Living abroad 
 
9.2. 您對您現在的薪水滿意嗎？Are you satisfied with your current salary 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
滿意 yes 
不滿意 no  
如果不滿意，請說明原因  If you ticked no please specify the reason  
 
9.3. 在您看來，足夠大學畢業生在台北獨立生活的最低工資應該是多少？ 
What in your opinion should be the minimum wage for university graduates that 
could enable an independent living in Taipei?  
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9.4. 你曾經參加過社團嗎 如果有, 請註明社團名稱. Have you ever been/Are you a 
member of a club/society/group? 
 
9.5. 你認為自己是一個快樂的人嗎？ Do you consider yourself a happy person? 
        (請您將正確答案畫底線) 
是 Yes 
不是 no 
 
9.6. 請簡單的解釋你對 "快樂" 的定義。Please explain briefly your definition of 
happiness. 
 
謝謝你! 
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